RAF and the SOE

Special Duty Operations in Europe During WW2

John Grehan

• Publisher: Frontline Books
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781473894136
• eBook ISBN: 9781473894150
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

The Special Operations Executive developed a vast network of agents across Occupied Europe which played a vital role in developing and sustaining Resistance movements that persistently sought to subvert German control of their territories. The culmination of their efforts was seen when the Allied armies landed at Normandy in June 1944, with the SOE and the Resistance causing widespread destruction and disruption behind the German lines.None of this would have been possible had it not been for the Royal Air Force. Not only the RAF supply the SOE, and the movements it led and coordinated, with the thousands of tons of arms and equipment needed to undertake this role, it also delivered and retrieved agents from under the very noses of the enemy.Compiled at the end of the war by the Air Historical Branch of the RAF, this is an extremely detailed and comprehensive account of the RAFs support for the SOE, and in it we learn of the enormous and complex arrangements undertaken by the Special Duties squadrons as well as showing how the material delivered by these aircraft was used in the field.This account is reproduced here in its entirety, along with a detailed appendix containing the official historical record of Bomber Command aircrews and aircraft engaged in clandestine operations. Taken together, this book represents the most comprehensive account of the RAFs support for SOE ever published.

Part I

The Charter and Directives Given to the SOE by the Chiefs of Staff and Allocations of Aircraft on Special Duties

Chapter 1

The Pioneer Phase

1940 to November 1942

Special Operations Executive was established, and its first Directive given, in a War Cabinet Meeting Memorandum of July 1940, in which it was recorded that the Prime Minister had decided, after a consultation with the Ministers concerned that a new organisation should be established forthwith to co-ordinate all action by way of subversion and sabotage against the enemy overseas.

WP(40)271, 19 July 1940

S.O.E. was to be under the Chairmanship of Mr. Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare, who would have the co-operation of the Directors of Intelligence of the three Service Departments, and of the Secret Intelligence Service (M.I.6), for the purpose of the work entrusted to him. The Memorandum emphasised that the general plan for irregular offensive operations should be kept in step with the general strategical conduct of war, and that Mr. Dalton should therefore consult the Chiefs of Staff as necessary keeping them informed in general terms of his plans, and in turn receiving from them the broad strategic picture.

COS(40)27(0), 25 November 1940

In November 1940 the Chiefs of Staff issued their first Directive to S.O.E. In this paper the importance of planning subversive activities within the framework of military strategy was underlined again, and S.O.E., the Joint Planning Staff, the Director of Combined Operations, and the Air Staff were told to keep in close touch with each other. The Directive stated that the process of undermining the strength and spirit of the enemy armed forces, especially those in the occupied territories, should be the constant aim of S.O.E. On a long view, it should be S.O.E.’s particular aim to prepare the way for the final stage of the war, when by co-ordinated and organised revolts in the occupied countries and by a popular rising against the Nazi Party inside Germany, direct and decisive military operations against Germany herself might be possible.

After explaining the impossibility of laying down with any precision the areas in which military operations would eventually take place, the Chiefs of Staff said:

“We are, however, very conscious of the important and even decisive part which subversive activities may play in our strategy … we feel that if we are to exploit the use of subversive activities to the full, these activities must be planned on a very big and comprehensive scale. Our aim, in fact, should be to get subversive activities laid on and ready for execution in all areas where there is any chance that they may be needed, so that, wherever the fortune of war may require action, the ground will be prepared in advance.”

In the enemy countries S.O.E.’s aim was to be the creation of political disunity, discontent, economic disorganisation and dislocation of communications.

Offensive operations by the Allies in Western Europe and the Mediterranean were envisaged, and S.O.E. was directed to encourage subversive activities in the enemy-occupied countries of these areas. The importance of guarding against any premature revolt was emphasised and S.O.E. was warned that abortive attempts could only lead to the elimination of individuals and organisations which might later be needed.

Necessity for Use of Aircraft by S.O.E.

3039/PDDO, 20 August 1940

Deep penetration of the enemy’s Fortress of Europe, as envisaged by the Chiefs of Staff, necessitated the use of aircraft as a means of transport. The difficulties of transporting supplies inland from the coast, and the increasing German surveillance of the coastal areas, particularly in Western Europe, served to put the emphasis more and more upon air transport. As early as the summer of 1940, therefore, the first aircraft were set aside for S.D. work, when the Director of Plans, Air Ministry announced the formation of No.419 Flight at North Weald. These aircraft were not allotted for S.O.E.’s exclusive use but were to be shared between S.O.E. and S.I.S.

First S.D. Operations and S.O.E. Reports on Results

During the winter of 1940-41 the first operation to Western Europe was carried out by this Flight, and although the weather was consistently unfavourable and the number of successful operations correspondingly small, organisers, W/T operators and coup-de-main teams were dropped in the countries of Western Europe.

Assistance had been given to the Services in a number of operations by S.O.E. The first raid on the Lofoten Islands and operations “Shamrock,” and “Hemisphere” and particularly “Rubble” owed something of their success to intelligence and special equipment supplied by S.O.E. or to personnel trained by S.O.E. R.A.F. raids on the Bergen/Oslo railway and on Hoyanger were given assistance by S.O.E. agents who arranged for light signals to be shown on the ground, and in the former case the raid was planned on photographs printed by S.O.E. Apart from these semi-military operations, small scale sabotage had been carried on continuously against enemy communications by organisations financed and supplied with material by S.O.E. Attacks on railways and locomotives and a number of acts of industrial sabotage had met with a wide measure of success.

S.O.E. Plans: General Necessity for Aircraft, April 1941

On 21st April 1941, a paper entitled “The Prospects of Subversion,” was submitted to Lieut. General Sir Hastings Ismay by S.O.E. After recording that considerable progress in the organisation of Resistance had been achieved, S.O.E. pointed out that there was still immense scope for development in this branch of warfare. The possibilities in all parts of the world were now being studied while existing fields were being further exploited, and support given. Like the other Services, i.e. the Navy, Army and Air Force, S.O.E. were handicapped by the existing shortages of arms, of aircraft and of transport facilities; when these were made up, progress was expected to be quicker. If S.O.E. were to be responsible for the organisation of the “Fifth Column of the Free” they declared that provision must be made for their needs, and urged that long-term planning should take place at once, unless S.O.E. were to lose their whole raison d’etre they would have to train and infiltrate large numbers of agents during the coming year. Four to five hundred men were actually already in training. Suitable aeroplanes in sufficient numbers must be made available, and above all communications ensured.

A letter to H.M.G. Jobb, Esq., 24 April 1941

General Ismay replied that it would be asking for the impossible to expect the Chiefs of Staff to give a definite undertaking that they would make available, from their respective Services, the men and material necessary for carrying out all the S.O.E. plans. This would commit them to an almost unlimited liability. Unfortunately the Chiefs of Staff were at present faced with the problem of having to feed many hungry mouths with bread, on which the butter had to be spread very sparingly, and he felt sure that though they would agree, in principle, with S.O.E.’s paper, they would not be prepared to give S.O.E. the carte blanche for which they asked.

S.O.E. Plans: Sabotage and Secret Armies

COS(41)147(0), 21 July 1941

In July 1941, a paper submitted by S.O.E. to the Chiefs of Staff set forth an outline plan of S.O.E. operations from September 1941 to October 1942. S.O.E. working to a target date of the autumn of 1942, had evolved plans for the organisation both of subversive sabotage groups and of Secret Armies for guerilla warfare, had strongly urged that the formation and equipment of Secret Armies should be undertaken. The total number of aircraft sorties, which, it was estimated, would be necessary to fulfil the plans, was, 2,334, of which 584 were needed to equip the sabotage and subversive groups, and 1,750 for the Secret Army.

JP(41)649, 9 August 1941

This paper was considered by the Joint Planning Staff, and later by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and both emphasised the distinction between the two types of organisation which S.O.E. proposed to encourage. The Joint Planning Staff suggested that sabotage might be a most valuable complement to the bombing effort of the R.A.F. and should therefore be directed chiefly in accordance with the bombing policy aim. The organisation of Secret Armies on the other hand, should be limited to those areas where it was anticipated that an Allied Offensive would later be possible, and since they could not operate until bombing had first created suitable conditions, it would be unsound to sacrifice the effectiveness of our bombing effort to these activities. The Joint Planning Staff therefore recommended that subversive activities should be given preference over Secret Armies.

COS(41)287th Meeting, Item 10, 14 August 1941

The report of the Joint Planning Staff was considered by the Chiefs of Staff Committee who agreed that subversive activities should be given every encouragement but the prospects of raising Secret Armies, which depended on our ability to provide arms and ammunition, were to be reconsidered at a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting the next day.

Increase of Aircraft for S.D. Work, October 1941

If subversive activities were to be given every encouragement the first essential was an increase in the number of aircraft allotted to S.D. work, so that men and supplies could be sent in to the occupied countries to intensify Resistance activities. From the R.A.F.’s point of view the allocation of more aircraft for S.D. work inevitably meant a loss to the bombing effort. The D.C.A.S., in a minute to the Director of Plans on 10th August 1941, pointed out the difficulty of deciding whether the sacrifice to the Bomber effort was compensated by an equal or greater success in sabotage, and also remarked that the fact that S.D. operations could be carried out only during the moon periods meant that aircraft engaged on this work were used much less intensively than normal Bomber Squadrons.

DDP/598, 5 October 1941

The Director of Plans, however, writing to the V.C.A.S. argued that although the diversion of two or three Heavy Bombers from Bomber Command would entail a proportionate drop in the bomber effort, it was possible that the results obtained by sabotage might outweigh the loss. Germany was now intensifying her efforts to crush the Underground organisations in the occupied countries and this might well be the most appropriate moment to show by practical help that these subversive activities were valued. It could be argued that the ultimate aim of the bombing policy and the purpose of S.O.E. activity were identical. Without the lifeline of air transport, resistance could not continue on an effective scale.

COS(41)287th Meeting, Item 10, 14 August 1941

The Chiefs of Staff Committee, therefore, in directing that subversive activities were to be encouraged took note that the Air Ministry would try to expand as soon as possible the Special Flight. By the end of 1941, 138 Squadron had been formed, and was engaged on S.D. operations. In the spring of 1942, a second Squadron (161) was also allotted to S.D. work, and for the greater part of the next two years it was left to these two Squadrons to carry out the operations from the U.K. necessary to implement the Chiefs of Staff Directives to S.O.E.

Secret Armies

COS(41) 288th Meeting, Item 14, 15 August 1941

As had been arranged, the problem of the Secret Armies was further discussed by the Chiefs of Staff when the Committee agreed to reconsider the raising of Secret Armies after the War Office report on the availability of the necessary arms and equipment had been circulated.

JP(42)465, 1 May 1942

A Joint Planning Staff paper of May 1942 reports, however, that at the above Chiefs of Staff Meeting, it had been decided that secret armies and sabotage organisations in the nearer countries (Northern France, Belgium, Holland and Norway, in that order of priority) should be supported by the delivery of personnel and materials, while action in Poland and Czechoslovakia must be limited to the support of sabotage groups alone, as sufficient supplies for a secret army could not be transported without an unwarrantable diversion of bomber effort.

S.O.E.’s Second Directive, May 1942

COS(42)133(0), 12 May 1942

In May 1942, S.O.E. received its second directive from the Chiefs of Staff. Future military operations were expected to comprise a series of raids to be carried out on the coast from the north of Norway to the Bay of Biscay; an active air offensive over North Western Europe; a large scale raid to bring about an air battle and/or the capture of a bridgehead in France; and a large descent on Western Europe in the spring of 1943. S.O.E. were required to ensure that plans for the use of Resistance conformed with this general military strategy, and was instructed to work in continuous collaboration with the Planning Staffs. In particular S.O.E. should endeavour to build up and equip para-military organisations in the area of the projected operations. The action of such organisations would be directed particularly against the enemy’s road, rail and signal communications.

The emphasis was already beginning to shift from the exclusive support given to clandestine sabotage: in future S.O.E. were requested to plan for more military organisations which were, in effect, the Secret Armies of which they had long dreamed.

First Operations in the Mediterranean: Yugoslavia

As early as the autumn of 1941 reports from Yugoslavia had shown that guerilla activity was growing up under a more or less unified command, and in October the A.O.C.-in-C. Mediterranean and the C-in-C Mediterranean agreed to allocate two Wellesley Bombers based on Malta and three bomber sorties from Cairo for dropping supplies to Montenegro.

COS(41)339th Meeting, Item 2, 1 October 1941

At a Chiefs of Staff Meeting, a statement was given of S.O.E.’s transport requirements in Malta and the Middle East. A telegram dated 29th September which had been received from the Middle East reported that the M.E.W.S.C. had agreed, with the approval of A.O.C. Middle East, to proceed with the immediate formation of a small flight to be supplied, operated and maintained by the R.A.F. and capable of expansion as demands increased. S.O.E.’s representative agreed that this arrangement went a long way towards meeting their requirements.

British Liaison Officers despatched by sea succeeded in contacting General Mihailovic, at that time the most promising leader in Yugoslavia. Two Whitleys were sent to the Mediterranean, but they proved to be too slow for daylight sorties, and owing to their general limitations only one sortie was successfully completed. Ill luck continued to hamper Yugoslav plans: of the four Whitleys allotted to Malta, one burnt out in England and two were destroyed or badly damaged on the ground in Malta by enemy action.

COS(42)139, 26 February 1942...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface by John Grehan
• Air Ministry Note
• Chronology
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• PART I : The Charter and Directives Given to the SOE by the Chiefs of Staff and Allocations of Aircraft Duties
• PART II : Assistance Given by the RAF to the SOE: Problems and Procedure of Special Duty Operations
• PART III : Resistance in Europe
• PART IV
• APPENDICES
• Plate section