International relations (IR) scholars began to seriously discuss the international implications of China and Chinese foreign policy after China started to intensify its economic growth in the post-Cold War period. The roots of these discussions date back much further. Scholars and policy-makers discussed China’s role in the international order long before China’s opening-up reforms in 1978. Due to China’s historical legacy of being the dominant power in its own region, figures as diverse as Napoleon Bonaparte and Great Britain’s ambassador George Macartney emphasized the role of China in world politics.1
John King Fairbank’s edited book World Order: China’s Foreign Relations tries to understand China’s view of the world order from the perspective of a broad historical analysis.2 A number of other studies have examined the historical background of China’s relations with other countries as well.3
In the early period of the People’s Republic of China, it was difficult to research on the Chinese political and foreign policy issues due to its isolation from the rest of the world. Except for a few published books, there was no full-fledged analysis of China’s domestic and foreign policies.4 However, after China’s 1978 opening-up reforms, there was an increasing trend among experts on China to learn the Chinese language and access Chinese archives.5 It was thus during this period that political scientists and IR scholars first began to publish extensively on the subject.6
Although not the focus of this book, it is worth noting that it was during this period, too, that scholars began to seriously discuss China’s domestic politics and foreign policy-making process.7 According to Lampton, professionalism, specialization, and bureaucratic differentiation are significant examples that reveal the changing dynamics of Chinese foreign policy-making in the beginning of 2000s.8 Scholars have noted that several different bureaucratic entities influenced the Chinese foreign policy decision-making processes. These included, alongside the traditional role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), new state-owned corporations (SOCs) and new economy-oriented bureaucracies such as the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). For example, MOFTEC had pivotal control over nuclear, dual-use, and chemical exports. It was also responsible for handling the relationship between China and international institutions.9 Moreover, firms from the United States, the European Union (EU), Japan, and Korea began establishing partnerships with SOCs.10 As a result of these partnerships, Chinese SOCs started to prioritize their economic benefits in terms of foreign policy issues between China and these countries.
The stable transformation of China’s domestic politics and changes in leadership also affected Chinese foreign policy decision-making processes over the last two decades. From 1992 until today, China has experienced three important leadership changes. Jiang Zemin, the second-most important political figure of the post-Mao period after Deng Xiaoping, stepped aside to give power to Hu Jintao, who served as president of China between 2002 and 2012. Although there were serious political scandals during the transition to Xi Jinping’s presidency between 2012 and 2013, such as the Bo Xilai affairs, these did not significantly affect Chinese foreign policy at the time.11 Xi Jinping was elected as General Secretary by the eighteenth Central Committee of the CCP in November 2012. Then, he was formally elected as president of the PRC by the twelfth National People’s Congress in March 2013.12 Since then China has started to implement much more aggressive and assertive foreign policies than the previous period.
After the Cold War, China’s security concerns and defense strategies have changed along with the foreign policy decision-making process. For instance, in 1993, China promulgated a “New Security Concept” in a white paper defining its national defense concerns. According to this new strategy, China would prioritize three important national interests in its foreign policies: preserving territorial integrity, sustaining economic development, and attaining great power status.13 This was a message to both the United States, which was the hegemonic power in the post-Cold War international order and the international system, in which China was trying to be part of it in these years.14 In addition, China has intensified its criticism of unilateral actions by the US in international crises such as Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Kosovo. However, during the 2000s, while China’s traditional security threats—including the hegemonic threat of the United States and the threat posed by Japan and India—remained unchanged, the non-traditional threats that China outlines diversified from domestic and social problems to international terrorism.15
Economic development of China was another factor influencing both China’s foreign policy and its position in the international system. The 1978 opening-up reforms coincided with the great transformation of world economies from closed to open markets, especially with the Washington Consensus and neoliberal reforms.16 Thus, the IR literature mainly discussed the rise of China within the framework of international political economy.17 Although China’s economic transformation was similar to global transformations of other world economies, there were also differences that paved the way for a new discussion such as the “Beijing Consensus versus the Washington Consensus.”18
China’s burgeoning economic reforms engendered concrete policy implementations in both domestic and foreign economic relations. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the most significant discussions were about China’s integration into existing liberal international economic institutions despite its incomplete transformation into a market economy. SOCs and their increasing investments in both China and the outside world became the most serious confrontational issue between Western and Chinese companies, especially in emerging markets in regions like Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. China prioritized the practical benefits of daily business with these countries and sustainable mass production at home rather than the transformation of its own economic structures. As described by Chinese authorities, China was trying a different model—one which required time for full integration into international institutions. To accelerate the process, China implemented various new economic policies by establishing special economic zones (SEZs), improving the financial system via regulation, and signing free trade agreements with other countries. All these efforts gained a new momentum in the Third Plenary Session of the eighteenth Communist Party of China Central Committee in November 2013. Xi Jinping’s first economic policy implementations emphasized the importance of a market economy and private ownership.19 He also promoted the idea of economically integrating China with the outside world with a new motto: “China Dream.” Under the guidance of Xi Jinping’s new approach, China led new international initiatives such as the Silk Road Project, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),20 and the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB).21 All these initiatives were indications of China’s search for new economic activism to continue its economic growth.
One of the most serious obstacles confronting the growing Chinese economy in the last three decades is related to the country’s energy needs. These have had an enormous impact on China’s foreign policy. Indeed, China’s energy dependence is the most important reason for China’s activism in foreign policy in distant regions. China’s need for foreign energy is growing, with China surpassing the United States as the largest importer of crude oil in 2016.22 Energy-rich regions, such as the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa, have accordingly become the primary focus of China’s foreign policy. As a consequence of its energy needs, China has been obliged to become involved in regional and international crisis in these regions.23
Changing priorities and institutions have shaped China’s foreign policy along with the new security concerns and economic needs that emerged right after the Cold War. All these factors have directly affected China’s relations with great powers, immediate regional countries, and cross-regional countries.
§ 1.1 China and the great powers
China’s relations with other great powers have been another crucial topic of discussion among IR scholars. Among the great powers, the most significant relations are between China and the United States. Not only economic interdependence but also global and regional security confrontations have triggered a security dilemma between the two countries.
Since the Sino-US rapprochement in 1979, Sino-US relations continue to be plagued by a number of problems.24 The most critical example is related to the mutual perceptions of the two great powers.25 According to Burcu Sarı Karademir’s unpublished doctoral dissertation, for instance, China has started to see US’ foreign policy as the source of insecure political atmosphere in the Middle East, especially since the invasion of Iraq in 2003.26 Before the Iraq invasion, Sino-US relations had started to improve after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. China officially shared US concerns over the struggle against international terrorism throughout the world.27 Even though there are severe political problems facing Sino-US relations—such as Taiwan, the South China Sea dispute, and the devaluation of the RMB, trade dispute—they have not directly confronted in a conflict, yet.28
The Sino-Soviet rift and the Sino-US rapprochement were the most critical strategic choices made by Chinese policy-makers during the Cold War.29 Thus, it could be claimed that Sino-Russian relations entered the post-Cold War era with more historical baggage than Sino-US relations. Sino-Russian relations, however, improved more than Sino-US relations in the post-Cold War period.30 One of the important reasons for this was the common security concerns of both countries vis-à-vis US hegemony in the international order in the post-Cold War era. Rising economic and regional security concerns also urged both countries to establish the Shanghai Five, a regional cooperation organization, in 1996. Five years later, joined by Uzbekistan, it became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). From that time, this SCO has become one of the most significant regional economic and security cooperation organizations in Central Asia.31
China–EU relations are more institutionalized than those between China and the United States or Russia due to the complex institutional structure of the EU. A trade agreement signed in 1978 between the European Community (EC) and China was the breakthrough in bilateral economic relations.32 This first trade partnership developed into economic cooperation between China and the EU. The European Commission’s long-term policy adjustments, which began in 1995, helped this cooperation as well.33 Three years later, the first EU–China summit was held in Brussels and served as the basis for a more comprehensive partnership between China and the EU.34 Since 1998, a China–EU summit has been held each year. Moreover, China published an EU White Paper (China’s EU Policy Paper) for the first time in 2003.35
The EU welcomes China’s rising visibility in IR and its great power status.36 In terms of geopolitical considerations, Sino-EU relations can be thought of as an alternative to China’s relations with both Russia and the United States.37 For David Shambaugh, comprehensive Sino-EU economic and political relations are an indication of an emerging axis.38 Accordingly, both China and the EU seek ways to constrain US hegemony and its unilateral action in international crises. Apart from economic relations, the EU has started to focus on other important topics of bilateral relations, such as financial reform, the rule of law, transition to an open society, legal and administrative reform, the environment, energy, and regional inequality.39
Sino-EU relations are also related to the EU’s strategy toward Asia.40 Accordingly, the EU emphasizes various objectives in Asia such as:
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