The Rise of the Seleukid Empire, 323–223 BC

John D. Grainger

• Publisher: Praetorian Press
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781526743763
• eBook ISBN: 9781473838604
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Greek Ancient History
• Index: History

The first of three books on the ancient Greek dynasty "reads with the pull of a novel and shows how the new Empire rose and fell."—Firetrench
 
The Seleukid kingdom was the largest state in the world for a century and more between Alexander's death and the rise of Rome. The first king, Seleukos I, established a pattern of rule which was unusually friendly towards his subjects, and his policies promoted the steady growth of wealth and population in many areas which had been depopulated when he took them over. In particular the dynasty was active in founding cities from Asia Minor to Central Asia. Its work set the social and economic scene of the Middle East for many centuries to come. Yet these kings had to be warriors too as they defended their realm from jealous neighbors.
 
John D Grainger's trilogy charts the rise and fall of this superpower of the ancient world. In the first volume, he relates the remarkable twists of fortune and daring that saw Seleukos, an officer in an elite guard unit, emerge from the wars of the Diadochi (Alexander's successors) in control of the largest and richest part of the empire of the late Alexander the Great. After his conquests and eventual murder, we then see how his successors continued his policies, including the repeated wars with the Ptolemaic rulers of Egypt over control of Syria. The volume ends with the deep internal crisis and the Wars of the Brothers, which left only a single member of the dynasty alive in 223 BC.

Chapter One

The Collapse of Alexander’s Empire

The empire conquered with such speed by Alexander the Great in his campaigns against the empire of the Akhaimenid Great King, crumbled into fragments almost as soon as he was dead. In part this was due to his premature death at the age of 32, before he had time to devise a proper administrative system for his conquests. But it seems unlikely that he would have bothered to do that even if he had lived. As he lay dying he was still planning an expedition to sail round Arabia to get to Egypt. He must have known that a prolonged absence on such an expedition would produce rebellions and corruption and oppression in the empire, for this is what had already happened while he was marching through the desert from India.

Such administration as existed was a relic of the system of the Akhaimenids, with aristocratic Macedonians largely, but not completely, replacing aristocratic Persians as satraps, the governors of huge provinces. These men had their own armed forces, since there was a good deal of local opposition to the Macedonians, not to mention continuing banditry in the mountainous regions. This meant that the satraps were largely independent and could, and often did, refuse to pay any attention to instructions from the king. On his return from India, Alexander had dealt with some of the worst cases by execution, but this would not be much of a threat when he was off a-voyaging and a-conquering elsewhere. (And after reaching Egypt he planned expeditions throughout the Mediterranean, which would take several years at the minimum.)¹

This was no way to run an empire, as was rapidly shown when he, the one man who had the charisma and authority to extract obedience from the satraps, died. Two main results followed; there were serious rebellions in Baktria and in Greece, and the military men in Babylon began quarrelling over their new positions and powers almost at once. The two problems partly neutralized each other, for the rebellions were sufficiently serious to compel the men in Babylon to mute their rivalries for a time. Nevertheless, more than one of them struck out for himself almost as soon as Alexander had died.

The problem of the succession to Alexander as king was also a delaying factor, and it aggravated the situation in Babylon as well. Alexander’s half-brother Philip Arrhidaios was judged mentally unfit to rule, and one of his widows, Roxane, was pregnant. Whatever child she produced there could obviously be no effective king for at least the next twenty years, so a regency was required. At first Perdikkas, the senior commander in Babylon, took the position, claiming to have been in effect appointed by Alexander when he was dying, but he had competitors; in Macedon an even more senior man, Antipater, had ruled the home kingdom while Alexander was on campaign, and in Kilikia, marching slowly towards Macedon with an army of veteran soldiers who were to be discharged, there was Krateros, who was also supposed to take over from Antipater in Macedon, a prospective confrontation he apparently did not relish. The reaction of these men to what amounted to Perdikkas’ coup in Babylon would not be known for some time.

Seleukos son of Antiochos was one of the contenders among the Macedonian commanders at Babylon. He had emerged in the latter part of Alexander’s career of conquest as a senior commander, though with little in the way of personal distinction to mark him out from the rest. He was one of a group of Alexander’s contemporaries who were clearly being promoted by the king to free him from the influence and caution of the older men he had inherited from his father – such as Antipater. In the crisis at Babylon Seleukos supported Perdikkas, who was soon challenged by the commander of the infantry, Meleager. This pushed Perdikkas into accepting both Philip and Roxane’s child, if it was a boy, to share the kingship. Meleager and his followers – ‘mutineers’ to those who continued in charge – were soon killed, but the joint kingship continued. Perdikkas organized a new distribution of offices, in which Seleukos became his second-in-command.²

It is notorious that more than one man decided at this point that it would be more profitable to secure control of a rich province than to continue as a subordinate in the imperial administration. Ptolemy, by choosing to go to Egypt, is the best known, but others did the same, notably Peithon in Media, who defeated the Greek rebellion there. Neither Antipater nor Antigonos (in Asia Minor) could be moved at Perdikkas’ word, so they remained where they were. Krateros, still in Kilikia, was made joint regent with Perdikkas, but since Perdikkas kept control of the kings’ persons, Krateros’ position was largely honorary, though he had the loyalty of the troops he commanded.

Perdikkas was soon suspected by his fellows of aiming to seize the kingship, a suspicion fuelled by his apparent intention of marrying Alexander’s sister Kleopatra. This brought all the rest out against him. The Greek wars – in Greece and Baktria – were won, but Perdikkas himself had done little in those struggles. He turned to deal with Ptolemy who had proved unexpectedly active in Egypt, eliminating the former administration in his own favour, annexing Cyrenaica, and seizing control of the great catafalque carrying Alexander’s body which was moving infinitely slowly towards Macedon.³ He took it instead to Egypt where eventually it was installed, supposedly preserved, in a tomb in Alexandria. This was a direct challenge to Perdikkas’ authority, and he came south through Syria with the imperial army to deal with Ptolemy.

This was a very unpopular move. It was not that Ptolemy himself was popular among his fellows, but this was a fight between elements of Alexander’s own army, Macedonians against Macedonians, and none of the soldiers wanted that. Ptolemy successfully played on their feelings, which no doubt he shared, and when Perdikkas organized a crossing of the river which failed with substantial casualties, and more men were killed by crocodiles, Perdikkas’ officers turned on him. One of those who literally wielded the knife was Seleukos.⁴

This stopped the invasion of Egypt; Ptolemy quickly brought supplies of food across the river for the invaders, and the army, grumbling at a lack of pay, marched back into Syria. At a meeting of army and commanders at a Persian resort called Triparadeisos in middle Syria, Seleukos emerged as one of the key players. Antipater arrived from Macedon, and was immediately chosen as the new regent. When trouble over the lack of pay developed it was Seleukos, along with Antigonos, the satrap of Phrygia, who calmed everything down.⁵ This was the first and last time these two men co-operated.

Antipater distributed posts again. Several of the major commanders, including Krateros, had been killed in the recent fighting, and others had earned rewards. There was still a party of former supporters of Perdikkas, led by Alexander’s Greek secretary Eumenes, to be suppressed; since they were mainly in Asia Minor, Antigonos was given the task of doing this, with a substantial part of the army. Ptolemy could not be shifted from Egypt, and anyway Antipater, 80 years old, probably did not have the will or the energy to tackle him. Seleukos had now appreciated that power in the future lay not in being part of the imperial government, which was in the feeble hands of Antipater, if it existed at all, but in controlling a province. He was made satrap of Babylonia, quite probably his own choice. After Egypt, this was the richest province of all.⁶

This war had winnowed out the competing generals down to half a dozen of real importance. Apart from Ptolemy, Antigonos, and Seleukos, there were Peithon in Media, Peukestas in Persis, and Eumenes. By now Eumenes was outlawed, but he was both talented and ingenious. He was for the present in interior Asia Minor. Antipater lived another year, and when he died his son Kassander seized control of Macedon itself. So from 319 there were several men who were in effect independent lords of major parts of the empire, and several more ruled smaller sections. There was no one man with empire-wide authority. It looked as though the empire was in the process of disintegration. Its reconstitution was a standing challenge and temptation to all these men, and was the main theme of the events of the next half-century.

Antigonos’ task of eliminating Eumenes turned out to be very difficult. Eumenes proved to be adept at persuading Alexander’s old soldiers (Macedonians and Greeks) to support him, though it was never easy. (He set up a throne in the royal tent, and had held Councils of War there, with Alexander’s spirit presiding from the empty throne.)⁷ Antigonos in turn proved to be an outstanding military commander. He had shown this in a difficult series of campaigns inside Asia Minor while Alexander was conquering in the east, but it seems that few had really noticed. One who had was Antipater. This made him suspicious of Antigonos’ intentions, and he had placed Kassander at Antigonos’ elbow to assist and watch him. Antigonos was a man of the same generation as Antipater, but he had not been part of the great adventure as far as India; he was therefore something of a mystery to those who had campaigned with Alexander; he was careful to keep his ambition within bounds for several years, partly because he had only a small armed force under his control.⁸

Antigonos used the campaign against Eumenes to build up his armed strength, and to eliminate or recruit possible competitors. In the process his ambition expanded. The conflict, starting in Kappadokia, moved gradually south and east until the final battles were fought in Iran. The satraps of Kilikia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Babylonia, and Media, and the eastern regions, were successively faced with the need to make the choice between Eumenes and Antigonos. For most of them the choice was not actually difficult. Eumenes had been condemned as a rebel at the time of the Triparadeisos meeting, and Antigonos had been tasked with suppressing him by the Macedonian assembly of men under arms, the nearest thing to a legal legislative body there was by that time. So when Eumenes and his army – consisting of a substantial part of the old army of Alexander – arrived on their doorstep each of the satraps had to make the decision whom to support. In theory Eumenes’ condemnation should have been decisive; in fact plenty of other considerations entered into the decision. Opposing Eumenes was dangerous. He had a substantial army, one greater than any of the forces commanded by any of the satraps. Defying him might well end a satrap’s life or at least his career.

The Syrian satrap, Laomedon of Mitylene, had already been removed by Ptolemy, and it seems that no replacement had been appointed; no doubt Ptolemy made himself the new governor.⁹ The land had been campaigned through at least twice since Alexander’s brutal conquest, and Ptolemy was occupying much of it by the time Eumenes arrived. Ptolemy did not fight him, but neither did he join him. He was effectively declaring that the contest was none of his concern, and so was indicating his independence; this was the first concrete indication that the empire of Alexander might not survive intact. When Antigonos came into Syria in pursuit Eumenes moved off to the east. The satrap of Mesopotamia, Amphimachos, joined Eumenes, but in a sparsely populated region with few soldiers he probably had no choice. Eumenes moved further east and spent the winter in northern Babylonia. Antigonos, having established his own control of Kilikia and northern Syria, moved eastwards also, but then camped in Mesopotamia for the winter (of 317/316).¹⁰

The problem of the approaching armies had brought Seleukos in Babylonia and Peithon in Media together. Eumenes negotiated with both of them during the winter, but news arrived that the dowager queen Olympias, allied with Eumenes and with Polyperchon – the official regent, but politically powerless – had returned to Macedon. She there killed King Philip and his wife (his half sister Eurydike) and then murdered a hundred of their Macedonian supporters.¹¹ Although Eumenes had nothing to do with this atrocity he was inevitably tarred by it, and this perhaps tipped the balance in the negotiations in Babylonia, for neither Seleukos nor Peithon could join Eumenes after that. In the spring Eumenes, who was militarily stronger than both of them together, marched through Babylonia and into Susiana.

Seleukos’ position in the negotiations had been a rather subtle one. Eumenes was campaigning as a champion of the kings (Philip III and Alexander IV), and had authority from Polyperchon to do so. This argument often worked, as it would in Iran in the next months. It clearly worked with his own army, whose core was the regiment of Argyraspides, the Silver Shields, commanded by Antigenes. These were royalists to a man and accepted, no doubt with a cynical grin, the play-acting of the royal tent and the empty throne. But the equally royalist meeting at Triparadeisos had condemned Eumenes; Seleukos had been at that meeting, as had Peithon, so when he was asked to give his support to Eumenes, Seleukos replied that he was as much a royalist as Eumenes, but that he could not accept orders from him.¹²

Seleukos could take his stand on the origin of his authority as satrap, for he had been appointed to the post by the conclave and assembly at Triparadeisos, where Eumenes had been condemned. Eumenes might argue that he had been forgiven – his authority from Polyperchon implied as much – but Seleukos’ post was clearly earlier and more authoritative in its origin than anything Eumenes could demonstrate. Peithon could go even better, for his authority as satrap of Media antedated even the Triparadeisos meeting, not that this did him any good, for he had attempted to enforce his authority over other satraps in Iran only to be defeated by them. He held onto Media, but by joining Seleukos, he aligned his enemies with Seleukos’ enemy, that is Eumenes. The confederate eastern satraps kept their army in being after defeating Peithon, and moved into Susiana, Antigenes’ satrapy. Seleukos and Peithon may be allied, but they were weak militarily, yet they had to oppose Eumenes.¹³ So the only way for Eumenes to get through Babylonia to Antigenes’ satrapy, as Antigonos approached from the west, was by force.

Seleukos had to try to stop him, for Eumenes had no authority to move into Babylonia. The invading army was unable to get across the Tigris. Eumenes gathered boats, but Seleukos arrived at the crossing place with two triremes, which had originally been built for Alexander’s intended Arabian campaign. Speaking from one of them, he tried, for a second time, to persuade Antigenes and the Silver Shields to depose Eumenes, but again failed. He then sailed upstream along a canal and broke a sluice to let the water out to flood Eumenes’ camp. But by doing so Seleukos (as he must have realized) left the crossing unguarded, except for some cavalry. Eumenes now got his army across, using the boats he had collected. He had to go back for the baggage and the camp followers, which were more difficult to shift, and then began his own excavation to divert the waters.

There was a certain amount of fighting, but once Eumenes had secured the crossing with his boats, Seleukos was unable to stop him marching on. Some casualties had been incurred, but neither side lost many men. Seleukos had sent messengers to Antigonos, who was following on but clearly was not going to arrive soon. Seleukos offered Eumenes a truce, but Eumenes marched his army onwards without any further hindrance, into Susiana. He was even able to march in three separate columns to facilitate gathering food. Seleukos was not strong enough to interfere.¹⁴

Eumenes managed to persuade the assembled eastern satraps to join him. He sent letters asserting his authority, derived from Polyperchon, but it was perhaps the fact that he and they were both opposed to Peithon which was the more persuasive argument. Refuelled by the treasure held at Antigenes’ capital of Susa, and resupplied by the looted resources of Babylonia, Eumenes now commanded a very large army. But he had forced Seleukos and Peithon into supporting Antigonos, who soon arrived.

Antigonos followed in Eumenes’ tracks into Susiana, by which time Eumenes had moved on into central Iran. Antigonos continued, leaving Seleukos to govern Susiana and to lay siege to Susa. Diodoros explains this as Antigonos appointing Seleukos as satrap in place of Antigenes, and ordering him to conduct the siege, but this is rather anticipating Antigonos’ later conduct. Seleukos would have said that he was assisting the legitimate commander in his appointed task. He certainly added some of his own troops to Antigonos’ army, and more were with him in Susiana. He did not, however, press on with the siege of Susa very vigorously, which gave him an excuse not to join Antigonos in the campaign against Eumenes.¹⁵

Seleukos’ position with regard to Antigonos was exactly what it had been with regard to Eumenes. He based his authority as satrap in Babylonia on his appointment at Triparadeisos, and this was exactly the same as Antigonos’ basis of authority. Antigonos, however, also claimed to hold a position as ‘general over Asia’, an appointment of Antipater’s, and this was the basis for his command of the forces hunting Eumenes. There was clearly a contradiction involved. Presumably once Eumenes was removed, Antigonos’ position as strategos should lapse, bu...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Maps and Tables
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 The Collapse of Alexander’s Empire
• Chapter 2 Ptolemy’s Commander
• Chapter 3 Seleukos and Babylon
• Chapter 4 Seleukos’ First Kingdom
• Chapter 5 Expedition to the East
• Chapter 6 The Grand Alliance
• Chapter 7 New Enmities, New Cities
• Chapter 8 Antiochos in the East
• Chapter 9 Seleukos in the West
• Chapter 10 Antiochos I and the Galatians
• Chapter 11 The New State
• Chapter 12 Creeping Imperialism
• Chapter 13 Antiochos II
• Chapter 14 War, Collapse, and Fragmentation
• Chapter 15 Failure
• Notes and References
• Abbreviations
• Bibliography