The RoutledgeFalmer Reader in the Philosophy of Education

Wilfred Carr

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• eBook ISBN: 9781000446104
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

This Reader brings together a wide range of material to present an international perspective on topical issues in philosophy of education today. Focusing on the enduring trends in this field, this lively and informative Reader provides broad coverage of the field and includes crucial topics. With an emphasis on contemporary pieces that deal with issues relevant to the immediate real world, this book represents the research and views of some of the most respected authors in the field today. Wilfred Carr also provides a specially written introduction which provides a much-needed context to the role of philosophy in the current educational climate. Students of philosophy and philosophy of education will find this Reader an important route map to further reading and understanding.

PART I
PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION

CHAPTER 1
PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY

Possibilities, tensions and tasks

Terence H. McLaughlin
Journal of Education Policy, 15, 4, 441–457, 2000

The nature of educational policy

It is helpful at the outset of our discussion to make a number of preliminary points about educational policy and policy making, which are relevant to the contribution which philosophy might make to them. Four preliminary points are of particular significance here.

First, what is an educational policy? In answer to this question, some writers stress the relationship between educational policies and politics, power and control (Codd, 1995: 1–2). Prunty (quoted in Codd, 1995: 1) defines educational policy making as ‘an exercise of power and control directed towards the attainment or preservation of some preferred arrangement of schools and society’. Codd himself argues that ‘educational policies are sets of political decisions which involve the exercise of power in order to preserve or alter the nature of educational institutions or practices’ (ibid.). Prunty and Codd seem to imply that educational policies can be formulated only by those who exercise power and control and who are involved in politics in this sense. Is it not the case, however, that educational policies can be formulated by many bodies and agencies, including those who do not (either temporarily or otherwise) enjoy the exercise of relevant forms of power and control but seek merely to influence educational arrangements indirectly through (say) appeal to the electorate, lobbying of various kinds or the stimulation of general debate and discussion? The kinds of bodies and agencies one thinks of here include political parties in opposition, subject and teacher associations, ‘think tanks’ of various kinds and the like. A more sensitive characterization of the relationship between educational policy making on the one hand and politics, power and control on the other seems therefore to be required. What is central to the notion of an educational policy is that it is a detailed prescription for action aimed at the preservation or alteration of educational institutions or practices. However, an educational policy, and the related notion of ‘educational policy making’ can be used in either (i) power and control related or (ii) ‘influence aspirant’ senses and contexts.

Second, educational policies originate at different levels and contexts in the educational system and from a number of different agents and agencies ranging from national to school (and even to classroom level). There are different ‘languages’ of policy debate, which can be roughly labelled as ‘official’, ‘professional’, ‘research’ and ‘popular’ (McLaughlin, 1999a: 37–38).

Third, educational policies differ with respect to the scope of their content and application. One way of expressing these differences is to invoke various kinds of continuum on which policies can be located. One such continuum involves generality and specificity. At one end of this continuum are policies of a very general kind involving matters such as the aims of education and the structure of the educational system, whilst at the other end are very specific policies relating (say) to strategies for the teaching of particular topics within specific subjects. Another (related) continuum can be described as involving ‘depth’ and ‘surface’ characteristics. The ‘depth’ end of this continuum involves educational policies with clear philosophical implications and ramifications. Many current policies concerned with the general area of ‘values education’ fall into this category. At the ‘surface’ end of this continuum are educational policies, which are less apt for philosophical reflection. It is important not to assume, however, that ‘generality’ is uniquely associated with ‘depth’ and ‘specificity’ with ‘surface’ characteristics. General policies may not be suitable for philosophical reflection and specific policies may be rich in philosophical implication.

Fourth, it is useful to note the distinction between different (though interrelated) aspects of educational policy and policy making: (i) the process of educational policy making; (ii) the policy itself and (iii) the application and evaluation of the policy.

These four preliminary points have significance for the role which philosophy might play in relation to educational policy and policy making. Taken as a whole, the points caution against treating ‘educational policy’ in an unanalysed way if one is seeking to achieve a sensitive characterization of the contribution which philosophy might make to it. Considered individually, each point contains an insight worth noting. The first point urges alertness to the influence which power and control might have on proffered philosophical contributions to educational policy; the second point raises awareness of the different levels and contexts where such philosophical contributions might be made; the third point reminds us that not all educational policies are equally apt for philosophical illumination and urges us to reflect on how we might distinguish between those policies which do and those which do not properly invite philosophical attention, and the fourth point brings into focus the different aspects and dimensions of educational policy and policy making which philosophers might seek to contribute to.

Philosophy and educational policy: some preliminary considerations

The claim that philosophy is one of the reflective and critical resources, which should be brought to bear on educational policy if policies are to be coherent, justifiable and effective, invites attention to the precise nature of the contribution which philosophy might make in these matters.

At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the contribution which philosophy can offer is a modest one. This is for at least two reasons. First, philosophy is only one of the ‘reflective and critical resources’ relevant to educational policy. Second, reflection and criticism may be necessary for educational policy but it is not sufficient for its coherence, justifiability and effectiveness: the wide-ranging contingencies of circumstance and practice are highly salient and decisive. The modesty of philosophy must extend both to an acknowledgement that its contribution to educational policy is a partial one, and to an acceptance that its contribution must be offered in relationship and dialogue with other reflective and critical resources and with the contingencies of circumstance and practice. It should be noted that the contribution which philosophy may make to educational policy need not necessarily be a ‘purely’ philosophical one, but can (and sometimes should) be linked to, and form part of, reflective and critical contributions of a wider kind.¹

One starting point for our investigation of the contribution which philosophy might make to educational policy is Amelie Oksenberg Rorty’s remark:

Fruitful and responsible discussions of educational policy inevitably move to the larger philosophic questions that prompt and inform them.

(Oksenberg Rorty, 1998a: 1)

As it stands, this remark requires qualification in a number of ways. First, the remark should clearly not be interpreted descriptively, as referring to what actually happens in discussions of educational policy, but normatively, as indicating what should characterize discussions of this kind. Even interpreted in this way, however, as requiring that all policy discussion should move on to philosophical questions, the remark is not obviously true, in, for example, the case of educational policies with merely ‘surface’ characteristics. Second, it is not clear that all educational policies are ‘prompted and informed’ by philosophic questions. Educational policies with merely ‘surface’ characteristics are again a case in point here. Further, it is not clear that ‘prompting’ is the most accurate way of characterizing the relationship between philosophy and educational policy. Many policy discussions are prompted by severely practical considerations. Oksenberg Rorty goes on to claim that educational policy is blind without the guidance of philosophy (1998a: 2). This too seems overstated, in this case with respect to the necessary modesty which I have urged on the role of philosophy in these matters. The remark ignores the contribution, which other reflective and critical resources might make to educational policy including those arising from practical pedagogic and educational experience. The remark also underplays the continuity of philosophical reasoning and reflection with common sense. We all have some capacity to discriminate between sound and unsound reasoning, and to discern the need for clarity and justification.

A more well-grounded approach to discerning the proper contribution of philosophy with respect to educational policy is to focus upon the embeddedness of philosophical considerations in (many) educational policies. Many educational policies contain (to a greater or lesser extent) assumptions, concepts, beliefs, values and commitments which, if not themselves of a directly philosophical kind, are apt for philosophical attention. These elements permeate many educational policies, even if they do not amount to ‘a philosophy of education’ (cf. Carr, 1995: section 3), and are not articulated but remain implicit, embryonic and perhaps confused. These philosophically significant elements relate not merely to the ‘content’ of particular educational policies but also to broader matters relating to education and educational policy in general. The illumination which philosophy can bring is therefore wide ranging. For example, Israel Scheffler in his essay ‘The Education of Policy Makers’ (Scheffler, 1991: section 10) brings into focus why policy making cannot be reduced to merely technical considerations. Policy is made, he argues, in the context of ‘...multiple human activities, experiences, purposes, and needs’ (p. 104) and so broad human understanding is required together with a grasp of matters of value and of the ‘normative space’ created by policy decisions.

The force of this point is that philosophical considerations do not need to be artificially brought to bear on educational policy. Such considerations are already implicit (and operative) within much policy. This is readily seen, for example, in policy-sensitive notions such as ‘evidence based teaching’² and ‘the knowledge creating school’.³ Given that education is inherently value-laden, why is (educative) teaching seen as ‘based in’ rather than ‘informed by’ evidence? Why is the (educative) school seen as creating knowledge rather than (say) insight and commitment? The choice is therefore whether to make philosophical considerations in educational policy explicit and to aim systematically at achieving clarity and justification in relation to them, or to leave the elements unexamined and undisturbed. A choice to take the road of explicitness and systematic attention brings into focus the distinctive contribution of the philosopher, whose watchwords are clarity, perspective, warrant and vision.

Many philosophers have self-consciously sought to influence educational policy. One thinks here of major philosophers such as Plato and Dewey among others, and, in Britain, T.H. Green and the idealist philosophers of the late nineteenth century (on Green and the idealist philosophers, see Gordon and White, 1979). Amelie Oksenberg Rorty has recently outlined the practical effects on education of the thought of a number of philosophers, and the aspiration of much of this thought to have educational effects of this kind (Rorty, 1998b: section 1; cf. Almond, 1995: 3–4). Interestingly, she further argues that ‘philosophy rings hollow’ without attention to its ‘educational import’ (Rorty, 1998a: 2). A desire to inform practical policies of various kinds can be traced back to the origins of philosophy (see Warren, 1992). In addition to direct influence, philosophy contributes to, and influences, educational policy indirectly through the general intellectual and cultural climate:⁴ secularism, pluralism, relativism, equality and the salience of market forces all have their philosophical progenitors.

All this is not to suggest, however, that the value of philosophizing about education should be judged solely in terms of its contribution to educational practice in general, and to educational policy in particular. There is some wisdom in R.K. Elliott’s insistence that ‘Philosophy did not free itself from domestic service to theology in order to become, in the sphere of education, little better than the oddjob man of pedagogy’ (Elliott, 1986: 66). Harvey Siegel calls into question the suggestion that philosophers of education have a duty to attend to practical matters (Siegel, 1988; cf. Soltis, 1988). Nor is hestitation about interaction with the practical domain on the part of philosophers solely related to a concern with the value of the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake. Peters, for example, expresses doubts whether adequate and imaginative ‘down to earth’ work of a philosophical kind can be done unless the ‘treatment’, ‘...springs from a coherent and explicit philosophical position’ (Peters, 1983: 55).

The nature of philosophy

Any attempt to gain a closer understanding of the distinctive contribution which philosophy can make to educational policy requires attention to how ‘philosophy’ is being understood. Philosophy, after all, is no one thing and different conceptions of philosophy give rise to potentially different conceptions of the contribution, which it can and should make to educational policy.

One prominent kind of philosophizing about education during the last forty years is locatable within the analytic tradition, associated with the pioneering work of Richard Peters and Israel Scheffler in the 1960s, and continued in a substantial body of work subsequently. The development of this tradition, specifically in the form of the discipline of ‘philosophy of education’, has been well charted in an extensive literature, as has the related methodological issues and disputes to which this development has given rise.⁵

. . . the elucidation of the meaning of any concept, idea or unit of thought that we employ in seeking to understand ourselves and our world, by reducing it, breaking it down, into more basic concepts that constitute it and thereby showing its relationship to a network of other concepts or discovering what the concept denotes.

(Hirst and White, 1998a: 2)

Analysis in this sense is concerned not merely with the meaning of beliefs, but also with their justification and truth (ibid.). The ‘connective’ character of analysis in this sense is worthy of emphasis: the investigation of ‘...how one concept is connected – often in complex and ragged-ended ways – in a web of other concepts with which it is logically related’ (White and White, 1997: 2).

Whilst there are common elements across all phases of the analytic tradition in philosophy of education it is possible to distinguish roughly an earlier and a later phase (mirrored by comparable trends in philosophy generally), the earlier phase subscribing to certain preoccupations and methodological commitments which have come to be less prominent from the perspective of the broader focus and concerns of the later phase.

In the early period, the analytical approach was applied to the clarification of concepts d...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: what is the philosophy of education?
• PART I Philosophy and education
• PART II The aims of education
• PART III Politics and education
• PART IV Educational policy
• PART V The moral dimensions of teaching