1.1 “Hegemony” in Western and Chinese definitions
In social sciences some specific terms can evoke different meanings or imply different nuances in different societies from specific cultural backgrounds and historical experiences. “Hegemony” is such a term. The exact meaning of “hegemony” in the modern international academic community and in Chinese language and culture has differences in nuances. Before examining the Tributary System and Belt and Road Initiative, the nuances in definitions of “hegemony” must be clarified to comprehend its exact meaning and differences according to the international actors.
“Hegemony”, “hēgemonia” and “hēgemōn” initially originated from the Greek word “hēgeisthai”, which means “to lead”. “Hēgemonia” literally means “leadership”, and it is derived from the word “hēgemōn”, which means “leader”. “Hēgemonia” was first used in the English language in the mid-16th century and finally evolved into today’s final form we use: “Hegemony” (Kaymak, 2016: 66; Agnew, 2005: 20; Scruton, 1996: 219; McLean, 1996: 218).
“Hēgemonia” is compared with two more words in the Greek language by Triepel, a prominent scholar in the related field. According to Triepel (1938: 343), all three have similar outcomes in terms of meaning, but with different intonations. One is “arche”, which carries the meaning of a stronger power relation compared with “hēgemonia”. It is interpreted as “sovereignty”. The other one is “dynamis”, which is used in quite close meaning with “arche”. The two words stress stronger power relations, while “hēgemonia” has a relatively loose meaning, interpreted as “supremacy”.
Hegemony, as a term in the social sciences, is often explained with the word “domination” as well, in most of the sources. Rosamond (2016) describes it as “the dominance of one group over another, by legitimating norms and ideas”. In political sciences it is defined as domination of a state or a group (Bealey, 1999: 153) or simply “domination of one state over another” (Safire, 1978: 324), respectively, in different sources. Since “domination” is about the capability of the dominant actor, it is a result of power relations between weak and strong (Evans and Newnham, 1990: 153), though it does not give any clues about the nature of that relation, like how the domination is set up by the strong over the weak.
In contemporary usage, hegemony refers to a softer form of “domination”. Domination may include coercion by use of material power (Shafritz, 1993: 333). When the United States started the Marshall Plan in 1947, the aim was to help war-torn Western Europe to recover and prevent possible further advancement of Soviet invasion. Yet, this was not the only result and aim of the plan. Through the Marshall Plan, the US established a matured supremacy over Western Europe. At this initial stage of the US supremacy, the Western European countries cherished the plan, as they needed the provided funds to recover from war destruction. In the later stages, the main incentive for Western Europe to accept the continuation of supremacy was their dependency on the US currency, leadership and power. US possession of nuclear weapons, for instance, was never a reason for Western Europe to accept US supremacy in the Cold War era. That is because US supremacy in Western Europe did not depend on exercising power but mostly on “leadership”.
In the same period, on the other hand, the Soviet regime was establishing its supremacy over a different region: Eastern Europe. In Hungary, Soviets sent troops to stop the economic and political liberal reforms in 1956. When it invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, by troops formed by neighboring communist states, the supremacy was again set up by coercion, and it was called “the fraternal invasion” (Robertson, 2002: 78). Therefore, supremacy in the two camps had different characteristics. The US supremacy was in the form of “leadership”, built on “consent”, which can be named “hegemony”, while the Soviet supremacy was differing with its characteristics of “coercion”, as can be described best by the term “domination”.
In the disciplines of politics and international relations, “hegemony” is a fundamental term, and has become the subject of many theories. One of the foremost theories of hegemony in this context is the Neo-Gramscian theory. Neo-Gramscian theory is attributed to the father of the critical school, Robert Cox (Moolakkatu, 2009: 439). Cox defines the term “hegemony” in the tradition of the Frankfurt School. He borrows Gramscian ideas and terminology of “hegemony” from the disciplines of politics and sociology, to create a comprehensive theory of “hegemony” in the discipline of international relations.
Cox (1992: 140) describes hegemony in international relations not just as rough supremacy of a stronger power over a weak one, but functioning in a more complicated way as using coercive power together with international institutions and ideological principles. The principles are meant to influence the whole international system, to bind the members in the system with the hegemonic rules and obtain their “consent”. In Cox’s definition of hegemony, the domination which solely depends on material power is not enough to set up a hegemonic system. Besides, the hegemon must get “consent” of the dominated states as well. Thus, material power, consent, international institutions and ideology are key factors in the Neo-Gramscian definition of hegemony.
In the Neo-Gramscian definition, hegemony is not just a type of power relation between the states, but also a system of global economy working with a dominant mode of production and influencing other countries, getting connected with the sub-production levels. It is at the same time a special kind of international socializing network that connects the classes from different countries. That is why international hegemony is a structure arising on a social, economic and political trivet. Hegemony cannot endure in the absence of any of them. All social, economic and political components must be working together to create an ideal structure of hegemonic system. Besides, there must be civil structures that operate beyond the nation-states, supporting the hegemonic system as a whole, by imposing its values on the member states. This can be done by universal sets of norms, institutions and mechanisms. Setting up such a huge and complex structure is a difficult undertaking and can only be done by the countries that have had extensive social and economic revolutions, which have changed domestic economic and political dynamics, carrying huge potential to influence the outside world as well (Cox and Sinclair, 2016: 137).
Ideology in a hegemonic system is a crucial factor that functions not only to manufacture consent, but also to prevent counter-hegemonic movements. Formation of these movements is prevented by hegemonic educational institutions, like universities and international organizations. They create local elites with domesticated minds, eliminate counter movements and ideas, as well as help the hegemon to convert all these into eliciting consent, if not targeting further steps like assimilation (Cox, 1983: 173).
International institutions, ideologies, intellectuals, media, universities, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international corporations and many other means of hegemonic tools are all created and designed to generate the consent of the dominated societies and governments. However, this peaceful framework does not mean that hard power does not have a function in the system, or it will never be used. Neo-Gramscian hegemony does not deny the role and importance of material power. On the contrary, coercion and consent are considered to be the two main pillars of the hegemonic system; they are mutually needed in creating the hegemonic system.
The idea of using coercion and consent to create hegemony originates from the Italian medieval political advisor Machiavelli. Machiavelli advised the “Prince” to be furnished by two managerial instruments, coercion and consent. He resembled the political power of the “Centaur”, a half-human, half-animal creature. The Centaur represented how coercion and consent would work together. The prince was advised to not hesitate to use either of them, whenever needed. Coercion is always innate in the system, but it is only utilized if there is a challenge to the system (Cox and Sinclair, 2016: 127).
Most terms have different interpretations and nuances in different cultural and historical backgrounds, and likewise the term “hegemony” in the Chinese language also carries some connotations added by Chinese historical experiences. The Chinese ancient Warring States Period and early modern history are often described as the arena of brutal repression by tyrants. The ruthless, repressive, tyrannical rule and endless power struggle between the war lords in these periods is often associated with the term “hegemony”. Further, it has strong psychological connections with unjust treatment; China also faced in the “Century of Humiliation” by Western powers. The common characteristics of these periods are injustice and tyranny, demonstrated by the powerful states.
“Hegemony” in the Chinese language and in daily usage does not overlap with the Western definition. The Chinese definition contains “immoral” nuances. This is the reason Chinese leadership, including Mao, has particularly stressed the point that they are not going to be a hegemon and they will always stand against hegemonic rules and aims (Nordin, 2016: 207).
The modern scholarly definition of hegemony is widely accepted to be associated with “leadership” and “consent” and it is presented in the Chinese language with the two characters 霸权 (bà quán) which literally mean “domination and influence” (Denisowski, 1997). However, when the character 霸 (bà) is taken alone, it does not have that simple and neutral meaning. In the Chinese language 霸(bà) alone means “tyrant, lord, feudal chief, to rule by force, to usurp”. Thus, in Chinese understanding, being a “hegemon” is simply being an “immoral, brutal tyrant” and setting hegemony is “setting domination in a ruthless tyrannical way” (Cunningham-Cross and Callahan, 2011: 367).
On the other hand, while the Chinese government and scholars defend that China will never be a hegemon, this should not lead the reader to think that China will not seek supremacy and domination in its relations with other countries. This approach can be interpreted as Chinese authorities claiming that they do not have the intention to be “immoral tyrants”, but that does not mean they will not be seeking “hegemony” in the Western meaning, which is in the form of “leadership” depending on “consent”. The objection of Chinese authorities is to its moral implications, not to itself.
In this book the term “hegemony” is used in the Neo-Gramscian meaning of leadership, depending on consent of the dominated parties, while the material power is essential but kept aside to assure the system is running.
