1Introducing an emerging Africa in the age of globalisation
In the year 2000, the World Bank published an influential book posing the question: can Africa claim the 21st century? (World Bank, 2000). This was a pertinent question at the time since Africa had experienced two decades of economic stagnation between the years 1980 and 2000. African citizens were, on average, poorer in real terms in the year 2000 than they were two decades earlier. Since the turn of the century, however, Africa has been emerging economically, politically, socially and technologically. A much larger proportion of Africa's 1.2 billion people in the year 2020 are in the middle class than was the case only a decade ago and poverty rates have almost halved compared to 1990 (Robertson, 2012). Development outcomes related to health and education have greatly improved over the past two decades. Africa is now much better governed than was the case in the first four decades after independence when authoritarian regimes abounded in more than half of Africa's states (Rotberg, 2013). Many of these authoritarian regimes in Africa collapsed in the 1990s and were replaced by more democratic ones.
Overall, these new realities have contributed to an “Africa rising” narrative that is being increasingly more boldly internalised by its citizens and governments. An emerging Africa has also been striving to assert itself on the global stage and cope with the new realities presented by globalisation. African states are trying to find a more articulate and assertive voice on the global stage in areas such as international trade, global environmental policy and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. They are increasing seeking out non-traditional development partners such as China, Russia and Brazil while also continuing to develop relations with traditional partners. The recent rapid spread of the COVID-19 pandemic shows how globalised the world has become. As a result of the pandemic, the global economy is projected to contract sharply by negative 3% in 2020 (International Monetary Fund, 2020). Sub-Saharan African economies are expected to enter their first major recession in 25 years and to contract by between − 2.1% and − 5.1% in 2020 which is due in no small part to spillovers from contractions in the rest of the global economy (World Bank, 2020). This economic contraction is expected to adversely affect a number of critical development outcomes in Africa such as health and education. Increased globalisation is manifested at the economic, political, cultural and technological levels although the extent of globalisation in specific domains is still a subject of great controversy (Baylis et al., 2014). African states strive to be more active participants in this new global reality as they also seek to address mutual global concerns. They yearn to contribute more fully to global policy-making in integral domains such as global trade and climate change.
Despite these encouraging signs, however, an emerging Africa continues to struggle in the age of globalisation. African states seek to address the myriad challenges posed by the new global order such as international terrorism and global pandemics. These challenges represent part of a complex global reality in which African states increasingly find themselves. Opportunities are often accompanied by massive obstacles that still remain to be overcome. For example, debates persist about the true depth of African democratisation. It is often asserted that African democratisation is concerned more with form rather than substance. The issue is further complicated by the fact that diverse African states and regions have very distinct realities. For example, poverty is much more pronounced in the Central African region than in the rest of Africa. Inequality is more evident in Southern Africa than the rest of Africa. In 2019, for example, South Africa was the most unequal country in the world. There is ultimately no such concept as “one Africa.” Rather, there are 55 different African states, each with very distinct realities.
A popular theme emerging over the past decade is that of “African solutions to African problems.” Whereas it is certainly important to contextualise African solutions to local realities, many challenges faced by African states reflect a broader and more interdependent global realities (Cheru, 2002). This underscores the linkages between challenges in Africa and the rest of the world. Many current policies in African states only address the symptoms of existing challenges such as increasingly internationalised conflicts related to religious extremism and ethnic conflicts. The Western African region has, for example, struggled with severe religious extremism for over a decade. The challenges there reflect broader global challenges of international terrorism whose epicentre is gradually moving away from the Middle East into weak states in other parts of the world. The African continent despite its progress over the past two decades still continues to have several weak states. The ideology and financing of such terrorist activities, however, still remain global in origin. A major trend in the post-Cold War era has been the increasing internationalisation of conflicts. Many other challenges faced by African states are also global in nature; for example, environmental challenges that often straddle borders. There is, therefore, an urgent need to reconceptualise policy-making in African states to more fully take into account global realities and address the root causes of challenges faced by African states in an age of globalisation. There is a critical need to move beyond state-centric solutions and incorporate the role of non-state actors in policy-making (Mudida, 2020). A polycentric approach to policy-making in Africa is vital (Koenig-Archibugi, 2010). This book combines a consideration of the fundamental obstacles faced by an emerging Africa with penetrating policy insights. Importantly, the interrelated nature of Africa's conundrum in an age of globalisation is considered from a policy perspective. Ultimately, the ability of African states to come up with solutions that are both specific to sub-regional realities yet reflect an increasing African and global interdependence will be vital. Insights from comparative public policy from different regions of the world will be extensively utilised in the book when analysing distinct African opportunities and challenges.
An overview of the book
Chapter 1 sets the scene for the entire book by providing evidence of the new realities Africa faces in an age of globalisation. It begins by emphasising the distinct realities in different African states and regions. The evidence of the “Africa Rising” narrative exists in many domains. Africa is, however, facing new challenges of religious extremism, environmental problems and democratic recessions in many states. Many of these challenges are interdependent, for example, political instability adversely affects development outcomes. A worsening of development outcomes in turn aggravates political challenges in many African states.
Chapter 2 of the book considers new frontiers in the diplomacy of African states with a focus on Africa's role in the dialogue of civilisations. This role is vital as some African states like Nigeria lie along civilisational fault lines with increased religious extremism indicating a deep divide between Christian and Islamic civilisations. The diplomacy of African states has traditionally primarily been a diplomacy of development as African states aim to uplift the standards of living of their citizens (Mudida, 2020). The diplomacy of African states has been conducted at both bilateral and multilateral levels. This diplomacy continues to be highly state-centric despite increasing recognition of the vital role played by non-state actors (Barston, 2014). Africa needs to sustain its diplomacy of development by expanding its role in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) effectively and participating more fully in international organisations. African states face an ongoing dilemma about whether to turn East or West as they develop strategic alliances. In recent times, African states have increasingly reached out to non-traditional partners such as China and Russia. China and Russia, as global powers, have also sought to expand their influence into Africa particularly in the pursuit of economic interests (Mudida, 2012). In October 2019, for example, the first Russia-Africa summit was held in Sotchi. China, in turn, has held several China-Africa summits over the past decade. As standards of living improve, however, Africa yearns to participate more fully in the dialogue of civilisations that has intensified globally over the past decade. Africa embodies many aspects of the clash of civilisations within its borders as the threat of Islamic extremism in many African countries particularly in West Africa and the Horn of Africa demonstrates. Policies are provided at the end of the chapter on how Africa can become a more active participant in the dialogue of civilisations while also pursuing its critical interests. New non-state-centric diplomatic avenues will also be considered.
Chapter 3 discusses a recurring theme in Africa's economic development which is how regional economic blocs can play a more effective role in Africa's development (Mudida, 2009a). Economic integration represents an important pillar in the economic diplomacy of Africa states. In May 2019, the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement entered into force. This represented Africa's most ambitious integration attempt in recent decades aimed at encompassing the entire continent. The African Continental Free Trade Area promises great opportunities. However, Africa's success even in less ambitious regional integration initiatives in recent decades has been modest. The East African Community and the Economic Community of West African States, for example, are still struggling to achieve deeper integration. The East Community despite being a common market does yet have complete free movement of labour across its borders. This chapter examines the prospects and challenges of this new continental integration attempt. It also provides vital policy-oriented advice for African governments and policymakers as they seek to make this latest continental initiative a success.
Chapter 4 of the book deals with the emerging challenges of human rights jurisprudence in Africa focusing on the case of the International Criminal Court and how this portends a new clash of civilisations between African and Western states (Shestack, 1998). When the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court entered into force in 2002, many African states embraced this development as Africa's post-independence authoritarian regimes and intense internal conflicts of the 1990s had led to widespread violations of human rights. This court replaced the ad hoc United Nations (UN) tribunals that previously existed to deal with gross and widespread violations of human rights by a permanent treaty-based court. This chapter examines the challenges that the International Criminal Court has faced over the past 18 years with attempting to assert its jurisdiction in situations where African leaders have been indicted. These challenges have been associated with renewed debates about the high number of African leaders indicted by the International Criminal court, the sovereignty of African states, the capacity of African states to address issues of human rights violations and a perceived imposition of rights by a court perceived to be hostile to African interests. This chapter concludes by providing a way forward in the conflictual discourse on the emerging human rights jurisprudence associated with the International Criminal Court and how African states can address this emerging clash of civilisations in a way that enhances understanding and cooperation. The atrocity prevention approach to protecting human rights will also be discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 5 of the book evaluates the changing nature of Africa's conflicts and regional security architecture. The African continent has been the focus of many conflicts since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, more than half of Africa's states were embroiled in protracted conflicts. Even though many of these conflicts have since abated, many African states, particularly Horn of Africa, Central Africa and West Africa, remain fragile states with recurring conflicts. This chapter examines the changing nature of Africa's conflicts and focuses on the responses of the regional security architecture. Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of Africa's conflicts has changed from inter-state to intra-state conflicts (Hyden, 2013). Many of these intra-state conflicts have become increasingly internationalised as their effects spill across state borders and destabilise entire regions. New forms of conflict especially related to religious extremism and ethnic conflicts have also intensified in the last decade. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in Western Africa have, for example, experienced brutal jihadist insurgencies for the greater part of the last decade. Violent incidents involving jihadist groups in Africa, for example, increased by 31% in the 12 months to 30 June 2020 according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies which is part of the United States defence department. In Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso alone, 4800 people were killed in 2019. If not adequately addressed in coming years, the Sahel may become the world's biggest conflict zone. Many of Africa's conflicts have structural sources as they arise from anomalous political, economic and social structures (Mudida, 2009b). Ethnic diversity in Africa is considered to be one of the cardinal factors underlying underdevelopment (Ranis, 2012). In the last two decades since the formation of the African Union, there has been an increased focus on African solutions to African problems. This factor has prompted African regional and sub-regional organisations to play a more active role in the resolution of African conflicts. Such home-grown African solutions have, however, encountered numerous challenges ranging from inadequate finances to the lack of political will by African member states with competing interests. These challenges have, for example, been manifested in the myriad difficulties in the attempts to achieve peace in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and Burkina Faso in recent years. Conflict management approaches in Africa have often been more settlement rather than resolution-oriented. The chapter concludes with a discussion of policies that can be applied to more successfully address the emerging forms of conflicts in Africa. These policies emphasise the importance of overhauling conflict-generating structures in African states as a way to prevent both structural and physical and violence (Galtung, 1969). Protracted overt conflict in many African states often arises from deep-rooted structural violence over many decades.
Chapter 6 of the book appraises Africa's challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding. Many peace agreements have been signed to end protracted conflicts in African states over the last two decades. Examples include agreements in South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Central African Republic. These agreements aimed to end existing conflicts and to usher in a period of post-conflict peacebuilding. This chapter explores the challenges that many African states face in their post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives (Cheeseman et al., 2015). Many peace agreements do not endure as the agreements in South Sudan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo over recent years have shown. Enormous economic, security and social challenges persist leading to recurring conflicts. A vital issue to be addressed in Africa's post-conflict peacebuilding is poverty and inequality. Poverty and inequality profoundly impact the quality of life of Africa's citizens and hence Africa's overall development. Whereas Africa has made notable progress in reducing absolute poverty levels in the last two decades, these levels still remain high by global standards. According to t...