Reasons in Writing

A Commando's View of the Falklands War

Ewen Southby-Tailyour

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 1990
• Print ISBN: 9781844150144
• eBook ISBN: 9781473817487
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

Reasons in Writing tells Southby-Tailyour's story of the Falklands War largely through the medium of diaries and letters written during his peacetime tour of duty in the seventies and the war itself. Reasons in Writing, is unlikely to be rivalled for its immediacy, insight and deep and genuine feeling for the Islands themselves, based on experience gained (unlike any other participant civilian or service) before, during and after that fateful winter of 1982.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements
Author’s Notes
Prologue
Introduction
Chapter One	A Wild Call
Chapter Two	A Clear Call
Chapter Three	The Gull’s Way
Chapter Four	Backing and Filling
Chapter Five	The Whale’s Way
Chapter Six	Homeward Bound
Chapter Seven	North by East
Chapter Eight	Invasion
Chapter Nine	Outward Bound
Chapter Ten	Ascension For Orders
Chapter Eleven	Doldrums
Chapter Twelve	The Whetted Knife
Chapter Thirteen	On the Beach
Chapter Fourteen	A Willing Foe and Searoom
Chapter Fifteen	The Wheel’s Kick
Chapter Sixteen	Advance!
Chapter Seventeen	A Settlement Too Far
Chapter Eighteen	A Bloody War and a Sickly Season
Chapter Nineteen	Victory
Chapter Twenty	When the Long Trick’s Over
Chapter Twenty One	Ask Me One On Beaches
Chapter Twenty Two	Wives and Sweethearts
Chapter Twenty Three	Sir, I Have The Honour
Chapter Twenty Four	Reflections
Bibliography
Index

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Since 1977 numerous people have helped me to write this book, at home and in the South Atlantic, in peace and in war, and have contributed as willingly now as they did at the time.

Some have preferred not to be named, but others I must thank publicly and in particular: Major-General Julian Thompson and Captain Michael Clapp for their endless patience with my queries and for reading, more than once, uncoordinated snippets of the manuscript in its raw state. Without their continual advice, support and counselling now and in 1982 there would be no tale to tell.

Lieutenant-General Robin Ross gave early and invaluable advice on presentation; Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Blundell read the whole manuscript and was polite enough not to comment too harshly; Lawrence Cotterell read the manuscript, commenting at length and with great wisdom; the staff of the Royal Marines Museum, and in particular Ed Bartholomew, checked my version of the history of the Royal Marines in the Falkland Islands; Captain Bill MacLennen of the Royal Marines Public Relations Office helped steer the manuscript through ‘the system’ – a vital task; Colonel Gerry Wells-Cole confirmed one or two of my opinions; Mrs. Sara Jones read a section of the manuscript and was kind enough to allow me to keep it in; Captain Fred Cook reminded me of NP 8901’s communications arrangements in 1979 and Colour Sergeant ‘Connie’ Francis supplied valuable information about his LCU’s duties on 8 June, 1982. Captain Phil Roberts was kind enough to comment on my perceptions of Sir Galahad’s routines on that same day from which I was able to clarify some important points. Major Tony Todd’s views are as invaluable now as they were at Fitzroy.

I would like to thank Tom Seccombe (lately the Director of Naval Security) for two things, firstly, for moral support in San Carlos on D Day; he will know the second reason!

Lieutenant Steve Nicoll very kindly lent me the original of his Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre notebook from his time in Winter Quarrie overlooking the track from Darwin to Fitzroy.

Assistance was given by three former officers in the Welsh Guards who served in the Falklands in 1982: Major Julian Peel Yates commanding Headquarter Company, Captain Robert Mason, Adjutant and Captain Jan Koops, second-in-command of the Prince of Wales’s Company. Without their painstaking scrutiny my story would be incomplete and one-sided, but as the result of this willing co-operation the awful events of 8 June, 1982, have now, I believe, been put into the fullest and most balanced perspective.

They, and everyone else mentioned above, helped with matters of fact but the interpretation of those facts and the conclusions and opinions reached are mine for which only I can bear the responsibility.

Major de Gascoigne’s devastatingly sensible comments and observations before and after the ‘war’ were always appreciated, but, most especially, was the moral support offered during it.

I must thank Leo Cooper, my publisher, for suggesting the whole idea, followed by his, and Tom Hartman’s, humorous and patient editorial work in the face of my incompetence as a typist… and, finally Jüri Gabriel, my agent, who kept me going long after I decided that I would rather be sailing than writing.

AUTHOR’S NOTE

This is a love story and during the last fifteen years I have agonized over how to tell it. Despite the mind’s ability to erase bad memories, I now realize that my involvement in the South Atlantic was not a bed of roses and there is no point in pretending that it was, even if that truth now hurts. Like all true love affairs, the bad has to be acknowledged as well as the good and my experience is no exception. To recount the tale highlighting only the happiness would be to falsify events – altogether a worse crime than hiding the facts from scrutiny.

By presenting my story in this manner I know I have opened myself to much justified criticism, but I must stand by my descriptions. Many of them are not very palatable, but I believe that they make honest reading. Above all I ask that my critics remember that the whole Falklands saga is an enigma with so many opposing forces pulling in opposition, each passionately believing that their course of action is the correct one – and in this respect I do not even consider the Argentinian view. For many of my early days I was in the middle, and not likely to win under any circumstances and while I do not regret this for one instance it does explain the conundrum in which I so often found myself. One thing I did learn, in large measure, is that while the military mind is trained to select and maintain an aim until the objective is achieved, the political mind (with one remarkable exception) was too often dominated by the twin spurs of personal gain and fear of retribution, making a stated and clear aim a very changeable goal. There is no doubt which principle led to our success.

The object of this love story are islands not people. People are transient, resilient and replaceable; they can look after themselves. Remote islands and their eco-systems are fragile and vulnerable and their inhabitants love them and care for them and their future with a passion not often understood by outsiders.

For my part this love affair influenced the many actions I was to take and, as in all such relationships, rationality in decision making rarely enjoys first priority! This ‘affair’ was to bring in unequal measures, immense happiness for much of the time, moments of intense sadness, not a little frustration, sometimes distrust and sometimes jealousy. I have, by nature, a happy-go-lucky disposition that relies heavily on the ‘it’ll-be-alright-on-the-night’ approach to life, although this aspect was to be well tested between 1977 and 1979. I am a fatalist and being at ease on my own I prefer to make my own decisions, which, of course, might explain some of what happens between these covers.

As the result of volunteering to serve with Naval Party 8901, the Falklands brought out a side of me that I had not appreciated previously. I became more sensitive to, and more positive about, certain aspects of life and it is no use pretending that, once smitten, I was unhappy to let the place dominate my life for over a decade. But now it is over and I have said my piece I feel very much like Admiral Grey whose final letter from the Falkland Islands in 1836 began thus:

“I will now bid goodbye to the Falklands with a few casual remarks and they shall be very few as I am quite tired of the subject.”

I felt strongly, almost possessively, about the Islands and their defence, their seizure, and the manner in which we were to capture them back: so much so that I was bound to be involved in controversial discussions. Some of my comments may, therefore, seem a little personal and harsh, but war, and its prevention, is a harsh and personal experience. It heightens emotions, deepens distrust, intensifies respect and destroys or confirms friendships.

Perceptions, where previously grey or muddled, become polarized and powerful; these are based on individual assessments, with no one person having access to all the facts. A full and accurate view of any situation is never available at the time to help decision making, and only hindsight can show where these judgements have been valid or baseless.

Therefore this is not a history book. It is merely an individual’s view of the Falklands in war and peace, before, during and after that Austral Autumn of 1982. Many will hold different views of the incidents I describe – these are mine. For the most part they are contemporary views, some of which have become modified by time and hindsight.

I made numerous mistakes between 1977 and 1982: some things were said (in my log and in public) that, with a wider perspective of events, I would have phrased differently or not at all. Some good decisions were taken that would not have been taken if all the facts had been known. Some actions I now regret, some I shall stand by to the end. All my decisions should be exposed, for without these conflictions a false picture of reactions and judgements would result. No one at any level is immune to these dichotomies where the time available for making a life-affecting decision can be measured in split seconds. We are all prone to making inaccurate decisions which, when executed, can by good fortune lead to success but without that luck can end just as easily in failure, as they often deserve to; hence Kipling’s warning ‘to treat the impostors [Triumph and Disaster] just the same, and that maxim holds particularly well in these cases. Fear and worry also play their part in personal perceptions, for each man has his own threshold of what is acceptable and what cannot be faced.

A calculated risk plus luck, is not the same as foolhardiness plus luck. ‘Getting away’ with an action does not necessarily validate the original decision, for that way future strategies and tactics could be based on delusions and the second time they may not necessarily work. Thus it is occasionally acceptable to criticize success.

For any successful military operation there has to be a clear, simpl...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents