Contemporary Far-Right Thinkers and the Future of Liberal Democracy

A. James McAdams, Alejandro Castrillon, A. James McAdams, Alejandro Castrillon

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9780367611620
• eBook ISBN: 9781000431964
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Fascism & Totalitarianism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book is the first systematic analysis of the efforts of a broad range of contemporary far-right thinkers to popularize their critiques of liberal-democratic norms and institutions and make their ideas the subjects of sustained political and academic debate.

The book focuses on outspoken thinkers in western and eastern Europe, Russia, the United States, Canada, and Australia. They include Alain de Benoist, Guillaume Faye, Götz Kubitschek, Pat Buchanan, Fróði Midjord, Jason Jorjani, contributors to the online magazine Quillette, and the elusive personality known as the Bronze Age Pervert. The book explores the diverse intellectual foundations of these thinkers' positions, the similarities and differences in their ideas, and their prospects for influencing attitudes about democratic politics within their respective countries. It examines diverse movements and schools of thought, including the European New Right, Paleoconservatism, the Alt-right, Identitarianism, White nationalism, and antifeminism.

Providing a much-needed global perspective, this book will be of considerable interest to students and scholars of populism, right-wing extremism, identity politics, fascism, racism, and conservatism.

Part I

Introduction

1

Contemporary far-right thinkers in the era of liberal-democratic crisis

A. James McAdams

Introduction

In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, a remarkable number of far-right intellectuals and activists has risen to prominence in tandem with the surging forces of global populism. The names of writers, pundits, publishers, online commentators, financiers, and occasional politicians, such as Stephen Bannon (USA), Götz Kubitschek (Germany), Daniel Friberg (Sweden), Martin Sellner (Austria), Diego Fusaro (Italy), Roger Köppel (Switzerland), Thierry Baudet (the Netherlands), Fabrice Robert (France), Vladeslav Surkov (Russia), and Olavo de Carvalho (Brazil), might otherwise have gone unknown. However, thanks to a perfect storm of intersecting conflicts over immigration, economic inequality, religion, and race relations, they have successfully ridden the waves of popular discontent over their governments’ policies and voiced their opposition to the continuation of liberal-democratic politics as usual. Testifying to their appeal, they have been joined by paternal figures from the past, including the éminence grise of the French New Right (Nouvelle droite) movement, Alain de Benoist, and the American Paleoconservative, Pat Buchanan.

These thinkers have succeeded in spreading their views beyond the realm of conventional intellectual discourse, cultivating large numbers of followers and, at times, weighing in on the decisions of politicians and political parties. They have capitalized on their access to print and electronic media to attract diverse audiences. Many routinely give interviews and appear on television talk shows. Some have founded publishing houses and research institutes. Others maintain personal web sites and use blog posts and social media to call their enthusiasts to action. They also take advantage of extremist outlets, like 4chan, Reddit groups, and dark corners of the web to recruit new followers. Accentuating these individuals’ visibility, populist politicians, such as Poland’s president Andrzej Duda and the former US president, Donald Trump, have forwarded their messages to millions of readers on Twitter and other social media platforms. Additionally, far-right thinkers have been dedicated organizers. Through conferences, symposia, public lectures, and educational forums, organizers like Friberg, the co-founder of the influential publishing house, Arktos Media, and the German strategist, Kubitschek, have reached out to disaffected young people, right-wing politicians, and extremist movements.¹ From Berlin to Paris, Washington, DC, Stockholm, Budapest, and Melbourne, they have also joined forces to expand their networks. In all of these ways, far-right thinking is no longer limited to particular countries. As much as any other movement in modern times, it has global dimensions.

Given the conjunction of these individuals’ emergence from virtual anonymity and the unexpected success of populist politicians and movements over these years, one might be tempted to equate the ideas of far-right intellectuals with the agendas of like-minded political actors. The two groups typically present themselves as the natural allies of the common man and woman, offering their guidance in an ostensibly zero-sum battle against liberal elites, mainstream news media, and the “deep state.” Whenever they can, they actively capitalize on each other’s strengths and weigh in on their counterparts’ perspectives. On the one side, right-wing populist politicians are attracted by the opportunity to apply a veneer of intellectual legitimacy to their policies. On the other side, the theorists are happy to find their ideas reflected in speeches and television appearances. In fact, the desire to be taken seriously is a driving force behind their actions. Provocatively, many of the most outspoken far-right intellectuals have advanced degrees in fields like political theory and philosophy but have been unable to find meaningful employment in academic institutions and recognition by mainstream publications.²

Despite these similarities, however, the views of a majority of contemporary far-right intellectuals are distinctly non-populist. In fact, I shall suggest in this chapter that these figures are better characterized as anti-populist.³ Unlike populist politicians who boast about having ready solutions to complex problems but then adapt their stands to the ebb and flow of voters’ preferences, far-right intellectuals do not have to worry about satisfying the desires of political constituents. Quite the opposite, they see themselves as the voice of an enlightened vanguard standing above the dirty business of partisan infighting and the demands of retaining political office. As a result, most are unabashedly elitist and uncompromising. Regardless of whether their populist counterparts win or lose, their self-assigned mission is to articulate convincing alternatives to liberal conceptions of democracy. In the words of Fabrice Robert, the president of the French Identitarian Bloc, “we are not the right wing of the patriotic movement, we are its point, firm in thought, sharp in action.”⁴

This disposition accounts for the counterintuitive fact that some of these figures, among them the American far-right organizer, Bannon, and the Austrian Identitarian, Sellner, have admitted an attraction to Leninism. In their self-perception, they are engaged in a long-term process of changing minds and hearts. Bannon minced no words about his role in an interview in 2017, declaring “I am a Leninist.” When asked what he meant by the term, he replied, “Lenin wanted to destroy the state and that’s my goal too. I want to bring everything crashing down and destroy all of today’s establishment.”⁵ Sellner, too, has embraced Lenin, as well as the Leninist co-founder of the Italian communist party, Antonio Gramsci, calling both revolutionaries “important sources of inspiration for our strategy and activism.”⁶

Scholars have generally underplayed these figures’ affinity to the father of the Bolshevik revolution. In contrast, they have drawn direct parallels between them and the ideologues of fascism and National Socialism of the first half of the twentieth century.⁷ In many ways, this equation of notable far-right personalities with fascist thought makes sense. Some activist thinkers have made this judgment easy. For example, Gianluca Iannone, the counter-cultural leader of the Italian Identitarian organization CasaPound has openly admitted his admiration for Benito Mussolini’s fascist regime. Others, such as Friberg and Sellner, were once members of neo-Nazi and skinhead groups. Even far-right intellectuals who explicitly base their arguments on the rejection of fascism, including the founders of the Nouvelle droite, regularly draw upon ideas—or at least cite passages—from the works of Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, Armin Mohler, Martin Heidegger, and Julius Evola, all of whom had direct or indirect links to fascist ideologues.⁸

Far-right thinkers also invoke many of the counterrevolutionary themes of contemporary neofascist movements: The rejection of Enlightenment values and free market economic policies; the superiority of corporate forms of identification over radical individualism; and the desirability of racial and ethnic uniformity. Despite their claims to oppose racism, anti-Semitism, and violence, many have attended the rallies of neo-Nazis and White supremacists. The fact that some, as we shall see in this volume, have moved beyond their pretense to moderation and joined these movements lends credence to the argument that they have been crypto-fascists all along.

Nonetheless, there is a substantial difference between the sentiments of the fascist cognoscenti of the past century and the positions of the new wave of far-right personalities in the current age. Whereas fascist and National Socialist theorists sought the ears of dictators and assumed influential positions in a climate of democratic failure, economic crisis, and widespread support for authoritarian politics, contemporary far-right intellectuals seek recognition in very different circumstances. With the exception of those individuals who came of age under the repressive conditions of communist rule in the former Soviet bloc, they are acting in circumstances in which democracy is taken for granted by ordinary citizens who have experienced no other form of government.⁹ In western Europe, nearly universal agreement on preventing a resurgence of fascism and other manifestations of authoritarianism has been one of the foundations of post–World War II democracy. In Germany, anti-democratic organizations are expressly prohibited in the name of “militant democracy.” In the US, democratic institutions have not been seriously threatened since the country’s Civil War, although they were certainly tested under the presidencies of Richard M. Nixon and Donald Trump. Even in the states in postcommunist eastern Europe, such as Hungary and Poland, where populist autocrats have risen to power, sizable segments of their populations remain committed to the democratic system and basic liberal principles.

For these reasons, it makes sense that contemporary far-right thinkers should attempt to present themselves to mainstream audiences as well-intentioned citizens who are sincerely motivated to serve the public good. If they simply mimicked the inflammatory rhetoric of the fascist past, they would be hard-pressed to make their views known, let alone be taken seriously by the intellectual establishment.¹⁰ Outside of fringe groups—rabid neo-Nazis and a diverse array of extreme-right skinheads, Viking enthusiasts, and Black metal bands—their ideas would lack currency and, as in past decades, they would be relegated to lives of obscurity. In contrast, by intoning the political vocabulary of the established order and affirming their commitment to democracy, they can position themselves to take advantage of times of social and economic uncertainty and make the case for their views. Thus, the publishers of Arktos Media take pains to emphasize that they simply aim to enhance democracy by exposing readers to new ideas. “Arktos,” they explain,

does not seek to propagate any specific ideology, system of beliefs or viewpoint, nor do we seek consistency. Rather, we want to provide a voice for individuals and viewpoints who are often overlooked by the mainstream, but who offer original and challenging alternatives to our prevailing culture that cannot be found elsewhere.¹¹

In support of this position, far-right thinkers, such as Götz Kubitschek, de Benoist, and Sellner routinely invoke a concept known as “metapolitics” when pressed to defend their views. In accord with this quasi-philosophical strategy, which its users attribute almost religiously to Gramsci, they argue that there is no point in trying to change society through revolutionary violence.¹² In their description, one must turn to the realm of ideas and seek to transform the culture on which the social and political order is based. In this case, far-right thinkers describe their objectives in terms of awakening an otherwise dormant and unenlightened segment of their population to the cynicism and hypocrisy of the liberal establishment. However, unlike in Gramsci’s case, the people they intend to liberate are not an enslaved proletariat. Instead, they seek to persuade a supposed majority of the populace that one can find salvation in association with ethnic, racial, and cultural communities, or any related form of collective identification. It is easy to understand why these intellectuals would be attracted to a strategy based upon the hegemony of ideas rather than the exercise of power by governments or socio-economic forces. In Faye’s words, metapolitics is all about “the social diffusion of ideas and cultural values for the sake of provoking profound, long-term political transformation.”¹³ Hence, in accord with this mission, these figures have reason to feel good about themselves. By their definition, they are already masters of metapolitics!

In one important respect, however, it does make sense to look for parallels between contemporary far-right intellectuals and their fascist predecessors. Despite the manifest differences between the worlds of the 1920s and the 2020s, the line that divides these figures’ claims to respect democratic principles and institutions from the advocacy of anti-democratic extremism is not at all uncrossable. As we shall see in this volume, it is telling that many of these thinkers appear to have moved from one realm to the other. As a result, however we choose to label them, we should not lose sight of the potential threat that their ideas represent to democracy.

The tension between the promise and contradictory views of far-right thinkers is a recurring theme in this book. In the following pages, I shall set the stage for the chapters to come by providing a framework for addressing both what these authors say and what their views might entail. To this end, I shall begin by outlining the core elements of their critique of liberal democracy and the measures they propose to rectify its perceived defects. Then, I shall identify ways in which their arguments can be, and have been, used to justify the anti-democratic attitudes and behavior they claim to decry. On these bases, I shall suggest three grounds for debate about the divergence between the claims and troubling implications of far-right thinking. Finally, I shall conclude this chapter by outlining prominent themes in the study of far-right thought and then provide brief sketches of the chapters that fall under each of them.

The far-right critique of liberal democracy

To understand the positions of today’s far-right thinkers and their efforts to attract diverse audiences, one must begin by recognizing that they are engaged in an essentially contradictory exercise. On the one hand, their desire for recognition and respect requires them to affirm at least some of the core elements of liberal democracy. On the other hand, because they are engaged in a basically subversive activity, they must present their arguments in such a way that they justify calling into question at least some of the assumptions behind the liberal-democratic idea. Typically, far-right thinkers attempt to square the circle between these competing objectives by underscoring the political establishment’s failure to live up to three of the central promises of classical liberalism: Human fulfillment, equality, and tolerance.¹⁴ On this basis, they seek to persuade potential supporters that they, and not their adversaries, are the true defenders of democracy.

Let us turn to the first element of this critique. For a majority of far-right intellectuals, one of the greatest problems with contemporary democracy is that liberal elites have prevented their citizens from achieving the sense of personal fulfillment that is owed to them as human beings. Despite their pretensions to look after the needs of each member of society, establishment politicians have formulated their policies on the basis of artificial principles, including the idea of individual autonomy, the existence of universal human rights, and the possibility of absolute equality, that have no real connection with the h...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Endorsements
• Half Title
• Series Information
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Note to the reader
• Notes on contributors
• Part I Introduction
• Part II Foundations of far-right thought
• Part III Theory in context
• Part IV From illiberalism to extremism
• Part V Into the future
• Part VI Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index