The Battle for Norway, 1940–1942

John Grehan, Martin Mace

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781526782137
• eBook ISBN: 9781473862685
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

Despatches in this volume include that on the first and second battles of Narvik in 1940; the despatch on operations in central Norway 1940, by Lieutenant General H.R.S. Massy, Commander-in-Chief, North West Expeditionary Force; Despatch on operations in Northern Norway between April and June 1940; the despatch on carrier-borne aircraft attacks on Kirkenes (Norway) and Petsamo (Finland) in 1941, by Admiral Sir John C. Tovey; the despatch on the raid on military and economic objectives in the Lofoten Islands (Norway) in March 1941, by Admiral Sir John C. Tovey, Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet; and the despatch on the raid on military and economic objectives in the vicinity of Vaagso Island (Norway) in December 1941, by Admiral Sir John C. Tovey.This unique collection of original documents will prove to be an invaluable resource for historians, students and all those interested in what was one of the most significant periods in British military history.

1

LIEUTENANT GENERAL H.R.S. MASSY’S DESPATCH ON OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL NORWAY I940

WEDNESDAY, 29 MAY, I946

OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL NORWAY, I940. PREFACE BY THE WAR OFFICE.

Of the two expeditions which the United Kingdom and France sent to Norway in April, I940, one to Northern Norway and one to Central Norway, the following despatch covers the latter from the beginning of operations.

In Central Norway two main landings were made, one in the Namsos area by a force under the command of Major-General A. Carton de Wiart, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., and one in the Åndalsnes area by a force under the command, first of Brigadier H. de R. Morgan, D.S.O., and later of Major-General B.C.T. Paget, D.S.O., M.C. On I9th April, I940, Lieutenant-General H.R.S. Massy, D.S.O., M.C., was instructed to assume the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the forces operating in Central Norway. He exercised this command from his Headquarters in the United Kingdom as the course of events did not permit the opening of a Headquarters in Norway.

When the decision to withdraw from Central Norway was taken on 27th April, I940, it was agreed to press on with operations against Narvik, and the force in Northern Norway comprising British, French and Polish troops succeeded in capturing the town of Narvik before it, in turn, had to be withdrawn at the beginning of June, I940.

The following despatch was submitted to the Secretary of State for War on I3th May, I940 by Lieutenant-General H.R.S. MASSY, D.S.O., M.C., Commander-in-Chief, North Western Expeditionary Force.

I have the honour to submit my report on the operations in Central Norway, up to and including 3rd May. This report is divided into four Parts as under:-

PART I. – General Summary of Events.

PART II. – Operations in the Namsos area.

PART III. – Operations in the Åndalsnes area.

PART IV. – Conclusions and lessons.

I am indebted for Part II of this report to Major-General Carton de Wiart and for Part III to Major-General B.C.T. Paget and Brigadier H. de R. Morgan, who have provided me with the necessary material for them.

PART I.
GENERAL SUMMARY OF EVENTS.

I. When the original plan for operations in Southern Norway was made, the landings at Åndalsnes and Namsos were intended as diversions to a main attack to be made on Trondheim. When the landings at Åndalsnes and Namsos were effected without loss, and our troops advanced inland from these bases, it was decided that Trondheim might be captured by a converging movement instead of by a hazardous direct attack from seaward.

It was hoped too that sufficient troops could be put into Åndalsnes to stiffen Norwegian resistance in the South, and thus put a limit to the German advance from Oslo.

It was against this background that I was instructed on I9th April to assume the appointment of Commander of the North-Western Expeditionary Force and to form my Headquarters with a view to taking command as soon as possible of the operations in progress North and South of Trondheim.

My instructions, as I understood them, were to capture Trondheim, and I decided that the first step towards this end must be to stop the German advance from Oslo, and then to plan a deliberate combined operation for the capture of Trondheim itself.

I record below a narrative of the operations which took place and the various decisions arrived at as the turn of events required. I have purposely kept this report as short as possible, fuller details on subjects which may require consideration will be forwarded separately to the War Office.

2. In accordance with my instructions I assumed direct control of operations on 22nd April. In view of the fact that my Headquarters were still in the process of forming and were not in a position to operate as such, orders were issued by my Staff in collaboration with the Staff of the War Office. This unusual and difficult position was made workable by the co-operation and assistance not only of the Military Operations Directorate but also of the numerous War Office branches which were necessarily consulted and whose aid was invoked during the period of operations.

Briefly, the situation in Southern Norway when I assumed command was as follows:-

In the area South of Trondheim Brigadier H. de R. Morgan with the I48th Infantry Brigade (I/5 Leicesters and 8 Foresters) was in the Lillehammer area South of Dombås in touch with Norwegian troops. The ship carrying Brigadier Morgan’s first-line transport had been sunk. He was therefore bereft of essential fighting equipment, including anti-tank guns. In the Namsos area, North of Trondheim Major-General Carton de Wiart had under his command Brigadier C.G. Phillips’ I46th Infantry Brigade (4 Lincolns, I/4 K.O.Y.L.I., and Hallams) and one demi-brigade of Chasseurs Alpins commanded by General Audet. The I46th Infantry Brigade was in contact with German forces near Verdalen, 45 miles North-East of Trondheim. The Chasseurs Alpins were in the vicinity of Namsos.

Major-General B.C.T. Paget had been selected to command the British forces operating South of Trondheim, and on this day he was handed my instructions, a copy of which is attached to this report at Appendix “A.” Accompanying him to assume control of the Base Area of Åndalsnes and to make a plan for its development as a base were Brigadier D. McA. Hogg, D.A. and Q.M.G. of Force Headquarters, and Brigadier D.J.R. Richards as Air Defence Commander to plan the air defence of the Base Area.

During this day news was received that the I46th Infantry Brigade had been attacked on the previous day, the 2Ist April, by enemy landed from a cruiser and destroyers, and that Steinkjer had been heavily bombed. The base at Namsos was now being regularly bombed and General Carton de Wiart reported that the maintenance of his force in this area was becoming difficult and that, unless some respite from the enemy bombing could be gained, it might well become impossible. Bombing of Åndalsnes was also taking place and considerable damage had been done. Arrangements were then made with the Royal Air Force to land Gladiators on a frozen lake at Lesjaskog, between Åndalsnes and Dombås, as soon as the necessary maintenance personnel could be landed. The support provided by the Royal Navy consisted of fighters from H.M.S. “Ark Royal” and “Glorious,” which were to operate over the ports, and torpedo bombers, which were to attack the enemy aerodromes in the neighbourhood of Trondheim and his ships in that harbour. Anti-aircraft cruisers and sloops were also allotted to give protection to the Base Areas.

3. On the 23rd, General Paget and his staff with Brigadier Hogg and Brigadier Richards left for Norway. During this day news was received from General Carton de Wiart that Brigadier Phillips had succeeded in extricating the I46th Infantry Brigade which, supported by the French, was occupying a position covering Namsos and Bangsund.

On this day too British troops on the Southern Sector had withdrawn as the result of heavy enemy attacks to hold a line South of Tretten, and behind them an effort was being made to re-organise Norwegian troops in the sector. During the whole of this day and the next both Base Areas were continually bombed, as were forward troops and the communications between them and the Base.

4. On the evening of the 24th, the 263rd Fighter Squadron, R.A.F. (I8 Gladiators) was flown ashore on Lake Lesjaskog. It was however immediately spotted by the enemy who commenced bombing next morning and continued it throughout the day. It is understood that, in spite of valiant efforts by the pilots and ground staff, but few of them were able to take off, and were quite insufficient to hold off the innumerable enemy bombers who attacked the aerodrome continuously.

5. On the 25th April, I was directed by the Chiefs of Staff to submit an appreciation on the situation in Norway. As it appeared to me then, the possibility of landing further troops or of maintaining the troops then ashore depended entirely on our being able to obtain control of the situation in the air. In my appreciation I stated this fact and gave it as my opinion that should adequate air support be available I had no reason to suppose that we could not hold our existing positions against the Germans, and at a later date eject them from Trondheim. Without it I had little doubt that any further operations would become impossible and that we should be compelled to evacuate our forces from Southern and Central Norway. I further stated that should evacuation be decided upon it would have to be done at short notice and that all necessary plans for this operation must therefore be made without delay. I requested that the Inter-Service Planning Staffs should be directed to make the necessary preparations forthwith. I was not aware when this appreciation was written that the attempt to establish the Gladiators ashore had failed.

During this day, the I48th Infantry Brigade was withdrawn to Otta and it became evident that the I5th Infantry Brigade, which had sailed under General Paget’s orders, part on 22nd and part on 24th April, would be required to hold Dombås and Opdal if the process of putting further troops ashore in the Åndalsnes area was to be contemplated. Instructions to this effect were sent to General Paget in amplification of his original instructions in Appendix “A”. The situation at Namsos did not materially alter during this or the following day, though bombing of this port and Åndalsnes continued. Both towns had been completely destroyed, and as the nights were getting shorter, the amount of unloading which could be undertaken was becoming progressively less.

6. During 26th April the situation at Namsos did not materially alter. From reports received from the South however it became increasingly obvious that in the face of artillery and mortar fire and incessant bombing, to none of which the Allied troops could effectively reply, the German advance could not be stopped. General Paget stated it as his opinion that his troops could not endure for more than four days unless adequate air support was forthcoming. During the whole of this day the bombing of Åndalsnes and Namsos continued and the possibility of these ports being rendered inoperative as bases had to be faced. During the afternoon I became aware of the previous day’s failure of the Gladiators to operate from a shorebased aerodrome, and it then became evident to me that the chances of our getting any air support which would enable us in any way to compete with the German air menace had practically vanished. I was convinced that evacuation would therefore be necessary. I reported my views verbally to the C.I.G.S. who informed me that the Chiefs of Staff had that morning been considering the possibility of re-instituting a modified operation for the direct attack on Trondheim, and had come to the conclusion that it would take some ten days to mount. I understood from him that, in view of the situation, the Chiefs of Staff were not prepared to recommend this course to the Government as they doubted, as I did, whether the forces in Southern Norway could hold on long enough to enable the operation to be put into effect.

7. Accordingly next morning, 27th April, I wrote an appreciation of th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• List of Illustrations
• The Despatches
• Abbreviations