It Had to be Tough

The Origins and Training of the Commandos in World War II

James Dunning

• Publisher: Frontline Books
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781848326385
• eBook ISBN: 9781783030880
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This book tells the fascinating story of the origins of the Commandos (Britain's first Special Service troops and the forerunners of today's Parachute Regiment, the SAS and the SBS) and the development of their special training in World War II. The commandos were raised on the specific and personal orders of the prime minister, Winston Churchill, in the dark days of the summer of 1940 when these islands faced the real threat of a Nazi invasion. It was a bold, but typically Churchillian, decision.The book traces the formation of the Commandos and the development of the extreme and often unorthodox training methods and techniques used to prepare the volunteers from all branches of the British Army for subsequent world-wide-operations from 'bolt and butcher' raids to the 'great raids' on Norway and France and finally their employment in the full scale invasions of North Africa. Sicily, Italy, Normandy, the Crossing of the Rhine and finally in Burma, whilst at all times fostering that indomitable fighting spirit with which the name 'Commando' became synonymous. So great was the Commandos' contribution in that war that the Army Commandos were awarded thirty eight Battle Honors and these are emblazoned on the Commando Flag which hangs in Westminster Abbey. Arguably the Army Commandos were disbanded too hastily after the War but their legacy, traditions and fighting spirit lives with those artillery, engineer and corps troops who today win their coveted 'Green Berets' and serve alongside their comrades of the Royal Marines on active service today.

CHAPTER I

‘A BOLD STEP’ – CHURCHILL’S COMMANDOS

THE COMMANDOS WERE FORMED AT a time in the Second World War when Britain’s fortunes were at their lowest ebb. It was the summer of 1940. Within three weeks in that June the armies of France, Britain and the Lowland Countries were defeated and routed by Hitler’s forces, who then swept on to the Channel ports forcing the withdrawal from Europe of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Their successful evacuation via Dunkirk was hailed as a miracle, but it incurred the loss, apart from personal weapons, of practically all the considerable remaining weapons, stores and equipment.

It was a tragic military disaster leaving Britain standing alone and ill-equipped, whilst the Germans, now masters of Europe from the Arctic to the Pyrenees, stood poised ready to invade these islands. The Nazis had an invasion plan (Operation Sea Lion) and indeed made a start with a series of daylight raids by the Luftwaffe on targets in the south of England.

Winston Churchill had only taken over as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence in the May, and, thus, his first few weeks in office were witness to a catalogue of defeats and disasters merely outlined above.

By July the threat of invasion was real and it completely dominated the thoughts and lives of all in these islands. They were grim days. To meet this dire threat our first lines of defence were on the sea and in the air.

Fortunately the two services involved, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force were in better shape to meet the threat than the Army, which was frantically reorganizing and re-equipping after the ‘deliverance of Dunkirk’. A new volunteer force, the Local Defence Volunteers (LDV), later retitled the Home Guard, was also in the process of being formed to bolster the regular land forces available to meet the invasion threat, but they as yet had few weapons.

The main priority for everyone, whether in the Forces, Civil Defence, munitions or industry, was clear and undisputed – the defence of Britain. Churchill recalled the mood of those momentous days, ‘This was a time when all Britain worked and strove to the utmost limit and was united as never before . . . the sense of fear seemed entirely lacking in the people . . . Nothing moves an Englishman so much as the threat of invasion, the reality unknown for a thousand years . . .’

It was then in this awesome atmosphere, with daily fears of German tanks coming ashore and German parachutists descending from the skies, that Churchill took the bold decision to look ahead beyond the immediate bleak future and propose the raising of an elite military force to take the initiative and carry the fight to the enemy with some forms of offensive action.

In the short term, and raised immediately, they would be available for defence, ‘to spring at the throat of any small landings or descents’. But the main purpose of these storm troops, or Commandos as they soon became known, was to wage a continuous campaign of tip-and-run raids on the enemy’s extended European coastline, thereby establishing a reign of terror prior to the eventual invasion of Europe. For even in those dark days Churchill was confident of ultimate victory and the liberation of Europe from Nazi tyranny.

Some special forces had already been formed and had been sent to Norway soon after being formed without having time to train and settle down as units. When they returned to Britain after that doomed expedition they were deployed on anti-invasion duties. Known as Independent Companies, they had been recruited mainly from Territorial Army (TA) infantry battalions. Later they were integrated into the Commandos.

In spite of the existence of the Independent Companies Churchill wanted his own corps of shock troops and to start afresh. In a typical Churchillian memorandum he outlined his proposals to the Chiefs of Staff. In all the books written on Commandos and dealing with the subject of their origins credit is rightly afforded to Lieutenant Colonel Dudley Clarke, Military Assistant to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff for the initial outline plan for their formation. Clarke, who had served in Palestine at the time of the Arab Rebellion, had made a study of guerilla warfare, and so was admirably placed to set out his ideas with a plan. This was duly approved as was the name ‘Commandos’.

However, it was a memorandum written by the then Director of Military Operations, Major General R.H. Dewing, which is fully quoted in Charles Messenger’s definitive history of the deeds and actions of the Commandos, 1940 – 5, that clearly sets out the ‘nitty-gritty’ details of how the units of this elite force would be recruited and also the means of organizing the unorthodox subsistence arrangements and administration.

One restriction on recruiting was imposed from the onset, namely, that no single existing unit should be diverted from its paramount task – the defence of Britain – to set up these forces. Instead, volunteers would be sought from all units within all the Commands (regional concentrations of troops) of Great Britain.

Furthermore volunteers were sought, not just from the ‘teeth’ arms, i.e. infantry, tank regiments and the artillery, but also from the ‘services’ such as the Royal Army Service Corps. Indeed, several outstanding early Commando volunteers came from the latter units.

To make a start, after calling for volunteers – officers, NCOs and other ranks – in each Army Command, a suitable volunteer officer would be selected as a Commando Leader/Commanding Officer with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

These COs would choose their own ten Troop (sub-unit) Leaders and they could be captains already, or, if not, promoted to that rank. They in turn would select their own two subordinate section officers and the remaining forty-odd NCOs and men to make up the full Troop of fifty all ranks. This would provide in total, with a handful of administrative officers and other ranks (details later in Chapter II) just over 500 altogether in each Commando.

Having settled the basic organization General Dewing outlined the general principles governing administration, training and the pattern for operations.

Although it was intended that the Commandos would be self-sufficient and operate with a minimum amount of administrative chores, it was recognized that there would be a need for an administrative officer ‘to relieve the Commanding Officer of paper work and carry out fundamental administration’. He would set up a permanent HQ in the Commando’s ‘Home Town’.

General Dewing’s directive concluded with this summary:

The main characteristics of a Commando are:

1. Capable only of operating independently for 24 hours.
2. Capable of very wide dispersion and individual action.
3. Not capable of resisting an attack or overcoming a defence of formed troops, i.e. (Commandos will be) specialising in tip and run tactics dependent on success and upon speed, ingenuity and dispersion.

The history of the Commandos from 1940 to 1945 records how the original concept of tip-and-run raids was extended so that they were increasingly used for sustained operations for which they were neither organized nor equipped. In due course these drastic changes in the roles of the Commandos affected the organization because the scale of weapons had to be increased, whilst transport and wireless sets were but two other additions needed to meet the extensions to the role of Commandos. Consequently from early 1942 these changes naturally affected and increased the range of subjects to be covered in Commando training.

However, for the moment it is intended to show how the original proposals for the recruiting and formation of the Commandos materialized.

Fortunately, it can be followed, in the case of a Troop in No 4 Commando, from a surviving diary of those days. Its story is typical of the other Troops in all Commandos.

For forty-five years the ‘F’ Troop diary had been preserved by ex-Sgt Vic (Tich) Garnett who, as one of the original members of that Troop, kindly lent it to me.

The cover of the diary is battered and worn, but inside the contents are as legible as on the day they were penned – in ink – in those pre-Biro days. The introduction captures the atmosphere of the post-Dunkirk and invasion-threatened period: ‘A True Record of the trials and adventures of F Troop of No 4 Commando during the years when Great Britain alone fought for the freedom of nations’.

Written by our Troop Leader, Capt L.C. Young (The Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment) it follows the above introduction with a description of the recruiting of his Troop:

It was Tuesday 8th July 1940 when I was stationed at Bognor Regis that I was interviewed by Colonel Legard, commanding No 4 Commando and invited to command ‘F’ Troop.

I accepted his invitation . . . and went to the Salisbury Plain area to choose the men for my Troop... I established my Headquarters in the George Hotel, Amesbury, and from there set out each morning on the important task of finding the right men . . .

He interviewed me in nearby Bulford camp where I was serving as a sergeant in a Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) training establishment.

Here it is relevant to explain that the officers and men being interviewed were volunteers who, through notices in their unit orders had applied to serve in ‘Special Service Forces’. There was a paucity of details about the nature of these forces, but for many it seemed implicit in the short list of qualifications required. In my case the unit orders had specified, ‘able to swim, not prone to sea-sickness, prepared to parachute or travel in a submarine and able to drive a motor car and ride a motor cycle’.

The names of all the volunteers were forwarded from units to the local District Headquarters and made available to the interviewing Commando officers. Although each Commando Leader had provided guidelines for these interviews to each of his ten Troop Leaders, they, in turn, interpreted them with a bias dependent on their own beliefs and the priority they gave to the various factors involved, plus of course, their own arm of service background, i.e. infantry, tanks, artillery, Brigade of Guards etc. To this extent the selection was subjective, reflecting personal preferences – as the following three examples, taken at random, show.

Peter Young (a formidable Commando Leader introduced later in this chapter), writing on the subject and his method, had this to say: ‘To pick them? You look at them, don’t you? You talk to them a bit, make up your mind if he’s a bull-shitter or has something to contribute . . . you can tell. Young soldiers are good. They have no wives or children to consider . . . A good old soldier is a good soldier, but a bad old soldier is worse than useless . . .’

Another Commando Leader, Roger Courtney – more about him later too – wrote: ‘My first choice was any Boy Scout, especially ex-Rover Scouts, they need no explanation.’ He also favoured any army bandsmen because ‘they were universally known as good shots on account of their particular training, playing an instrument, reading the music and marching, all at the same time. This makes them excellent marksmen, because they have to do three things at once – aligning foresight, backsight and target at the same time, at any range and with any weapon.’ In addition he went for studious and artistic types because they were super sensitive which he reckoned was essential for his own specialized Commando sub-unit, the Special Boat Section (SBS).

Another famous Commander Leader, Bob Laycock, had a couple of pertinent suggestions: ‘Choose your other ranks more carefully than you choose your wife . . . tolerate no creepers.’

Whatever their priorities all agreed there was one undesirable type none wanted, ‘the swaggering tough type, whose toughness was mostly displayed in pubs under the influence of alcohol’.

We all have our tales to tell about the interviews. But in all instances it was clear that there was no shortage of volunteers. It appeared that the acceptance rate was in the order of about one to six volunteers.

What many will find extraordinary is that there were no tests of any kind, physical, medical, musketry or any other sort. Many of the early volunteers readily admit that had there been they would probably have failed. The weeding out came later in the training.

Commenting on his results, our Captain Young, having selected his two section officers and the forty-seven other ranks, wrote: ‘I feel that we have got off to a flying start . . .’

Before listing all the volunteers, he added an appropriate rider: ‘All of them have volunteered not only out of a sincere desire to serve this country, but also for the fun and adventure.’ These last two factors were certainly prominent in the minds of the younger – rather naive – soldiers like myself.

Having been selected, we all then duly arrived from our various units at Weymouth – our appointed ‘Home Town’ – and were installed in civilian billets. Next day we all attended our first full Commando parade, held in the Pavilion of that Dorset resort.

There, on 22 July, some 500 officers and men, all volunteers, drawn from a wide range of famous infantry, armoured, artillery and engineer regiments, plus those from service corps, were eagerly, and apprehensively, awaiting the ‘welcome’ speech from our new Commanding Officer.

The Colonel wasted no time in outlining the purpose and role of our new unit, emphasizing the urgent need to settle down, and start to get fighting fit and prepare to strike back at the enemy. There was a murmur of approval.

He told us that in spite of the grave and imminent dangers of an enemy invasion we were going to take offensive action. Not for us the job of waiting for Jerry to land before we struck. No, we would go out across the Channel in small boats to carry out raids on the enemy’s coastline and start a reign of terror on the Nazis. We would hit first, hard and often.

He warned the training would be demanding and tough. Those unable to meet the standards required would be returned to their unit (RTU). This method of military action was an innovation, but was to be, without any shadow of doubt, one of the fundamental factors attributing to the success of the Army Commandos. There would be no right of appeal against the CO’s decision to RTU any officer or other rank; by the same token any volunteer could, in his turn, request to leave the Commando at any time. Albeit in my six years in Commandos I cannot recall any man being retained against his wish, but the number of RTUs was countless. This system of selective culling was a prerequisite to the maintenance of the highest standards of military efficiency and morale.

The Colonel went on to tell us of the origin of the unit’s unfamiliar name – ‘Commando’. Most of us had no idea that it belonged to an old enemy, the Boer guerillas who had wrought some humiliating defeats on Queen Victoria’s redcoats in the South African War of 1899 – 1902.

Finally, the Colonel reiterated the urgent need to be ready for action in a matter of days and weeks, rather than months. There was no time to lose. We must all be ready as soon as possible. So with high hopes of almost immediate action, we were dismissed, excited, to start training straightaway.

In the event we, in No 4, had to wait several months before we went into action. Meanwhile we trained and trained; we even rehearsed and prepared for operations, but they were cancelled resulting in frustrations and temporary lapses in our usually high morale.

Before describing the initial organization and early training it may be of interest to look at some of the main reasons that prompted so many to volunteer for special service in the Commandos.

Basically, without going into individual cases, I contend there were three main groups of volunteers. All, in these groups, had one common and dominating reason to volunteer – ‘to have a go at the Jerry’. Whatever other reason or reasons they had this was the crucial and fundamental one.

To understand the other main reason of my first group it is necessary to cast one’s mind back, not just to 1940 and the then current war situation, but to before the War, to the inter-war years, when the young men were growing up. Because they did so in an era when patriotism was generally and genuinely accepted by all – it was not regarded as a ‘dirty’ word . . .

Britons had been brought up and nurtured on beliefs in the merits, virtues and invincibility of the British Empire.

Suffice it here to provide just one example of how such patriotism was fostered. Every school, annually on 24 May, celebrated Empire Day. The day usually started with a special assembly in the school hall, at which patriotic fervour featured in hymns, songs, poems and readings. At the conclusion the school was generally dismissed for a half-day holiday or had a school outing or a sports meeting. It was a special day with significance and meaning, a day that was part of our heritage.

With this kind of background in mind, in the summer of 1940 the fall of France, the defeat of the BEF, the threatened invasion and the growing number of enemy air raids invoked many to express their defiance and patriotism in a definite and positive way. They did so not with noisy jingoism, but with a quiet and reserved determination to strike back and restore the honour of their wounded Britain. They did not need other specific causes or ideologies; these they left to latter-day historians and commentators to expound. They refuted the age-old axiom of the old sweats, ‘never volunteer for anything’, but did just that. They were sure it was the right and patriotic thing to do.

The second group of volunteers consisted of the regulars, reservists, pre-war Territorials and conscripts who had survived Dunkirk and Norway. They had felt, most strongly, they had been ‘let down’ and were humiliated. Furthermore, the professional pride of the regulars, in particular, had been badly wounded, and that hurt. These soldiers knew they were as good as ‘Jerry’. No! They were better and needed the chance to prove it. They wanted revenge, and preferably, wanted that chance quickly, as soon as possible. Volunteering for the Commandos would seem to offer this chance.

Thirdly, and finally, there were those officers and men, some from the service corps who would not normally have been involved in offensive operations, who welcomed and cherished the prospects offered by Special Service. For them the chance ‘to have a go’ at the enemy – and the inherent training and methods involved – would undoubtedly provide the ‘fun and adventure’ mentioned in Captain Young’s diary. In this group of volunteers were those intrepid Commando characters – and what ‘characters’ some were – who pioneered parachuting and adapted civilian mountaineering, cliff climbing and canoeing techniques for military operations, plus those leaders who founded the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Section (SBS). Many in this group were young soldiers with little military experience, but all saw in that brief description of qualifications needed for Special Service the possibilities of excitement, fun and adventure. They were not to be disappointed . . .

So much for some of the main reasons for volunteering, but from whence did they come and exactly what manner of men were they? Briefly, as intended, they came from all the many regiments and corps in the British Army. At one time in No 4 Commando we had officers and men from over ninety different regiments and corps; all wore the cap badges of their parent unit, initially in their normal headdress, be it a forage (‘fore and aft’) cap, a Service Dress cap, beret or Tam o’ Shanter etc., until in 1942 the green beret was introduced for all Commandos, but even then we all continued to wear our own regimental badges in the beret.

Not only did the volunteers come from all units, but they were of all ages and of all different types and backgrounds.

Although the majority were in their twenties there were some youngsters under twenty – I was just twenty. At the other end of the range were ‘old sweats’ nearing forty years; the latter tended to keep quiet about their age for fear of being rejected. There was a handful of exceptional officers, who as youngsters had seen active service in the First World War. In No 4...

Table of contents

• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• FOREWORD
• INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER I - ‘A BOLD STEP’ – CHURCHILL’S COMMANDOS
• CHAPTER II - SETTING UP – BILLETS AND ORGANIZATION
• CHAPTER III - MAKING A START – INITIAL TRAINING AND TRIBULATIONS
• CHAPTER IV - ON THE WATER – SMALL BOATS AND LANDING CRAFT
• CHAPTER V - WEAPON TRAINING – SHOOT TO KILL
• CHAPTER VI - TRAINING CENTRES – LOCHAILORT AND ACHNACARRY
• CHAPTER VII - SPECIAL OPERATIONAL TRAINING – THE ST NAZAIRE AND DIEPPE RAIDS
• CHAPTER VIII - SMALL CANOES AND THICK JUNGLES – SBS AND BURMA
• CHAPTER IX - SNOW, MOUNTAINS AND SURF
• CHAPTER X - PARACHUTING PIONEERS
• CHAPTER XI - AND FINALLY . . .
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX