Viriathus

& the Lusitanian Resistance to Rome, 155–139 BC

Luis Silva

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781781591284
• eBook ISBN: 9781473826892
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military Biographies
• Index: History

This fascinating biography sheds light on the important yet overlooked military leader who thwarted Rome in what is now Spain and Portugal.
In the second century BC, as Rome engaged in the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, they met with determined resistance from the Lusitanian people and their skilled leader, Viriathus. Though renowned in his day Viriathus has been neglected by modern historians, a travesty that Luis Silva puts right in this thoroughly researched and accessible biography.
Apparently of humble birth, Viriathus rose to prominence after the treacherous massacre of the existing tribal chieftains and soon proved himself a gifted and audacious commander. Relying on hit and run guerrilla tactics, he inflicted humiliating reverses on the Roman forces, uniting a number of tribes in resistance to the invader and stalling their imperial efforts for eight years. Still unbeaten in the field, he was only overcome when the Romans resorted to bribing some of his own men to assassinate him.

Chapter 1

Hispania at the End of the Second Punic War

The End of the Punic War in Hispania

With the Carthaginian defeat at the Battle of Ilipa and the naval defeat of Hannibal’s youngest brother, Mago Barca, off the coast of southern Spain near Gades (modern-day Cadiz) in 206 BC, the Romans had successfully driven out the Carthaginians from Hispania.¹ With Hispania now under their control, the Romans planned to consolidate this newly acquired territory and stabilize it from any further violence. Rome thus inherited its wealth as well as its problems, most notably the rebellious Iberian tribes. The year 206 BC marked the end of the first period of Roman involvement in the peninsula. They were now ready to begin their second phase: consolidation and pacification of the natives. Prior to the start of the Second Punic War in 218 BC, Rome had no interest in Hispania except to maintain a watch over the growth of Barcas family power and its influence in the Mediterranean.² But after the war, the status quo had changed.

As all powerful nations and empires have discovered, breaking off from an involvement of such magnitude is not so simple, even if one wants to. The Romans had realized that their presence in the Iberian Peninsula for the last twelve years had altered the status quo in the Mediterranean. Rome, which had formed alliances with the Iberians, was now obligated to support its allies on the peninsula, and disregarding those obligations might have weakened Rome’s ability to control what had become an important area strategically and economically. Their so-called Iberian ‘allies’ were disobedient, unruly and unpredictable, so they could not be trusted to keep out the Carthaginians. It was important for the Romans to maintain some sort of governance and military presence in Hispania because its distance from Italy would prevent Rome from quickly responding to any crisis.³ Thus direct control from within Hispania by Senate elected officials was the only practical solution. Furthermore, Roman presence had resulted in the creation of commercial avenues of interests, such as trading and mining, which brought considerable additional wealth into Rome.

Rome decided to stay on, fearing that if it withdrew from Hispania the Carthaginians would quickly return. To maintain a long-term presence, it became clear to Rome that it needed to replace the military consular imperium (power) given to military commanders with some form of an organized government.⁴ But for this to happen, Hispania had first to be labelled a provincia by the Senate. Its unofficial designation as a Roman province (though this would not be officially ratified until 197 BC when Hispania became an official state of the empire) enabled Rome to quickly gain some control over this new addition to its growing empire by stationing soldiers within its borders to combat any future Carthaginian or indigenous threat.

With the war over, military commanders also became administrators and began contacting local tribal leaders, developing a structure that would determine the life of the province. Besides caring for and training their army, they began to collect taxes and tributes, set up and maintain friendly relations with local tribes, institute laws and practices, and establish new settlements. As Roman influence grew in Hispania’s coastal areas, the appearance of more Roman settlers led to the exploitation of the peninsula’s mineral and agricultural resources and peoples. This would cause the indigenous population to rebel against the new occupier within a year of the war’s end.

Rome and the Indigenous People of Hispania

The decision to get involved in Hispania in 218 BC came primarily from the Senate after the fall of Saguntum, an Iberian city that had become an ally of Rome, at the start of the Second Punic War.⁵ While the Senate provided a command structure, supply and manpower, and sent its elected commanders onto the shores of Hispania, all decisions were then made by the commanders in the field, particularly the Scipio family, which was in charge of the entire military operation.⁶ A military commander was delegated senatorial power once assigned to Hispania due to the Senate’s concurrent war against Hannibal in Italy and the fact that the Spanish campaign was in a remote area, distant from senatorial supervision or control.⁷ Because of distance and the need to make rapid and immediate decisions, an ad hoc mechanism of a military government was set up in 217 BC.⁸ Despite the Senate’s interest in the war, its advice and decisions appear to have had no effect on the conduct of military operations. In the end, it was the commander’s decision that counted, for he was the one who was there fighting the Carthaginians.

After the war, according to Professor J.S. Richardson, the governmental/military command structure in Spain remained the same, but how governors were elected changed. Richardson’s study of the Roman campaign and occupation of Hispania shows that from the year 206 BC military governors were elected by a popular assembly, either the comitia centuriata or the comitia tributa.⁹ With the war over, the Senate wanted decision making to be shared by senators and military governors, but this proved impractical for the same reasons as before. It was decided that the military governors would continue to be the deciding governing body on Roman policies in Hispania, but would have to inform the Senate of what they had instituted.

While at the time of the invasion, manpower, supplies and money for the army came from Rome, by 215 BC there were signs that the Romans had begun to take root in Hispania, making them a self-sufficient force.¹⁰ By the end of the war, not only was P. Scipio Africanus, the son of Publius Scipio, obtaining sufficient supplies, troops and money from Rome, he was also able to levy fresh troops from his allies and requisition land and money from defeated tribes allied to the Carthaginians.¹¹ It was from these exactions of money and provisions from the Iberian tribes that Scipio Africanus was able to pay a stipendium to his army.¹²

Maintaining good relations with the indigenous people proved to be the hardest job of the Roman commanders in Hispania. Although it is difficult to assess the type of relations that existed because reports and histories were susceptible to being reworked by Romans to either favour or disfavour a people, several accounts state that when the Romans arrived in Hispania they were determined to win local backing.¹³ It was in the Romans’ best interests to persuade the Iberians to support them, and during the war they won over as many allies as they could.¹⁴ One of the main reasons Scipio was successful in gaining tribal support was the harsh rule the Carthaginians imposed on the Iberians.¹⁵ In addition, the Romans commissioned Iberian soldiers, who were mostly Carthaginian defectors, to fight as mercenaries rather than conscripting them as the Carthaginians had.¹⁶ In some cases, these mercenaries were better paid than they were by the Carthaginians.¹⁷

In the aftermath of the Roman victory at Ilipa (modern-day Alcalá del Río, near Seville), Scipio decided to make an example of tribes or towns that had sided with Carthage. The two Iberian towns selected to be the first to feel Rome’s power were Castulo and Ilurco.¹⁸ The reason these two cities were chosen was because their citizens had participated, respectively, in Scipio’s father’s death at the Battle of the Upper Baetis (211 BC) and his uncle’s at Ilorco (210 BC).¹⁹

M. Junius Silanus, Scipio’s deputy, along with a legion from Tarraco (modern-day Tarragona), was sent to Castulo to make sure its inhabitants accepted Roman rule.²⁰ They refused to swear allegiance to Rome, and soon became enraged and hostile. When this was communicated to Scipio, he immediately set out from Carthago Nova (modern-day Cartagena) to assist Silanus’ attack on Castulo. On his way, he decided to change direction and attacked the town of Ilurco, which was 19 miles (30 km) from Castulo.²¹ In Livy’s account, Scipio marched from Carthago Nova to the outskirts of Ilurco in five days, covering about 124 miles (200 km) through mountainous terrain. His change of plan was because during his father’s time in Hispania, Ilurco had been friendly to the Romans, but after his father was killed in battle, the city had welcomed a Roman legion only to hand it over to the Carthaginians.²² Perhaps he also changed his battle plan because he thought Castulo may have warned Ilurco of his coming and that when Castulo was taken by Silanus, Ilurco might rally its forces against the Romans. Both Livy and Appian say that Ilurco was taken in four hours, and that although he was wounded in the neck, Scipio did not desist until the city was in his hands. In their desire to take the city as quickly as possible his legionnaires killed everyone, including women and children. Even though they had not received orders to, they razed the entire town on their own initiative in search of plunder.²³ But according to Appian, Scipio seemed to have been in such a rush that his soldiers did not get the chance to collect any booty, as he quickly reorganized and redirected his troops toward Castulo.²⁴ We can only assume that he did this to reach Castulo before any survivors of Ilurco could.

Arriving at Castulo to support Silanus’ siege, Scipio divided his army into three and set up camp around the city. At first he did not press the siege, but watched the town to see if it would surrender to him, for he had received intelligence that the Castacians had intended to give in to his demands. After hearing what had happened at Ilurco from several of its survivors, the Castacians quickly and quietly gave up. Scipio then stationed a garrison there and placed the town under a pro-Roman government made up of Castacian citizens under the leadership of a man named Cerdubelus.²⁵ Scipio returned to Carthago Nova and sent Silanus and L. Marcius Septimius into Hispania’s unconquered northern central regions to devastate, plunder and take control of as much territory as they could.²⁶

Moving west into the Baetis Valley (now Guadalquivir River Valley) the two commanders took several Iberian cities and continued to move in a southwesterly direction to deal with Gades (today Cadiz), the last pro-Carthaginian stronghold. The best recorded siege of this campaign concerns the town of Astapa, another pro-Carthaginian town (today it is an ancient ruin on the Guadalquivir River, north of Astigi, modern Écija). Appian writes:

Marcius Septimius on arriving at Astapa quickly laid siege to the city, and the inhabitants foreseeing that when the city was taken by the Romans, they would be reduced to slavery. To deny the Romans that victory, they brought all their valuables into the marketplace, piled wood around it, the men then placed the elderly, their wives and their children on the heap while calling out to their gods for what they had done. Fifty of their best men took an oath that whenever they should see that the city was about to fall, they would kill everyone, set fire to the pile, and slay themselves.²⁷

From Livy’s account of the battle, which is more detailed than Appian’s, he writes:

committed to their word, the Astapians warriors flung open the town gates and burst out in a tumultuous charge, which Marcius Septimius did not anticipate anything of the kind. On seeing the human wave coming, he quickly deployed the entire cavalry and light infantry against them. Fierce fighting ensued in which the legionnaires, who had been first to come into contact with the enemy were soon routed; this created a panic amongst the light infantry. The Iberian attack would have been pushed to the foot of the Roman camp’s defence perimeter if it had not been for Marcius’ leadership in getting his men back on line.²⁸

He goes on to write:

at first there was some wavering amongst the Roman front ranks, for the enemy, blinded by rage, fury and desperation rushed with mad recklessness upon wounds and death, allotting the Romans a few minutes to get into a line formation. On seeing the human wave, many of the inexperienced Roman soldiers at the front rank began to waver. Unshaken by the frantic onset, the veterans came up in support and cut down the enemy’s front ranks. When the Roman line began to waver due to the Astapians’ ferocity, Marcius extended his lines and outflanked the enemy. With sheer numbers, the Iberians fighting in a compact body and the Roman’s tactical manoeuvering, the Romans wiped them all out.²⁹

When all had fallen, the fifty who remained behind killed the women and children, kindled the fire, and flung the bodies of the dead as well as themselves on it. Livy says that by the time the Romans arrived on the scene, all had perished:

At first the Romans stood horror-stricken at such a fearful sight, then, seeing the melted gold and silver flowing amongst the other articles which made up the heap, the greediness common to human nature impelled them to try and snatch what they could out of the fire. Some were caught by the flames, others were scorched by the heated air...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Maps
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: Hispania at the End of the Second Punic War
• Chapter 2: First Celtiberian War
• Chapter 3: Lusitanian Warfare and Weapons
• Chapter 4: Viriathus the Man
• Chapter 5: The Lusitanian War with Rome Begins
• Chapter 6: The Viriathan War
• Chapter 7: The End of the Viriathan War
• Chapter 8: Campaigns of Lusitanian Pacification
• Chapter 9: The Romanization of Lusitania
• Chapter 10: Viriathus the King and the Legend
• Notes and References