Air Battle for Burma

Allied Pilots' Fight for Supremacy

Bryn Evans

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Aviation
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781473858923
• eBook ISBN: 9781473858947
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

After a long series of crushing defeats by the apparently unstoppable Japanese air and ground forces, the eventual fight back and victory in Burma was achieved as a result of the exercise of unprecedented combined services cooperation and operations. Crucial to this was the Allies supremacy in the air coupled with their ground/air support strategy.Using veterans firsthand accounts, Air Battle For Burma reveals the decisive nature of Allied air power in inflicting the first major defeat on the Japanese Army in the Second World War. Newly equipped Spitfire fighter squadrons made the crucial difference at the turning point battles of the Admin Box, Imphal and Kohima in 1944. Air superiority allowed Allied air forces to deploy and supply Allied ground troops on the front line and raids deep into enemy territory with relative impunity; revolutionary tactics never before attempted on such a scale.By covering both the strategic and tactical angles, through these previously unpublished personal accounts, this fine book is a fitting and overdue tribute to Allied air forces contribution to victory in Burma.

Chapter 1

Japanese Air Power Strikes Across Half the Globe

Late in the morning of 10 December 1941 from an altitude of 8,000 feet, nine torpedo-bombers of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Genzan Air Corps began their attack run. The twin-engined Mitsubishi G3M aircraft, known by the Allies as ‘Nells’, were part of Rear Admiral Sadaichi Matsunaga’s 22nd Air Flotilla based at Saigon. The target was Britain’s most modern battleship, HMS Prince of Wales, nearly 44,000 tons, commissioned in January 1941, and at that time one of the largest ships in the world. The Nell was a seven-seat medium bomber, with twin radial engines, a top speed of 232mph and a range of 2,722 miles.1

The Japanese bombers dived through a blizzard of anti-aircraft fire, and for a moment it seemed that no aircraft could survive. That moment passed in an instant, as the aerodynamic torpedo-bombers came on, unstoppable, as if they were flying through melting snow flakes. All nine of the bombers somehow evaded the withering fire from Prince of Wales to launch their torpedoes. One Nell was hit by ship fire after releasing its torpedo, and lost height. Its pilot, Petty Officer Kawada, attempted a suicide dive onto Prince of Wales, before crashing into the sea. Only one of the nine torpedoes released hit home on the port side. Yet, micro-seconds after the explosion, a mountain of water, flame and smoke soared some 200 feet into the air.

Almost simultaneously the great battleship shuddered. Prince of Wales lost half its power, immobilizing half its guns, and cutting its electric light and ventilation. The ship’s speed dropped quickly to only 15 knots, and it began to list to almost 13 degrees. With no steering Prince of Wales signalled to its accompanying battlecruiser, HMS Repulse, that it was no longer under control. It was a mortal blow, and the Japanese pilots could see the battleship was stricken. A second wave of attacks was inevitable. How had it come to this, for the pride of Britain’s Royal Navy to be so quickly immobilized?2

* * *

In May 1941 Prince of Wales and Repulse had both been part of the pursuit and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck, which had first been crippled by torpedoes dropped by Swordfish torpedo-bombers, the Fleet Air Arm’s obsolete biplane aircraft. The Swordfish squadron had flown off from the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal. One of the torpedo strikes damaged the steering gear, causing Bismarck to remain stuck on a course of 15 degrees to port – effectively sailing in a circle. Only then were the battleships HMS King George V and HMS Rodney able to close in and pound the German battleship until it sank. As the Bismarck disappeared below the waves, those on board the Prince of Wales and Repulse would have observed that not one Swordfish aircraft was lost to enemy anti-aircraft fire.3

Churchill had decided in early November 1941, before Japan’s attack on the USA at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, to deploy Prince of Wales and Repulse to Singapore as a deterrent to the Japanese threat in the Far East. The two capital ships, together with their destroyers and other support ships, were codenamed Force Z, and should have included the new fleet aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable. After commissioning in October 1941 HMS Indomitable sailed on her maiden voyage to the West Indies to work up for operational service. On 3 November Indomitable ran aground during this work-up on a coral reef near Jamaica, which resulted in her entering port in Norfolk, Virginia, for repairs, and postponement of the deployment to Force Z. Even without this accident, there is doubt that Indomitable would have been able to complete her work-up during November and reach Singapore in time to provide air cover for Force Z.4

The absence of HMS Indomitable may not have been perceived by Admiral Phillips as too great a loss. At the time there was still a substantial body of opinion in Royal Navy circles which believed that battleships could be protected from aircraft attack by light multi-barrel and heavy high-angle (HA) anti-aircraft guns. Admiral Phillips was known to lean in favour of this view, and gave the appearance of being dismissive of any need for battleships to have air cover by fighter aircraft. He also had limited experience of operational command at sea. When Phillips was appointed as C-in-C of Force Z by Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, and approved by Prime Minister Churchill, the appointment was met with dismay by a number of senior naval staff.5

Upon arrival in Singapore on 2 December 1941, however, Admiral Phillips did request air cover to be provided for Force Z by land-based Hurricane fighters, if within range, against Japanese air attack. Unfortunately, there were no Hurricanes at Singapore, only a Royal Australian Air Force squadron of Brewster Buffalo fighters. The Buffalo, with a top speed of only 225 mph and armed only with four machine guns, was much inferior to Japanese fighters. Furthermore, the Australian pilots were new to these planes and had no operational experience.

When it was learned that, early on 8 December, Japanese forces were landing at Kota Bharu on the Malayan east coast, Phillips was not deterred by the lack of air support and protection. To disrupt and prevent the Japanese from establishing a bridgehead, on 8 December at 17.25 hours Force Z departed Singapore. The Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor in Oahu, Hawaii, on 7 December began at about 07.55 local time, which occurred only an hour or so later than the attack on Malaya (ignoring the distortion of the International Date Line). Phillips may not have known or been fully aware of the surprise Japanese attack, and its impact on the US Navy ships.

On 8 December Singapore also suffered Japanese air raids, planned to coincide with the Pearl Harbor attack and the invasion of Malaya. Certainly the threat of attack on Prince of Wales and Repulse by Japanese aircraft, if considered at all, was not seen as sufficient for Phillips to call for any delay in the departure of Force Z. He planned for the capital ships to sail north all day on 9 December so as to reach and attack the Japanese invasion fleet on the morning of 10 December in the region of Singora on the Malayan east coast.

Around 14.00 hours on 9 December a Japanese submarine, I-65, its hull and conning tower hidden by a rainy and cloudy afternoon, sighted Force Z.6 Acting on this report Admiral Matsunaga sent out both reconnaissance aircraft and bombers to attack the British battleships. Admiral Kondo, who was in command of the Japanese invasion force, and in the knowledge of Force Z being in the region, had recently gained additional aircraft now based at Saigon, to provide extra air protection. The aircraft despatched by Matsunaga were unable to locate Force Z during the day but, shortly before sunset, the radar of Prince of Wales detected a Japanese seaplane. It was soon seen from the decks of Prince of Wales and Repulse. Everyone knew what was now inevitable.

With the location and course heading of the two capital ships identified by the Japanese reconnaissance plane, an attack by enemy aircraft would be certain the next day. When Admiral Phillips received a signal from Singapore that Japanese troopships with naval escorts had been sighted off the Malayan coast near Kota Bharu, south of Singora, it made up his mind. At 20.55 on 9 December, recognizing that he had lost the advantage of surprise, Phillips turned around Prince of Wales and Repulse and their accompanying destroyers and headed back towards Singapore. His hope was that the Japanese would not know that Force Z had reversed direction.

However, unbeknown to Phillips and close to midnight, Japanese submarine I-58 observed Force Z and reported the battleships’ new southerly course to Admiral Matsunaga. At 02.30 hours on 10 December the Japanese submarine fired five torpedoes at Prince of Wales and Repulse. All five missed and in the dark no-one in Force Z was aware of the attack. Following a further signal to Force Z from Singapore, reporting that Japanese landings were taking place at Kuantan, at 02.55 on 10 December Phillips altered course again, this time to south-west to strike at the new location. The night though could not cloak their changes of direction much longer. Around 05.00, as the sun rose, the look-outs on Repulse spied a dot just above the eastern horizon. For half-an-hour it stayed there, as if attached to Force Z by some invisible wire, keeping pace. Once again a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft had spotted Force Z.

Captain Tennant of Repulse saw the dot on the horizon through his binoculars and, although unable to identify the type of aircraft, felt near certain that it was a Japanese seaplane. The implication was also clear. As they gazed at that mesmerizing dot floating above the dawn horizon, the Japanese were planning their air attack against Prince of Wales and Repulse.7

* * *

In Saigon at 06.25 on 10 December Admiral Matsunaga watched the first aircraft of the 22nd Air Flotilla take to the air. Many pilots had put on their ‘1,000-stitch’ belts or scarves, which had been woven by their wives, mothers or sisters. Every stitch represented a prayer for good luck in the fight to come.8 Matsunaga was not waiting for the return of the reconnaissance planes and their full reports, and sent thirty-four high-level bombers, Mitsubishi G4M ‘Betty’ attack bombers, and fifty-one torpedo-bomber Nells, climbing into the south-west sky to seek and destroy Force Z. A Nell torpedo-bomber carried a 24-inch torpedo and was able to launch at a height of 500 feet in its approach, at the time this was far superior to the British and American torpedo-bombers.

At 10.15 when many of the Bettys and Nells had turned around, unable to locate Force Z and nursing their fuel, a sighting was finally made and signalled to their leader, Lieutenant Commander Nakanishi. All the Japanese aircraft, now in scattered formations, reset their course and headed for the British ships. Within an hour at a distance of 25 miles, Nakanishi saw the large wakes and silhouettes of Prince of Wales and Repulse. At around 8,000 feet he called for the attack formation and ordered his pilots to begin their bombing run.9

At 11.18 Prince of Wales blasted out with every anti-aircraft gun available, including sixteen 5.25-inch dual-purpose guns, approximately eighty-eight 2-pounder pom-poms, eight 40mm Bofors guns, triple-barrelled 4-inch high angle turrets, and up to thirty-eight 20mm Oerlikon guns.10 Not surprisingly, they swamped the sky with a barrage of tracer, smoke and exploding shells in front of the approaching enemy bombers. In an amazing contradiction, the sleek and fast Japanese aircraft speared through the maelstrom as if it were a shower of confetti.

As well as the torpedo strike on Prince of Wales, a bomb hit Repulse, crashing through its aircraft catapult deck into a hangar. Following the first wave of bombs and torpedoes, there was a brief lull. The two ships, wounded but still able to mount a defence, then waited. Casualties were attended to, guns and equipment made ready again. Both crews knew a second wave of ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Plates
• Acknowledgements
• Author’s Note
• Foreword
• Maps
• Prologue
• 1. Japanese Air Power Strikes Across Half the Globe
• 2. The Japanese Storm Hits Rangoon
• 3. The Debacle at Singapore – Welcome to ‘Synon-Lo!’
• 4. An Unstoppable Tsunami – Across Burma’s Land and Sky
• 5. Retreat from Rangoon, Further Losses at Sea, and Colombo Bombed
• 6. Trincomalee Bombed – More Allied Ships Sunk and the Japanese Army Drives into Northern Burma
• 7. Hanging On in India – In the Heat, the Monsoon and Against the ‘Rising Sun’
• 8. On the Bengal Coast – Confronting the IJAAF
• 9. Chasing Dinah – High Speed Interception at ‘Angels 30’
• 10. Spitfire Dawn
• 11. Operation HA-GO – Arakan’s Battle of the ‘Admin Box’
• 12. Operation U-GO! – The Japanese Invasion of India
• 13. The Critical Battles for Kohima and Imphal – Air Power and the Monsoon Offer Salvation
• 14. Winning the Air battle – Breaking the Ground Siege at Imphal
• 15. War in the Shadows – With Air Support
• 16. Into 1945 – Three Allied Ground Offensives and a Fourth in the Sky
• 17. Race for Rangoon – With a Hammer, an Anvil and a Steel Cloak of Air Power
• 18. Mandalay to Rangoon, by Land, Sea and Air
• Epilogue
• Postscripts
• Statistics
• Glossary
• Bibliography and Sources
• Bookplate