The Nuclear Terrorism Threat

An Organisational Approach

Brecht Volders

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000408720
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the threat of a terrorist organisation constructing and detonating a nuclear bomb.

It explores the role and impact of the organisational design of a terrorist organisation in implementing a nuclear terrorism plot. In order to do so, the work builds on the organisational analogy between an assumed nuclear terrorism scenario and four case studies as follows: the construction of the first atomic bombs at Los Alamos; South Africa's Peaceful Nuclear Explosives (PNE) program; Aum Shinrikyo's chemical-biological armament activities; and Al Qaeda's implementation of the 9/11 attacks. Extrapolating insights from these case studies, this book introduces the idea of an effectiveness-efficiency trade-off. On the one hand, it will be argued that a more organic organisational design is likely to benefit the effective implementation of a nuclear terrorism project. On the other hand, this type of organic organisational design is also likely to simultaneously constitute an inefficient way for a terrorist organisation to guarantee its operational and organisational security. It follows, then, that the implementation of a nuclear terrorism plot via an organic organisational design is also likely to be an inefficient strategy for a terrorist organisation to achieve its strategic and political goals. This idea of an effectiveness-efficiency trade-off provides us with a tool to strengthen the comprehensive nature of future nuclear terrorism threat assessments and sheds new light on the ongoing debates within the nuclear terrorism literature.

This book will be of particular interest to students of nuclear proliferation, terrorism studies, international organisations, and security studies in general.

1
Introduction

Introduction

It is time. Al Qaeda succeeded in assembling a simple fission device. A similar device devastated Hiroshima more than 70 years ago. Now, justified by their religious beliefs, they intend to destroy Manhattan. Tens of thousands of people will die; an even higher number will be injured. The project team spent years quietly planning their mission. The crude nuclear bomb’s essential components had secretly been stolen bit by bit from nuclear facilities in Pakistan, Iran and Russia. It took them years to collect, hide and secure this material. An abandoned house at the outskirts of Peshawar served as a machine-shop to assemble the improvised HEU device. Once ready, the project team illicitly smuggled the device to American soil by means of maritime transport in a matter of weeks. Now, parked in their truck at the 9/11 memorial, the attacking team just finalised the last checks with respect to the device and received the go-ahead by their leader.

This type of scenario is often topic of both popular and political concern. The nexus between indiscriminate terrorism and nuclear proliferation is generally considered a risk to international security. Yet, assessing this risk is a challenging task. There are a variety of diversely motivated terrorist organisations, a multitude of potential pathways to success for a terrorist organisation, and a range of security measures designed to prevent (particular aspects of) such a nuclear plot. Moreover, security considerations related to the sensitive nature of this topic invariably cloud discussions on this topic, terrorist organisations might be intelligent and adaptable, and nuclear terrorism threat assessments need to cope with a paucity of data.¹ There are no empirical cases. Downes and Hobbs therefore describe nuclear terrorism as a “virtual risk.” While it is true that relevant information is available, this is often “limited, incomplete, open to interpretation, or only applicable to small part of the overall puzzle.”² Considering the large number of unknown variables, it follows that both quantitative and qualitative assessments often disagree with respect to the likelihood of a nuclear terrorism plot enfolding.³ The input parameters to these threat assessments are attributed very diverging probabilities. This book, however, aims to deepen our understanding of the probability of this threat as the output of analysis. This way, this book aims to contribute to the validity of future nuclear terrorism threat assessments.

Before elaborating on this theme, however, we should ask ourselves whether there actually is a good reason for the popular and political attention to this risk? In this context, it is interesting to note that any risk assessment is considered to be function of the probability of the phenomenon occurring and its potential consequences. On the one hand, the probability of this type of scenario is generally considered to be low. Notwithstanding substantial disagreements in particular nuclear terrorism threat assessments, it is clear that “most terrorist attacks involve readily available weapons and rarely include sophisticated tactics that require long-term planning.”⁴ It has been illustrated that “of the more than 113,000 attacks recorded in the GTD (Global Terrorism Database) only 220 used chemical weapons and only 32 used biological weapons.” Moreover, the GTD also clarifies that “only 13 [attacks] used radiological weapons and none used nuclear weapons.”⁵ This demonstrates that the general prevalence of this type of advanced technical terrorist attack is low. On the other hand, however, a risk equation also needs to take into account the consequences of a particular scenario. Terrorist organisations constructing and detonating a (crude) nuclear device would lead to unseen socio-economic, physical, and psychological disruption and destruction. The effective detonation of a terrorist atomic device can change societal order as we know it. At least two terrorist organisations [Al Qaeda (AQ) and Aum Shinrikyo] are known to have demonstrated interest in this type of attack. In reflecting upon the societal relevance of this book, we should therefore take into account the difference between probabilistic and possibilistic thinking. It is true that we need probabilistic thinking in terms of chances and odds; it leads to prescriptions on how society ought to be organised. Yet, this does not imply that we should forget the possibility of such an event occurring. Worst cases do happen.⁶ It therefore can be downright dangerous to completely neglect possibilities in favour of probabilities.⁷

It thus remains necessary to reflect on how we should best assess the nuclear terrorism threat. Paradoxically, as we focus on the possibility of this scenario and its consequences, we are insurmountably confined to probabilistic thinking. Yet, in doing so, we need to remain thoughtful of assessing the probability as the “output of analysis.”⁸ This is true for both quantitative and qualitative assessments: There are no empirical cases of a well-developed nuclear terrorism plot. Selective use of data and insights can lead to both speculative and exaggerated threats.⁹ Secrecy can have a generative effect in this context.¹⁰ A variety of conceivable scenarios might converge in a single worst-case nuclear threat projection, thereby resulting in excessive and adverse countermeasures. Probability assessments should therefore aim to be the result of an encompassing analysis. It is overly simplistic – and by consequence wrong – to merely assign probabilities to individual (input) parameters. It is necessary to understand a diverse variety of variables and their interplay. A terrorist group’s decision and implementation of a nuclear terrorism project is dependent on, e.g. a group’s capabilities, the tactical and strategic aims of this organisation, their perceptions regarding success or failure, and counter-terrorism security measures.¹¹ We should not limit ourselves to only considering isolated variables or individual parts of a nuclear terrorism plot.¹²

This book therefore focuses on the organisational challenges to the complete implementation of a nuclear terrorism project. While organisational dynamics and variables are no omnipotent causal force, it is remarkable that this dimension has not been identified in-depth and systematically explored. This book neither does aspire to develop an all-encompassing model to assess this phenomenon, nor does it aim to provide any numerical estimates on the threat. Yet, it does hope to enable a deeper understanding of the probability of nuclear terrorism. By exploring this underdeveloped dimension in nuclear terrorism probability assessments, we hope to contribute to the encompassing nature of future nuclear terrorism threat assessments.

As is illustrated in this book, traditional nuclear terrorism threat assessments focus primarily on a terrorist organisation’s motivation to use a nuclear device, the availability of nuclear know-how and technology, and/or clandestine organ-isations’ opportunities to obtain fissile material. Few experts, however, systematically focus on exploring the complexity for a terrorist organisation to implement a nuclear armament project. Experts often refer to a well-organised and sophisticated,¹³ a technically sophisticated,¹⁴ or organisationally sophisticated¹⁵ terrorist group. Yet, rather than systematically reflecting upon the meaning of these concepts, most of them divert attention to circumscribing the threat by means of the aforementioned traditional nuclear terrorism variables. One should, however, not only focus on the individual components, but also reflect on the system. Implementation of the armament project is otherwise taken for granted and the process itself remains understudied. Traditional approaches insufficiently integrate questions like: who should make the decisions in a nuclear terrorism project, how can unforeseen obstacles dealt with, and/or how should security considerations be taken into account throughout assembly of the nuclear device?¹⁶ An organisational approach enables thorough reflection upon these questions. This way, it might add to our better understanding of the nuclear terrorism threat.

This book thus adopts such an organisational approach in order to strengthen future nuclear terrorism threat assessments. This is not incompatible with previous discussions and insights with respect to the three traditional nuclear terrorism variables. In contrast, exploring this organisational dimension might shed new light on the ongoing debates and enable a deeper understanding of the nuclear terrorism threat. That is the goal of this book.

Focus of the book

“Nuclear terrorism” is a complex phenomenon. It can manifest itself in various ways and may be achieved through a diversity of pathways. The exact challenges in organising a nuclear terrorism project can therefore strongly vary. Setting the focus of this book is subsequently of essential importance. In order to explore these organisational challenges, we have delineated the scope and design of this book in three interrelated ways:

First, this book specifically focuses on the construction and detonation of an “improvised nuclear device” (IND) by a terrorist organisation. While we will use this term interchangeably with a “crude nuclear device” or a “terrorist nuclear device,” it is of importance to clearly mark what these conceptually ambiguous terms mean. Given that it would be inherently arbitrarily to determine a basic yield that would be required to qualify as an IND, we start from a definition of an IND as any device with a yield-producing explosion based on a chain reaction created by the fission of nuclear material. This thus can range from a fizzle (that results in a few tons to a 100 tons) to the terrorist equivalent of Hiroshima [which would result in around 15 kilotons (kT)]. While the latter type of terrorist nuclear device would imply an increased technical complexity, the development of each type of IND on this continuum would often imply the implementation of a nonroutine project. Even the development of a nuclear plot that would result in a fizzle would often go beyond standard operations for any terrorist organisation.

An IND does not refer to a neutron flux or any other type of nuclear terrorism (e.g. an attack on a nuclear facility or radiological terrorism). These types of nuclear terrorism can cause substantial psychological and physical damage. Yet, the consequences are most likely less destructive and disruptive compared to an actual nuclear explosion. An IND does not refer to an actual nuclear weapon. A nuclear weapon is understood as a military qualified item. It is ready to be delivered by aircraft, missile, or glide bomb. It is more reliable, safe, and predictable. A crude nuclear device does, however, not need to be more advanced than an “experimental assembly” in order to create substantial levels of destruction.¹⁷ Moreover, this book also does not focus on the scenario of a terrorist organisation stealing or buying an intact nuclear device. This type of scenario would unduly broaden the focus of this book. Admittedly, various cases of (near) loss of control over nuclear weapons, state terrorism sponsors in conflicts zones, uncertainty with respect to security measures in several states (e.g. Pakistan or North-Korea), and problems with nuclear forensics should suffice to remain aware of this option.¹⁸ Yet, we believe that the counterarguments that stringent security measures are often in place, that attribution to the responsible state is likely, and that a state is unlikely to allow losing control over these unique and destructive weapons is sufficient justification to focus specifically on the construction and detonation of an IND.¹⁹

Second, and closely related to this last remark, this book will start from a particular nuclear terrorism scenario. Even merely considering the construction and detonation of a crude nuclear device, there is a myriad of pathways for a terrorist organisation to achieve this type of nuclear capacity. The exact pathway depends on the terrorist organisation’s resources, the (state) assistance that they can acquire, their exact operational environment (and its opportunities), the organisation’s strategic and operational goals, and so on. Organisational dynamics and variables will subsequently play a different role in different pathways to a terrorist nuclear capacity. Given that it is impossible to systematically include every potential course of action, we will build on expert opinion to adopt a particular nuclear terrorism scenario. This nuclear terrorism scenario will be outlined in detail in the next chapter. Such a scenario provides a formal way to structure thinking about this phenomenon. It provides focus and a framework of reasoning to this book. Although it will inherently remain open to discussion, we portrayed a scenario that does not needlessly complicate the project while simultaneously enveloping most potential pathways. This way, we avoid exaggerating the impact of organising this nonroutine endeavour.

Third, any book on this issue inherently struggles with the lack of empirical cases. There are no cases of a terrorist organisation successfully constructing and detonating an IND. This lack of direct empirical evidence forces us to look for alternative ways to empirically assess the threat. We have therefore opted to build on case studies of four projects that were facing the implementation of a nonroutine project: (1) the construction of the first atomic bombs at Los Alamos, (2) the South African development of a nuclear device, (3) Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical and biological (CB) armament activities, and (4) the implementation of 9/11 by AQ. We will outline in depth that the adopted nuclear terrorism scenario would also be such a nonroutine project. We are subsequently able to better understand a potential nuclear terrorism case by knowing about these other nonroutine cases. We will extrapolate relevant insights with respect to a potential nuclear terrorism plot by building on this shared organisational feature. Each case was characterised by a similar nonroutine nature of technology. It therefore contains relevant insights with respect to a better ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of figures and tables
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The need for an organisational approach in nuclear terrorism threat assessments
• 3 Exploring the role of the organisational design
• 4 Constructing the first nuclear bombs at Los Alamos
• 5 The South African PNE program
• 6 Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical and biological armament activities
• 7 The implementation of 9/11 by Al Qaeda
• 8 Towards a deeper understanding of the nuclear terrorism threat
• 9 Conclusion
• Annex 1: Methodology of the book
• Bibliography
• Index