Marshal of Victory

The Autobiography of General Georgy Zhukov

Geogry Zhukov, Geoffrey Roberts, Geoffrey Roberts

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781473831834
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military Biographies
• Index: History

The complete and unredacted autobiography by Stalin's star general, chronicling his many campaigns throughout WWII. At Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin—as well as virtually all the principal battles on the Eastern Front during the Second World War—Georgy Zhukov played a major role. He was Stalin's pre-eminent general throughout the conflict, and he chronicled his brilliant career as he saw it in this essential text. Here, Zhukov reveals intriguing insights into who he was, both as a man and as a commander. He also delves into the military thinking and decision-making at the highest level of the Soviet command—making this volume essential reading for anyone studying the conflict in the east. This edition of the memoirs, which were first published in heavily censored form, features an introduction by Professor Geoffrey Roberts in which he summarizes the additional material omitted from previous editions. He also provides, in an appendix, a translation of Zhukov's account of the 1953-7 period as well as an interview with Zhukov that has previously not been available in English.

CONTENTS

14. The Battle of Moscow

15. The Ordeal Continues (1942)

16. Strategic Nazi Defeat at Stalingrad

17. The Crushing Defeat of the Nazi Troops in the Kursk Bulge

18. Fighting for the Ukraine

19. Liberation of Byelorussia and the Ukraine

20. From the Vistula to the Oder

21. The Berlin Operation

22. Unconditional Surrender of Nazi Germany

23. The Potsdam Conference. The Control Council for Governing Germany

Conclusion

Chapter 14

THE BATTLE OF MOSCOW

On October 5, 1941, I received a message from General Headquarters: “Stalin wants to speak with Front Commander over direct line.”

From the communications room of Leningrad Front HQ I telegraphed to General Headquarters over the Baudot: “Zhukov here.” General Headquarters replied: “Stand by.” In less than two minutes the other end of the line telegraphed: “Stalin here.”

Stalin: “How do you do.”

Zhukov: “How do you do.”

Stalin: “Comrade Zhukov, can you get on a plane and immediately come to Moscow? The Stavka would like to discuss with you the necessary measures to rectify the situation on the left wing of the Reserve Front in the vicinity of Yukhnov. Leave someone in your place — Khozin, perhaps.”

Zhukov: “May I fly out early in the morning of October 6?”

Stalin: “Excellent. We’ll expect you in Moscow tomorrow.”

However, certain important events in the sector of the 54th Army made it impossible for me to leave on the morning of the 6th, and, with permission of the Supreme Commander, the flight was postponed.

In the evening on October 6 Stalin again phoned me in Leningrad.

“How are things with you? What’s new in enemy actions?”

“German pressure has slackened. According to what prisoners say, German troops sustained heavy losses in September and are taking up defensive positions near Leningrad. Artillery is shelling the city, and it is being bombed from the air. Our aerial reconnaissance has detected large columns of motorized infantry and tanks moving southward from the Leningrad area — evidently, in the direction of Moscow.”

Having reported the situation, I asked the Supreme Commander if his order for me to fly to Moscow still stood.

“Leave General Khozin or Fedyuninsky in your place,” Stalin repeated, “and fly to Moscow.”

I bade farewell to the members of the Leningrad Front Military Council and left for Moscow. Since General Khozin had to be rushed to the 54th Army, I delegated temporary command of the Leningrad Front to General Fedyuninsky.

In Moscow I was met by the chief of Stalin’s bodyguard. From him I learned that the Supreme Commander was ill and was working at home. We went there at once.

Stalin had a cold; he didn’t look very well, and received me curtly. He acknowledged my greeting with a nod and called my attention to a map, where he pointed out the Vyazma area.

“Look at this,” he said. “A very grave situation has developed. I can’t get a detailed report from the Western and Reserve Fronts on the true situation there. And we cannot make any decisions without knowing where and with what strength the enemy is mounting the offensive, or what the fighting value of our troops is. You are to go at once to Western Front Headquarters to investigate the situation thoroughly. Phone me from there at any hour, day or night. I’ll be waiting for your call.”

After a moment Stalin asked:

“What’s your opinion? Do you think the Germans can soon mount an offensive against Leningrad?”

“I don’t think so. They suffered heavy losses and moved out tanks and motorized divisions all along the way from outside Leningrad to the central direction. They are not in a position, given the strength they have now, to mount a new offensive operation.”

“And where do you think they are going to send those tank and motorized forces that Hitler moved out of the Leningrad area?”

“Obviously in the direction of Moscow. But only after they are brought up to full strength again and repairs made to the equipment.”

Throughout our discussion Stalin stood at the table, on which there was a topographical map of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts. Pointing to the Western Front, he said: “Apparently they’ve already been moving in that direction.”

I immediately went to see B. M. Shaposhnikov, Chief of General Staff, and gave him a detailed picture of the situation as of October 6 in the Leningrad area.

“The Supreme Commander has just phoned,” he said. “Ordered us to prepare a map of the Western sector for you. It will soon be ready. Western Front Command is where Reserve Front HQ was in August when you conducted operations to crush the enemy near Yelnya.”

Shaposhnikov filled me in on the details of the situation on the Moscow sector. He gave me the Supreme Command order which stated:

“To the Commander of the Reserve Front.

“To the Commander of the Western Front.

“By order of the Supreme Command General of the Army Zhukov is assigned to command the Reserve Front and represent the Stavka.

“The Stavka requests that Comrade Zhukov be informed of the situation. All decisions taken by Comrade Zhukov in the future, regarding the utilization of the troops and on questions of conducting operations are to be heeded absolutely.

“For the Supreme Command

“Chief of General Staff Shaposhnikov

“October 6, 1941, 19:30 hrs.”

While we were waiting for the map, Shaposhnikov poured me a cup of strong tea. He said he was very tired, and he looked it. I left Shaposhnikov and went straight to Western Front Headquarters.

On the way I studied the situation on the map using a pocket flash-light. I was very sleepy, so every now and then I had the driver stop the car and took short runs to shake off sleep.

It was night when I reached Western Front HQ. The duty officer reported that the commanding officers were in conference with the Front Commander. The Commander’s office was dimly lit with stearin candles. Sitting at a table were Konev, Sokolovsky, Bulganin and Malandin. Everyone looked exhausted. I told them I was there on the Supreme Commander’s order to investigate the situation and phone in a report at once.

What Lt.-Gen. Malandin, Chief of the Front HQ Operations Division, was able to tell me in reply to my questions about the latest developments, supplemented and specified the information we already had.

What had happened on the Western sector?

At the time the German troops started advancing on Moscow, three Fronts were defending the far approaches to the capital. They were: the Western (Commander Col.-Gen. Konev), the Reserve (Commander Marshal Budenny) and the Bryansk (Commander Lt.-Gen. Yeremenko). In late September the three Fronts had a combined strength of about 1,250,000 men, 990 tanks, and 7,600 mortars and guns, 677 planes. Most of the troops, means and equipment were on the Western front.¹

After regrouping his troops on the Moscow sector, the enemy had a force superior to the combined strength of our three Fronts. He had 40 per cent more men, 70 per cent more tanks, 80 per cent more mortars and guns, and twice as many planes.²

The German offensive, code-named Typhoon, began on September 30 with attacks by Guderian’s tank group and the 2nd Army on the Bryansk Front forces in the sector between Zhukovka and Shostka. On October 2 the enemy dealt powerful blows at the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts. Hitting especially hard from areas north of Dukhovshchina and east of Roslavl, he succeeded in piercing our defences. The enemy shock units lunged forward from the south and the north, enveloping the Vyazma grouping of the Western and Reserve Fronts.

An extremely grave situation developed to the south of Bryansk where the 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front found themselves faced with the threat of encirclement. Encountering no real opposition, Guderian’s troops headed for Orel, where we did not have the forces to repulse the offensive.

On orders of the Supreme Command, a reinforced 1st Guards Rifle Corps was formed under Major-General Lelyushenko on October 2. Its mission was to hold up the enemy advance and enable the Bryansk Front to withdraw its troops.

On October 3, developing their offensive, the Guderian forces captured practically undefended Orel, with the Nazi 24th Motorized Corps emerging in the rear of the Bryansk Front. The 1st Guards Rifle Corps, deployed in the Mtsensk area, engaged the enemy’s motorized group and panzers. It held them at bay for several days, inflicting considerable casualties and destroying much of their weaponry. For the first time, the tankmen of our 4th and 11th brigades hit enemy vehicles from ambush. And the troops of the Bryansk Front took advantage of the good show put up by the 1st Guards Rifle Corps to withdraw to the appointed line.

Here are the recollections of the episode by General Guderian, commander of the Nazi 2nd Panzer Army: “2nd October… Simultaneously in the operational zone of the 24th Panzer Corps near Mtsensk, north-east of Orel, bitter fighting broke out, involving the 4th Panzer Division… A large number of Russian T-34s was engaged in the battle, causing considerable losses to our panzers. The superiority that our panzers had so far was now lost and seized by the adversary. This wiped out the chances of a rapid and unintermittent success.”

He added: “The planned swift offensive on Tula had had to be put off.”

True enough. Not only had Guderian put off the offensive on Tula, he also never captured the city. But the Bryansk Front was cut. Suffering losses, its troops were rolling back east, fighting all the way. A menacing situation took shape on the Tula sector.

Col.-Gen. Konev, Commander of the Western Front, ordered a counter-offensive from the north of Vyazma against the enemy’s northern grouping that was trying to outflank his troops. Unfortunately, that counter-offensive was not successful. Late on October 6 a considerable part of the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts was encircled west of Vyazma.

From my talks with the officers at Western Front Headquarters and an analysis of the situation I got the impression that the disaster in the area of Vyazma could have been averted. Despite the enemy’s superiority in manpower and materiel, our troops could have avoided encirclement. To do so it had been necessary to determine more exactly and in time the directions of the enemy’s main effort and concentrate on those directions the bulk of the troops and weapons at the expense of the inactive defence sectors. However, this was not done, and our defences were not able to sustain the enemy’s concentrated blows. Large gaps were made in our defence line, which we had nothing to close with — there were no reserves at the Command’s disposal.

At 2:30 a.m. on October 8 I phoned Stalin. He was still up and working. After outlining the situation on the Western Front I said:

“The main danger now lies in the weak Mozhaisk defence line. Because of this, enemy armoured troops may suddenly appear near Moscow. We must bring up forces quickly from every place possible to the Mozhaisk line.”

“Where are the 19th and 20th armies, and Boldin’s group of the Western Front?” Stalin asked. “Where are the 24th and 32nd armies of the Reserve Front?”

“They’ve been encircled to the west and north-west of Vyazma,” I replied.

“What do you propose to do?”

“I’m leaving at once for the Reserve Front to see Budenny.”

“Do you know where the Reserve Front’s headquarters is?”

“I’ll look for it in the neighbourhood of Maloyaroslavets.”

“All right. Go to Budenny and call me from there.”

A steady drizzle was falling, and the thick fog clinging to the ground restricted visibility. When on the morning of October 8 we drove up to the Obolenskoye railway station we saw two signalmen laying a cable from the bridge across the River Protva to Maloyaroslavets.

“Where are you pushing these wires to, comrades?” I called out to them.

“Right where we’ve been ordered to push them,” one of them, a huge man, replied without even looking up.

I had to tell them who I was, and that we were looking for Reserve Front HQ.

The huge signalman stood at attention and said:

“Excuse me, Comrade General, did not know you by sight. That’s why I answered the way I did. You’ve already passed headquarters. It was moved here two hours ago, and housed in the cottages over there in the forest on the hill. The sentries there will show you the way.”

The car turned around. Soon I was in the room of Army Commissar 1st Class L. Z. Mekhlis, a GHQ representative, who was with Major-Gen. A. F. Anisov, Chief of Staff of the Front. Mekhlis was on the phone, giving someone hell.

I asked them where the Commander was, and the Chief of Staff answered:

“Nobody knows. He was with the 43rd Army during the day. I’m afraid that something unpleasant may have happened to Budenny.”

“Have you taken steps to find him?”

“Yes, I’ve sent liaison officers but they haven’t come back yet.”

Mekhlis addressed a question to me then:

“And what assignment brings you here?” he asked.

“I’ve come as a Stavka member on the Supreme Commander’s instructions to investigate the situation here.”

“You can see that the situation is none too good. Right now I’m rounding up the stragglers. At assembly points we’ll arm them and form new units out of them.”

My talks with Mekhlis and Anisov gave me very little concrete about the situation of the Reserve Front troops or about the enemy. So I got in the car and rode on to Yukhnov, hoping to quickly find out more on the spot.

As we drove across the Protva River I involuntarily recalled my childhood. I knew the area very well, as I had walked through it many times in my youth. My native village of Strelkovka was ten kilometres away from Obninskoye where Reserve Front HQ was located. My mother, my sister and her four children were living in Strelkovka. “How are they? Suppose I call on them?” But that was impossible, there wasn’t time. I asked myself what would happen to them if the fascists came to the village. What would they do to a Red Army general’s relatives? Shoot them, surely. “First chance I get,” I thought, “I’ll have...