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The history of Russia-European Union relations
Konstantin Khudoley and Maciej RaĹ
Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (EU), their cooperation but also competition and even rivalry, have shaped the European order since the 1990s. Competition and rivalry gained in significance in the twenty-first century as the EU enlarged and deepened its engagement in the post-Soviet area. The contradictory interests of Russia and the EU âinfectedâ their cooperation with each other. The history of Russia-EU relations has shaped their policies towards each other as well, leading to disillusionment, misperception, distrust and eventually tensions (see also DeBardeleben; Morozov in this volume). Narratives about the evolution of Russia-EU relations, as presented by both parties, have diversified and become contradictory under the influence of their political goals. History is a science, but political elites tend to use it instrumentally to pursue their political objectives, which further complicates relations.
This chapter traces the evolution of Russia-EU relations since the beginning of the 1990s, when Russia acquired sovereignty and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) entered into force, until 2019. Some references to the Soviet perception of integration processes in Western Europe are treated as a starting point. The main goals are to identify which factors influenced Russia-EU relations and to determine their relative significance, to examine the views of both sides on the factors that shaped each stage of the relations and to define to what extent these factors and views shaped the relationship.
Three periods can be distinguished in the history of these relations: 1990sâ2004, 2005â2014 and 2014 to present. During the first period, the institutional base for multidimensional cooperation was developed. Despite some political and economic challenges, both partners strove to strengthen cooperation. The EU enlargement in 2004 enhanced its influence over the Eastern European partners but elicited Russiaâs counteraction, sometimes tough and irreconcilable with the EUâs position. The period between the mid-2000s and 2014 can therefore be described as a path to crisis, although the parties attempted to establish new rules for their partnership. The year 2014 was the most crucial for both actors. The West made another step eastward, and Russia reacted to it sharply, unleashing the most serious crisis since the end of the Cold War. Both Moscow and Brussels were surprised, disappointed, even shocked by the other side. âWestern expansionismâ versus âRussian aggressionâ have become dominant narratives. Hence, the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), the consequences of the 2004 enlargement and the 2014 crisis are three bifurcation points in the history of Russia-EU relations.
The focus of this chapter is interdisciplinary. The authors analyse the importance of political, economic and other factors in the individual periods discussed. Emphasis is placed on political interactions. The evolving ânatureâ (the political and social-economic system) of the Russian Federation is taken into account, along with asymmetries between the parties. References to varying perspectives on the history of Russia-EU relations and the Soviet period form the initial parts of the analysis.
Varying perspectives on the history of Russia-EU relations
The evolution of Russia-EU relations has been studied in a slightly different manner in the Western and Russian literature. Much of our understanding of the history of Russia-EU relations stems from an EU-centric approach, whether through a focus on EU policies or EU variables. The English-language literature varies in its approach but shares a tendency to try to explain the evolution of the relationship, whether in narrower, wider, empirically or theoretically directed ways. Many authors focus on political relations, security, creating European order, or discourse related to these issues (Allison et al. 2006; Baranovsky 1997; Delcour 2017; Diesen 2015; Khudoley 2016; Leonard and Popescu 2007; Popescu and Wilson 2009; Sakwa 2015; Zaslavskaya and Averre 2019). The theoretical literature at times views the relationship through just one international relations theoretical lens (Akchurina and Della Sala 2018; Casier 2018; DeBardeleben 2012; Pänke 2015; Smith 2016; Tulmets 2014) and at others argues for the need to apply a different lens depending on the period under discussion or other determinants (Casier 2013; Klinke 2012; Forsberg and Haukkala 2016; Romanova 2015a) or delivers a more institutionalist account (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012; Haukkala 2010; Hughes 2006; Kobayashi 2017; Romanova 2014). Some important insights are delivered through the constructivist approach (Averre 2005; Casier and DeBardeleben 2017; Liik 2018; Neumann 2017; Pänke 2015; Thorun 2009), while others adopt a far more technical, sectoral approach, especially related to the energy dialogue (Aalto 2007; Casier 2011; Krickovic 2015; Kuzemko 2014; Turksen 2018). Clearly, however, the English language scholarship has applied more theoretically driven approaches (Romanova 2019: 139).
The analysis of Russia-EU interactions has usually reflected the climate of relations at a certain time. The shift from an âoptimisticâ to âpessimisticâ/âpragmaticâ/ârealisticâ vision of the relations and their future prospects is visible in the English-language literature. The âpositive interdependenceâ between the parties, based on (neo-)liberal assumptions, dominated in the postâCold War period of the 1990s (Cooper 2003). Along with the gradual deterioration of the relationship and decreasing mutual confidence between the two actors, various scholars started emphasising the divergent interests expressed by the partners, as well as the ideational differences between them (Casier 2016; Ferrari 2015; Khudoley 2016; Liik 2018; Maass 2017; Prozorov 2016; RaĹ 2015; Sakwa 2018), noting that (neo-)realist (Smith 2016) or constructivist (Makarychev 2014) approaches would be more useful to study the Russia-EU relationship.
By comparison, the Russian-language academic literature on the history of Russia-EU relations is not extensive. Russian scholars â compared with Western ones â have evidently been influenced by political views rather than theoretical attitudes. Two main visions are advanced: Euro-optimists and Euro-sceptics. Euro-optimists perceive Russia and the EU countries as two branches of the same civilisation, moving in the same direction but at different speeds and with some markedly different interests and/or concerns. They regard European integration as a successful project, encouraging Russia to undertake market and democratic reforms. All this should lead to Russia-EU rapprochement and a strategic partnership (Khudoley 2003). Euro-optimists believe in a convergence of the two societiesâ value orientations, which should foster a sharing of common values. Thus, in discussions of the history of the relationship, emphasis is placed on the positives and connections; the challenges are treated as something secondary. From the standpoint of Russian Euro-sceptics, Russia and the EU countries belong to two distinct civilisations, following separate paths. The EU is not regarded as an optimal project; predictions are put forward as to its growing crisis and even its inevitable collapse. The misalignment of each actorâs value orientations is identified, relations between them deemed to be based on formulas such as âsemi-partnershipâsemi-rivalryâ, which might lead to confrontation. The EUâs enlargement triggered particularly negative judgments: since the mid-1990s, sceptics have therefore predicted an inevitable clash over the post-Soviet space. The history of the relationship is thus viewed as a continuous run of failures and attempts by the EU to intrude into âhistorical Russiaâ (Shishelina 2006: 253).
In the period 1991â2005, when Russia-EU relations mostly developed along an upward trajectory, Euro-optimists prevailed (Romanova 2015b). Later, the balance gradually shifted in favour of Euro-sceptics, the latter dominating after the mutual slapping of sanctions in 2014. Euro-sceptics are also driven by notions of a crisis of the âhistorical Westâ, popular among the higher strata of Russian society (Kulikov and Sergeitsev 2017), and the superiority of authoritarian state capitalism over liberal democracy (Karaganov 2018). A number of researchers have even referred to a âpost-European Russiaâ (Miller and Lukyanov 2016).
Both the English and Russian language academic literature focuses in particular on the following areas: political relations; the âcommon neighbourhoodâ; energy dialogue; economic relations; cross-border cooperation; and cooperation concerning internal issues, including internal security (Romanova 2019: 137â9). Systemic differences and divergent political ânaturesâ (Shevtsova 2010), the role of elites (KratochvĂl 2008), the influence of EU member statesâ interests and perceptions (Leonard and Popescu 2007; Liik 2018; Siddi 2018) and the US factor (Ferrari 2015; Gasztold 2020; Kanet 2009) or divergent international strategies (Averre 2009; Diesen 2015) are also taken into consideration. Some of them should be recognised as significant or even systemic/structural (touching fundamental aspects of the relationship).
The Soviet period
During Soviet times, ideological and political factors definitely prevailed. That resulted from a sharp multidimensional confrontation between the two competitive political-economic systems. Although from the time of Peter the Great, the Russian Empire had considered itself a part of Europe, being actively involved in European politics, the USSR declared itself an antagonist of bourgeois Europe, proclaiming the creation of a new society based on qualitatively different values and stressing the reactionary nature of European integration (Lenin 1969: 352, 354). Therefore, Moscow considered the integration projects of the 1920sâ30s as coalitions against the USSR and world socialist revolution. This policy was continued after the Second World War. The situation began to change only in the late 1950s, when the European Communities (EC) were developing at a rapid pace. The limited destalinisation of the mid-1950s favoured this process.
Simultaneously, the USSR tried to integrate European socialist states; however, these efforts proved limited, which also stimulated a new Soviet policy towards the EC. The first, unsuccessful probing to establish relations was undertaken by Moscow in the 1960s, though the EC perceived it as a mere propaganda event (Lipkin 2016: 315â17). The issue of cooperation arose more seriously in the run-up to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Leonid Brezhnev recognised the EC as a reality then (Brezhnev 1972: 490). However, official relations were not established due to tensions between the USSR and the West in the late 1970s. The differences between the two actors prevented any real cooperation.
Qualitative changes in Soviet policy occurred in the late 1980sâearly 1990s, linked to Mikhail Gorbachevâs ideas of new political thinking and a common European home, implying a convergence of the two previously opposed sociopolitical systems. Within this framework, the USSR recognised the EC as both an economic and political entity, established diplomatic relations and signed the Agreement on trade and commercial and economic cooperation (European Communities and Soviet Union 1989). Gorbachev considered this an important step for integration of the Soviet economy into the world one.
The first stage: relations on the ascent (1991â2004)
The collapse of the USSR and the establishment of the EU occurred almost simultaneously. Russia implemented democratic and market reforms, creating a good foundation for cooperation free from ideological dogmas and other Cold War legacies. The EU established diplomatic relations with Russia, extending to it the 1989 Agreement. Shared positions on important international issues were reflected in the UNâs activities, the Helsinki process and other international f...
