The Two Battles of Copenhagen, 1801 and 1807

Britain and Denmark in the Napoleonic Wars

Gareth Glover

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781473898318
• eBook ISBN: 9781473898332
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: French History
• Index: History

This military study sheds new light on the significance of Copenhagen in the Napoleonic Wars through primary source accounts of two major battles.
In 1801 and 1807, British forces clashed with Napoleon and his allies in the Danish capital of Copenhagen. Yet the significance of those battles, and the key role the country played in the conflict in northern Europe, has rarely been examined in detail. In The Two Battles of Copenhagen, Gareth Glover uses original source material to describe these events from the British and Danish perspectives. In the process, he reveals new insights into the politics of this region during this turbulent phase of European history.
The first Battle of Copenhagen was a naval battle celebrated in Britain as one of Nelson's great victories. The second was an assault on the city by the British army in which Wellington played a prominent part. These episodes in the continental struggle to resist the French are described in vivid detail, with extensive quotes from the recollections of eyewitnesses on both sides.

Chapter 1

Walking the Tightrope of Neutrality

Following the end of the Great Northern War in 1721, Denmark and Sweden had seen their influence wane, with Prussia and Russia becoming the dominant powers in the Baltic. The Danes had not enjoyed much success during the war, but they had emerged with their possession of the north German state of Schleswig now uncontested, but their retention of its neighbour Holstein was still a matter of dispute. These provinces therefore became the soft underbelly of Denmark, bringing her into very close proximity to the danger of becoming embroiled in the almost incessant wars that raged across Germany.

It must first be understood that Denmark in 1800 should not be viewed as simply the Jutland Peninsula and the islands of Zealand, Fyn, Lolland, Falster and Mon, which form the modern-day country. The entire country of Norway formed a part of Denmark, not as a vassal state, but as an equal partner ever since the Kalmar Union of 1397, which had originally also included both Sweden and Finland. The Union had collapsed in 1523, but Norway had retained its ties with Denmark, both continuing as a joint kingdom ruled by the Oldenburg dynasty. Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands were also part of Norway’s dowry and they formed a further extension of the Denmark-Norway Union although all were relatively sparsely populated.1

Denmark’s influence in the Baltic had often brought her into sharp conflict with her neighbours: indeed Sweden was usually viewed as the ‘arch enemy’. An emergent Russia also sought to gain influence in the Baltic, leading to interminable squabbles and intrigue between these three states, as they all sought to gain the upper hand. Occasionally, when feeling threatened by outside influences, they had put aside their differences and had tried to work together for the common good of the region. But a severe lack of trust regarding each other’s motives, caused by constant intrigues and regular switching of allegiances, guaranteed that all attempts at alliances, often termed ‘leagues’, would soon end in rancour and a return to war.

Like all nineteenth-century European powers, Denmark also possessed an overseas empire, owning the West Indian sugar islands of St Thomas, St Jan (now St John) and St Croix, which had been purchased from France in 1733,1

and also maintained a number of trading posts and protective fortresses along the Gold Coast of West Africa, including Fort Frederiksborg, purchased from Sweden, Ossu Castle near Accra and Frederiksberg.2

Denmark had also established a number of trading posts and small colonies for growing and trading spices throughout the Indian subcontinent, including the colonies of Trankebar3 in the Tamil Nadu region and Fredericksnagore4 just north of Calcutta.5 Both of these enclaves continued until 1845, when they were sold to Britain. They also owned the Frederik Islands or New Denmark (Frederiksoerne)6 until 1868 when they were also sold to Britain. Danish merchants also maintained regular trade with China.

As can be seen, therefore, Danish possessions abroad were numerous and led to an expanding merchant fleet trading with both the West and East Indies, trading particularly in high-value goods. This trade was of course an irritation to British merchants, but it did not pose a significant threat to British commercial ventures, whilst sailing under a neutral flag ensured them safe and unrestricted passage. This trade grew throughout the eighteenth century, and the coffers of both the Danish merchant houses and of the Danish government grew fat on the proceeds.

Great Britain was of course involved in a very similar business, but on a far greater scale, and a grudging forbearance was granted to the Danes, who were not viewed as a serious military or mercantile threat to Britain’s own undertakings. Indeed, the Danes proved that they were willing to cooperate with the British in 1726, when a British fleet under Vice Admiral Sir Charles Wager was sent to sit off the port of Reval7 on the Baltic coast of Russia and was joined by a significant reinforcement of Danish ships.8 This combined fleet overawed the Russians and the threatened installation of a Russian prince in Danish Holstein was abandoned and Britain was granted further trading rights. A second British fleet the following year was supported not only by the Danes1 but also the Swedes this time, but their help was not needed, as Catherine I died, and her successor had no stomach for the fight.

Denmark’s location, of course, controls all access into and out of the Baltic Sea, through the narrow channels which run to the east and west of the island of Zealand. Access to the two western channels, known as The Little Belt and The Great Belt, was difficult, with a number of dangerous shoals and submerged rocks, it was passable to ships, but the Danes heavily emphasized its dangers to discourage its use. The eastern channel, commonly known as ‘The Sound,’ was however commanded by the cannon of Cronborg Castle on the Danish side and Helsinborg Castle on the Swedish side, the channel being only 2.5km wide at this point. Denmark retained the very lucrative rights to levy a charge on every merchant ship passing through the Sound as a percentage of the total value of the cargoes. To ensure that no ship’s captain significantly understated the value of his shipment, the King reserved the right to purchase any cargo at the value stated on the customs forms. Major Wybourn of the Royal Marines, aboard HMS Isis during the expedition of 1800, records that he was informed that Denmark earned £70,000 per annum from these dues.2

Britain had traditionally shown little interest in the Baltic, as long as its own merchants retained free access; but this had become much more of a serious issue as the indigenous supply of wood for shipbuilding was diminishing just as demand soared, as both the merchant and naval fleets grew exponentially during the eighteenth century. New sources had to be secured for the import of naval stores, particularly masts, hemp and pitch to seal the hulls. The best sources yet discovered for these items was Norway and Sweden for general wood supplies, and Russia and Poland for the great masts and hemp for pitch; therefore, Britain became far more concerned about its access to the Baltic and very wary of any suggestion of a combined Scandinavian fleet cutting off these vital supplies.

Britain had secured a fifty-year trade agreement with Russia in 1734 for the supply of naval stores, which had been specifically designed to counterbalance any threat to this supply from Sweden and Denmark, who had at that time traditionally favoured close relations with Britain’s arch-enemy, France. This balance of power in the Baltic continued relatively harmoniously until 1756, when the outbreak of the Seven Years War changed everything. Russia and Britain found themselves on opposite sides in this conflict, but they did not come to blows and their mutually-beneficial trade (the ships carrying naval stores to Britain returned fully laden with British wool) continued unchecked.

Sweden and Denmark became increasingly nervous that with this turn of events Britain would challenge their ships on the high seas in search of contraband. The British government had become increasingly aware of the use of ‘neutral’ ships by their enemies, in an effort to circumvent the British blockades, designed to starve their enemies into submission and destroy their commerce. The Danes saw nothing wrong with this subterfuge which had become a very lucrative trading opportunity. Therefore, Sweden and Denmark came together and sent a large combined squadron1 into the North Sea, both to protect their merchant ships and to send a very potent message to the British.

This first example of a Scandinavian ‘armed response’ came to be termed the ‘Armed Neutrality’ and clearly indicated that they were prepared to fight to ensure that their ships were accepted as neutrals, and were not harmed or captured. This was particularly useful at times when Britain was either isolated or fully stretched, when their naval superiority could not be fully utilized in response.

Britain possessed well over a hundred line-of-battle ships2 which could clearly overwhelm any of the individual navies in the Baltic. However, the British navy was required for numerous operations worldwide and could not spare much of this huge fleet for any operation in the Baltic. What really mattered was the number of battleships in the area. In 1757, the Russian and Swedish fleets had combined in Kioge Bay, numbering twenty-two ships of the line, defying Britain to enter the Baltic with a superior fleet. Britain could not spare adequate numbers to force the Sound and to bring the issue to a head. The salutary lesson was not lost on either side: the Baltic states were now confident that jointly they could defy the threat from the Royal Navy. The Danes had since signed an ‘Eternal Alliance’ with Russia in 1773, which had effectively made Denmark into a Russian client state.

The American War of Independence saw the Baltic states resurrect their ‘Armed Neutrality’ in 1780, including Russia, Prussia, Sweden and Denmark, but the league was not officially limited to just the Baltic states, with Holland at one time proposed for membership. However, squabbling between the individual members meant that it was effectively defunct before any actions could even be agreed. Denmark was horrified by Russian demands for formal ratification of what the Danes had enjoyed ‘unofficially’ for decades.1 Indeed, when the Tsarina, Catherine the Great, learnt that the Danish Foreign Minister, Count Andreas Bernstorff, the original instigator of the treaty, had at the same time struck a private deal with Britain to safeguard Danish shipping and trade, she demanded and got his removal from office.

The Dutch West Indian island of St Eustatius was a free port and a magnet for contraband and illicit trade, but when the Dutch allowed American privateers to operate out of its port, which wreaked havoc with British trade in the West Indies, the Royal Navy was sure to react. Therefore, the Dutch, not wishing to lose such a lucrative trade, had looked to join the ‘Armed Neutrality’ in a bid to stave off any British reprisals, by allying itself with the strength of the other ‘neutral’ fleets. However, Britain, hearing of Dutch intentions, promptly declared war, effectively blocking their efforts to join the ‘league of neutrals’, by making her now a combatant. The coast of Holland was blockaded and Dutch trade was soon crippled, sending the economy into crisis; this lesson was not lost on the Baltic neutrals! The Danes secretly continued to help the Dutch, by buying up their ships which were then laid-up and also providing false papers for them, so that they could sail as neutrals under the Danish flag. The Danes even performed the same service for the Spanish, to enable them to bring their South American produce to Europe in safety. This blatant collusion even went as far as having Danish warships acting as escorts for their protection.

The British government did, however, look ambivalently on the Baltic neutrals. It simply wanted to continue its own vital trade with the Baltic without it being in any way inhibited. As long as this remained true, the Royal had much more important business than sending fleets to the Baltic. The ‘Armed Neutrality’ of 1780 also worked to Britain’s advantage, in keeping her rivals out, ensuring that there was no threat of a Spanish or French fleet entering the Baltic.

Things took another turn in 1788, when Sweden attacked Russia, in an attempt to regain its territory in Finland, lost in the Great Northern War. Russia called on Denmark to assist her and a Norwegian force marched into Sweden, in a bid to make the Swedes think again. Britain and Prussia had no wish to see Russia dominant in the Baltic, especially as Catherine was now cosying up to the French, and they brought huge pressure to bear on Denmark. The British Ambassador at Copenhagen, Hugh Elliott, with Prussian support, demanded that Denmark end the war (it had hardly been a war yet, with very little, if any, fighting by the Norwegian troops) and the Danes promptly buckled under the pressure, recalling their forces.

In 1791, Prime Minister William Pitt had rashly got involved in a joint demand with Prussia to halt Russian advances in the Black Sea area, which might have affected naval supplies to Britain, if the Poles had shipped through this new route into the French-dominated Mediterranean, rather than through the Baltic. Pitt arrogantly considered sending a small fleet into the Baltic to threaten the Russian fleet, but this did highlight a very major problem. No officers currently serving in the Royal Navy had ever sailed through the Sound between Sweden and Denmark, and they had no accurate charts or depth measurements for the shoals, the navigation of which channel was so difficult and dangerous. However, all of this was soon forgotten, as the wars against Revolutionary...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Plates
• List of Maps
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Maps
• Introduction
• 1. Walking the Tightrope of Neutrality
• 2. The Drums Beat ‘To Arms’
• 3. The British Mobilization
• 4. Parker Delays
• 5. Denmark Prepares
• 6. The Die is Cast
• 7. The Battle of Copenhagen
• 8. Battle Continues
• 9. Winning the Peace
• 10. Five Years of Relative Harmony
• 11. Rapid Escalation
• 12. The Cabinet Deliberates
• 13. The Fleet Forms
• 14. The Fleet Arrives in the Sound
• 15. Danish Preparations
• 16. British Troops Land
• 17. The Battle of Kioge
• 18. The Bombardment
• 19. The Aftermath
• 20. Danish Losses Further Afield
• 21. The Gunboat War, 1808–1809
• 22. The Swedish Question
• 23. The Final Years
• Overview
• Visiting the Scenes Today
• Appendices Relevant to the Battle of Copenhagen 1801
• Appendices Relevant to the Siege of Copenhagen 1807
• Bibliography
• Plate Section