Frankforce and the Defence of Arras 1940

Jerry Murland

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781473852693
• eBook ISBN: 9781473852709
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World War II
• Index: History

There is no other city in France that has the same associations in time of conflict that the British have with Arras. Since the campaigns of John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough, in the early 18th century, British soldiers have fought in and around Arras, occasionally as an enemy but, more often, as defenders of French and Allied democracy. Battlefield visitors to the area will immediately recognize the names of towns and villages that were as significant to the men of Marlboroughs army as they were to those who fought in the First and Second World Wars.This book serves both as guide to the Second World War battlefields that surround the city and its environs as well as detailing the actions of the British armored attack of 21 May 1940. The book looks at the strategic situation that led up to the famous Arras counterstroke and, using material that has not been published before, examines the British and German actions between 20 and 23 May. The only Victoria Cross action that took place during this time is looked at in detail; as is the fighting that took place in Arras and during the breakout.Despite its shortcomings, the counterstroke achieved the essential element of surprise and caused widespread alarm amongst the German command and hit Rommels 7th Panzer Division at precisely the moment when his armored units were ahead of the infantry and gunners. The British infantry fought well and both the Durham battalions were fortunate that their commanding officers and senior NCOs were men who had already fought in one conflict and possessed the determination to rally their less experienced junior ranks and fight on regardless. Such was the case with the two tank battalions, although sadly they lost both their commanding officers and over half the tanks that went into the engagement. The attack did enable the British to tighten their hold on Arras albeit temporarily and, as is often cited, built doubts in the minds of German High Command as to the speed of their advance and contributed to the subsequent Hitler halt order of 24-27 May.The author has gone to some lengths to track down accounts from those individuals who served in the area during May 1940 and fought the enveloping tide of the German advanceThe book is supported by three car tours, one of which takes the visitor along the tragic path taken by the Tyneside Scottish on 20 May and two walking routes, which concentrate on Arras.137 black and white photographs (integrated) and a number of maps derived from regimental histories; and six tour maps provide the battlefield visitor with illustrations of the battlefields as they were in 1940 and as they are today.

Chapter One

Invasion

On 10 May 1940 Germany invaded France and the low countries of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. The attack involved three Army Groups advancing simultaneously; Army Group B, under Generaloberst Fedor von Bock, advanced through north eastern Belgium and a panzer assault, led by Generaloberst Gerd von Runstedt’s Army Group A, which attacked through the Ardennes to cross the Meuse with the intention of cutting through the British and French armies. The third group, Army Group C under Generaloberst Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, was tasked with breaking through the Maginot Line. Dubbed ‘the Matador’s Cloak’ by Basil Liddell Hart, the German plan was masterly in its simplicity and adopted the code word Fall Gelb.

Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt, commanded Army Group A.

Up until 10 May Allied forces, under the overall command of General Maurice Gamelin, had concentrated on extending the Maginot Line along the Belgian border, a period of some eight months that became known as the ‘Phoney War’. Gamelin’s plan to counter the expected German invasion was for French and British forces to cross the border into Belgium and occupy the line of the River Dyle, which runs roughly north and south about thirty miles east of Brussels. Given the operational code name Plan D, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) were to deploy between Louvain and Wavre, with the French First Army, under General Georges Blanchard, on their right in the Gembloux Gap. The Belgians, who were expected to hold their positions for several days, would then fall back into the gap between the left of the BEF and the right of the General Henri Giraud’s Seventh Army, who were to link-up with the Dutch via Breda.

The eight month period of the Phoney War lulled the Allies into a false sense of security.

General Maurice Gamelin was in overall command of Allied forces until he was replaced by Maxime Wegand on 17 May.

It was a plan that certainly puzzled many in the BEF who had spent the whole of the previous winter preparing defences behind the Belgian frontier. Now, as soon as Germany invaded Belgium, all that was to be abandoned and the enemy was to be brought to battle from positions that were unfamiliar and where the defences were already thought to be of a poor quality. If that was not bad enough, there was considerable doubt over the fighting quality of the Belgian forces and their ability to put up a stout resistance.

General Henri Giraud.

General Georges Blanchard.

The BEF command structure

In overall command of the BEF was 53-year-old John Vereker, the 6th Viscount Gort. Known more simply as Lord Gort, he was a highly decorated Grenadier Guards officer who had served in the First World War with some distinction; wounded on four occasions, he had been decorated with the Military Cross (MC) and the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and two bars. His award of the coveted Victoria Cross (VC) came whilst he was commanding the 1st Battalion during the battle on the Canal du Nord in 1918.

Commanding I Corps was General Sir John Dill, an individual who had served with distinction under Douglas Haig and succeeded General Sir Edmund Ironside as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) on 27 May 1940. After Dill’s recall, command of I Corps was passed to Lieutenant General Michael Barker. In command of II Corps was the energetic and able Lieutenant General Alan Brooke, a gunner who rose from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel over the four years of the First World War. By the end of 1939 a third regular division had been formed – the 5th Division – and in January 1940 the first of the Territorial divisions arrived, giving rise to the formation of III Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Ronald Adam.

John Vereker, 6th Viscount Gort and his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Henry Pownall, at Habarcq Château in November 1939.

The Dyle Line

The German advance of 10 May signalled the end of the ‘Phoney War’ and the move east by allied forces to the River Dyle. The main fighting force was headed by motorcycle units of the 4/Royal Northumberland Fusiliers and the Morris CS9 Armoured Cars of the 12th Lancers and was carried out with little interference from enemy activity by the troop carrying companies of the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC). Gort’s plan was to place the 1st and 2nd Divisions on the right flank and the 3rd Division on the left, astride Louvain. By way of reserve the 48th (South Midland) Division was ordered to move east of Brussels and the 4th and 50th (Northumbrian) Divisions to the south. In addition the 44th (Home Counties) Division was under orders to march to the Escaut south of Oudenaarde and the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division placed on readiness to take up station to their right if required.

General Headquarters

GHQ, as it was known, was situated at the château at Habarcq and at Arras, where it was based in the Palais-St-Vaast. The Hon Arthur Maxwell Stamp was a staff officer at Arras and remembered it was composed of ‘a weird assortment of officers and men, with all sorts of jobs and specialities, the city was seething with khaki’. On 10 May Gort advanced with the BEF into Belgium and GHQ was moved to Wahagnies, where the forward command post was established. Remaining in Arras was GHQ (Rear) under the command of the Adjutant General, Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Brownrigg.

Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Brownrigg.

Events on the Meuse

The campaign was essentially lost on 14 May when German panzer units of Army Group A stormed across the Meuse and headed for the channel ports along a twenty-five mile wide corridor of advance. This was the socalled ‘Sickle Cut’ through the Ardennes, which reached the Channel coast on 20 May and effectively cut the Allied armies in two. These German advances late on 13 May had hastened a disorganized French retreat, which twenty-four hours later had been reduced to a rout, opening up a dangerous gap that ultimately the French failed to fill. General Georges Blanchard had little choice but to order a retirement to avoid being outflanked, which, in its turn, involved the British I Corps swinging their line back from the Dyle for some six miles to the River Lasane in order to conform to the French retirement. Gamelin was replaced by the 73-year-old General Maxime Weygand on 19 May; but by then, the military disaster of 1940 was almost complete.

73-year-old General Maxime Weygand was recalled from North Africa to take over command of the Allied Armies.

Petreforce

On 17 May, Gort issued his orders for the defence of Arras and twenty-four hours later created the first of two ‘ad hoc’ formations that would have a direct impact on the fighting in and around Arras. Petreforce, under the command of 53-year-old Major General Roderick Petre, was created to hold Arras; unlike Macforce and its commander, Major General Mason McFarlane, Petre was already in command of the 12th Division and possessed a relatively experienced staff and system of communications. Unfortunately, his departure was not communicated to the 12th Division, who were by this time spread widely across the battlefield, and command appeared to rest with Petre’s senior staff officer. Failing to inform the 12th Division that Petre was now commanding ‘Petreforce’ and thus leaving it for the most part leaderless, was just one example of a patchwork of ineptitude on the part of the 54-year-old Adjutant General, Sir Douglas Brownrigg, that was to seal the fate of the 12th Division’s battalions and the majority of 70 Brigade from the 23rd Division.

General André Corap.

A deteriorating situation

By19 May the strategic situation in the French First Army Group had become serious. To the north Allied forces had been forced back to the line of the River Escaut, while in the south the Panzer advance of Army Group A, that had broken through at Sedan, had created a large gap in General André Corap’s Ninth French Army sector. German panzer divisions now threatened the right rear of the BEF, a threat which Gort temporarily countered by the creation of Petreforce in Arras and Macforce, which at the time was thinly spaced along the Haute Deûle and Scarpe Canals. Despite this, German commanders were quite rightly concerned that an Allied counterstroke from both north and south of the River Somme could in effect turn the tables on the German advance, cut off their supply lines and trap them on the Channel coast.

Frankforce

Under the command of Major General Harold Franklyn, who commanded the 5th Division, Frankforce was formed on 20 May (the same day that German forces reached the channel coast). In addition to the six battalions of the 5th Division, Frankforce drew in two brigades of the 50th Division and 1 Tank Brigade, together with the units of Petreforce now established in Arras.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Edmund Ironside.

Although it was fast becoming clear that the BEF was now cut off from French forces in the south, Gort still firmly believed that the gap in General André Corap’s Ninth French Army sector must be closed if disaster was to be prevented. But, as he later explained to General Edmund Ironside, this was an undertaking that the French had to initiate from the south, as all the BEF’s divisions – except two, which were at Arras with Frankforce – were committed to defending the line of the Escaut. Ironside, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had been sent by Churchill and the War Cabinet to appraise the situation and pressure Gort into attacking south in conjunction with t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Maps
• Introduction by the Series Editor
• Author’s Introduction
• Acknowledgements
• Chapter One Invasion
• Chapter Two The Demise of 70 Brigade
• Chapter Three Petreforce
• Chapter Four Frankforce – The Counterstroke
• Chapter Five The Scarpe Valley – East
• Chapter Six The Scarpe Valley – West
• Chapter Seven Conclusions
• Chapter Eight The Tours
• Walk 1 Arras Central
• Walk 2 St-Nicolas and Ste-Catherine
• Car Tour 1 The 70 Brigade Disaster
• Car Tour 2 Frankforce – The Left Flank Route
• Car Tour 3 Frankforce – The Right Flank Route
• Appendix 1 German, British and French Tank Specifications
• Appendix 2 Cemeteries in the wider area of Arras
• Appendix 3 Order of Battle
• Selected Bibliography