Forgotten Battles of the Zulu War

Adrian Greaves

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9781526791870
• eBook ISBN: 9781844689392
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 19th Century History
• Index: History

Adrian Greaves uses his exceptional knowledge of the Anglo-Zulu War to look beyond the two best known battles of Isandlwana and the iconic action at Rorkes Drift to other fiercely fought battles.He covers little recorded engagements and battles such as Nyezane which was fought on the same day as the slaughter of Imperial troops at Isandlwana but has been eclipsed by it. Like the battles at Hlobane and Gingindhlovu.The death of the Prince Imperial, which caused shock waves round Europe and had huge repercussions for those involved, is examined in detail. The defeat of the Zulu Army at Ulundi was the culmination of the war and the author reveals new and shocking details about this battle.There is a hint of ominous events to come in the slaughter of Colonel Austruthers Redcoat column by Boers as they marched from Ulundi to Pretoria. This was the opening salvo of the First Boer War.This hugely informative book will fascinate fans of this period of our Imperial history.

Chapter 1

The Invasion of Zululand, January 1879

Invasion layout

On and around the 11th December 1878, five large columns of well-trained and seasoned British troops invaded Zululand, a small independent country in Southern Africa and whose autocratic leader, King Cetshwayo, had hitherto been friendly towards Britain. The main invasion column, the Centre or No. 3 Column, consisted of some 4,700 men led by the British military commander in South Africa, Lord Chelmsford – an experienced and seasoned General with recent experience fighting local native insurrection in the Cape region. His invasion force was made up of the finest British units in South Africa and was equipped with modern artillery, mounted troops and the latest Martini-Henry rifles. The invasion was expected to be swift and simple; after all, his force was battle-hardened and rated among the best in the British Empire while the Zulu army was armed with nothing more than a few ancient muskets and their traditional stabbing spears. However, in less than one hour this elite British force suffered a humiliating defeat and was annihilated almost to a man by the Zulu army, an inexperienced force (they had not seen action for twenty-three years) and ill-equipped; the location was a rocky outcrop, which soon became known as Isandlwana. As a result, Britain’s world-wide reputation as a mighty military and invincible force lay in tatters.

Later the same day, a Zulu reserve force of some 4,500 warriors, which had not taken part in the battle, then crossed the nearby river border at Rorke’s Drift into British controlled Natal and attacked the column’s supply depot and temporary hospital manned by 130 soldiers and soldier-patients, including B Company of the 2nd Battalion (Warwickshire) Regiment. In the twelve-hour action that followed, the defenders held the Zulus at bay, and in so doing, this skirmish became a legend, known thereafter as the battle of Rorke’s Drift.

The skirmish at Rorke’s Drift, for that is what it really was, and to a lesser extent the Zulu victory at Isandlwana, have long since become engraved in the minds of the British, whether civilian or military. Isandlwana is lesser known than Rorke’s Drift, having been an inglorious disaster that shook the British military establishment to its core. Innocent heads rolled to pay for the ignominy of the defeat but due to the bravery and luck of victory at Rorke’s Drift, the defeat of Isandlwana was successfully covered up and sidelined. Nevertheless, the manifestations of this shock defeat soon dawned on British politicians and the public and, within months, brought down the Tory government of Disraeli. The defeat also showed the rest of the world that the British Army was not invincible. The discovery of this unexpected flaw in British military prowess had immediate repercussions, which commenced that very same year with the Boer rebellion against the British in South Africa and with two ignominious British defeats, firstly at Bronkhorstspruit, followed by Majuba. These Boer victories led, in turn, to the terrible two Boer Wars of 1880 and 1899.

But how could the disaster at Isandlwana have happened? This was a question that would perplex the British Government, the War Office and, via the popular press, the British people. After all, the invasion of Zululand was little more than an adventure with the aim of enhancing the reputations of the soon-to-retire British High Commissioner in South Africa, Sir Bartle Frere, whose idea led to the invasion of Zululand, and of Frere’s military commander, General Lord Chelmsford, a favourite of Queen Victoria.

A brief overview of British expectations in Zululand

There can be little doubt that Lord Chelmsford and his invasion columns fully expected an early and easy victory over the Zulu army. Chelmsford’s officers and most of his troops were already experienced in African warfare and Chelmsford’s main fear was that the Zulus would not fight or that his campaign would deteriorate into a series of ‘hit and run’ skirmishes similar to those he had recently experienced in the recent Eastern Cape Colony Frontier Wars against the amaXhosa. (1)

Generally speaking, South Africa was rough fighting country; both the infantry and mounted troops would normally engage the enemy, the infantry first by volley fire and then the mounted troops by attacking once the enemy was put to rout. Chelmsford knew that in the unlikely event that the Zulus would appear in any number, the British would form a square or entrench their position to draw the Zulus into the range of their overwhelming firepower. In Chelmsford’s considerable experience, well-aimed rifle volley fire by calm and experienced troops supported by rockets, artillery and Gatling guns would ensure the swift defeat of the Zulu army. (2)

Chelmsford devised a three-pronged invasion that would advance on the Zulu capital at Ulundi. Each ‘prong’ or column was thought to be strong enough to engage and defeat the Zulu army if it ever stood to fight. The actual tactic was remarkably similar to the Zulu tactic of the ‘horns of the bull’ and the irony of its use by the British would not have escaped King Cetshwayo and his advisers.

Chelmsford originally intended that five columns would converge on Cetshwayo’s capital at Ulundi but later modified his plan to just three, the Coastal, Centre and Northern Columns. On the 8th January Chelmsford wrote:

All the reports which reach me tend to show that the Zulus intend, if possible, to make raids into Natal when the several columns move forward. The strength of the three columns, Nos. 1, 3, and 4 is only just sufficient to enable them to advance. (3)

Chelmsford’s five invasion columns:

No. 1 Coastal Column

Chelmsford’s orders to Colonel Pearson read:

Cross the Tugela at Fort Pearson and encamp on the Zulu side; when ordered to advance, to move on to Eshowe, and there, or in its neighbourhood, to form a depot, well entrenched. (4)

In tactical terms, a coastal column in support of the main centre column was a sound tactic but one that overlooked the unseasonable bad weather, rugged terrain, prevalent sickness and the constant threat of an enemy whose tactical abilities and bravery were badly underestimated by senior officers.

Colonel Pearson’s Coastal Column assembled at the Lower Drift of the Tugela River and was tasked with the role of marching along thirty-seven miles of rough twisting tracks to occupy the mission station at Eshowe before the Zulus destroyed the buildings. Here the column’s supply wagons were to be unloaded and returned to pick up more stores while defences were built to convert Eshowe into a fortified advanced supply depot. From Eshowe it was intended to advance on the Zulu capital at Ulundi in a converging movement with the other two columns.

No. 2 Reserve Column

Chelmsford’s orders to Colonel Durnford were:

To form a portion of No. 1 Column, but act separately, reporting to Colonel Pearson; to remain on the middle Tugela frontier until an advance is ordered, and Colonel Pearson has reached Eshowe. (5)

River crossing points, or drifts, as they are known, are few and far between Rorke’s Drift and the Indian Ocean some 130 miles distant. When in flood, the river rushes through steep gorges and forms a natural barrier, especially during the rainy season from September to March each year when the river becomes a serious and powerful torrent. The Middle Drift near Fort Buckingham was one of the few places where, when the river was low, the water level dropped to a depth of some three feet, although this stretch of water was still about 100 yards across and fast flowing; the river could be crossed on foot only with great caution. The role of this Reserve Column, under the command of Colonel Anthony William Durnford RE, was to guard this drift.

Durnford was the eldest son of General E.W. Durnford, Colonel Commandant, Royal Engineers. He was born on the 24th May 1830 and was educated chiefly in Germany. He entered the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in July 1846 and obtained a commission as Second Lieutenant in the Royal Engineers on the 27th June 1848. He then enjoyed numerous and varied postings. At the end of 1871 he embarked for South Africa; upon his arrival he was employed for a short time at Cape Town and King William’s Town, and then proceeded to Natal, where he formed one of the military escorts that accompanied the Minister for Native Affairs into Zululand to be present at the coronation of King Cetshwayo in August 1873. He subsequently acted as Colonial Engineer in addition to performing his own duties and under his superintendence much valuable engineering work was undertaken for the colony. In 1878, he was one of the commissioners on the disputed Zulu Boundary Commission, whose award restored to the Zulus a considerable portion of their territory.

Durnford had been pleased with his appointment to the No. 2 Column as he wrote to his mother:

The Governor has been pleased to express his confidence in me. I shall have some 3,000 men, infantry, cavalry and a rocket battery. So the command is at least a respectable one for a Lieutenant Colonel. (6)

While awaiting further orders, Durnford moved his main force to the small homestead at Kranskop, some five miles from the Middle Drift but with good access to any possible Zulu crossing points. His most recent orders were to send part of his force northwards to prevent the Zulus crossing into Natal and to be prepared to support Colonel Pearson’s Coastal Column once the border was secure. The final section of the order was unclear and Durnford was about to succumb to its ambiguity. The orders gave him permission to engage the Zulus if he considered such action necessary to prevent an attack but he was then to return to the Natal side of the border; otherwise, he was to await further orders.

On the 13th January Durnford received a report from Bishop Schroeder intimating that the Zulus were massing near Middle Drift prior to invading Natal. This communication seemed, at first sight, to make sense; after all, this was the very circumstance that Durnford was ordered to prevent. Durnford had not yet complied with Chelmsford’s instruction to send troops towards the north; he accordingly cancelled their impending move and sent an urgent despatch to Chelmsford informing him that he was about to engage the Zulus with his whole force at Middle Drift. Durnford ordered his men to prepare for an advance towards the river, obviously with a view to engaging the Zulus reported by Bishop Schroeder. Whilst preparations were underway a mounted orderly arrived with an urgent despatch from Chelmsford; it was a despatch that both startled and distressed Durnford. It read:

Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command and to substitute another officer for the command of No. 2 Column. When a column is SEPARATELY in an enemy’s country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. Your neglecting to obey the instructions in the present instance has no excuse. You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder, which may or not be true and which you have no means of verifying. If movements ordered are to be delayed because reports hint at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and will not give me any further occasion to write in a style which is distasteful to me. (7)

Chelmsford would hold the matter against Durnford to deadly effect in the coming enquiry into the defeat at Isandlwana. However, on this occasion Chelmsford was right; there was no Zulu force at Middle Drift, which seriously embarrassed Durnford. The following day, Durnford received fresh orders from Chelmsford to move towards Rorke’s Drift; whether Chelmsford had decided to keep Durnford on a tighter rein or not is uncertain. By the 19th January Durnford’s force reached a point between Helpmekaar and Rorke’s Drift when he received the following order:

No. 3 Column leaves tomorrow for Isandhlwana hill (sic) and from there as soon as possible to a spot about ten miles nearer to the Qudeni forest. From that point I intend to operate against the two Matyanas (local chiefs – Ed.) if they refuse to surrender. I have sent you an order to cross the river (Buffalo River – Ed.) at Rorke’s Drift tomorrow with the force you have. I shall want you to cooperate against the Matyanas but will send you fresh instructions on this subject.

Later that day Durnford was instructed to cross the Buffalo River, await further orders and make camp on the Zulu side. He was then ordered to move to the camp at Isandlwana.

No. 3 Centre Column

Chelmsford’s orders to Colonel Glyn read:

No. 3 Column to cross at Rorke’s Drift when the thirty days expired; to move forward and form an advanced depot, strongly entrenched, as found advisable from the nature of the country, etc. To assist in clearing the border south-east of Rorke’s Drift, and to keep up communication with the columns on left and right. (8)

The backbone of the Centre Column consisted of the two regular battalions of the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment. It was coincidental, and certainly unusual, that both battalions of any regiment would serve alongside each other yet here they were, advancing together into Zululand. Both battalions were enthusiastic at the prospect of leading operations against the Zulus. The very experienced 1st Battalion had not seen home service since arriving in South Africa on the 4th February 1875, after a series of Mediterranean postings. They were tough and battle-hardened after four years active campaigning during the Ninth Frontier War at the Cape. The 2nd Battalion with twenty-four officers and 849 other ranks, had arrived in South Africa on the 28th February 1878 and shortly afterwards took up their duties at King William’s Town. Both battalions were then engaged in quelling small pockets of rebellion throughout the Cape area; this added experience helped to toughen the regiment in preparation for the arduous campaign looming against the Zulus. During the operations against the native tribes, neither battalion had sustained significant casualties. Only two officers, Captains Carrington and Godwin-Austen, were wounded, one man was killed and a few wounded, (though from disease the loss was higher, eighteen men of the 1/24th and twenty-one of the 2/24th). Both battalions had earned much praise by their cheerfulness in facing hardships and discomforts and by their good conduct and discipline in the field. General Thesiger (soon to be Lord Chelmsford) spoke in the highest terms of both battalions, emphasizing how well the younger soldiers, of whom the 2/24th was in large measure composed, had come through this severe ordeal of hard work in the face of difficult conditions. Likewise, the soldiers respected Chelmsford, as the Natal Witness reported:

The headquarter staff camp is pitched to the right of all the others, almost in the centre as you walk from one end to the other. The Union Jack flies in front of the tent of the General, and his mule wagons are placed in position behind; otherwise there is nothing to show the difference between it and the other camps. His Excellency is much liked, and sets a good example to the men under him. He rises at daylight, and when on the march assists in striking and pitching his own tent. His manner is exceedingly affable to all, and he seems to have the happy knack of thoroughly understanding at once what is meant to be conveyed to him, although it may be wrapped up either in eloquence or long-windedness. His love of punctuality is well known through the camp, and of course, leads to the same system in others. (9)

By July 1878, officially inspired rumours were beginning to spread throughout Natal that King Cetshwayo was threatening to invade the province; consequen...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Maps
• Glossary
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: The Invasion of Zululand
• Chapter 2: Skirmish at Chief Sihayo’s Homestead
• Chapter 3: The First Battle of Hlobane
• Chapter 4: The Battle of Inyezane (Nyezane)
• Chapter 5: The Battle of Ntombe Drift (Meyer’s Drift)
• Chapter 6: The Second Battle of Hlobane
• Chapter 7: Gingindlovu
• Chapter 8: The Battle of Khambula
• Chapter 9: The Battle of Ulundi
• Chapter 10: Ntombe River Incident
• Chapter 11: The Battle of Tsate
• Chapter 12: The Battle of Bronkhorstspruit
• Chapter 13: War’s End
• Plates
• Notes
• Appendices
• Index