Love disappointed in its excess, and especially love deceived by the fatality of death, has no other recourse but madness. As long as there was an object, mad love was more love than madness; left to itself, it pursues itself in the void of delirium.
I will have you with me
In my arms only
For you are only
My love, my love, my love.
The outside world beyond the lovers is finally and irrevocably blocked out, leaving them with nothing but themselves silently and luminously together in each otherâs arms as Juliet rocks herself and her beloved to everlasting sleep, âa death in which the lovers will never be separated againâ (Foucault 30).
The powerful final image of the dead lovers illuminating an otherwise darkened Globe Theatre embodies the iconicity that the play and its protagonists have reached as the quintessential Western dramatisation of romantic love, even beyond the Shakespearean canon. Romeo and Juliet has been called âthe normative love story of our timeâ (Garber, Modern Culture 34), âthe absolute embodiment, the tragic paradigm, of romantic loveâ (McMullan xvi) and âthe most famous story of doomed young love ever writtenâ (Weis 1), a reputation demonstrated not only in critical readings of the play but also in its pop-cultural legacy. John Maddenâs 1998 film Shakespeare in Love exemplarily posits Romeo and Juliet as the answer to the underlying question of the filmâs plot: âCan a play show us the very truth and nature of love?â (59:12â23 min) Shakespeare in Love in no uncertain terms suggests that âYes, Romeo and Juliet is the play that canâ. The young and struggling playwright Will Shakespeare falls head over heels in love with the beautiful noble lady (and part-time actress) Viola de Lesseps. Their secret affair hence inspires him to write his romantic masterpiece Romeo and Juliet, an original rather than adapted work, contrary to literary history. In its premiere performance at the climax of the film, the play â against all odds â proves so affectively powerful that even Judi Denchâs steely Elizabeth I deems it a convincing representation of true love. The performance of emotion by Will and Viola in the title roles, the film suggests, is so genuine and heart-felt that spectators, both on- and off-screen, cannot help but be affected by it themselves. What is it, then, that makes the dramatisation of love in Romeo and Juliet so affectively captivating even 400 years after its creation? If the love between Shakespeareâs protagonists is so ungraspable that âno words can that woe soundâ (3.2.126),1 why do these woes nevertheless hold such a powerful emotional grasp over us four centuries later?
To answer this question, this book reassesses the play and its representation of affect and emotion, particularly love, in light of a recent critical development that has pushed affectivity and its semiotic intelligibility to the discursive forefront of the Humanities: the so-called turn to affect, or âaffective turnâ. Starting in the mid-1990s, the affective turn has caused a renewed and ongoing interest in diverse notions of affectivity as non-cognitive, embodied phenomena (Gregg and Seigworth 1â25). According to Patricia Clough, âthe turn to affect and emotion extended discussions about culture, subjectivity, identities, and bodies begun in critical theory under the influence of post-structuralism and deconstructionâ (206). It particularly constituted a âmove from a strictly constructivist account of the body as a material substratum of ensuing social inscription to a more refined exploration of the âmatteringâ of the body whereby agency emerges as a dynamic forceâ (Athanasiou et al. 8). Rather than continuing the psychologised sense of emotion as an internal experience that took hold at the beginning of the 19th century, this critical development emphasised affective phenomena as inter-relational constellations of bodily intensities that blur epistemological distinctions between outwardness and inwardness and challenge conventional thinking about emotional intentionalism.
One of the fundamental paradigms of the affective turn â and also one of its most fiercely contested premises since â has been what Ruth Leys calls âthe belief that affect is independent of signification and meaningâ (315). Many affect theorists, including figureheads like Brian Massumi, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Adam Frank, whose writings marked âwatershed moment[s]â (Gregg and Seigworth 5â6) in the rise of affect theory, have argued for a categorical distinction between affect and emotion, variously proclaiming affects to be virtual, pre-personal intensities (Massumi 96) or evolutionarily conditioned, non-intentional hardwires (Gregg and Seigworth 6) that differ from emotions as actualised and semiotically fixated entities. Others have vigorously rejected this premise, arguing that theorists who place affect outside of social meaning-making not only misconstrue scientific data (Papoulias and Calllard 47) but also effectively reinforce the very dichotomies that they self-professedly intend to deconstruct, especially the Cartesian dualism between body and mind (Leys 341, see also Hemmings 563â565). As Benedict Robinson remarks,
[t]he irony of a theory that seeks to undermine mind/body dualism by embracing a radically embodied concept of affect is that this radically embodied concept is the product of mind/body dualism, not an alternative to it.
(123)
This issue pertains not only to the discussion of âreal-lifeâ affective phenomena within Social Sciences and Cultural Studies, however, but also to the representation of affective experiences in artistic works, including literature, which has gained increasing traction in both Literary Studies at large and Shakespeare and Early Modern Studies in particular.2 As Eu-genie Brinkema cautions in her aptly titled study The Forms of the Affects:
Affect is not the place where something immediate and automatic and resistant takes place outside of language. The turning to affect in the humanities does not obliterate the problem of form and representation. Affect is not where reading is no longer needed.
(xiv)
The question in what ways the seeming ineffability of affect takes aesthetic form lies at the very heart of Shakespeareâs Romeo and Juliet. Not only is it a play which, as Jill Levenson observes in the Oxford Shakespeare, âwas, and still is, famous for its affectâ (âIntroductionâ 15), but also a play which thoroughly examines the expressibility of affect from the perspective of two lovers whose connection to the world in which they live lessens as their amorous connection to one another strengthens. In that regard, Shakespeareâs 16th-century play strikingly anticipates the 20th- and 21st-century debate on affect as a (pre-)discursive phenomenon. This book follows Brinkema in conceiving affective experiences, especially love, not as being outside of or beyond artistic form, but rather as being performatively constructed in and brought forth by various artistic forms. The alleged unspeakability of love in Romeo and Juliet thereby moves to the centre of my critical attention. Is the passionate love between Shakespeareâs young protagonists truly a rapture so pure that its seemingly only words are tears â âsi pure extase que ses paroles sont des pleursâ â as the libretto to Hector Berliozâs dramatic symphony RomĂ©o et Juliette so poignantly suggests (RomĂ©o 43)?3 Or is it rather an affective relation which despite all its ineffability nevertheless has found articulate expression in different artistic âlanguagesâ, like drama, music, and dance? To answer this overarching question, I do not seek to simply re-state the acclaimed affectivity of Romeo and Juliet. Instead, I take cues from affect theory to formulate a transmedial model of love that specifically adheres to the story of the star-crossed lovers from Verona. This model, I argue, becomes manifest as a constitutive structure in Shakespeareâs use of poetic language especially when we read the text âpreposterouslyâ with and through the perspective of non-verbal adaptations of the play: since âart works from the past will be perceived and interpreted differently if they are seen through the lens of their later recyclings and refigurationsâ (Bronfen 7), in what ways has the chronologically posterior afterlife of Shakespeareâs Romeo and Juliet in music and dance inscribed itself into our understanding of the anterior early modern play?
This book therefore analyses and compares both verbal and non-verbal renditions of the famous story to explore the extent to which the love of Romeo and Juliet is in fact bound by or âbeyondâ verbal language, as the characters proclaim. I interrogate Levensonâs notion that the play is still âfamous for its affectâ from the literary perspective of Shakespeareâs text â itself an adaptation of earlier narrative material â as well as from the perspective of non-literary adaptations of that very text. Instead of ascribing to Shakespeareâs lovers a pre-discursive interiority which is then externalised expressively â a prominent idea in the romantic reception of Shakespeare â this book seeks to enquire how the idea of such âboundlessâ (2.1.176) and unspeakable interiority is artistically constructed in the first place. As David Schalkwyk has recently noted, âEarly modern and classical writers ⊠offer no united front on the relation of love to desire or on the nature of love as passionâ (Language 215), and neither is there a âsingle theory or view of love in his [Shakespeareâs] plays and poemsâ (Language 11). This book reads Shakespeareâs play and a selection of its adaptations in light of affect theory in order to derive a concept of love from these works, rather than enforcing any pre-conceived notion of love onto them. Such a concept marks a first important step on the way towards a still-lacking transmedial theory of âShakespearean loveâ, in Romeo and Juliet and beyond.
1.2. Affective Movements and Practices
As appealing as affect theory has proven to cultural critics over the last 25 years, as much does it still lack conceptual and methodological consensus, particularly concerning the questions of how to define affect in itself and how to theorise its relation to the affiliated term âemotionâ:
There is no single, generalizable theory of affect: not yet, and (thankfully) there never will be. If anything, it is more tempting to imagine that there can only ever be infinitely multiple iterations of affect and theories of affect.
(Gregg and Seigworth 4; see also Thrift 175)
The term âaffect theoryâ does not denote a unified, cohesive string of theory, but rather an umbrella term that encompasses various, at times highly contradictory ide...