A History of the Mediterranean Air War, 1940–1945. Volume 2

North African Desert, February 1942–March 1943

Christopher Shores, Giovanni Massimello, Russell Guest, Frank Olynyk, Winfried Bock

• Publisher: Grub Street Publishing
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781909166127
• eBook ISBN: 9781910690970
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: African History
• Index: History

This second volume in the seminal series on aerial combat, pilots, and tactics in Libya and Egypt in the middle of World War II.
In volume two of this series, historian Christopher Shores begins by exploring the 8th Army's movements after Operation Crusader when they were forced back to the Gazala area in northeastern Libya, as well as their defeat in June, 1942, the loss of Tobruk, and the efforts of Allied air forces to protect their retreating troops.
Shores continues with the heavy fighting that followed in the El Alamein region. This features the Western Desert Air Force and the arrival of the first Spitfires. The buildup of both army and air forces and the addition of new commanders on the ground aided the defeat of Rommel's Deutsche Afrika Korps at Alam el Halfa, after which came the Second Battle of El Alamein.
With the arrival of the United States Army Air Force, the Allied air forces gained dominance over the Axis. Shores recounts the lengthy pursuit of the Italo-German forces right across Libya, including the capture of Tripoli and the breakthrough into Southern Tunisia. This allowed a linkup with other Allied forces in Tunisia (whose story appears in Volume 3).
Included with the action are stories of some of the great fighter aces of the Desert campaign such as Jochen Marseille and Otto Schulz of the Luftwaffe, Franco Bordoni-Bisleri of the Regia Aeronautica and Neville Duke, Billy Drake, and "Eddie" Edwards of the Commonwealth air forces.
Finally, Shores touches on the Allied and Axis night bombing offensives and the activities of the squadrons cooperating with the naval forces in the Mediterranean.

CHAPTER 1

HALFWAY BACK

The conclusion of Volume 1 found the 8th Army battered and somewhat bewildered at the end of January 1942, defending the Gazala Line, which was a few miles to the west of Tobruk, but east, not only of Derna, but of Benghazi by the full width of the Cyrenaican ‘bulge’. In but a few days, more than half of the territory that it had taken in two months of costly fighting to gain, had been lost.

The RAF had learned many hard lessons since 1940, but also much that was of value. The recent performance of the army had, it may be recalled, led to a growing sense of bitterness that their colleagues on the ground had not seemed to be putting heart and soul into the conflict in the manner in which the air forces were. Poor leadership was much of the problem, and here the Western Desert Air Force had a distinct advantage. The overall air commander in the Middle East, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, was proving to be masterful in his role and his relationship with his immediate subordinate, Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham, as commander of WDAF itself, was growing in confidence, trust and understanding.

Winston Churchill, the British prime minister, had complained to his advisors that they seemed incapable of offering him an army commander who could actually win battles. It was a desperately worrying time. Apart from the rebuff of the Crusader offensive during January, the Russians seemed only just to be holding on the Eastern Front, while in the Far East the early disasters resulting from the Japanese assaults on the USA and on the British territories in Malaya and Burma were still happening, or were at the least very fresh in the memory. It was less than two months since the shock of the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse which had occurred immediately after the loss of so much of the US fleet at Hawaii.

Although the presence of the Soviet Union and the USA as allies gave an almost certainty of eventual victory, the way ahead before that could be achieved, looked long and hard. In only days ahead the German capital ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, bottled-up in Brest harbour for many months, would make their successful breakout up the English Channel, under the very noses of the main British defences. Before February was over Singapore would capitulate with the loss of a huge number of prisoners, further shattering British pride and morale.

There was still little that the United Kingdom could do; to launch an invasion of north-west France with the forces available was quite out of the question. Even maintaining the supply of the mother country with food and war materials was threatened still by the depredations of the Kriegsmarine’s U-Boats on shipping in the Atlantic. Further evidence was becoming available that at this stage of the war the night bombing offensive against Germany was achieving little, and would require much development and production of heavier four-engined bombers and navigational aids before it could make any worthwhile contribution to the overall war effort. This left aid to Russia and holding on to North Africa as the only viable alternatives available for the immediate future.

Even these two activities could be mutually counter-productive. North Africa required much reinforcement of tanks and aircraft – just the items that Josef Stalin was demanding most vociferously for Russia. Moreover, the new war in the Far East made vast new demands for aircraft and warships, the latter requirement placing still greater pressure on the need to provide escort for the convoys seeking to be sent throughout a greatly widened war zone. It was hardly surprising that this was the period of the greatest shipping losses.

Of further concern to the British was the possibility that Russia might be defeated, or even enter into some separate agreement or armistice with Germany to bring the war in the east to a close. Either possibility opened the potential for the Germans to advance southwards through the Caucasus mountains down into the Middle East, threatening the British army with an attack from the rear. This also posed the threat of the oil-rich areas of Iran and Iraq falling into Axis hands, and endangered the main routes to the British possessions in India and Burma.

It was into this hugely problematic scenario that, on 1 December 1941, General Sir Alan Brooke had taken over the post of Chief of the General Staff from Field Marshal Sir John Dill. Considered probably to be the best military brain produced by the United Kingdom during the war, Brooke would work closely with Churchill for the rest of the conflict. His arrival commenced with a fight with Lord Beaverbrook, Minister for Aircraft Production, who was about to despatch 72 Hurricanes to Russia, with further supplies to follow. Subsequently, Brooke learned that the Chief of the Air Staff was suggesting sending six squadrons from the Middle East at a time when “we were at our wits end as to how to hold up adequate air forces” in the United Kingdom and Far East. Fortunately he was able to persuade the Prime Minister to postpone this proposal until after 8th Army had launched a new offensive in Cyrenaica, potentially planned for mid May.

Brooke had rapidly become aware that Churchill was not happy with the performance of General Auchinleck and was considering replacing him. Brooke had been worried for some time about Auchinleck’s ability, and particularly about some of his advisers with whom he had surrounded himself. In an effort to improve this latter situation, Maj Gen R.L.McCreery, who had the relevant experience, was sent out, but was never consulted and was practically ignored. Regarding Auchinleck, Brooke wrote in his diary: “I have not the highest opinion of him!” However, by defending him from Churchill, he was seeking to ensure continuity. He wrote, most tellingly: “All depressing but made worse by lack of good military commanders. Half our Corps and Division (commanders) are totally unfit for their appointments, and yet if I were to sack them I could find no better; they lack character, imagination, drive and powers of leadership. The reason for this state of affairs is to be found in the losses we sustained in the last war of all our best officers, who should now be our Senior Commanders. I wonder if we will muddle through this time as we have done in the past.” It is easy, 70 years later, to forget how close together the two great wars of the 20th Century were. However, that this was the view of Britain’s senior soldier at the time augured ill for the immediate future.

Turning to the RAF itself, it does need to be stressed how different was its supply and maintenance position to that of the two opposing Axis air forces. For the Italians particularly, any need for rest, reequipment, overhaul, etc. required no more than the relatively short flight across the Mediterranean home to Italy. For the Germans it was a little further, although bases were rapidly established in both Italy and Greece for immediate matters, while the flight on to southern Germany and Austria was not a vast distance further. Coupled with this, the Luftwaffe also had the advantage of a large force of transport aircraft, capable of carrying both men and urgent supplies in considerable quantities.

For the British, the position was very different (including the very substantial number of South African and Australian units sent to serve with the parent nation’s units). To maintain a sizeable air force in the Middle East, capable of supporting 8th Army, defending the Egyptian base areas, and to maintain a presence further east against possible bombing attack and in case of a future threat from the Caucasus, required a huge administrative ‘tail’. Volume 1 detailed the number of maintenance units, armaments depots, personnel holding units, operational training units, etc, which had already been set up by the end of 1941. These would continue to grow as the size of the ‘spearhead’ of squadrons grew to meet the everincreasing planned strengths.

This required not only the creation of new units, but the building of a network of sub-contractors scattered through the back streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and other towns and cities. These were particularly valuable in overhauling and maintaining engines of both aircraft and vehicles, the work of recovery being achieved by the R & S units being particularly valuable. Study of the daily details of combats taking place will rapidly bring home the fact that the number of aircraft forced to land or crashland due to damage or technical faults, made up a very high proportion of the losses suffered. The number of such aircraft picked up and removed for repair, or even rebuilding, was very considerable and a study of aircraft serial numbers indicates that having apparently been lost in action, the same aircraft would sometimes appear again in an active role.

As lines became more static, it rapidly became obvious how well both sides were served by mobile radar stations. Increasingly, no sooner did a formation take off to carry out a bombing or strafing attack, or a patrol over the front, than within minutes the opposing air force would be scrambling fighters to intercept. Indeed, study of information derived from Ultra transcripts or Y Service radio intercepts which are now available to the historian, indicates how considerable was the knowledge of the other side’s ‘comings and goings’, personnel, etc. While not enjoying the level of information-gathering achieved by Ultra, the Axis listening services were no less efficient t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction and Acknowledgements
• Chapter 1: Halfway Back
• Chapter 2: Disasters on the Gazala Line
• Chapter 3: Above the Waves, 1 February – 30 June 1942
• Chapter 4: The Yanks are Coming!
• Chapter 5: The Stand on the El Alamein Line
• Chapter 6: The Battle of Alam El Halfa
• Chapter 7: The Battle of El Alamein
• Chapter 8: Pursuit into Tripolitania
• Chapter 9: The Mareth Line
• Chapter 10: Above the Waves, 1 July 1942 – 31 March 1943
• Chapter 11: The Allied Heavy Bombing Offensive
• Bibliography