Hermeneutic Dialogue and Shaping the Landscape of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

The Work of Frank Richardson

Robert Bishop

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9780367557546
• eBook ISBN: 9781000413991
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

This volume introduces the methodological value of hermeneutic dialogue in the field of theoretical and philosophical psychology. It reflects on the works of Frank Richardson, who has made, and continues to make, seminal contributions to the field, as well as having influenced the work of many of the practitioners engaged in this field today.

Each chapter explores a major topic of hermeneutic dialogue and is authored by a scholar whose work has been directly impacted by Richardson's life and research. The chapters illuminate a variety of issues in psychology, such as instrumentalism, individualism, relationality, social ontology, the wisdom of limits, neoliberalism, and the idea that theory is a form of praxis. All contributions in this volume illustrate aspects of theory as practice coming to expression in reflection on theoretical and philosophical psychology and trace some of the implications for psychology, political philosophy, social justice, community, human dignity, and transcendence.

This book will be a valuable resource for students and scholars of theoretical and philosophical psychology, philosophy of the mind, and personality theories.

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INTRODUCTION

Robert C. Bishop

Although many people have contributed to theoretical and philosophical psychology as a field of inquiry and analysis in the past several decades, Frank Richardson has made seminal contributions as well as influencing many of its practitioners. A central focus of his work has been the exploration of philosophical hermeneutics and its implications for psychological theory and practice. Philosophical hermeneutics has proven a fruitful approach to illuminating issues in psychology such as instrumentalism, individualism, and relationality—more broadly, social ontology—the wisdom of limits, neoliberalism, and theory as a form of practice.

In honor of his 80th birthday, this edited volume is composed of essays from several authors who have been particularly impacted by the work of Frank Richardson as much as by their relationships with him. Each essay is a tribute to his legacy in the field as well as the impact on our lives as thinkers engaged in theoretical and philosophical psychology. The essays exhibit not only Richardson’s influence but also how philosophical hermeneutics has or can shape theoretical and philosophical psychological inquiry for quintessential and contemporary issues in human life and society. The collection begins with an introduction to philosophical hermeneutics and implications for theoretical and philosophical psychology to help orient the reader to these essays as well as to the many contributions Richardson has made to the field.

Philosophical Hermeneutics and Inquiry

Fundamentally, philosophical hermeneutics is human coming to understanding—interpretation—of a text, concept, person, society, or life situation—anything in our experience (Bishop, 2007; Gadamer, 1989; Guignon, 1991; Heidegger, 1962; Ricoeur, 1981a; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999; Taylor, 1985a, 1985b). For psychology, any discussion of coming to understanding has to grapple with the dominance of a natural science/scientistic cast of mind that treats the drama of pursuing our activities with meaning, purpose, and value as “subjective” in contrast to the “objective” reality studied by the natural sciences (Bishop, 2007; Richardson et al., 1999; Taylor, 1985b). The first step in coming to grips with this challenge is realizing that the natural science/scientistic cast of mind itself is an interpretation—an understanding—of our world that is adopted in light of ineliminable human meanings, purposes, and values.

Central to human understanding is a hermeneutic movement—often called the “hermeneutic circle”: Our understanding of any part of a text, event, individual life, or community is shaped by our initial or assumed understanding of the whole of it while our understanding of that whole is continually reshaped by our encounter with and modified understanding of its parts. We all experience this movement while attending a play or getting to know a person over time. This hermeneutic movement functions much like a spiral moving in a direction of growth and enrichment in understanding.

Although mostly unnoticed, natural science inquiry involves coming to understanding—interpretive or hermeneutic movement—about physical reality. The patterns that natural scientists uncover in data are dependent on their interpretations. For instance, when a physicist proposes a hypothesis for what is predicted to happen when two electrons collide at high energy within the theoretical framework of the standard model of elementary particle physics, it represents an expected or projected understanding of how that slice of physical reality regularly works. Hypotheses and data are understood—made sense of—within the larger theoretical framework just as the larger theoretical framework is refined, extended, or enriched by hypotheses, the data generated in experiments, and its analysis (Kuhn, 1996/1962).

More importantly, when natural scientists investigate properties and processes, they typically do so by subsuming them under general models and theories that involve laws, forces, or other broad regularities. Such forms of explanation succeed by treating physical reality as a collection of decontextualized objects enmeshed in a network of efficient causal interactions. This is an objectifying stance toward objects of inquiry representing an interpretation of physical reality. It presupposes a powerful capacity for abstraction removing all meanings and values from what is observed (Bishop, 2007, pp. 113–122). The implication is natural science inquiry encounters its objects of study as inherently meaningless spatiotemporal properties and processes. That is a substantial interpretation of material reality and seems well-justified in the sense that electrons, molecules, and galaxies are not subjects possessing self-understandings, meanings, and values. These are mind-independent aspects of physical reality. However, to the degree that psychological inquiry patterns itself after this natural science model is the degree to which psychologists remove themselves almost entirely from the social reality they intend to study and understand while surreptitiously imposing the same decontextualized interpretive framework on their subjects of inquiry, treating them as mind-independent!

In contrast to the natural sciences, human involvements and activities have a unity to them that is not defined by position in a particular space and time and the interaction of material forces and changes of energy. Rather, human activities have a unifying meaning and purpose, often binding together several discrete events at different times and places. Consider unified experiences such as going camping, carrying on a friendship, or teaching a semester-long class. These kinds of lived realities are prior to any abstracting distinction between self and world, subject and object, or even mind and matter. Such abstracting distinctions are made later for the purposes of coming to understand lived experience aiming at forming meanings binding past, present, and future into a coherent whole. This process of coming to understanding involves interpretation and reinterpretation of our involvements and activities as we are involved in the ongoing business of living—the hermeneutic movement among parts and whole, leading to growing understanding.

Moreover, natural science methods presuppose deep assumptions about their subject matter, such as repeatability and mind-independence. For example, to study how electrons behave in a magnetic field, we already presuppose that they exhibit regular behavior that is independent of our thoughts and values. Furthermore, we also assume that electrons have no thought life, values, or any other meanings. This is all to say that epistemology relevant to natural science inquiry is laden with key assumptions intertwined with methodology. One assumption doing significant work is that observers are fully distinct from their objects of inquiry, not only in the sense that such objects are “out there” but also in the sense that what we think or feel about these objects has no impact on their behavior. Natural science methodology, then, functions with a subject–object split where theories and models are representations of a material reality independent of the inquirers.

Disguised Ideology

Much of the success of the natural sciences depends on this subject–object split and the stability of mind-independent properties and processes of the material world. Nevertheless, the application of this epistemology to the study of humans and social reality is anything but morally innocent. As Charles Taylor (1995, p. 7 ff.) points out, the application of a natural science epistemology to human beings yields a “punctual self,” a disengaged, disembodied, and atomistic observer “distinguished… from natural and social worlds,” where “identity is no longer to be defined in terms of what lies outside” the self. Yet, this clearly is a moral stance presupposing an atomized individuality reflecting the highly autonomous liberal individualism of current Western society (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Bishop, 2007; Richardson, Rogers, & McCar-roll, 1998). Such individualism separates persons from their histories, cultures, relationships, and moral commitments inherently part of their being, treating them as decontextualized objects. To model people as autonomous individual units as if they are electrons and stars disconnected from each other and the inquirer is to already take a moral stance on what it means to be human. Hence, to the degree psychology adopts this disengaged epistemology is the degree to which it both presupposes this individualism and imposes a morally laden picture of the social reality it studies on its subjects of inquiry.

The moral qualities of this epistemology are unacknowledged and unexamined, functioning as “disguised ideology” in Richard Bernstein’s terms (Bernstein, 1976; Bishop, 2007; Richardson et al., 1999). Because it is unquestioned, a disguised ideology works in a behind-the-scenes way—society is structured to conform to the ideology while at the same time what is “true” or “real” about society looks increasingly like the ideology. The categories of a disguised ideology, though below the surface, seem given and inevitable. Psychological and social science theory and practice reflect liberal individualism as social reality and perpetuate this disguised ideology, reinforcing such unexamined individuality and sharp separateness of disengaged punctual selves. Unfortunately, liberal individualism is far from innocent—out of sight doesn’t mean out of mind. It has degrading effects on marriage and family relations (e.g., Richardson et al., 1999) and has been linked to propping up white superiority society through reinforcing the white-American dream of having our “own” destiny, and the confidence that we individually can free ourselves entirely from bias (DiAngelo, 2018).

Liberal individualism is closely connected with another pervasive disguised ideology, that of an instrumentalist or means–ends form of action as the fundamental characteristic of human and social activity (Bellah et al., 1985; Bishop, 2007; Richardson, 2011; Richardson et al., 1999; Taylor, 1995). Much social theory and practice treats the punctual self as distinguished and separate from the natural and social worlds so that it relates to those worlds in an instrumental, means–end, manipulative way. The punctual self really has no other option for how it relates to what is external to it, including its own values. Indeed, anything potentially limiting the expansion of instrumental prowess—whether it be social conventions and mores, or government regulation—comes to be viewed as arbitrary and oppressive (e.g., social distancing or facemask requirements during a pandemic). Hence, instrumentalism is as much an ethical as an epistemological ideal even though instrumentalism squeezes the moral and cultural dimensions of living into mere matters of technical and instrumental consideration. The upshot is that persons and societies lose the ability to reason together about the worth of the ends they seek because the focus is on the efficiency or effectiveness of the means to any ends we choose—efficiency and effectiveness become the most important values (Habermas, 1971; Horkheimer, 1974). This is particularly disturbing because although liberal individualism supposedly cherishes and defends personal liberty, integrity, creativity, and other potent and important values, the punctual self is free to discard any substantial values if there is a more effective means to securing its ends. One does not have to look very closely at twenty-first century politics, economics, and consumerism in America to see the damaging effects of such instrumentalism.

Nonetheless, liberal individualism and instrumentalism have become dominant disguised ideologies in social theorizing and inquiry as well as in political and economic life. As such, they are treated as ontological realities rather than as the moral and epistemological interpretations they really are. These disguised ideologies represent compelling visions of the good life where people are free to pursue any goods they deem desirable and free from interference as long as they do not obstruct anyone else’s pursuit of desirable goods (e.g., political liberalism ensuring the maximum number of compossible visions of the good life as master value in politics and society). Or the good life defined by efficiency and effectiveness of means to achieving ends as the most important value (e.g., free-market efficiency and profit maximization as master values for politics and society). At its logical conclusion, individualism and instrumentalism lead to the punctual self, which reduces personal identity down to the powers of effectiveness, planning and choice or to the putting on or taking off of external personas (Cushman, this volume; Fromm, 1969/1941).

A particularly stark example of liberal individualism and instrumentalism is what Christian Smith and Melinda Lundquist Denton (2005) identify as moral therapeutic deism. Although first studied in American teenagers’ views of religious faith, it seems to be more pervasive in adult religious views than just the teen set (p. 166). Primary beliefs in moral therapeutic deism are (1) that the central goal of life is to be happy, to feel good about oneself and to enjoy personal satisfaction (liberal individualism) and (2) that God stands by and only becomes involved in people’s lives when they need help with problems they can’t resolve themselves (instrumentalism). In essence, religion is a means to happiness and fulfillment of the self. “Being moral in this faith means being the kind of person that other people will like, fulfilling one’s personal potential, and not being socially disruptive or interpersonally obnoxious” (p. 163).

Traditionally, Christianity is about living for God and serving others rather than focusing on the self and viewing God as standing by to help if I get in a jam. Moral therapeutic deism is faith as a means to achieve personal happiness and moral satisfaction rather than faith as an intrinsic way of life. Religion is seen as being more about feeling good about oneself as essential to the moral life, not about confession and repentance from sin, building character through suffering, or a vision of service to others for their sake (pp. 163–164). Moralistic therapeutic deism represents a vision of the good life as being centrally about personal happiness, self-fulfillment, and living an obstacle-free life. Of course, we all want these things, but to make life centrally about these as a vision of the good life is a thin vision, indeed, where God’s role is to make us feel good and help us when we run into problems.

Hermeneutic Ontology

That humans are self-interpreting beings is one of the crucial insights philosophical hermeneutics draws on (Taylor, 1985c). We have self-understandings, a grasp of who we are, where we have come from, where we are going, of what matters or is significant or worthwhile. It is amidst living and working with others where such meanings and self-understandings are hammered out and constitute us to a great extent. Humans are being-in-relation or being-in-communion, participating in gift and reception—giving to and receiving from each other in myriad ways constituting our particularity (Gunton, 1993).

Think of how you have been shaped by what has been given to you through your family of origin, teachers, friends along the way, mentors, competitors you have had, communities you have lived in, books you have read, movies and plays you have seen, music you have listened to, and the society in which all of this relationality and mutual influence takes place. We are all being-in-relation, shaped to our cores by others. Relationality is part and parcel of human life and modes of being. It is in the midst of such everyday engagements that we come to understand who we are, who we want to be, what kind of society we live in, how that society shapes our understanding of the good, how we want that conception of the good to change, what is possible versus unlikely versus impossible in our society, and so forth (Guignon, 1989; Richardson et al., 1999; Taylor, 1985c). From this vantage point, neighborhoods loom large in their shaping roles in our lives as we reshape them (Slaney, this volume).

None of this is adequately captured by the natural science model of knowers as distanced, disengaged subjects observing meaningless objects. One reason for this inadequacy is that for self-interpreting beings, subject–object distinctions are greatly softened. For instance, we are not separate from the families and societies we have grown up in and are a part of; they help constitute who we are as persons. This means that instead of being atomistic loci of independent agency, where social relationships are the products of individual interactions among atomistic individuals, humans are indelibly social beings who participate in shared agency. We are not disengaged individuals interacting with other disengaged individuals through social or personal “forces” functioning as distanced knowers/observers—the typical social science modeling of humans. The structure of our lives shares more in common with an unfolding narrative interpenetrating other unfolding narratives (Bishop, 2007; Guignon, 1991; Slife & Slife, this volume; Slife & Richardson, 2008; Woolfolk, this volume). Our lives—our very selves—are always joint projects as we engage in practical kinds of coming to understanding through working out meanings together. The narrative structure of human lives is forged from involvements in relationships, communities, diverse traditions, contexts, and projects. Throughout, there is mutual influence and dialogue mediated by language and culture, between self and other, between the present and cultural past as well as vision of the future.

One important implication is that comprehending events mainly as “instances” of a general concept or law, or as targets of objective, neutral descriptions, along the lines of natural science inquiry, fundamentally mis-conceives of social reality.¹ Instead, humans are enmeshed with others—other persons, society, our physical world. Our lived experience changes the meaning events and actions can have for us because our lived experience is engaged dialogical involvement where both events and our knowledge of them are interconnected and continually transformed. This contrasts with the natural science model for knowing, where we change our views about an independent object, such as the Sun, as we observe it. Instead, in social reality, events and our knowledge of them are continually transformed as we engage in understanding. As an illustration, both the meaning of the American Revolution and our lived understanding of freedom continue to be modified in the dialogue between them. For instance, 30 months elapsed between Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and Major General Gordon Granger’s finally delivering the news to Texas slaves. How are we to understand freedom during these two and a half years? What does freedom mean for us in the middle of World War II or a global pandemic when people are prevented from engaging in normal activities or forced to work in dangerous environments (Slife & Slife, this volume)? As another illustration, Melanie McAlister argues that “Foreign policy is a semiotic activity [symbo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents
• List of Contributor Bios
• Series Foreword
• Book Foreword
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Empty Selves, Multiple Selves, Engaged Selves, Our Selves: Frank Richardson and the Building of an Intellectual Movement
• 3 Confessions of a Frankophile
• 4 The Long and Winding Road From the Critique of Individualism to a Social Ontology of Humans
• 5 What’s Wrong With Liberalism?
• 6 A Hermeneutic Exploration of the Grounds for Social Justice
• 7 Love Thy Neighbor: Community Within a Wisdom of Limits
• 8 Human Dignity, the One and the Many
• 9 How Does the World Become Ecstatic? Notes on the Hermeneutics of Transcendence
• References
• Index