Liberating Europe: D-Day to Victory in Europe, 1944–1945

John Grehan, Martin Mace

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781783462155
• eBook ISBN: 9781473838277
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

Despatches in this volume include the Despatch on air operations by the Allied Expeditionary Air Force in North West Europe between November 1943 and September 1944, the despatch on the assault phase of the Normandy landings June 1944, despatch on operations of Coastal Command, Royal Air Force in Operation Overlord the invasion of Europe 1944, the despatch on operations in North West Europe between 6 June 1944 and 5 May 1945, by Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Commander 21st Army Group, the despatch on the final stages of the naval war in North West Europe, and, as an addition, the despatch on the Dieppe Raid in 1942.This unique collection of original documents will prove to be an invaluable resource for historians, students and all those interested in what was one of the most significant periods in British military history.

1

THE DIEPPE RAID 18-19 AUGUST 1942

The following despatch was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, on the 30th August, 1942, by Captain J. HUGHES-HALLETT, R.N., Naval Force Commander.

Portsmouth Combined Headquarters,
Fort Southwick.
30th August, 1942.

I have the honour to submit the accompanying report of proceedings for Operation “Jubilee” which was carried out on 18th/19th August, 1942.

2. Generally speaking I consider that the Naval Forces engaged in the operation carried out their role as well as was possible under conditions which became increasingly difficult as the operation proceeded. A number of minor mistakes were made, chiefly by myself, and find their place in the narrative. Fortunately none of these had any vital influence on the operation as a whole.

3. I am glad to be able to report that almost without exception the conduct of all Naval personnel was exemplary, and in accordance with the traditions of the Service. Recommendations for honours and awards are forwarded separately, but I have no doubt that many unrecorded acts of heroism must have occurred off the beaches and in vessels which were lost.

4. The fighter cover afforded by No. II Group was magnificent and the fact that a number of bombers got through was to be expected. It is considered that the loss of only one ship from bombing should be regarded as an unusually fortunate result.

5. I wish respectfully to pay a tribute to the Military Force Commander. No one could have been more helpful than Major-General J.H. Roberts. All our major decisions were jointly made in complete agreement.

6. I wish also to draw your particular attention to Major P. Young of No. 3 Commando, who with the troops from a single L.C.P. effectively diverted the attention of the coast defence battery at Berneval during an important part of the operation, thereby averting the exceedingly serious consequences which might have resulted from the failure of the Yellow Beach landings. In my judgment this was perhaps the most outstanding incident of the operation.

7. Operation “Jubilee” differed fundamentally from any other Combined Operation that has been carried out by this country in modern times, in as much as it amounted to a direct daylight assault upon an important objective strongly held by the first army of Europe. From the point of view of its perspective in the war as a whole, it may perhaps be compared to the British offensives on the Western front during 1915. Although from purely a military point of view the results achieved were disappointing, and the heavy casualties sustained regrettable, it is considered that the operation was well worth while provided its lessons are carefully applied when the time comes to re-enter France on a large scale. The principal lesson appears to be, firstly, that much stronger military forces are required to break through the German coastal defences in any important area; secondly, that a very much higher proportion of the military force should be held in reserve until the progress made in the initial assaults is known, and that this reserve should then be employed in exploiting success. Unless this is done there is no guarantee that any of the beaches will be properly secured, and this is an absolute prerequisite of success whether the subsequent phases of the operation are to take the form of a withdrawal or a further follow-up.

8. A further point which was very clearly shown, is the strength of the German defensive system in the coastal regions, which confronts assaulting troops with the problem not dissimilar to that of the Western Front in the last war. Arising out of this is the need for far more effective methods of supporting the troops, unless it is quite certain that defences which dominate the landing places can be overrun by a surprise night assault. The methods whereby effective support can be given are not considered to include night bombing.

9. From the purely naval point of view the operation has taught us less, if only because the passage and landings went very largely according to plan. Although this was so, it is considered that the liberties that were taken in dispersing the force so widely on passage with so small a covering force, could not prudently be repeated. For example, the groups which sailed from Newhaven were vulnerable to attack from the east, and the L.S.Is. (Infantry Assault Ships) were exposed to a considerable risk from the time that they stopped to lower their boats until they returned to the English side of the Channel. The conclusion is that a substantially larger covering force should be employed in the future, because the enemy is less likely to be surprised again.

10. The Naval Forces were fortunate in as much as they sustained no damage from mines and no serious damage from coastal batteries. Until more experience is gained, however, it would be most unsafe to draw too firm a deduction from this for future operations.

11. The operation was interesting also as being perhaps the first occasion on which light naval forces (i.e., coastal craft and landing craft) manned almost entirely by the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, have been employed on a large scale and under conditions of extreme difficulty. They acquitted themselves well, but the small leavening of experienced officers of the Royal Navy who were employed in positions of control was an important factor in the results achieved.

12. I consider that the chief lessons of the operation are:-

(i) It was shown still to be possible to achieve tactical surprise in a cross-channel operation of some magnitude.

(ii) The comparatively small naval forces which took part in the operation sufficed to prevent the enemy from offering any surface opposition whatever, apart from that resulting from the chance encounter of Number 5 Group with German armed trawlers.

(iii) If it should be necessary to attempt a frontal attack on strongly defended enemy positions again, it will be essential to provide far more effective means of supporting the troops. In this particular operation I am satisfied that a capital ship could have been operated in the Dieppe area during the first two or three hours of the operation without undue risk.

(iv) The enormous possibilities of this type of operation for bringing about a decisive air battle were demonstrated.

13. Finally I venture to submit that, should it be decided to undertake further operations of this nature in the near future, my Staff and I may be afforded the opportunity to carry them out. While realising the force of the arguments in favour of giving other groups of officers a turn, I feel that in time of war the overriding requirement is to get results, and this is more likely to be achieved by those who have gained first-hand experience. While every effort has been made to record the lessons we have learned, there is so much which cannot be set forth on paper and which can only be properly grasped by those who have had the advantage of direct personal experience.

(Sgd.) J.H. HALLETT.

Captain, Royal Navy.

NAVAL FORCE COMMANDER.

OPERATION “JUBILEE.”
NAVAL FORCE COMMANDER’S NARRATIVE.

The Passage.

1. Generally speaking the assembly of the force and the passage were carried out in accordance with the plan and without any major incident. After clearing the gate H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA (Captain G.L.D. Gibbs, D.S.O., R.N. (Ret.)) leading Groups 1, 2 and 3, appeared to me to be proceeding at an excessive speed, and H.M.S. CALPE (Lieut.-Commander J.H. Wallace, R.N.) and the destroyers had some difficulty in taking station ahead. At 0016 when H.M.S. CALPE was abeam of H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA a signal was made informing her that she was ahead of station and instructing her to reduce to 18 knots. After this the destroyers formed ahead, and shortly afterwards altered course for the Western passage through the minefield. The Dan Buoys and the M.L. marking the entrance to this channel were only sighted about 2 minutes before H.M.S. CALPE entered the channel, no signals from the type 78 Beacon being received on account of a breakdown of H.M.S. CALPE’S R.D.F.¹ However, H.M.S. CALPE and the destroyers of the 2nd Division successfully passed through the Western channel, but H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA with Groups 1, 2 and 3 in company, lost touch with the destroyers and passed through the Eastern channel, overtaking H.M.S. FERNIE (Lieut. W.B. Willett, R.N.) and certain groups of L.C.Ts.² and L.C.Ps.³ but fortunately without any collisions.

2. A word of praise is due to the 9th and 13th Minesweeping Flotillas (Commander H.T. Rust, R.N. and Commander L.S.J. Ede, D.S.O., R.N.) who carried out the task allotted to them with efficiency and precision.

3. After passing through the minefield H.M.S. CALPE stopped in accordance with the plan, and subsequently signalled her position to H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA, H.M.S. PRINCE ALBERT (Lieut.-Commander H.B. Peate, R.N.R.) and H.M.S. GLENGYLE (Captain D.S. McGrath, R.N.), as these vessels respectively came in sight. H.M.S. CALPE then proceeded and stopped about one mile to seaward of the position in which H.M.S. GLENGYLE with Group 4 had stopped to lower their boats.

4. At about 0350 gun fire was observed to the E.S.E. which it was realised must be in the immediate vicinity of Group 5. At the time I considered this might be caused by an E-boat attack, but with the knowledge that Polish Ship SLAZAK (R. Tyminski, Kmdr.-Ppov.) and H.M.S. BROCKLESBY (Lieut.-Commander E.N. Pumphrey, D.S.O., D.S.C., RN.) were within about 4 miles of Group 5 and that H.M.S. CALPE was the only ship in the immediate vicinity of H.M.S. GLENGYLE and Group 4, it was decided to keep Group 4 in sight.

5. Actually Group 5 had made a chance encounter with some armed trawlers, and although Commander D.B. Wyburd, R.N., in S.G.B.5 (Lieut. G.H. Hummel, R.N.R.) maintained a steady course and speed in order that his L.C.Ps. should remain in company, S.G.B.5 was soon disabled, and the L.C.Ps. disorganised. Commander Wyburd’s persistence in remaining the guide of the slow L.C.Ps. while himself under heavy fire, showed great gallantry and determination. Nevertheless, I am of opinion that he would have done better to use the speed and smoke-laying capabilities of S.G.Bs.⁴ in order to protect the L.C.Ps. L.C.F.(L) I⁵ (Lieut. T.M. Foggitt, R.A.N.V.R.) also in company with Group 5, successfully engaged the German vessels, setting one on fire and claiming to have sunk a second. In the course of this engagement her fire control was unfortunately put out of action.

6. During the action O.R.P. SLAZAK with H.M.S. BROCKLESBY in company was approximately four miles to the N.N.E. but did not intervene. The Commanding Officer of O.R.P. SLAZAK has since informed me that he considered the firing came from the shore and therefore thought it best to continue with his patrol.

7. It will be convenient at this stage to complete the story of the Yellow Beach landings, which were frustrated by this encounter.

8. Five L.C.Ps. effected a delayed landing on Yellow I Beach. ⁶ Heavy opposition was encountered and the troops made no progress. Subsequent attempts were made by the L.C.Ps. to withdraw them but it proved impossible to close the beach on account of machine gun fire, and eventually only the Naval Beach Party who swam off to the boats were taken off. During this period, a small German tanker was set on fire and driven ashore by M.L. 346 (Lieut. A.D. Fear, R.N.V.R.) whose conduct throughout the operation was outstanding.

9. One L.C.P. effected an unopposed landing at Yellow II Beach. ⁷ The troops on board, under the command of Major P. Young, M.C., succeeded in approaching the coast defence battery at Berneval and in sniping it for about two hours. Subsequently they were successfully withdrawn. I have little doubt that the failure of the coast defence battery at Berneval to play an effective part in the operation was largely due to the action of Major Young.

10. Subsequently on the extreme western flank, the PRINCE ALBERT’S Landing Craft, carrying No. 4 Commando, were successfully landed according to plan. This part of the operation, which was under the joint command of Lieut.-Commander H.H.H. Mulleneux, R.N., and Lieut.-Colonel the Lord Lovat, M.C., M.P., went through without a hitch from beginning to end. The troops were very fortunate in that they blew up an ammunition dump at their objective by a chance mortar hit early in their attack. They were subsequently withdrawn at approximately 0815 and returned to England without incident.

11. Reverting to the main landings, that at Green Beach⁸ took place punctually and according to plan, and only encountered slight initial opposition. Subsequently Group 6, under the command of Commander H.V.P. McClintock, R.N., and carrying the Camerons of Canada, effected a landing at Green Beach according to plan but about 30 minutes late. The reason for the delay lay partly in the anxiety of the Senior Military Officer not to be landed ahead of time, and partly due to navigational difficulties occasioned by smoke during the final approach. This landing met with a certain amount of opposition, but the troops were successfully put ashore. It is interesting to note that at this stage the enemy fire on the approaches to Green Beach was slight, but steadily increased throughout the operation, and resulted in very heavy casualties being suffered during the eventual withdrawal. This was because the force landed did not succeed in occupying the high ground east of the beach.

12. The landing on Blue Beach⁹ was delayed for 15 minutes, on account of time lost when the boats were forming up. This was due to M.G.B. 315 (Lieut. J.I. Lloyd, R.N.V.R.) (whose role was to remain with H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA and escort her back) going ahead and getting mixed up with the Landing Craft from H.M.S. PRINCESS ASTRID, who mistook her for M.G.B. 316 (Act Temp. Lieut.-Commander T.N. Cartwright, R.N.V.R.) whose role it was to lead in these landing craft. Although the landing subsequently took place according to plan, I fear that the 15 minutes’ delay must have been partly responsible for the very heavy opposition which the troops immediately encountered after landing, and which apparently pinned them down on the beach area throughout the day. Subsequently H.M.S. DUKE OF WELLINGTON’S Flotilla of L.C.As. ¹⁰ landed additional troops on this beach according to plan. This landing took place at about 0545 and encountered no abnormal opposition. At about 0530 I was informed that a signal had been received stating that no landing had taken place on Blue Beach, and I reported this in my situation report made at 0612. Actually there is some reason to suppose that this report was of German origin but the whole of the events that took place ashore at Blue Beach were obscure, although it was clear from the very outset that the troops were held up. There is little doubt that this was the chief cause of the failure of the Military plan, and in view of the uncertainty about what really happened, I have since requested the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA to conduct a close enquiry with all the boat officers concerned. The resulting report has been forwarded separately.

13. Meanwhile the main landings on Red and White Beaches¹¹ took place punctually and according to plan, with the exception that the leading wave of three L.C.Ts. approached from too far to the westward and were about 10 to 15 minutes late in touching down.

14. The air support, and the smoke-making aircraft on the East cliff, were accurately synchronised, and the destroyer’s fire, both on the houses along the front while the boats were going in, and subsequently on the East and West Cliffs, appeared to be as effective as could be expected. No losses of landing craft took place during the initial landing, but it did not appear to officer in charge that the troops were able to capture the strong points along the front after landing. However, the L.C.Ts. on going in encountered very heavy opposition, and I consider that theirs was a notable achievement in landing 28 out of 30 tanks dry-shod. The heavy damage and casualties in the L.C.T’s. were undoubtedly due in a large measure to the relatively long periods they remained on the beach, waiting for the miscellaneous troops that they were carrying in addition to the tanks, to disembark.

15. The work of L.C.F. (L) 2 (Lieut. E.L. Graham, R.N.V.R.) in supporting the main landing, calls for special mention. This vessel closed in to provide point blank ran...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Introduction
• List of Illustrations
• List of Maps
• 1. The Dieppe Raid, 18-19 August 1942
• 2. The Assault Phase of the Normandy Landings, 1944.
• 3. Liberation of Europe (Operation Overlord) Operations of Coastal Command, Royal Air Force, from May to August 1944.
• 4. Air Operations by the Allied Expeditionary Air Force in North West Europe from 15 November 1943, to 30 September 1944.
• 5. The Final Stages of the Naval War in North West Europe.
• 6. Operations in North-West Europe from 6 June 1944, to 5 May 1945.
• Abbreviations
• Notes