The Battle of Marne, 1914

A Battlefield Guide

Andrew Uffindell

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9781848848016
• eBook ISBN:
  9781783469079
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia francese

A traveler's guide to the history and sites of the World War I battle in the Marne River valley in France.

The First Battle of the Marne was one of the most pivotal battles in history. Fought outside Paris in September 1914, it turned the tide of the German invasion of France and robbed Kaiser Wilhelm II of his best chance of winning the First World War.

The battle began when the French and British armies launched a massive counter-offensive, and it ended—after five, tense days of fluctuating fortunes—in a German retreat. The so-called "miracle of the Marne" was among the most crucial episodes of the war, and yet no complete, in-depth guide to the battlefield has been available until now in English.

Andrew Uffindell begins his guidebook with a gripping account of the battle, followed by a series of easy-to-follow tours of the battlefield. Each tour covers a particular sector in detail, using vivid eyewitness accounts to reveal what the fighting was like for the men in the front line.

This unique and highly illustrated book enables readers to explore the battlefield and retrace the course of those dramatic events for themselves. It gives directions to dozens of museums, cemeteries, and monuments, including the memorials to the famous "taxis of the Marne." It will be fascinating reading for anyone interested in the Great War, and an essential companion for visitors keen to see the actual terrain over which the battle was fought.

BATTLEFIELD TOURS

Tour 1

OPENING CLASH

Our first tour examines the preliminary encounter battle on 5 September, when the foremost elements of the 6e armée ran into a German corps around the villages of Monthyon and Penchard just 40 km north-east of Paris. This was the opening clash of the Battle of the Marne, but was not meant to happen. Joffre had ordered the 6e armée to be in position to attack eastwards across the Ourcq river on the 6th, the day that he had selected for the start of his counter-offensive. The 6e armée therefore advanced on the 5th, intending to reach positions north of the city of Meaux, within easy reach of the Ourcq. None of the French commanders, from Joffre down to the regimental officers, expected the 6e armée to run into German opposition west of the river.

WHAT HAPPENED

Nearly the whole of Kluck’s 1. Armee had already pressed forward across the Marne. But two of its formations – the IV Reservekorps and the attached 4. Kavallerie-Division – were following in its wake, as a flank guard, and were still north of the river. They were moving south, towards the Marne at Meaux, and unknowingly were heading directly across the path of the 6e armée. Neither of these German formations was at full strength. One-third of the infantry in the IV Reservekorps had been detached to cover the lines of communication, while the cavalry division had been badly mauled by the BEF at Néry on 1 September.

General der Artillerie Hans von Gronau, the commander of the IV Reservekorps, did not anticipate a battle. Crucially, he had no aircraft attached to his corps, and it was not until mid-morning that he received reports from his cavalry of French troops on the move about 15 km to the west. He then learned that the troops in question – initially thought to be no more than a cavalry division – were a substantial force of all arms, and that they were marching towards him. Gronau remained unsure just how much of a danger they posed, for his view was blocked by a string of wooded heights known as the Buttes de la Goële. They formed a backbone across the land, separating the plateau du Multien to the north-east from the plateau de la Goële to the south-west, and prevented the two sides from seeing each other as they converged. Only from the top of the hills would Gronau be able to see the situation for himself. Ingrained in him through his years of training was one of the central tenets of German military doctrine: the need to react instantly and vigorously to a threat. An immediate counter-thrust was the only way to blunt the oncoming French advance, and to clarify the situation by securing the vantage points of the hills. At 11.15 am Gronau gave the necessary order, gambling that his boldness in taking the offensive would compensate should he run into a more numerous foe.

By this stage the IV Reservekorps had completed its march southwards for the day, and was looking forward to some rest in its bivouacs some 6 – 8 km north of Meaux. It now moved off again, switching direction to the west, and the result was a head-on collision with the French on an 8-km front between St-Soupplets in the north, and the villages of Monthyon and Penchard further south. The ground favoured the Germans. Gronau’s boldness secured the key features of the battlefield, the twin heights at Monthyon and Penchard. Further west, the ground the French would have to cross was an undulating plateau, cut by a couple of streams, and dotted with a few villages, but otherwise exposed.

From the west came the leading elements of the 6e armée – two reserve divisions (the 56e in the north, and the 55e in the centre), and the Brigade marocaine in the south. The French had no warning of the impending clash, for their cavalry reconnaissances failed to detect the German approach. In the centre, the head of the 55e division had actually halted for a rest at Iverny, just 3 km west of Monthyon, when shells suddenly started bursting around it. French guns riposted against the German batteries that were coming into action around Monthyon, and by 1.30 pm the battle was under way in earnest.

German infantryman.

From Monthyon, the string of heights known as the Buttes de la Goële curves away towards the town of Dammartin in the north-west, forming a spine of hills that marks the northern edge of the battlefield. In this area it was the French who managed to gain the high ground – their 56e division occupied the wooded ridge of the Bois des Tillières, which served as a solid bulwark on this flank. One infantry battalion even managed to occupy the town of St-Soupplets, 1.5 km further north-east, but by 2.00 pm had been evicted and forced back to the heights. Fighting continued in this northern sector for the rest of the day, and the French made several attempts to recapture St-Soupplets.

Opening clash, 5 September

One of those who witnessed the battle was Mildred Aldrich, a US writer in her early sixties. Her home stood on a hilltop at the village of Huiry, south of the Marne, and gave her a grandstand view across the river. ‘The battle had advanced right over the crest of the hill’, she wrote. ‘The sun was shining brilliantly on silent Mareuil and Chauconin, but Monthyon and Penchard were enveloped in smoke. From the eastern and western extremities of the plain we could see the artillery fire, but owing to the smoke hanging over the crest of the hill on the horizon, it was impossible to get an idea of the positions of the armies.’ It was nothing like what she had imagined a battle would be, for she could see no lines of soldiers, or galloping detachments of cavalry. ‘Now I was actually seeing a battle, and it was nothing like that. There was only noise, belching smoke, and long drifts of white clouds concealing the hill.’

The most important action flared up on the southern wing at 3.30 pm. Here, the Brigade marocaine – Moroccans serving under the French flag – advanced on Penchard from the west. One battalion actually penetrated into the village, only to be thrown out by a decisive counter-attack as Gronau’s rearmost units reached the battlefield. Crucially, the Moroccans lacked artillery support, and had become exposed on their northern flank as a result of the 55e division being pinned down by German fire in front of Monthyon. As the Moroccans broke and poured back to the west, the Germans pursued to the Rû de la Sorcière, a stream 2 – 3 km west of Monthyon and Penchard. But Gronau wisely halted the advance, having realized that he faced a major French offensive.

Moroccans outside Neufmontiers church after the action, searching through captured equipment.

By dusk the whole plain seemed to be ablaze, from the burning villages and haystacks set alight by the artillery shells. That night the wind changed, and the smoke drifted towards Mildred Aldrich, 9 km away on the opposite side of the Marne, so she could actually smell it. She found it impossible to sleep, as she thought of the soldiers lying dead in the starlight, on such a beautiful night.

For the French, the clash had come as a surprise. They had failed to coordinate their forces or to react sufficiently quickly as the action unfolded; nor was the bulk of the 6e armée near enough to join the fighting that day and give them a crushing numerical advantage. Only two reserve divisions and the Brigade marocaine had actually been engaged, and they had been checked by two depleted German reserve divisions and the remnants of a cavalry division.

Gronau had fulfilled his aim: he was now certain that the French were mounting a serious offensive from the Paris region. But he had taken heavy losses, and knew that his weak corps would be outflanked as more enemy units arrived the next day. To avoid destruction, he fell back under cover of darkness to a new line 7 – 8 km further north-east, where he would be successively reinforced by other elements of the 1. Armee as they were recalled from south of the Marne in response to the emerging threat. The French failed to detect Gronau’s withdrawal early enough to hamper it; nor did they pursue vigorously. Not until 4.30 am the following day did a company occupy the village of Monthyon, after being pushed forward on reconnaissance.

The fact that the two sides had clashed on the 5th did not cost Joffre the advantage of surprise in the Battle of the Marne as a whole, for it was not immediately clear to the Germans that he was about to launch a general counter-offensive south of the river. But it did rob the 6e armée of the full impact of its planned thrust into the German flank and rear. Instead of landing a decisive blow, the 6e armée would be checked during the next four days whilst still trying to reach its intended jumping-off positions.

WHAT TO SEE

The battlefield remains much the same as in 1914, despite the growth of some villages, and the construction of a high-speed railway line that passes through the gap between Monthyon and Penchard. The tour’s starting point is Monthyon. To reach it from Meaux, head north-westwards along the N330. When you reach the eastern side of Monthyon, turn left at the crossroads with the D97, and then, immediately afterwards, take the turning to the right. This leads you uphill, and through the town to the church, where you can usually find a parking space.

Point 1: Monthyon

Today Monthyon is a small town of over 1,600 inhabitants, but in 1914 it was just a village with barely more than 700. The church was a German dressing station for the wounded. So, too, was the massive farm of l’Hôpital at the southern end of the town (descend the rue Gambetta from the church, and you will see the farm on the opposite side of the D97).

Tour 1

The hilltop town is screened by trees on its western edge, so to obtain a view over the battlefield you will need to go to the nearby fields. Leave Monthyon by the southern exit, at l’Hôpital farm, and turn right on to the D97. After 500 m...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• INTRODUCTION
• ADVICE FOR TOURERS
• BATTLEFIELD TOURS
• FURTHER AFIELD
• FURTHER READING
• USEFUL ADDRESSES AND WEBSITES
• INDEX