While CX is exposed to imminent risk, the bell has not yet tolled. Because leaders and employees are themselves customers, there is still a daily quest for (and sometimes a discovery of) truly differentiated customer experiences. These are the experiences that are both surprising and delightful. The abundance of inherent hope CX will prevail exists because we know customers no longer base their loyalty exclusively on price, product, or brand. Instead, they stay loyal with companies because of the experience they receive.8
CX must pivot to survive, prosper, and escape its potential inclusion on the long list of defunct management fads. Changing the approach to CX is critical inside many organisations where CX investments have not been as successful as first hoped. The potential of CX to transform businesses and shift the needle on performance relies on first understanding the gaps, inadequacies, and blind spots.
Three critical vulnerabilities are common across the landscape of government and enterprise CX programs today:
Inability to Demonstrate CX Returns
Reflecting on the lack of bottom-line CX outcomes, some CEOs are beginning to exhibit early symptoms of CX fatigue. The CEO, struggling to identify an ROI (return on investment) on several years of CX investment, questions the economic upside created from customer experience improvement. The silence from many CX practitioners is deafening.
Developing and selling the conceptual story of why customer experience is important has proven relatively easy. Executives in many markets realise they must differentiate their organisations through compelling customer experiences. From the early 2000âs to the present day, leadership teams have demonstrated their support for the notion of improving the experience their customers have by incorporating CX in their articulation of strategy. This articulation was sometimes followed by investments in customer research, current state journey mapping, and target state design. Sadly, in most cases, the advancement came to a grinding halt. CX groundwork headed for the filing cabinets of informed, but largely unconvinced, leadership teams. Others remained steadfast in their commitment to investment and progressed into CRM implementation, Voice of Customer program design, and experience reporting and dashboard creation. Fewer still progressed beyond strategy, design, and other internally focused programs to creating new and/or differentiated experiences for customers. This is an alarming but not entirely surprising outcome.
The inability of CX leaders and teams to link CX to the top- and bottom-line fortunes of an organisation is a fundamental contributor to its decline and potential destruction. CX has always been a strategy for growth and profit. It has never been about putting journey maps up on a wall to showcase understanding. A relatively small investment might be adequate for some journey maps and co-design workshops; however, real transformation will only be realised if it is underpinned by a credible, financially driven, business case highlighting the economic benefits of customer experience. In the absence of a financially driven business case, leadership teams may be approaching a time when they are no longer willing to fund the CX experiment. The reason is simple: they cannot see the clear linkage between the experience delivered and creation of financial value.
So why, after many investment seasons, are most CX teams still unable show the ROI attached to their CX program? It would seem to be an amazingly simple question. Despite the importance of customer experience economics, few executives know even the basic numbers that are so critical to establishing a financially driven customer experience business case. Companies struggle to tie customer centricity directly to business performance because many executives feel customer centricity is more of a qualitative measure than a quantitative one.9 In the words of William C. Taylor:
Most organisations know the cost of everything but the value of nothing.10
A big part of the problem is the use of Net Promoter Score (NPS) as the cornerstone metric for CX. NPS was first developed in 2003 by Bain and Company. Today the metric is used by millions of businesses as a measure of customer perception and loyalty. It is often held up as the gold standard CX metric. NPS measures customer perception based on a simple question: âHow likely is it that you would recommend our [Organisation/Product/Service] to a friend or colleague?â Respondents provide a rating between 0 (not at all likely) and 10 (extremely likely). Customers are categorised by their response into three groups: (1) Promoters, with a score of 9 or 10 are typically loyal and enthusiastic customers; (2) Passives, with a score of 7 or 8 are customers satisfied with service but not happy enough to be considered promoters; and (3) Detractors, with a score of 0 to 6 are unhappy customers who are unlikely to buy again and may even discourage others from buying. The actual NPS score determined from the difference between Promoters and Detractors is scaled to 100 responses.
Bainâs original research showed companies with positive NPS scores grew faster than their lower scoring rivals. However, NPS scores do not vary consistently across markets, and the rate of growth is not consistent with NPS across sectors. A bank with a small positive NPS could not be compared to Appleâs remarkable NPS to determine a proportional level of growth. NPS purports to measure customersâ desire to stay with a company and whether they will recommend others to that company. It does not do that. NPS is a measure of immediate sentiment like customer satisfaction. The difference with NPS is in providing a way for customers to signal they were more than just satisfied. Companies with positive scores can know they have created experiences resulting in more than just satisfied customers. The resulting revenue is not predicted by this score. The cost of this sentiment is also ignored. NPS must be connected to return metrics to be totally effective â frequently it is not.
The problem with NPS is it is only an accurate measure of sentiment. It is an inaccurate measure of intent. Asking customers about their likelihood to recommend is different from tracking if they did actually recommend someone, who was referred, and when. It is tantamount to the billions of all too frequent discussions about weight loss. Being on a diet may or may not account for something on the bathroom scales. Stating you are on a diet and intend to slim down only indicates a sentiment about body image and a desire to lose weight. But it is the scales that provide unambiguous evidence about your actions. If you have ever tried to lose weight and failed, you will know the scales do not seem to listen to your stated intentions. Scales are not sentimental! Intention to purchase research is notoriously inaccurate (see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). Tracking NP...