The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters

Linchpin of Victory, 1935–1942

Andrew Boyd

• Publisher: Seaforth Publishing
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781473892484
• eBook ISBN: 9781473892507
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

How British naval power in the Indian Ocean played a critical early role in WWII: "Commands the reader's attention. . . . a history game-changer." — Warship, Naval Books of the Year
 
This new work tells the compelling story of how the Royal Navy secured the strategic space from Egypt in the west to Australasia in the East through the first half of the Second World War—and explains why this contribution, made while Russia's fate remained in the balance and before American economic power took effect, was so critical. Without it, the war would certainly have lasted longer and decisive victory might have proved impossible.
 
After the protection of the Atlantic lifeline, this was surely the Royal Navy's finest achievement, the linchpin of victory. The book moves authoritatively between grand strategy, intelligence, accounts of specific operations, and technical assessment of ships and weapons. It challenges established perceptions of Royal Navy capability and will change the way we think about Britain's role and contribution in the first half of the war. The Navy of 1939 was stronger than usually suggested and British intelligence did not fail against Japan. Nor was the Royal Navy outmatched by Japan, coming very close to a British Midway off Ceylon in 1942. And it was the Admiralty, demonstrating a reckless disregard for risks, that caused the loss of Force Z in 1941. The book also lays stress on the key part played by the American relationship in Britain's Eastern naval strategy. Superbly researched and elegantly written, it adds a hugely important dimension to our understanding of the war in the East.

PART I

Preparing for Two-Hemisphere War

1

The Royal Navy 1935–39: The Right Navy for the Right War

For fifty years after the Second World War, the standard portrayal of the Royal Navy in the interwar period was one of decline and decay modified by a late (and from the political perspective reluctant) spurt of rearmament. Outside a few specialist works, this picture remains dominant.1 This prevailing view stresses not only the rapid decline in size of the Royal Navy, both absolute and relative, from its zenith in 1919, but a failure of the Royal Navy leadership to learn the lessons of the First World War and especially to address the implications of air and submarine power. Thus the Royal Navy at the start of the 1930s has been described as ‘technologically obsolescent, truncated by treaty, no longer a war hardened fighting service, but once again a kind of fashionable yacht club more apt for elegant displays of ship handling and Royal Tours of the Empire than for battle’.2 Such language may be florid and overstated, but it captures the popular picture of the interwar Royal Navy. This portrays a service fixated on fighting another Jutland and, at best, technically and tactically conservative, if not backward, compared to its US Navy and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) peers.3 There is a fascinating example recently highlighted which contributed to this image. This is the endless repetition of the claim first made by Stephen Roskill, the official naval historian of the Second World War, that ‘not one exercise in the protection of a slow moving mercantile convoy against sea or air attack took place during the period 1919–1939’. This ‘seeming extraordinary assertion’ has been taken as fact ever since.4 The claim is wrong, and one of many enduring myths.5

This chapter shows that the Royal Navy of the late 1930s was a stronger, more innovative, and more ambitious force than even the most revisionist views have so far suggested. It begins by examining the state of the Royal Navy, with its inherited strengths and weaknesses, in 1935. This is the chosen starting point for this book for three reasons. First, as already noted, it marks the moment when the risks to Britain’s maritime security from a resurgent Germany in Europe and from Japan in the Far East became real. By the end of that year, a third potential enemy, Italy, was in view as well. Secondly, it marks the beginning of a naval rearmament programme, designed to address the new risks, but also deficiencies in naval investment accumulated since the late 1920s. Finally, it marks the time when the naval limitation structures which had been in place since the Washington Treaty of 1922 began to break down. From this 1935 starting point, the chapter examines the Royal Navy’s response to the emerging threats to Britain’s naval security. It scrutinises the Royal Navy rearmament programme, the industrial capacity to support it, what it hoped to achieve, whether its goals were realistic, and how well it met Royal Navy requirements for the war it ultimately had to fight from 1939 through to the end of 1942. The final section assesses Royal Navy strengths and weaknesses by 1939 and its overall operational effectiveness then, compared to its future enemies. The evolution of Royal Navy strategy and planning during this period for a global war against three potential enemies is addressed in the next chapter.

1919–1935: Underlying strength and resilience

At the start of 1935, the Royal Navy remained the largest navy in the world, whether judged by total warship tonnage or by numbers of major warships.6 Leaving aside the US Navy, where there was broad parity, it had a significant margin over any other single naval power, at least in quantity, in every category of major warship except submarines, where Japan and France had larger numbers. It had the three largest and arguably most powerful capital ships in the world. These were the battlecruiser Hood completed in 1920, the largest and fastest capital ship until the completion of the Bismarck in late 1940, and Nelson and Rodney, the extra capital ships permitted to the Royal Navy under the 1922 Washington Treaty. The two Nelsons completed in 1927 had a design more modern than any contemporary.7 The Royal Navy also possessed a network of global bases that made it the only navy genuinely deployable on a worldwide basis, though until the Singapore base was complete (which was still some years away), there were no dockyards capable of heavy repair east of Suez and the Cape, which would constrain any long-term fleet deployment in the Far East.8

For the first fifteen years after the end of the First World War, there were certainly no immediate risks to the maritime security of the British Empire and, arguably, no credible risks at all. Despite naval rivalry and some economic tensions, war with the United States was inconceivable. Germany was effectively disarmed and other European powers were friendly. Japan, with the third largest navy in the world, posed a theoretical threat to British interests and territories in the Far East, but until the early 1930s it was hard to see how serious conflict would develop in practice. Against this background, the size and composition of the post-war Royal Navy through to 1935 was shaped by three factors. These were: the strength inherited at the end of the war and the historic experience and assumptions that had created and sustained that strength; subsequent political judgement on the size of navy appropriate to a global empire dependent on secure global maritime communications; and an international environment that, until the early 1930s, favoured measures promoting peace and disarmament.

The key issue for the British political leadership, contemplating naval policy for a post-war world without obvious security risks, was whether to sustain the historical status of a Royal Navy stronger than all other powers, risking a ruinous competition with a US Navy set on parity. Their decision, which reflected a broad political consensus, and reluctant acceptance from the Royal Navy leadership, was to adopt a ‘one-power standard’. This standard, first defined in 1921 and confirmed by the Cabinet in 1925, required that ‘our fleet, wherever situated, should be equal to the fleet of any other nation wherever situated’. The US Navy, as the next largest after the Royal Navy, became the new standard against which Royal Navy strength was assessed. The British naval staff accepted this formula because it granted them a virtual ‘two-power standard’ over Japan, the only credible threat to British interests in the Far East, and France as the largest European naval power.9 The Royal Navy therefore acquiesced in broad parity with the US Navy from 1921. This parity was underpinned by the Washington Naval Limitations Treaty negotiated at the end of that year. The Washington Treaty text contains no direct reference to parity, but British government willingness to concede this was crucial in making the treaty possible. It is worth noting, however, that although the limits established for capital ships came close to parity, the Royal Navy came away with a slight advantage in both permitted tonnage (about 6 per cent greater) and numbers (twenty versus eighteen). The US Navy calculated at the end of 1922 that the Royal Navy had come away from Washington with a much greater superiority, perhaps 30 per cent, in the effective fighting strength of its capital ship fleet.10

The one-power standard was interpreted flexibly. It was a target, not a precise measure. The Royal Navy leadership always stressed that Britain had ‘absolute’ naval requirements, notably the security of empire communications, which dictated Royal Navy strength in addition to the ‘comparative’ requirements relative to other powers. British stakeholders generally accepted, therefore, that the Royal Navy could not slavishly copy the US Navy, or accept parity across all categories of warship. This flexibility of interpretation was inevitably used by the Admiralty to push for larger investment and by the Treasury to rein it in.11 As the Director of Plans, Captain Tom Phillips, stated in 1937 – ‘The term “One Power Naval Standard” is extremely vague and means different things to different people’.12 The commitment of successive governments to the one-power standard through the 1920s and the Great Depression 1929–31 reflected the consensus that the continued security and wellbeing of the empire rested on the perception by both friends and potential enemies that Britain intended to remain the dominant maritime power. It was also due to the success of the Admiralty in portraying Japan as a plausible future opponent, and using this as a focus to frame plans, budgets and political debate in a practical way.13

The concept of a one-power standard suited British needs well enough during the 1920s, when other European navies were in decline and the international situation was benign. It also suited the Royal Navy which, through skilful negotiation with the Treasury, won rather more investment than parity strictly required and, arguably, ended the decade with its superiority over the US Navy enhanced. However, by the early 1930s, as the risk of naval conflict with Japan became more credible, the argument used to set the standard of strength shifted. By 1932 the Cabinet had effectively recognised, though not formally agreed to fund, a modified standard proposed by the Admiralty.14 This recognised that security in Europe might be threatened while most of the Royal Navy was fighting a Far East war with Japan. It therefore stated that ‘we should be able to retain in European waters a “deterrent force” to prevent our vital home terminal areas being commanded by the strongest European naval power while we took up a defensive position in the Far East and brought home the necessary units for home defence’. The growth of the French and Italian navies initially drove this change, more than concern over Germany. It clearly fell short, at this stage, of a two-power standard, excluding the United States. It was a move in this direction, but still a limited and achievable objective.15 The change enabled the Royal Navy to bid for more resources, but it had little practical effect on Royal Navy funding before fiscal year 1935.16

The application of the one-power standard defined against the United States, and the subsequent two-power standard excluding the United States, were complicated by the interwar naval limitation treaties. These set internationally agreed limits on naval strength, both quantitative and qualitative, and also defined relative strengths between the naval powers. The treaties confirmed the general concept of British and United States parity, but did not initiate it. They rather endorsed a comparative balance that the two parties had already agreed for their own reasons. The treaties, therefore, allowed Britain to pursue a one-power standard up to the ceiling set for the US Navy but, with some exceptions, not to exceed it. The treaties also constrained the flexibility with which Britain interpreted the one-power standard, by setting common limits on certain warship categories that did not suit Britain’s particular needs. While the treaties set upper limits, they naturally did not define minimum levels of strength. Britain invariably built up to her permitted limits while, during the period 1925–35, the US Navy often failed to do so. The Washington Treaty allowed the Royal Navy to build two new battleships as soon as it wished, but there was no requirement to commence construction immediately, or indeed at all. Nor was it obvious that the Royal Navy would be in a position of immediate inferiority without them for some years to come. In the event, the Royal Navy got immediate political backing for the ships and laid the two Nelsons down within ten months of the treaty. The Royal Navy also laid down fifteen heavy cruisers between 1924 and 1928, compared with just eight by the US Navy. The ambitions of the US Navy leadership to achieve parity with the Royal Navy never received the necessary political and financial backing in this period. The Royal Navy therefore retained an advantage in major surface units well into the 1930s and, as already noted, was still some 10 per cent larger than the US Navy in 1935.17

The Royal Navy in 1919 contained a huge number of warships which were less than five years old, in all categories completed or laid down during the war. Those laid down later in the war were often of innovative design, reflecting war experience. They included the battlecruiser Hood, arguably the world’s first ‘fast battleship’, larger and faster than any contemporary, with protection superior to the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships until their reconstruction in the late 1930s, and the ‘V’- and ‘W’-class destroyers, the most advanced of their day. These destroyers set the standard for most navies through to the early 1930s. They had geared turbine machinery, were well armed and the best sea-boats of their size anywhere. Over one hundred ships of these classes were ordered, with sixty-seven completed between 1917 and 1924. Fifty-eight remained on the strength as second-line destroyers earmarked for convoy escort in 1939. Twenty were converted to specialist anti-aircraft escorts between 1938 and early 1941, and a further twenty-one to long-range Atlantic escorts during the first half of the war.18 The Royal Navy completed twenty-nine cruisers and seventy-nine destroyers from mid-1917 onward, seventeen and thirty-one of these, respectively, after the war. Apart from Hood, completed in 1920, sixteen capital ships had been completed during the war and were four years old or less. All these vessels had a normal lifespan remaining of at least fifteen to twenty years.19 Early replacement was hard to justify in threat terms, but the Admiralty recognised that without steady investment it faced a block obsolescence problem later.

The Royal Navy, therefore, had a very modern core through the 1920s, enhanced by the two new battleships, Rodney and Nelson, and the substantial number of County-class heavy cruisers completed at the end of the decade under the Washington Treaty terms.20 However, by the 1930s, this core was ageing. Two-thirds of the cruisers and destroyers, and almost all the capital units, in the Royal Navy fleet at the start of 1935 derived from wartime investment. Given treaty limitations and economic stringency, implementing a programme through the 1930s that combined modernisation with increased strength to meet new threats was certainly challenging. However, the political and economic limitations were overcome through a mixture of good foresight, shrewd political management, and some luck, and the Royal Navy achieved sufficient of the right cap...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Maps
• List of Illustrations
• Foreword by Professor N A M Rodger
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I Preparing for Two-Hemisphere War
• Part II Existential War in the West
• Part III July 1941: The Road to Disaster in the East
• Part IV An Inescapable Commitment: The Indian Ocean in 1942
• Conclusion
• Annex: Warships Completed by Principal Naval Powers 1930–1942
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Plate section