America and the Indo-Pacific

Trump and Beyond

Harsh Pant, Kashish Parpiani, Harsh V Pant

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN:
  9781138570702
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000422931
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book offers an extensive account of Donald Trump's foreign policy record in the Indo-Pacific region. Set against the backdrop of Trump's policy of sustained US confrontation with China, it recounts his administration's efforts to shore up America's position with the Indo-Pacific strategy. It also reviews Trump's record with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and the South Asian subregion in context of the 'great power competition' between China and the United States. Amidst the ongoing conversations on the declining currency of American internationalism, the volume showcases the seeming insularity of the Indo-Pacific region from forces that are informing an America in retreat. In noting Trump's record to have been a consequential one, the authors also offer insights into the prospects for US policy continuity under Joe Biden.

This timely book will be of great interest to scholars, teachers, and students of politics and international relations, Asia studies, US-China studies, area studies, foreign policy, maritime studies, and world politics. It is a recommended read for all watchers of US foreign policy and the evolving US-China rivalry.

1
OBAMA’S ASIA AND TRUMP’S CAMPAIGN

On inheriting two expansive Global War on Terror (GWOT) military efforts from the George W Bush administration, Barack Obama had committed to leading the US “in a new direction” during the 2008 presidential election.¹ Upon assuming office, in his attempt “to end the war in Iraq and properly prosecute the war in Afghanistan”,² Obama often invoked the “just war” theory to support the latter³ and explained his opposition to the former as him being “opposed to dumb wars”.⁴ As a result, Obama announced the withdrawal of the remaining 40,000 US troops in Iraq by the end of 2011 (as per the Status of Forces agreement signed under Bush).⁵ Whereas, after conducting an administration-wide review of the US’ approach in Afghanistan – which culminated in Obama announcing a surge of an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan – his administration set a predetermined withdrawal timeline of 18 months.⁶

With the US on path to extricating itself from the two wars which had come to be seen as a sign of American hegemonic excesses of the Bush years, the Obama administration sought to shift US priorities and capitalise on the much touted ‘Asian Century’. In 2010, Obama’s then-Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes said, “We see core U.S. national interests that will be advanced by us playing a key role in helping to shape the future of the region and making clear that we’re an Asian and a Pacific power”.⁷ In asserting America’s commitment to Asia – over which Obama had criticised his predecessor for paying “too little attention”⁸ – Obama instituted a focus on the region in his administration’s maiden year itself. Beyond declaring himself to be “America’s first Pacific President”,⁹ in 2009, Obama became the first American president to meet all ten leaders of ASEAN member nations as a group,¹⁰ and Hillary Clinton became the first US secretary of state in a generation to make Asia the destination of her first overseas visit.¹¹

Thereafter, in 2010, the first signs of the administration’s focus on the region taking shape with specific US policy priorities emerged. Speaking at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, Clinton announced that the peaceful resolution of competing claims in the South China Sea was in the US’ “national interest”.¹² The subregion, which has been known to be rich in natural oil and gas deposits, has been subjected to competing claims. Chiefly, with China claiming a majority of the territory – which overlaps with the continental shelves of the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. In her remarks, Clinton announced that Washington would support “a collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion” and even denounced the “use or threat of force by any claimant”.¹³ Her comments were deemed by China’s foreign minister as “an attack on China”,¹⁴ since there was little doubt about the addressee of Clinton’s remarks. With China construing its claims as a matter of “core interest” of its sovereignty,¹⁵ in the past, Beijing had resorted to using force to seize parts of the contested area – such as its 1974 occupation of the western Paracels and subsequently the Mischief Reef in 1995.¹⁶

Shortly thereafter, the Obama administration formalised its focus towards the region with the announcement of the Pivot to Asia strategy. Writing in Foreign Policy magazine, Clinton made a case against giving in to retrenchment impulses following the winding down of Global War on Terror (GWOT) wars, by noting the criticality of Asia in “America’s future” and “an engaged America” being “vital to Asia’s future”.¹⁷ In outlining “a multifaceted and persistent effort” to actualise America’s “irreplaceable role in the Pacific”, Clinton outlined an approach based “along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights”.¹⁸

Gains under the Pivot

Although Obama often criticised his predecessor for having “squandered” an opportunity with the GWOT effort to rally partner nations, the Bush administration’s record in Asia reflected a slightly different reality. For instance, with Japan, the Bush administration laid the initial precedent of security cooperation. In addressing the Japanese Diet, Bush underscored the two nations’ “common interests, common responsibilities and common values” and welcomed Japan “for providing important logistical support” to “rebuild a liberated Afghanistan”.¹⁹ For the first time since the end of the Second World War, Japan deployed its forces abroad towards assisting America’s GWOT efforts. With the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law²⁰ – to ensure these exceptions don’t overtly test the limits to Japan’s offshore deployments under its post-war Pacifist Constitution – Tokyo deployed its Maritime Self-Defense Force in the Indian Ocean to provide refuelling assistance to NATO forces operating in Afghanistan.²¹

Similarly, GWOT accorded the US an opportunity to expand the scope of security cooperation with South Korea with its “out of area” contributions²² – with Seoul’s 2004 deployment of “1,400 combat Marines and Special Forces commandos and 1,600 military engineers and medics” to the “465 Korean military medics and engineers” already present in Iraq since 2003.²³ In addition, with Oceanic partners such as Australia, the first invocation of the ANZUS Treaty of 1951 led to significant contributions by Canberra towards US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In following this impetus to security cooperation between military forces of the US and its Asian and Oceanic partner nations, the Obama administration gained crucial latitude to then argue for recalibrating strategic ties under the announced Pivot to Asia policy.

For instance, in endorsing Clinton’s postulations as per her Foreign Policy magazine article, Obama addressed the Australian Parliament in late 2011 to announce that the he had “made a deliberate and strategic decision – as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future”.²⁴ In offering his “salute” to Australia for being “the largest contributor of troops” (outside NATO) to Afghanistan, Obama sought Canberra’s support in the US now turning its “attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region”.²⁵ In defining the future of US–Australia security cooperation, during the same visit, Obama announced the US’ plan to oversee troop rotations to eventually build up to 2,500 US Marines being stationed at Darwin, Australia.²⁶

In addition, the Obama administration enhanced relations with Tokyo by sealing a renewed set of guidelines for US–Japan defence cooperation. The same built on exceptions such as the discussed Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, to increase the possibility of Japan “signing on to U.S. military priorities elsewhere”.²⁷ Most notably, the 2015 Revision of the Guidelines for US–Japan Defense Cooperation laid out frameworks for the two countries to “address bilateral cooperation on cybersecurity, the use of space for defense purposes, and ballistic missile defense”.²⁸ Moreover, with the Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM), Japan and the US instituted an integrated command structure for contingencies involving common threats. This was a belated addition and a warranted upgrade in view of such measures existing in other American alliances frameworks, as with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This was the first such revision to US–Japan security guidelines since 1997 and was hailed by then-Secretary of State John Kerry as “an historic transition”.²⁹ In addition, despite Chinese alarmism over Japan “re-militarizing”, the Shinzo Abe government also reinterpreted Japan’s post-war pacifist constitution to permit Tokyo to exercise the right to “collective self-defense”.³⁰

The Obama administration subsequently also renamed its Pivot to Asia effort to Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific in order to emphasise that the United States “had never left Asia” and assert its status as a Pacific power.³¹ This made sense mainly from the standpoint of the military component of the Obama administration’s plan of posturing American naval forces from the then “roughly 50–50% split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60–40 split between those oceans” to eventually encompass the shift of six aircraft carriers and a majority of US cruisers, destroyers, combat ships, and submarines.³² In addition, advocating for America’s “rebalance” to the region also included “rebalancing within the Asia-Pacific region”³³ – either in terms of pushing for increased burden sharing with partner nations or reducing the concentration of US forces in Northeast Asia, which dates back to the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and the subsequent Korean War. Hence, in modernising the US’ military footprint in Northeast Asia, the Obama administration encouraged “a more “flexible” approach to deployments in the region”, wherein American deployments would be “smaller, more agile, expeditionary, self-sustaining, and self-contained”.³⁴ Thus, whilst underscoring the historical relevance and continued deterrence value of US forward positions – chiefly at Camp Humphreys and Osan Air Base in South Korea (ROK) and the Yokosuka naval base and Yokota Air Base in Japan, the Obama administration sought to further the model of rotational deployments to other strategically important locations like Australia, Singapore, Guam, and Hawaii. Moreover, in reducing partner nations’ operational dependence on the US, the Obama administration in 2014 agreed with Seoul on “a conditi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Obama’s Asia and Trump’s campaign
• 2 The Trump presidency and China
• 3 Trump and the Indo-Pacific
• 4 Trump and South Asia
• Conclusion
• Epilogue: Anticipating Biden’s proposition for the Indo-Pacific
• Index