The German Army in the Spring Offensives 1917

Arras, Aisne & Champagne

Jack Sheldon

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781783463459
• eBook ISBN: 9781473872868
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: German History
• Index: History

"A detailed and vivid account of the battles on three deadly fronts. The research is breathtaking, the assembly of the story is masterful."—The Long, Long Trail
 
After the great battles of 1916, the Allied Armies planned to launch massive attacks North and South of the Somme. The German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line in March 1917 forced the new French CinC General Nivelle to rethink and the French embarked on a major attack in the Aisne area and along the Chemin des Dames, with the British conducting large-scale diversionary operations around Arras.
 
The French suffered disastrously and, rendered incapable of further offensive operations, it fell to the British to step up the pressure, which they did albeit at a terrible price.
 
This latest work by expert Jack Sheldon describes the event of Spring 1917 from the defenders' perspective. In particular it reveals the methods the Germans used to smash the French attacks and Oberst Fritz von Lossberg's transformation of the defenses in the Arras front. Actions described in detail are the bitter battles around Monchy Le Preun, the Roeux Chemical works and Bullecourt as well as the capture of Vimy Ridge.
 
"This volume of Jack Sheldon's highly detailed series of books on the German Army in the Great War follows his usual effective model—employing the clear writing and knowledge learned from dogged, detailed research . . . It would be impossible to offer other than the highest recommendation for this book."—Stand To! The Western Front Association
 
"Incredibly moving and powerful."—Pennant

CHAPTER 1

Vimy Ridge

In the wake of the unexpected German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line, the British army had to recalibrate its participation in the forthcoming joint offensive. So, as March turned to April, the British began to mass the formations of their First (initially involving only a much reinforced Canadian Corps) and Third Armies, north and south of Arras, ready to assault the German Sixth Army. The main effort was to be on the left flank of a front running from Souchez in the north to Quéant in the south, with particular emphasis on the capture of Vimy Ridge (which was entrusted to the Canadian Corps) and operations astride of the Scarpe in the direction of Cambrai. In parallel, a bombardment of hitherto unheard of intensity began to come down all along the attack frontage. In the skies above the battlefields, British and German aircraft fought hard for air superiority and, despite the ensuing heavy cost to the Royal Flying Corps during so-called ‘Bloody April’, when between 4 and 8 April 1917 alone the British lost no fewer than seventy five aircraft shot down and a further fifty six aircraft in accidents,¹ the effect of the gunfire was considerably enhanced by aerial observation of the fall of shot.

In all the destructive bombardment lasted for the best part of two weeks and it was calculated later that the weight of explosive delivered during the first week was twice that fired the previous year prior to the battle of the Somme. Bearing in mind that the front was much shorter than had been the case in 1916 and that the fire brought down during the final week before the assault was about six times greater, it is easy to see why the German defenders suffered so much and their ability to defend was so drastically reduced when the blow fell. Long before 9 April, all the forward positions were wrecked and all the identified German batteries were either destroyed or continually drenched with gas. In support of the operational priorities, a huge weight of fire came down along Vimy Ridge between Givenchy and Farbus.

During the early stages of the bombardment it was still possible for reasonably accurate estimates of the shelling to be maintained. 79^th Reserve Division, manning the highest part of the ridge, counted between 12,000 and 15,000 shells per day landing in its area. As the bombardment ground on, coming down ever more heavily, it became impossible even to guess at the number of shells involved. Approach routes and depth targets were also included in the overall fire plan so, following the deaths of numerous French inhabitants in the affected area, the entire civil population was evacuated. Once it was clear that the British had begun to prepare the battlefield, Commander I Bavarian Reserve Corps [Group Vimy], General der Infanterie Karl Ritter von Fasbender, issued his corps concept for battle to his subordinate formations: 79^th Reserve Division, 1^st Bavarian Reserve Division and 14^th Bavarian Infantry Division. This interesting directive provides a clear insight into the way he intended to prepare for and meet the forthcoming offensive.²

“Subject: Preparations for the Defensive Battle

1. In view of the extent of the work necessary on the positions, it is especially important that, within the context of an all-embracing plan, efforts are concentrated on those places that will be tactically the most important in the defensive battle. All other [work] is ruthlessly to be set aside in favour of priority places. The divisions have the necessary oversight. They must ensure that they exert decisive influence on the type and extent of the work on the positions. This must be done on the basis of a division-wide work plan which covers all the individual sectors and lays down precise tasks. The necessary materiel and manpower is then to be provided at the relevant times and places. [The plans must be drawn up] so as to ensure that regimental and divisional boundaries are not treated as dividing walls against tactical cooperation. It is essential that care is taken through the placement of machine guns, so that their mutually supporting fire can be brought to bear from a flank.

2. It is anticipated that, with the exception of the Siegfried-Ecke [Siegfried Corner] to the south of the Scarpe, the British attack will be directed all along the front from the Souchez River to the Scarpe. Within this front the enemy is likely to launch particularly heavy attacks against particular localities. Points will be selected for major break-ins where the enemy considers that they offer the best chances for the continuation of the attack in order to achieve the overall aim. The places which the enemy has singled out for damage by means of artillery and mortar fire or raids provide a starting point in this respect. At Verdun and on the Somme the enemy concentrated their attacks against sector boundaries. In view of this, particular attention would seem to be appropriate in the following places:

• The divisional boundary to the right [north] of 79^th Reserve Division.

• The positions in the Second Line either side of the junction of Fischergang and Staubwasserweg [Fischer Alley and Staubwasser Way].

• The positions in the Second Line either side of the junction of Prinz Arnulf Tunnel and Prinz Arnulf Weg.

• The positions in the Second Line either side of the junction of Grenadierweg [Grenadier Way] and the Völkertunnel.

• The positions either side of the road Neuville St Vaast – Thélus (Divisional boundary).

• The positions in the First line either side of the forward limit of Grävenitzweg.

• Positions either side of the track between Roclincourt and Thélus.

3. In addition every effort is to be made, by means of the closest possible observation of enemy digging operations and the placement of their destructive fire, to clarify further the assessment of probable enemy main break-in points.

4. Special measures are to be taken at the probable enemy main break-in points to ensure that any enemy attack can be beaten off or nipped in the bud, or that any enemy who have managed to break in can be prevented from expanding their foothold and can be rapidly ejected by means of a counter-stroke. This can be achieved by:

• Prepared defences. (Constant improvement of the smashed trenches and obstacles; placement of stop lines and obstacles at right angles to the front; company dumps of wire obstacles that can be laid rapidly.)

• Deployment of the garrison. (Distribution of machine guns, light mortars and grenade launchers.)

• Increases in destructive and defensive fire. (Due consideration having been given to the [risk of] loss of our guns.)

• Artillery preparations. (Designed to engage enemy forces and armoured vehicles which have broken in.) The guns of the close support battery are in themselves insufficient for this purpose.

5. These passive preparatory measures alone are insufficient.³ Enemy batteries should already be being engaged systematically whenever suitable opportunities present themselves. The necessary ammunition for this is ready and available. All necessary steps are to be taken in order to ensure that the means are available to fire gas as soon as the enemy preparations for the attack commence. We must adapt our response to the gradual transition to battle. This means that we must make it difficult for the enemy to prepare for battle by engaging with planned, heavy, destructive fire their observation points, mortar base plates and approach routes.

In both respects we must do considerably more than has been done so far. More precisely, we must ensure that the medium mortars and, wherever they can be deployed successfully, the heavy howitzers are better exploited and so deliver destructive fire.

6. There is to be:

• sharpest attention to detail, in order to ensure that enemy attack plans are discovered in good time.

• carefully planned and controlled, but ceaseless, digging efforts, in order to maintain and improve the tactically most important parts of our positions.

• systematic engagement of the enemy artillery and destruction of all installations that are particularly valuable to the enemy as they complete their attack preparations.

Signed: von Fasbender

Upon receipt of this directive, the divisions which made up Group Vimy were quick to issue their own complementary orders, because at this local level all the commanders were sure that the opening of the attack was drawing close. The army group commander was not entirely convinced.

Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria: Diary Entry 26 March 1917⁴

“Sixth Army has written in its weekly report for 24 March, ‘The reinforcement of the enemy artillery, which has been observed since the end of February, has been confirmed further … ‘The reason for the massing of enemy forces either side of Arras is still not completely clear. Possibly the enemy fears an attack and, therefore, has only deployed some of the available divisions in the front line. Whatever the explanation, the deployment is not normal for a major offensive. Because the possession of Vimy Ridge would be of far greater significance than the gaining of ground around Arras, it would seem, despite the greater concentration of force near the latter, that an attack on Vimy Ridge is the more probable. Nevertheless, both possibilities must be borne in mind.”

For several weeks, the Canadians had pursued a policy of aggressive raiding and patrolling against Vimy Ridge. Sometimes these enjoyed success, on other occasions they failed in their aim. Late on 29 March, for example, Reserve Infantry Regiment 263, 79 Reserve Division, captured four men of the Canadian 31^st Battalion, 6 Brigade, 2nd Canadian Division during a raid launched astride the Neuville-Thélus road in sector Arnulf 3. The objective of the operation had been to capture German prisoners but, the tables turned, subsequent interrogation of these Canadian soldiers yielded very useful intelligence for the defence. On 31 March, an initial report, signed off by Major Lenz, Chief of Staff I Bavarian Reserve Division, was widely distributed:⁵

“From statements by prisoners belonging to 2^nd Canadian Division the following points have arisen:

• The mission of the 2^nd Canadian Division is to attack to the south of the road Neuville – Thélus – Farbus.

• To its south it appears that 1^st Canadian Division has been inserted between it and 51^st (Highland) Division

• To the north are located 3^rd and 4^th Canadian Divisions in that order. 5^th Canadian Division may be a designated reserve.⁶

• The Arras – Souchez front is to be rolled up from south to north. If that succeeds, the cavalry will be released onto the [Douai] Plain …

“The statements sound probable and fit well with the picture built up by the Corps concerning the direction of the [forthcoming] attack and the main break-in points. Divisional Infantry and Artillery counter-measures would seem to be indicated.”

Interrogation of these prisoners continued the following day. A second report, dated 1 April,⁷ was issued and an additional one on 2 April.⁸ In the 1 April document the interrogators reported:

“Units of [6 Canadian] Brigade conducted attack exercises between 13 and 23 March to the north of Grand Servin. Each day between 8.00 am and 1.00 pm drills were rehearsed and attacks were practised on a training area adapted to resemble the actual terrain of the attack. The target of the attack, which was intended to be launched some time between 26 March and 6 April, was declared to be Thélus and Farbus Wood [modern Bois de Berthonval]. The German trenches were marked out with white tapes and the communication trenches were represented by red flags. The roads Arras - Lille and Neuville - Thélus were marked with yellow flags. Blue flags were used to show the village of Thélus and the wire obstacle was indicated with two wires.

“A small wood near the training area was used for Farbus Wood. Each exercise began with the troops advancing in ‘diamond artillery formation’, then the attack was conducted by the individual companies in three waves against Thélus and Farbus Wood. 27^th Battalion had been designated to capture Thélus, whilst the 31^st Battalion was intended to move through it and thrust towards Farbus Wood…”⁹

Additional information included in the 2 April report included confirmation that the attack was to be launched between Lens and Arras and that the bombardment was scheduled to last six to ten days. As a further illustration of the value of careful prisoner interrogation, a great deal of information concerning the whereabouts of supply dumps and gun positions was extracted, whilst the precise weight of and methods to be used in the attack on the Thélus - Farbus front were also obtained. The whereabouts of large stacks of ammunition and numerous gun pits was described, as was the fact that that twelve out...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• Acknowledgements
• Author’s Note
• Maps
• Chapter 1: Vimy Ridge
• Chapter 2: The British Assault North of the Scarpe
• Chapter 3: The British Assault South of the Scarpe
• Chapter 4: The French Assault Along the Aisne
• Chapter 5: The French Assault in Champagne
• Chapter 6: Bullecourt
• Chapter 7: Attrition and Stagnation East of Arras
• Chapter 8: Flogging a Dead Horse: Stalemate and Mutiny on the Aisne/Champagne Battlefield
• Appendix I: German-British Comparison of Ranks
• Appendix II: Selective Biographical Notes
• Bibliography