1.1 Introduction
One of the reasons why politicians today are held in low esteem by the public has to do with perceptions of grubby, instrumentalist, arrogant, or underhanded political communication. This is not merely about sectional or partisan objections to the particular content, subject matter, or viewpoint of political rhetoric, as might be true of some objections to propaganda, hate speech, or conspiracy theories, for example. It is also about the sorts of reasonable objections that anybody could have to dubious communicative strategies. These strategies can include, for example, question dodging; giving scripted answers; stonewalling; not listening; making false promises to voters; bullshitting; being insincere; exaggerating past achievements; never apologising; giving false denials; issuing revisionist interpretations; or smearing opponents and rivals.
Such modes of political communication can be infuriating. With few exceptions, the political figures concerned implicitly believe either that they are not guilty of using such techniques or if they are guilty then their own use of these techniques is somehow necessary and justified. But in what ways might the use of these techniques be ethically or morally dubious? Are the justifications offered reasonable? If not, what should be done to deter this sort of political communication?
The central aim of this book is to develop an ethics of political communication that answers the above questions. I make three main arguments: first, that the public is not imagining the problem since these sorts of rhetorical techniques can indeed be ethically or morally problematic, and in a number of different ways; second, even taking into account various excuses and justifications that politicians might offer, explicitly or implicitly, there are modes of political communication that a well-informed and reasonable public would not put up with if they had a fair say in the matter; third, that the public does not have to put up with politiciansā excessive or unreasonable use of dubious communicative strategies because there are a plethora of regulatory measures either available or devisable to tackle them.
In making these arguments I endeavour to highlight the specificity of particular modes of political communication; the particular contexts and situations in which they are used; the real motivations for their use; the different power relations they reflect and embody; the precise forms of consent that may or may not be involved; the specific excuses and justifications that tend to be offered for them, either explicitly or implicitly; and the different potential consequences when they are used.
However, my ethical theory of political communication also aims to provide a degree of generality: first, it identifies reasons for thinking that particular modes of political communication are ethically or morally dubious that might also be relevant to other rhetorical techniques not discussed in the book; second, it develops an overall theoretical framework for evaluating possible reasons for and against the use of given modes of political communication, a framework that is potentially applicable to the full range of excuses and justifications that can be, and often are, invoked by politicians, whether implicitly or explicitly.
In general I take a bespoke applied ethics approach to the subject matter and use methods rooted in the analytic tradition of philosophy. In particular, I draw on insights and ideas from four main traditions of moral thought: Kantian ethics; virtue ethics; theories of deliberative democracy; and contractualist conceptions of normative political legitimacy. My key theoretical assumptions are: first, that an ethics of political communication may draw on a range of ethical traditions but should ultimately appeal to distinctively political moral values, principles, and rights, and that normative political legitimacy is the best candidate for being the final appeal; second, that normative political legitimacy depends on there being a legal and political system that could be the subject of hypothetical agreement among members of the political community placed under idealised conditions of freedom, equality, and mutual respectfulness; and, third, that the elements composing the legal and political system include the structure of political communication itself.
That being said, in the course of the discussion I shall also engage with a variety of literature on ethics, communication, and politicsāliterature that reflects a broad range of academic disciplines including applied ethics, professional ethics, political theory, political philosophy, rhetorical studies, political sociology, sociolinguistics, diplomacy studies, leadership studies, media studies, journalism studies, and communication studies.
In addition to providing normative diagnoses of the problem of dubious political communication, I also develop practical solutions. In particular, I propose some bespoke models of self-regulation and hybrid regulation for political communication, including rules of debate, rules of procedure, and codes of conduct, all backed up by orders, penalties, and sanctions.
Overall, I integrate descriptive and normative, thematic and specific, theoretical and applied analyses of the ethics of political communication. I also illustrate abstract theory with practical case studies taken from different countries, including political communication at the national and international levels.
In particular, I focus on four main political figures as follows. Both as a presidential candidate and as president, Donald Trump was notorious for making false denials or issuing revisionist interpretations of his own words and deeds. During her time in office, Prime Minister Theresa May gained a reputation for dodging questions, by routinely answering a different question to that which was actually asked. She also perfected a technique I call āshoehorningā: not merely surreptitiously sidestepping the question but also taking the opportunity to deliver pre-prepared political messages. Prime Minister Boris Johnson is known not only for his metaphor-heavy style of oratory but also for a tendency to avoid scrutiny by going AWOL, the ultimate form of stonewalling. Finally, the then Danish prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen shot to international notoriety during the Danish cartoons affair in 2005 by refusing to meet with a delegation of ambassadors from majority-Muslim countries. Rasmussen famously attempted to justify this communicative disengagement on the grounds that āit is so crystal clear what principles Danish democracy is built upon that there is no reason to [meet the ambassadors]ā.
The remainder of this chapter lays the foundations for the moral inquiry to come. I begin by providing a characterisation of political communication as a general subject matter of moral inquiry (Section 1.2). I then outline some of the specific challenges faced by different sorts of political figures, such as managing fraught communicative interactions not only with other political figures but also with the media and the public, and how these challenges can lead to the use of ethically or morally dubious rhetorical techniques (Section 1.3).
Following on from that, I provide some necessary background by showing how the ethics of political communication has become the Cinderella of moral inquiry (Section 1.4). I also set out some basic methodological assumptions that inform my main arguments, including the assumption that an ethics of political communication, in its ultimate appeal to values, should be a species or subset of some kind of distinctive political morality (Section 1.5).
I then introduce my overarching theoretical framework: a contractualist conception of normative political legitimacy grounded in the idea of hypothetical agreement (or reasonable consensus), reached under idealised deliberative conditions, about key aspects of the legal and political system, including an agreement about what norms and rules should govern the structure of political communication itself. I also explain and defend my working assumption that the object of political legitimacy, the legal and political system, includes the structure of political communication (Section 1.6).
In the final section, I introduce and then reject two preliminary objections to my moral inquiry: first, that in fact politicians have no ethical or moral case to answer when they use certain rhetorical techniques because people implicitly know what politicians are up to and vote for them anyway; second, that even if politicians have an ethical or moral case to answer for using dubious communicative strategies, it does not matter very much because politicians are typically guilty of doing far worse (unjust, illegitimate) things (Section 1.7).
1.2 What Is Political Communication and How Is It an Ethical Matter?
In developing an ethics of political communication I shall understand the term āpolitical communicationā to refer to the communicative behaviours and strategies of political figures, the communicative interactions between political figures, and also the communicative interplay between political and non-political figures.
Political figures include everyone from electoral candidates and elected representatives; through to members of the ruling government or executive branch; to elected and unelected public officials and civil servants; to leaders or other prominent personalities associated with political parties, pressure groups, movements, and campaigns; to political journalists; to political commentators; to political radio talk show hosts; and to anyone in civil society who consciously takes up an active role or position in the political life of the community including, for example, business leaders, spokespersons for civil society organisations, artists, actors, musicians, sports personalities, and social media influences.
Political communication covers all aspects of politics in its communicative forms, including communication both as a means of pursuing political ends and as a way of doing politics, or politicking. It is connected with governing as much as campaigning; with holding to account and scrutinising as much as submitting to political accountability and scrutiny; but also with avoiding political accountability and scrutiny, such as in order to send a message of power or open defiance. It can be encapsulated as much by the propaganda of the powerful as by speaking truth to power.
Political communication can be monologic or dialogic. It can encompass communicative situations in which political figures are doing most of the active communicating and the public remain largely passive audiences, such as political debates, campaign speeches, select committee sessions, news interviews, press briefings, public announcements, legal and technical documents, and various forms of political advertising; but also more citizen-led communicative situations in which members of the public are given opportunities to express their opinions and put questions directly to politicians, although in formal settings the questions tend to be pre-selected by journalists and independent bodies.1 Social media also afford opportunities for interactive or dialogic forms of political communication between political figures and the public, even if it is often limited to comments below the line (ārepliesā) and aggregated communication (ālikesā).
Political communication can be composed of spoken and written words; but also images, audio, and audiovisual communications, both live and recorded. It can be verbal communication; but also non-verbal communication such as a look, gesture, or comportment (McNair 2003: 24). It can also incorporate meaningful or expressive political acts (and omissions) of various kinds, including legislating, policymaking, taxing, voting, not voting, protesting, ethically consuming, and rioting (Savigny 2017: 1ā2). It can take forms that are informative, narrative, argumentational, persuasive, or conflictual. It can involve asking and answering questions but also evading questions. It can occur online or offline; and can be to greater or lesser degrees mediated or unmediated.
Political communication encompasses political marketing; that is to say, the artful management of a political figureās presentation, perception, image, and reputation (Savigny 2017: 1ā2). It also involves influencing political action; but also shaping the environment of public values, beliefs, discourse, and opinion about issues of public interest (Swanson and Nimmo 1990: 9; Denton and Woodward 1998: 11).
Political communication can express political beliefs, values, and ideological commitments that exist independently of it; or it can articulate ideas which come into existence only through the process of articulation (a form of political self-realisation).
Political communication can be a bridge between political actors and institutions of different kinds, between politicians and the people, between elites and non-elites, between generations, races, genders, and cultures; but it can also be a source of division. It can be a site of struggle or conflict; yet also a vehicle for, and embodiment of, compromise and reconciliation. It can be a means of self-expression as well as a tool of control. It can be a way of recognising or misrecognising identity; a modality of intercultural dialogue or instead cultural imperialism. It can involve spreading or combating propaganda; promulgating information or spreading disinformation. It can be a matter of voicing grievance, talking back, resisting, dissenting, and calling out injustice; but also a way of coercing, oppressing, dominating, subordinating, and silencing.
Grounded in the foregoing general characterisation, the book will focus on cases when political figures use potentially unethical or immoral rhetorical techniques in the performance of any acts common to political communication and reflecting interests, motivations, goals, principles, positions, offices, and powers related to politics.
How is political communication an ethical matter? In many respects this question will require the remainder of the book to answer. However, I can make some preliminary remarks that foreshadow what is to come. One of the things that could be unethical or immoral, for example, about political communication is if a political figure uses lies, false denials, revisionist interpretations, or other deceptive statements in order to persuade people of something, such as in the course of trying to make a persuasive argument to the public, in a manipulative way (see Chapters 5 and 6).2
However, clearly this does not exhaust the possible forms of unethical political communication. For example, many communicative interactions involving political figures begin with the posing of questions to political figures as opposed to political figures making claims and arguments. Whether or not political figures answer questions (see Chapter 2), and, indeed, whether they even submit to questioning in the first place (see Chapter 3), are also ethical issues. Likewise, some interactions involve attempts to express opinions or put persuasive arguments to political figures, and whether or not political figures are willing to listen to, receive, or meaningfully hear those opinions and arguments is an ethical issue (see Chapter 4).
Another feature that could be unethical or immoral about political communication is if a political figure is ostensibly speaking in his ...
