The Doomed Expedition

The Campaign in Norway, 1940

Jack Adams

• Publisher: Leo Cooper
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9780850520361
• eBook ISBN: 9781473813717
• Subtopic: European History

A gripping account of the disastrous first significant land encounter of WWII, focusing on the areas of Narvik and Bodö-Mosjöen, Namsos and Aandalsnes.
In the early hours of 9 April 1940, the Germans invaded Denmark and Norway. Within twenty-four hours, Denmark was overwhelmed and the main Norwegian airfields and seaports were under German control. Thus started the first confrontation in modern war in which combined operations on land, sea, and in the air were fully involved.
Reluctantly the Allies launched Anglo-French landings in the Lofoten Islands and in Central Norway. At the outset, serious liaison, command and, above all, communication problems arose.
The urgent military needs of the Norwegians, with their King and government pursued by the Germans, were tragically misrepresented and never fully understood by the Allied politicians.
On another level, personality clashes between senior commanders further confused conditions in the field, where lack of air cover, supporting arms, and equipment made the task of the comparatively few combatants almost impossible to perform. Heroic battles and humiliating retreats led to the inevitable evacuation of an Allied expedition doomed from the start.

CONTENTS

FOREWORD
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
PART ONE	3 September 1939 to 8 April 1940 Scandinavian Prelude
PART TWO	9 to 15 April 1940 The German Invasion. Norwegian Resistance and Allied Countermeasures
PART THREE	14 April to 31 May 1940 Operations in the areas of Narvik, Bodö, Mo and Mosjöen.
PART FOUR	14 April to 3 May 1940 Operations based on Namsos
PART FIVE	17 April to 3 May 1940 Operations based on Aandalsnes
PART SIX	12 May to 8 June 1940 The recapture of Narvik. Final evacuation.
PART SEVEN	Comments and Conclusions
APPENDIX A	Land Forces taking part in the campaign
APPENDIX B	List of Sources
INDEX

FOREWORD

Unsuccessful military campaigns tend to be forgotten, particularly by the losers. Such is the ill-fated campaign fought by the Allies in Norway in the Spring of 1940.

Years later the distinguished German historian, Professor Walther Hubatsch, insisted that: ‘The Norwegian campaign occupies a special place among the campaigns and operations of the Second World War.’ He points out that its duration was relatively short, its theatre restricted and the forces engaged limited. Why ‘special’?

Because it was the first example of a modern combined operation by land, sea and air. It was the first modern trial of strength between air and sea power.

Here the ‘experts’ are divided. Some maintain that it was the first real conclusive proof we have had of the undermining of sea-power by air power. Others say that the main effect of Germany’s superiority in the air was ‘psychological’. Dr T. K. Derry, whose Campaign in Norway, written with full access to official papers, was published in 1952, formed the opinion that the effect of German air superiority was the most obvious lesson of the campaign, although ‘no degree of foresight could at that time have prevented us from defeat’. He goes on to say that the campaign ‘was in many respects a novelty’. Lieutenant-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, VC, who commanded the Allied forces in the Namsos area, reinforces this view by saying that ‘this was a campaign for which the book does not cater’.

The weather conditions ranged from unpleasant to impossible, faced by the soldiers, sailors and airmen on both sides with courage and fortitude. They met with new and unusual problems. Most did not understand the strategic, economic, technical and political dilemmas besetting the field commanders and their staffs.

On the Allied side this was mainly due to an overwhelming lack of communication, aggravated by personality clashes among some of the top Commanders, (notably at Narvik between Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of Cork and Orrery and Major-General P.J. Mackesy, who commanded the Allied troops on the ground).

This book does not profess to be a full and comprehensive history of the campaign in Norway. In the space allotted there is, regrettably, no room for a full account of the famous sea fights, such as the first and second naval battles in the Narvik fiords. However, these are well documented and easily available. Furthermore, in a book of this kind a detailed analysis of higher strategy and the political in-fighting which caused changes of course, sometimes leading to catastrophe, may be of marginal interest to the general reader.

The book is concerned with the events on land in the geographic areas of Narvik and Bodö-Mosjöen, Namsos and Aandalsnes. The sea-borne operations which covered these confrontations are recorded as, without this naval back-up, movement on land could not have been sustained. Emphasis is strongly on unit action, and the participation of individuals and small groups.

Many of the troops taking part were specialized and well-trained. The French put in the Chasseurs Alpins as ski troops but failed to deliver the vital equipment needed to perform their role. With them came the Foreign Legion, swapping their semi-tropical station for the rigours of the Arctic.

The Poles sent their Highland Brigade (under French command), some of whom had already fought against the Germans. The scattered units of the Norwegian forces fought doggedly on their home ground, at first without allies. Their two brigades in the north, under the determined command of General Fleischer, played a crucial role in the recapture of Narvik.

Britain provided two first-class, well-trained Regular Brigades, together with five Territorial Army battalions. The latter had neither the training nor equipment and weapons to carry out the exacting task thrust upon them at such short notice.

The Germans sent General Dietl’s Mountain Division to the Narvik front. Having secured the Oslo area and the port of Trondheim on 9 April 1940, they poured a steady stream of reinforcements into Norway. The ground had been well-prepared beforehand with the help of German residents and ‘tourists’.

The Norwegian traitor, Quisling, helped to undermine the authority of the legitimate Norwegian government, who were forced to evacuate to the North, together with King Haakon and the Crown Prince.

The scene was set for the first significant land encounter of the war. The outcome for the Allies can perhaps be summed up in the words of Desmond Fitzgerald, the Historian of the Irish Guards ‘… hopes and plans ended in failure and depression. The campaign was a tragedy, made more grievous by the endurance of the few troops who did the fighting with inadequate material. From the beginning of May a sense of ineluctable fate hung over Norway.’

JACK ADAMS
Freshford
October 1988

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a special debt of gratitude to Kingston Derry, OBE, who, with full access to official papers, wrote a definitive history of the campaign in Norway, which was published in 1952. From his home in Oslo he read and commented on the text of my manuscript. His familiarity with the Norwegian language (of which I am dismally ignorant) and his wider knowledge of the scattered operational areas, enabled him to offer advice and guidance which have been most helpful.

Professor Olav Riste, the Director of the Research Centre for Defence History at the Norwegian College in Oslo, kindly provided background material and helped with the compilation of the list of Norwegian units shown in Appendix A. He also found time to read and comment on Part Seven of the book.

The British Embassy in Oslo was particularly co-operative. The Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Robin Gamble, Royal Green Jackets, opened the door to sources that may otherwise have been out of my reach.

The Director of the Red Cross War Museum at Narvik, Mr Nils Ryeng, went out of his way personally to guide me around the battlegrounds and, by translating German Army documents into English, threw new light on the operations in which 24th Guards Brigade took part.

Further south, at Bodö, Captain Knut Störe of the Royal Norwegian Air Force acted as my guide through the still recognizable operational areas as well as allowing me access to his extensive collection of Norwegian, British and German photographs and documents relating to the campaign.

The Curator of the South Wales Borderers Museum at Brecon, Major R. P. Smith, readily provided archive material and published an appeal for help in the Regimental Journal of the Royal Regiment of Wales. The response brought in anecdotes and personal accounts, some of which are used and acknowledged in the book. The foremost contributor is Brigadier C.F. Cox, OBE, who, in addition, read and commented on Part Three of the manuscript. My thanks are also due to Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hywell-Jones MC, Mr Tom Flower, Colonel Peter Martin, Mr Leslie Morgan, Mr T. G. Morgan, Major J. G. Morgan-Owen CB, MBE, QC, Mr A. A. Williams, Mr Kenneth Williams and Lieutenant-Colonel P. A. Worrall OBE.

I received help from the Royal Artillery Association at Woolwich, the Royal Engineers Corps Library at Chatham and the Institution of the Royal Corps of Transport (for the RASC). As ever, the Regimental Secretaries of the British Regiments mentioned in the book were prompt and generous in supplying material. The Commando Association provided me with information about their forerunners, the Independent Companies who fought in the campaign. The Clifton Park Museum at Rotherham made available documents of the now-disbanded York and Lancaster Regiment.

I paid several visits to the Imperial War Museum, where my friend, Dr Conrad Wood, was particularly helpful. The Public Records Office at Kew made available primary material, such as War Diaries, and the Army Historical Branch of the MOD provided a list of relevant published sources.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Dezaunay, the French Army Liaison Officer at the School of Infantry, Warminster, kindly obtained documents from the Service Historique de l’ Armée de Terre in Paris which plotted the movements of the Chasseurs Alpins, the Foreign Legion and the Polish Highland Brigade. Further information about the Poles came from the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London. The most important document, the official history of the Samodzielna Brygada Strzelcow Podhalanskich, was translated into excellent English for me by Mrs Teresa Mundziel-Staniszewska, Associate of the Institute of Linguists. From Germany, Captain W. Heinemann of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt kindly forwarded a list...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents