Hampshire at War, 1939–45

Murray Rowlands

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781473869967
• eBook ISBN: 9781473869981
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

Hampshire at War 1939-45 looks at the pivotal role Hampshire played during the Second World War, including principal details of the genesis for D-Day and how the Battle for Britain happened on a day by day basis. The author highlights the peoples experience of total war from the blitz in Portsmouth, Gosport and Southampton, along with raids throughout the county, not to mention the role played by the Royal Navy at sea and in the dockyards. As well as saluting the role of civilians who created and built Spitfires and Hurricanes, the book places a rightful spotlight on the role Hampshire's women played in the final victory.Hampshires major effort towards final victory arose from the towns and hamlets of the county. Training for the secret war and espionage took place in Beaulieu and the training for the Cockleshell Heroes took place around Southsea. Hampshires war involved the arrival of men and women from all over the world, but in particular from Canada and America with important cultural changes for everyone living there. When invasion threatened in 1940, a defence of Britain had to be organised and Hampshire's coast was particularly vulnerable. Details of how German troops would be resisted after landings in the Solent and along Hampshires coast are also explored.Hampshire at War 1939 - 1945 traces the progress of evacuating its children from vulnerable cities such as Southampton and Portsmouth, and records the experiences of the children themselves. But most importantly, Murray Rowlands provides the experience of living through the Second World War, as it happened.

CHAPTER ONE

Hampshire: The Hub for any Defence of Britain

Any invasion of Britain would have to focus on Hampshire because of its geographical location. In 1939 Hampshire was much more than the geographical expression that it is now rapidly becoming. This automatically added to its vulnerability to any reduction in military spending which was a feature of Britain in the inter-war years. The dominant characteristic of these years was a reluctance to come to terms with the realities of total war as prefigured in 1936 by the Spanish Civil War. Joyce Carlisle, who lived on the outskirts of Southampton, is critical of the ‘Britain can take it’ view of civilian morale that has characterized the experience of months of bombing. Some indication of the consequences for civilian populations had been given by the Zeppelin attacks in the First World War. More than the reality for populations of being bombed by high explosives was the fear of gas attack which was assumed to be part of any new war. However, as the country slowly recovered from the Great Depression politicians such as Sir Eric Geddes were not prepared to countenance investment in defence, let alone the provision of shelters for those likely to be in direct line of attack from an invading force. The latter would come down to a mass-produced Anderson shelter or an improvised Morrison shelter built around the kitchen table in the final months when the British establishment finally confronted the reality of approaching war.

Hampshire had great strategic importance due to Portsmouth being a major base of the British navy. Around the city a whole range of activities relating to the navy took place, despite defence cuts. When belatedly serious thought began regarding the threat from Germany and how it might be countered following Hitler’s acquisition of power in 1933, it was assumed that the kernel of defence of the realm would rest with the navy. Grudgingly, money was also made available for the development of new aircraft at Fairey Aviation, based at Southampton and Eastleigh as well as experimental work at Farnborough. Only reluctantly was Aldershot, the home of the British army, given the necessary finance for recruitment and exercises for the Territorial Army.

A recovery from the universal aversion to all things military that had arisen following the Great War slowly took place in the 1930s. Great faith had been vested in the League of Nations to retain peace. By the mid-1930s this had been proved to be a false promise by the actions of Italy and Germany that had been left unchecked by appeasement. This emphasized the mistaken belief of the coalition government that an expeditionary force would not be required in the near future. Labour politicians such as George Lansbury were reinforcing the ideas of Conservative Treasury Ministers who sought cuts in military expenditure. Not until the mid-1930s was Lansbury challenged by Labour’s Ernest Bevin’s call for support of a rearmament programme. The belief for much of the inter-war period exemplified by Stanley Baldwin and some other Tory politicians was that the economic risk was greater than the military threat facing the country. They accepted there was a role for the military and that was to protect Britain’s imperial interests. The navy’s role in this was the protection of mercantile interests. Because of this there was a reluctance to agree to the construction of major capital ships which limited the development of aircraft carriers, for instance, and adequate recognition of the crucial role that would be played by submarines. A reflection of this can be seen in the struggle by Portsmouth City Council to set up a seaplane base at Langstone Harbour airbase. The council encountered repeated refusals from government to fund the development, as well as a refusal to support a Bill in the House of Commons backing the scheme. The minutes of Portsmouth Council in 1938 reflect its frustration with the Chamberlain government’s intransigence over this issue.

Chamberlain. After the Munich Agreement of 1938, rearmament was halted in parts of Hampshire.

Neville Chamberlain’s willingness to appease Hitler was reflected in his inherent financial caution when he was elevated from Chancellor of the Exchequer to prime minister in 1938. He said he could not accept the demands of the military services for more spending. He complained:

The country has been asked to maintain a larger army than it has for many years; a greater air force, which is a new arm altogether, and in addition, an army for use on the continent as well as facilities for the production of munitions which would be required not only by our forces but also our allies.

Even if Churchill had gained power prior to 1940 he would have experienced grave difficulties in moving beyond Chamberlain’s more limited defence spending that had government and wider support. Just how much Chamberlain’s belief that it might be possible to accommodate Hitler’s demands was shared by political decision-makers in Hampshire is seen in the decision of Portsmouth Council to suspend some of its civil defence programmes in response to the Munich Agreement of 1938.

In relation to Portsmouth, government decision-making about the navy could be seen as having direct consequences for the city. A useful comparison is between spending on the navy in 1936 and that in 1914/15. In 1936 it was £18 million more than during the First World War, although there were only fifteen capital ships and none being built. By comparison in 1914/15 there were sixty-eight capital ships and fourteen being built. In 1936 the navy possessed only 54 battle-cruisers and 17 under construction, against 110 and 17 under construction in the previous era. The figures for destroyers were even worse: 54 and 12 being built as against 109 and 322. Bearing in mind the crucial role that submarines were to play in the Second World War, the navy only possessed fifty-one compared with seventy-four in the First World War when they were a relatively new naval development.

The rivalry between the navy and the Air Force was reflected not only over the proposed Langstone Base but also other bases around Portsmouth in relation to the operation of seaborne aircraft. In a speech on 18 March 1936 Churchill, who had just been brought in as First Lord of the Admiralty, said ‘The foundation of British Navy policy is the acceptance of the principle of parity with the United States not only in battleships but over the whole range of the Fleet.’ Despite America being determinedly isolationist, Churchill saw America as an ally exemplified by the thousands of American troops in Hampshire prior to D-Day. It is interesting that Churchill had to justify the construction of aircraft carriers through their role in protecting trade. The Defence Requirements Subcommittee of the House of Commons finally advocated that the strength of the British navy should be equivalent to that of the combined Japanese and German navies; a radical departure from attempts to commit the size of the navy based on international agreement. Unfortunately, even in 1937 the gain of the Fleet Air Arm by the navy from the Air Force came too late for its requirement of modern planes prior to the outbreak of war. However, by 1939 Portsmouth dockyards were part of a record ship-building programme involving the construction of 200 vessels or 870,000 tons of new shipping. By 1940/41 the output from British dockyards including Portsmouth had at last exceeded that for a comparable period in the Great War. Portsmouth’s dockyards were making a major contribution towards updating the existing fleet through the installation of anti-aircraft (AA) guns and more accurate systems of control. From 1936 the number of systems capable of firing a shell of 2lb had risen by 75 per cent.

Aldershot certainly was not immune from the cuts in defence spending made following the First World War for whom the spearhead was Sir Eric Geddes. The only corps formed during the war to survive was the Royal Tank Corps. Others such as the Machine-Gun Corps were disbanded and their function subsumed within infantry units. In 1920 the Royal Signals was created, moving it out of the Royal Engineers. Sir Douglas Haig’s beloved sixteen cavalry units were reduced from sixteen to eight with big reductions to the infantry battalions and size of the Territorial force. When the Irish Free State was created in 1922, six Irish regiments were lost from the British army. Despite this, many Irish soldiers serving in Aldershot decided to stay with regiments based in the town. Regiments would periodically return to Aldershot, filling gaps in their main role as imperial policemen. Until the mid-1930s army life in Aldershot was characterized by military tattoos rather than encouragement from top brass of experimental work such as that related to the Experimental Mechanical Force through the REME in 1927–28. Worse still, the army failed to make its case for rearmament in competition with the navy and Air Force. It was not until the Munich Crisis of 1938 that serious moves were made to expand the army to a realistic level by increasing the size of the Territorial Army and the reintroduction of conscription in April of the following year. By mid-1939 the British army consisted of 230,000 regulars and 453,000 Territorials and reservists. This was dwarfed by the German army who, under the guise of labour battalions and glider instruction, had got around the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles that placed limitations on recreating a large army. Some progress was made, however, through the creation of the Auxiliary Territorial Service for women, enabling men to be released for front-line service, something that accelerated in 1940.

Military tattoos dominated the life of Aldershot, home of the British army between the two world wars.

Research from contemporary reports from papers written on the cusp of war reveals the unreadiness of Britain for a German attack. There was a deficiency of trained officers. The provision of barracks for the army was well below the safety line. Troops would arrive after mobilization without any provision being made for their physical support. No system existed within the Southern Command for the obtaining of appropriate supplies, nor was there any identified person to order these supplies. The NAAFI was woefully unprepared for a total war situation. The consequence of local commanders ordering locally caused shortages within the areas surrounding southern camps. The Territorials arriving at their barracks were on subsistence rations for fourteen days. The vital organization of petrol supplies was lacking. Low pay for barrack wardens drawn from retired officers resulted in these men seeking other employment. Because of the absence of effective systems, chaotic issuing of uniforms and stores took place without an adequate audit. There was a history of weak liaison with Territorial groups that resulted in men arriving at barracks without a central direction and adequate preparation being made for their arrival. With experienced staff from the regular army being mobilized, there was a void of army officers capable of offering training; this resulted in substandard training being available to Territorials and volunteers. The vehicles taken over by the army from civilians were not fit for military use. Mobilization could result in a highly-qualified military engineer being placed in charge of military baking.

Evidence from the Buller Barracks in Aldershot reveals that even in peacetime the Royal Army Ordnance Corps struggled to adequately supply the services and materials that were part of its brief. There was a desperate shortage of trained drivers as well as a whole range of tradesmen. Upon mobilization, regular soldiers’ positions were filled by members of the Territorial Army but there was no like-for-like acquisition of necessary skills in the changeover. Urgent questions relating to the possession of craft skills had to be given to the militia men pouring into Aldershot, sometimes as many as 400 in each train. There was a desperate shortage of accommodation, with mobilized men sleeping in sheds, gyms, the riding school and the drill hall. In the search for tradesmen it was found that a ‘fitter’ referred to a fitter of corsets! The War Office wrote on 19 December 1939 complaining about commanding officers awarding commissions to friends in a desperate move to acquire senior staff.

A grim picture of the British army post-First World War as the result of financial constraints can be seen. Officers in Aldershot were distinguished by their preoccupation with hunting and spending six times as much on cavalry training as training with tanks. The army was starved of money, consigning its men to leaking huts with uncomfortable iron beds. The food offered featured greasy porridge, rissoles, and dry bread washed down with sweetened cocoa. The two shillings paid per day were in real terms less than soldiers had been paid at Waterloo. It was said of the officers that they travelled the world to hot spots such as Palestine in 1936 without learning anything about the countries in which they served. Hopes were expressed that officers training at Sandhurst might be roughly up to the standard of West Point in America but these were dashed through lack of funding. Even after the expansion of the Territorials in 1936, they suffered through lack of equipment. In April 1939 the decision was made to double Hampshire’s Territorial Army and, using existing drill halls throughout the county, recruitment began. At Merry Oak, Bitterne near Southampton, A Company was formed; B Company at Carlton Place, Southampton; C Company at Holdenhurst Road, Bournemouth and Portfield Road at Christchurch. Platoons formed up in Bath Road, Lymington and in Fordingbridge. As recruits poured in, raising the total strength to 1,250, new drill stations opened at Swanwick, Botley, New Milton and Brockenhurst. Permanent staff instructors were appointed to the expanding battalion, which by August had almost achieved two-battalion status. However, the war history of the 7th Battalion Hampshire Regiment, above a photo of the Hampshire Regiment’s annual camp, talks of the unpreparedness of the military situation on the eve of war.

The first and second infantry battalions were based in Aldershot. They formed the spearhead corps available for deployment abroad. There were only two brigades of anti-aircraft artillery alongside some belated mechanization. From 1932 anti-aircraft provision was made in the Territorial Army and this increased from 1935 alongside slow mechanization of the cavalry units.

As far as the Air Force was concerned, the interwar period was ‘up in the air’ until the prospect of war appeared on the horizon. In 1917 there were seventy-three aerodromes operating in Britain. In just one year this had been expanded to 301, but by 1924 the number of aerodromes had dropped to 44 comprising 27 military and 17 civilian. By contrast, although the Germans had lost the Great War, by 1930 they had begun a whole process of aircraft expansion. The British response to this poorly-disguised German activity was to further cut its aircraft expenditure, reducing Britain’s position as top air power in 1918 to fifth in 1933. However, from 1934 there was a belated recognition of the threat posed by German air development and the Royal Air Force (RAF) was increased by forty-one squadrons. Farnborough renewed its work in testing new aircraft designs. Air training took place at Hamble Worth giving cadets an experience of flying, and also a home for Fairey Aviation who played a major role in aircraft manufacture.

In Alan Cobham’s work for aviation can be seen something that raised the whole consciousness of the vital role which the development of the aircraft industry would play in the future of Britain. Arriving in Eastleigh in August 1936, he began the process of developing a commercial aerodrome that was to play a crucial role in developing the Spitfire when Supermarine used it for test flying. It came to be called Southampton Airport and became an invaluable location for RAF squadrons holding summer camps. This coincided with Supermarine’s work on a desperately-needed single-seater fighter that was created by their chief designer R.J. Mitchell and appropriately named the Spitfire. By June 1936 the RAF had ordered 310 of these and Supermarine commenced their construction alongside amphibious flying boats. The first Spitfire was not available to fly until 15 May 1938 and entered service with 19 Squadron of the RAF in August 1938. However, producing an adequate number of Spitfires proved difficult so that by the beginning of 1939 only forty-nine had been delivered. There was a menacing comparison with Luftwaffe Fighter Command and although Hawker Hurricanes were being delivered to the RAF, Britain lacked the aircraft for adequate defence. In April 1938 the Air Ministry took control of air traffic facilities with civil aviation terminating in early 1939. There was a rush to camouflage the buildings at Eastleigh as war approached but how effective this was against massed attack in 1940 is open to question.

In 1921 the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) at Farnborough had absorbed the Instrument Design Establishment based at Biggin Hill and the Air Ministry’s Air Worthiness Department. Despite cutbacks elsewhere, no expense was spared in a whole range of activities including testing and research work on aircraft engines, flight refuelling and flying at high altitudes. Farnborough was renowned for its wind tunnel. As an indication of the importance that air defence was about to play, the Anti-Aircraft Co-op Unit was based here alongside the School of Photography. The RAE was to play an absolutely crucial role in the testing of German aircraft when they fell into British hands.

Lee-on-Solent was important in providing a link between air and naval activity. In 1920 it was renamed as the School for Naval Co-Operation and in 1939 was taken over by the Admiralty as HMS Daedalus airfield. It played a crucial role in training seaplane pilots. Supermarine built 287 planes including the Swordfish for aircraft carriers as part of a programme of amphibious aircraft construction. Odiham’s expansion in the early 1930s owed much to its strategic proximity to Aldershot and Farnborough and by 1936 No. 4 Squadron had moved across from Farnborough to the new base. Because its grass runway was unsuitable for heavy bombing aircraft it was the first airfield in the south-east to receive a concrete runway.

Despite an overall policy of appeasement, priority was given to the development of a system of air defence with the reality of the Spanish Civil War underlining the need for civilian protection. The Home Chain system of radar was developed in top secret, together with the creation of two planes for fighter defence: the Hurricane and the Spitfire. The Spitfire Type 300 prototype made its maiden flight from Eastleigh Airport on 5 March 1936. Vickers Armstrong Ltd used Eastleigh for flight testing. The decision taken in 1937 to press ahead with production of these aircraft was the vital factor of victory in the Battle of Britain in 1940. ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword and Acknowledgements
• Chapter 1: Hampshire: The Hub for any Defence of Britain
• Chapter 2 How the Civilian Population Prepared for War
• Chapter 3: War Approaches
• Chapter 4: Evacuation: Saving Hampshire’s Children
• Chapter 5: The ‘Phoney War’: Not Phoney for Some
• Chapter 6: Dunkirk: Britain Stands Alone
• Chapter 7: Defending Hampshire: The Armed Forces
• Chapter 8: Defending Hampshire: The Civilian Dimension
• Chapter 9: The Royal Navy and the Dockyards
• Chapter 10: Hampshire’s Battle for Britain
• Chapter 11: Hampshire and Radar
• Chapter 12: Hampshire and the Blitz
• Chapter 13: Hampshire’s Secret War
• Chapter 14: Hampshire’s Airfields
• Chapter 15: Maple Leaves, Yanks and Kiwis
• Chapter 16: Living Through It: Aldershot 1942–43
• Chapter 17: Hampshire Hero: Syd Hewson, RN
• Chapter 18: Hampshire’s Canoeist Raiders
• Chapter 19: Hampshire Women’s Crucial Role
• Chapter 20: The Island That Got in the Way
• Chapter 21: Lymington and Cove’s Sacrifice
• Chapter 22: Prisoners of War
• Chapter 23: Hampshire and D-Day
• Chapter 24: Carrying On Until the End
• Chapter 25: The Hampshire Regiment
• Chapter 26: Hampshire Celebrates Victory in Europe
• Chapter 27: On to VJ Day
• Chapter 28: Aftermath
• Bibliography