Intergovernmental Relations on Immigrant Integration in Multi-Level States

Ilke Adam, Eve Hepburn

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9780367774776
• eBook ISBN: 9781000425192
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book explores how governments in multi-level states coordinate immigrant integration policies. It sheds light on how the decentralization of immigrant integration to substate regions can lead to conflict or cooperation, and how a variety of factors may shape different approaches to migrants.

Immigrant integration is an increasingly important policy area for governments. However, in multi-level states, immigrant integration is rarely the responsibility of the 'central' government. Instead, it is often decentralized to substate regions, which may have formulated their own, unique approaches. The way in which migrants are included into one part of a state may therefore be radically different from the experiences of migrants in another. How do multi-level states deal with potentially diverging approaches? This book examines how governments coordinate on immigrant integration in multi-level states. Four multi-level states form the backbone of the analysis: two of which are federal (Canada and Belgium) and two that are decentralized (Italy and Spain). We find that intergovernmental dynamics on immigrant integration are shaped by a variety of factors ranging from party politics to constitutional power struggles. This analysis contributes not only to our understanding of intergovernmental relations in multi-level systems; it also enhances our knowledge of the myriad ways in which different regions seek to include migrants into their societies, economies and political systems.

The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Regional and Federal Studies.

Intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration in Canada: Insights from Quebec, Manitoba, and Ontario

Sanjay Jeram and Eleni Nicolaides

ABSTRACT

The pattern of intergovernmental relations (IGR) on immigrant integration in Canada runs counter to core arguments in the extant literature. In particular, Canad!’s federal structures have not produced multilateral, institutionalized, and conflictual IGR; IGR in Canada has been predominantly bilateral and only moderately institutionalized. Moreover, IGR has been conflictual at times, while collaborative at others. Several factors explain this unexpected pattern. In an attempt to ward off separatism, the central government devolved authority over immigrant selection and settlement programmes to Quebec, creating a deep asymmetry between Quebec and the Anglophone provinces (and territories) in these areas. Interprovincial competition drove other provinces to seek powers over immigration and integration. The central government – driven by fiscal pressures and a philosophical commitment to symmetry – struck bilateral agreements with Anglophone provinces to fund and devolve settlement programming and some control over the selection of economic immigrants.

Introduction

Canada is a fascinating case study for intergovernmental relations (IGR) on immigrant integration because it has developed the most decentralized immigration/reception regime of any federation among the advanced liberal democracies (Banting 2012a). While the central government in Canada holds exclusive jurisdiction over formal citizenship and has final authority over whether immigrants – even those selected by the provinces – can enter the country, the constitution is silent about which order of government has jurisdiction over immigrant reception – or settlement, as it is called in Canada. Even without de jure constitutional change, however, immigrant selection and reception have gone from matters managed almost exclusively by the central government to very decentralized within a few short decades.

The central research questions animating the Special Issue to which this paper contributes are: How and why do governments coordinate on immigrant integration in multi-level states? As noted in the introductory article by Adam and Hepburn, this is a topic on which there is little systematic knowledge. Of particular interest to our study is the extent to which IGR is institutionalized, bilateral or multilateral, and collaborative or conflictual. To explain the resulting form of IGR in immigrant integration in Canada, the article tests a number of hypotheses set out in the introductory article, which are restated below. These hypotheses focus upon constitutional and institutional factors, in addition to partisan dynamics across governmental levels. In doing so, this paper concentrates upon IGR in the sub-policy areas of immigrant selection and settlement. Essentially, the purpose of this paper is to describe IGR on immigrant integration in Canada and to explain the patterns identified in these sub-policy areas.

To examine IGR on immigrant integration in Canada, our paper will be organized around three provincial case studies: Quebec, Manitoba, and Ontario. These three case studies were selected due to a variation on the key independent variables that animate the Special Issue's hypotheses: substate nationalism and party incongruence. These cases also exhibit a range of bilateral relationships with the federal government, which Banting (2012a, 91) identifies as the ‘comprehensive provincial control’ (Quebec), ‘devolved model’ (Manitoba), and ‘tri-level model’ (Ontario). At the same time, the cases highlight the key features of IGR on immigration policy in Canada common to all province-central state relationships. First, the predominant form of IGR on immigration issues has been vertical: formal bilateral negotiations between individual provinces and the federal government have dominated IGR in this sector. Second, both collaboration and conflict have been present at different stages of policy development and decentralization.

Quebec is the site of an active substate nationalist movement, which undergirds the province's special interest in immigration and has driven the development of an asymmetrical integration policy regime in the country. Beginning with the 1991 Canada–Quebec Accord (CQA), the federal government has negotiated agreements with the provinces and territories to decentralize selection policies and settlement services. Manitoba is a small province that is a ‘pioneer’ with respect to using the provincial nominee program (PNP) to pursue immigration-generated economic growth and population expansion. Moreover, its design and administration of settlement services since 1998 proved very successful and made Manitoba an example for other provinces (Leo and August 2009, 497–9). Ontario is the choice of a majority of newcomers because of the established immigrant communities in the Greater Toronto Area. Ontario has historically been less active and was slow to come to a bilateral agreement with the federal government, finally doing so in 2005.

The next section addresses the constitutional structure of the Canadian state as it pertains to immigration. The subsequent section provides a succinct restatement of the hypotheses presented by Adam and Hepburn in the introductory article. The core section of the paper presents three dyadic case studies (Quebec–Canada, Manitoba–Canada, and Ontario–Canada) as empirical evidence. This involves qualitative analysis of publicly accessible archival data, including federal–provincial agreements, government statements, government websites, parliamentary debates, and news articles, along with secondary sources.¹ The final section revisits the core arguments developed through the study of the Canadian case and touches upon Canada's ‘exceptionalism’ among the cases featured in the collection.

Constitutional structure and overview of competencies

Jurisdiction over immigration is concurrent, with section 95 of the Constitution Act of 1867 giving both the federal and provincial governments the power to make laws related to immigration, with the proviso of federal paramountcy. Yet, as previously mentioned, immigrant selection and integration have gone from matters managed almost exclusively by the central government to very decentralized within a few short decades. Paquet (2014, 521–522) refers to the changes to Canada's immigration system as ‘federalization’, which she describes as an alteration in the number of actors that can act legitimately within an institutional regime. The following section provides an overview of the constitutional structure and how the allocation of competencies has developed over time.

Immigrant selection and admissions

The federal government retains the sole authority to determine admissibility of immigrants to Canada. Since the 1990s, however, it has gradually devolved more power to the provinces over the selection of economic immigrants.² The 1978 Couture–Cullen agreement gave Quebec the ability to select immigrants according to its own criteria, even if such applicants did not meet the standards of the Canadian federal selection system. The CQA confirmed the paramountcy of Quebec's selection powers and affirmed the objective of respecting ‘the distinct identity of Quebec’ (Vineberg 2011, 35). It was not long before the other provinces expressed interest in selecting immigrants. Fearing a domino effect leading to 10 separate CQAs, the governing Liberal Party at the federal level responded by introducing the PNP in 1995, under which provinces are authorized to identify a specific number of economic migrants to meet provincial economic needs.

Reception and settlement

In addition to affirming its selection authority, the CQA permitted the province – with federal funding – to design and implement all settlement services. The CQA is meant to be quasi-constitutional in nature; it states that amendments require the agreement of both the Canadian and Quebec governments.³

In English Canada, the federal government currently has the largest role in establishing reception and integration policies through a wide range of departments and agencies. It is the largest funder of such programming and supports a variety of services (e.g. orientation counselling, interpretation and translation, employment-related services, refugee assistance, language instruction, and programmes that link newcomers with Canadian ‘hosts’). Third parties, including service provider organizations, multicultural/ethnic organizations, educational institutions, and partners in the private sector, are contracted by the central government to run the majority of these programmes.

Part of the impetus for the federal government's ‘settlement realignment’ through IGR was the large deficit that resulted in a programme review by federal ministers in 1995 and 1996. Each ministry was asked to consider whether any programmes could be devolved to the provinces. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) in particular was asked to work around a $60 million dollar cut to its budget and thus decided that settlement and integration would be best handed over to provinces. The official rationale for the decision focused on efficiency, but in reality, CIC hoped that any funding it offered would amount to less than it had been spending on delivering settlement programmes previously (Clément, Carter, and Vineberg 2013, 18).

Healthcare, education, and employment policies targeted at immigrants

The provinces are responsible for many of the policy areas affecting the short- and long-term integration needs of immigrants, including healthcare, education, social services, and labour market regulation. The provincial jurisdiction over healthcare is provided most directly through section 92(7) of the Constitution Act of 1867. However, the federal government is responsible for establishing health standards for those attempting to immigrate to Canada (Library of Parliament 2008, 3).

Education is a provincial competence under section 93 of the Constitution Act of 1867. Provinces autonomously develop programmes to integrate immigrant youths into the public school system with federal block grants. The provinces also have jurisdiction over employment under s. 92. Occupational regulatory bodies are accountable to provincial governments, and assessment, recognition, and licensing practices vary from province to province. As the sources of Canada's immigrants diversified, foreign credential recognition became a serious issue. The 1994 Agreement on Internal Trade committed the federal, provincial, and territorial governments to pursue the steps necessary to foster labour mobility across Canada, and discussions generated by it have focused on both inter-provincial and foreign credential recognition (Vineberg 2012, 56). The first concrete steps toward this end, however – the Labour Market Development Agreements – exclude most immigrants from the resulting training and support programmes because eligibility for federal unemployment benefits is the main criterion for access (Banting 2012a). The federal government also created its Foreign Credentials Referral Office under CIC in 2007, but it is limited to making recommendations to provincial bodies (Canada 2013b).

The 2009 Pan-Canadian Framework for the Assessment and Recognition of Foreign Qualifications has been touted as the breakthrough that will speed up and harmonize the integration of internationally trained professionals into the Canadian labour market (Vineberg 2012, 56). However, the framework is not binding since it is merely a joint statement. The provinces have continued to develop their own approaches to foreign credential recognition and labour market integration (see Biles et al. 2011; Carter and Amoyaw 2011; Germain and Trinh 2011; Rimok and Rouzier 2008).

Anti-discrimination policies

The Canadian constitution is silent on the matter, but the federal government has developed a number of instruments to address discrimination against immigrants and visible minorities. The Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988 formalized the adoption of multiculturalism as an ‘official policy’ in 1971. While affirming that all Canadians are equal, the 1988 Act acknowledges the ‘freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance, and share their cultural heritage’. The multiculturalism mantra has had an influence on anti-discrimination initiatives of federal agencies and, importantly, the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Charter includes a guarantee of freedom of religion and prohibits discrimination based on ‘race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex or mental or physical disability’. More tangibly, Canada's Action Plan Against Racism is a ‘comprehensive strategy designed to provide policy coherence across twenty federal departments and agencies’ (Garcea and Hibbert 2011, 56). The provinces carry out their own anti-racism programmes that generally complement federal objectives and fit the precepts of multiculturalism.

As a substate nation within Canada, Quebec prefers its own Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms to the Canadian Charter. Similarly, Quebec has its official policy of interculturalism, rather than multiculturalism. Quebec inaugurated interculturalism through its Declaration of Intercultural and Interracial Relations (1986), committing the province to encourage the full integration of every Quebecker regardless of national or ethnic origin. While some argue that interculturalism as a guiding policy framework is distinct from multiculturalism (Gagnon and Iacovino 2006), Quebec's anti-racism programmes are similar to those in English Canada.

Citizenship

Section 91(25) of the Canadian Constitution grants exclusive authority over naturalization to the federal government. Immigrants in Canada with permanent resident status who wish to become Canadian citizens must meet a residency requirement, declare their intention to live in Canada after naturalization, and take a federal citizenship t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction: A comparative assessment of intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration in multi-level states
• 1 Intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration in Canada: Insights from Quebec, Manitoba, and Ontario
• 2 Intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration in Italy: Insights from Piedmont and South Tyrol
• 3 Defying the traditional theses: Intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration in Belgium
• 4 Intergovernmental relations on immigrant integration in Spain: The case of Catalonia
• Index