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CHAPTER ONE
First Operations in the Channel
At the start of the Second World War, on 3 September 1939, many naval experts anticipated that the general pattern of the war would resemble that of the 1914-1918 conflict, but perhaps on a lesser scale and with the largely unknown factor of air power as the wild card. The Royal Navy was but a pale shadow of its former self, and the great days of the fleets of 1918, or even 1914, were but a fading memory. The German fleet was also much smaller and seemed to offer little threat. Its squadrons were, on the whole, composed of ships which were more modern, more heavily armed and faster than their British counterparts, but their qualities were unknown other than that they appeared to have a greater awareness of the necessity for heavy anti-aircraft armaments than did the British. It was not thought that their cruisers, battlecruisers or battleships would influence events in the Channel area (one of many false predictions); their air force was expected to be a new facet in convoy defence. The greatest threat to the Narrow Seas was anticipated from destroyer raids, submarines and mines.
Initially, this indeed was the case, but the Germans proved themselves far bolder in the deployment of their surface units, particularly their destroyer forces, than had been imagined. Indeed, no provision was at first made to intercept such forces, despite the lessons of the Dover Patrol in the previous war. As no immediate advance was made on land toward the Channel ports, the enemy lacked the advance bases to harass the huge concentrations of British and neutral shipping which assembled off such points as Southend and the Downs, and so it was considered that they were relatively immune from surface attack. And so it proved, but this did not stop losses, for the Germans boldly used their destroyer flotillas to lay mines right up the Channel, to the very doorstop of the major British naval bases in fact, undetected, and with considerable success. The U-boats were not so successful, as they were few and their usage expected. Countermeasures, such as patrols, laying of defensive minefields and the like, soon took a toll of the U-boats and brought their activities to an early pause. Likewise, the activities of the Luftwaffe were strictly limited during the first months, although they showed that their methods had not been satisfactorily countered in the pre-war planning. The RAF was experiencing difficulties of its own, and for the first three years of the war, its contribution to the defence of British shipping, or attacks on enemy shipping, tended to be intermittent.
Organization of Convoys
The Admiralty had already decided to introduce the convoy system on the outbreak of war, despite the crippling lack of sufficient escort vessels to offer more than a token defence. Convoys crossing the Narrow Sea were the Coastal series, those running westward from Southend to Falmouth being coded CW, those in the opposite direction, CE. These did not commence until July 1940. In the beginning the OA convoys from the Thames out into the Atlantic via the English Channel and the FN series from the Thames to Methil and back, commanded most of the Royal Navy's attention. These all commenced running from 6 September 1939.
Disposition of Forces
The surface forces available to the Royal Navy in the Channel area at the outbreak of the war consisted of the Channel Force based at Portland; the battleships Resolution and Revenge, the aircraft carriers Courageous and Hermes, the light cruisers Cairo, Caradoc and Ceres and the 18th Destroyer Flotilla (DF): Veteran, Whitshed, Wild Swan, Windsor and Wren. Also at Portland was the 12th DF: Echo, Eclipse, Electra, Encounter, Escapade and Escort. These were part of the Western Approaches command, as were the two flotillas of destroyers based at Plymouth, the 11th DF: Mackay, Vanoc, Vanquisher, Versatile, Vimy, Walker, Warwick, Whirlwind and Winchelsea and the 17th DF: Keppel, Vanessa, Viscount, Vivacious, Vortigern, Wakeful and Wessex. At Portsmouth lay the 16th DF: Malcolm, Venomous and Wivern, while at Dover was the 19th DF, which was composed of the Beagle class destroyers, less the Bulldog.
Coastal Submarine Offensive
The Germans sailed every available U-boat to British waters on the outbreak of war, but this concentration achieved very little in the waters of the Nore and the Channel. U-26 laid a minefield off Portland, which claimed three small merchant vessels and damaged the coastal corvette Kittiwake. U-17 laid magnetic mines in the Downs and these caused more problems as, although the British had invented this weapon in the First World War and had methods of sweeping prepared, nothing could be done until they discovered the method of activation used by the Germans. In addition, U-31 sank two ships, U-35 four, and U-53 two, by conventional torpedo attack.
British Defensive Minefields Laid
To counter the threat of German submarines working close inshore and penetrating the Straits of Dover in order to reach the south-western approaches, the Admiralty had long prepared to lay mine barrages in the Straits of Dover and this was very quickly implemented, much to the surprise of the Germans. Both deep and shallow minefields had been planned in the Straits with a deep field in the Folkestone-Cap Gris Nez area. To catch the U-boats, anti-submarine fields were put down between the Goodwin Sands and the Dyck Shoal by the cruiser-minelayer Adventure, the coastal minelayer Plover and two converted train ferries, Hampton and Shepperton. The laying commenced on 11 September and was completed five days later, some 3,000 of the old HII type mines being laid, while protection was given to the layers by the anti-aircraft cruiser Cairo and the 19th Destroyer Flotilla. A further operation by the Hampton and Shepperton, laid the second field with a further 636 mines by the end of the month.
This defensive measure quickly produced results for the U-12 was sunk on 8 October, U-40 on 13 October and U-16 on 24 October. This swiftly controlled and subsequently stopped, the passage of U-boats through the Channel, although not before U-19 had lain a magnetic minefield off the Inner Dowsing and U-33 yet further mines of the same type off North Foreland at the end of October, which sank two merchant ships and the auxiliary minesweeper Ray of Hope.
If the U-boats were speedily brought under a measure of control, the unforeseen threat of minelaying by German destroyers quickly brought the enemy a large measure of revenge. On the night of 12-13 November a flotilla, under the command of Captain F. Bönte, and consisting of the destroyers Karl Galster, Wilhelm Heidkamp, Hermann Künne and Hans Lüdemann, sailed from their home ports and passed close to the Noord-Hinder light-vessel and then on a bearing to the North Foreland. The three deepwater channels of the Thames Estuary were their targets and some 288 magnetic mines were sown in the 'South' and 'Edinburgh' channels. The German flotilla was completely undetected and remained so for a long time. This, their first sortie of many, was soon to reap a rich reward for their audacity.
Mining of Adventure; loss of Blanche
The German destroyers' plans were aided partly by fate and partly by the weather. The Adventure had been under orders to sail for Portsmouth from the Humber but had been delayed for twenty hours due to the non-arrival of her escorts; two ships of the 19th Flotilla, Basilisk and Blanche from Dover. On 10 November they had been ordered to proceed to the Humber, but their passage was delayed by thick fog, which forced them to anchor at 1115 hours on 11 November in the Outer Dowsing Channel. They weighted at 1710 hours the same day, but had to anchor once more at 2006 hours due to weather conditions. They weighed at 0700 hours on 12 November and anchored in Grimsby Roads at 0900 hours. Half an hour later they sailed back for Portsmouth escorting the Adventure (Captain A. R. Halfhide).
The same thick weather, shielding the work of Bönte's ships, continued to delay the British squadron, which was forced to anchor in the Barrow Deep at 2057 hours on 12 November. Not until 0300 hours next morning could they once again set sail and, two hours later, they passed the Tongue light-vessel. Six and a half minutes later they ran into the German minefield and a large explosion occurred just before the minelayer's bridge structure. Captain Halfhide immediately surmised that his ship had been mined, rather than torpedoed, and at once ordered Basilisk alongside to transfer wounded and burned men, while he tried to effect repairs. The rescue of the injured had been completed by 0715. Meanwhile, on seeing Adventure hit, the destroyer Blanche (Lieutenant Commander R. N. Aubrey) had at once gone full speed astern and was ordered to keep clear, but to send her boats to aid the rescue work. She then carried out an anti-submarine sweep, while Basilisk (Commander M. Richard) went alongside the damaged minelayer.
Good work below, resulted in Adventure being able to get under way under her own power at 0715, using her after steering position. Basilisk was ordered to lead her into the Edinburgh Channel, giving as wide a berth as possible to the position in which she had been mined. By 0725 she was making four knots, which was gradually increased to eight knots. Alas, this splendid progress had to be abandoned twenty-two minutes later when it was discovered that the oil fuel being fed to the boilers had become contaminated with seawater as a result of the explosion. Adventure therefore stopped engines and Basilisk prepared to take her in tow. However, once again thanks to the indefatigable engineering party below, she managed to clear the oil fuel system by 0807 and the cruiser once again got under way, first at six and then at eight knots. Things were looking good when, at 0810, came another blow.
Blanche was stationed on the cruiser's starboard bow when she too, fell foul of a magnetic mine. There was a large explosion in the after part of the ship and all steam for the main engines was lost. The upper deck of the destroyer was split forward of the after superstructure, the after eng...
