Selling De-Radicalisation

Managing the Media Framing of Countering Violent Extremism

Gordon Clubb, Daniel Koehler, Jonatan Schewe, Ryan O'Connor

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000413151
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines how de-radicalisation programmes have been portrayed in the media and details the role of public relations (PR) strategies employed by such programmes and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) to create positive coverage of their work.

CVE and de-radicalisation programmes have seen a significant rise in recent years and are now cornerstones of many countries' counterterrorism strategies. Despite the increased importance of these tools to counter violent radicalisation leading to terrorism, they remain controversial and sometimes receive fierce public criticism and opposition. This work looks at how CVE and de-radicalisation programs are able to influence a country's discourse on de-radicalisation, and how far governmental programs differ from non-governmental initiatives in terms of their PR strategies. The book also provides a theoretical basis of how the discourse on CVE is constructed in the media. As major case studies, this book examines the United Kingdom, Germany and Nigeria. For these countries, the authors have gathered and assessed roughly 3,000 newspaper articles on de-radicalisation programmes over a decade to provide an empirical base.

This book will be of much interest to students of countering violent extremism, de-radicalisation, and terrorism studies.

1 Conceptualising de-radicalisation programmes

The premise of the book is that there is something of value to be gained by understanding de-radicalisation beyond what occurs at the programme and individual trajectory levels – in this case, the media’s framing of de-radicalisation and its construction within society. One of the main contentions of the book is that the media’s framing of de-radicalisation is shaped by the nature of the concept itself; therefore, the purpose of Chapter 1 is to unpack de-radicalisation. The chapter sets what de-radicalisation is conceptually, engaging with key definitional debates in the literature and arguing that de-radicalisation distinctly refers to interventions in the post-criminal space. Furthermore, it advances an understanding of de-radicalisation as a form of brand, as distinct from the activities and outcomes associated with the group and individual processes of de-radicalisation. Our aim in this chapter is to make a substantial contribution to the various calls for a deeper conceptualisation of de-radicalisation and de-radicalisation programmes.

While we examine de-radicalisation beyond the programmatic and individual levels, there is an existing body of literature which has quite extensively examined the discourse of counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation policies. Research under the umbrella of CTS has looked extensively at the discourse of counter-radicalisation policies; however, the book differs from this literature’s implicit normative assumptions on de-radicalisation and its focus on state power. In other words, we do not pre-judge de-radicalisation to be fundamentally always ‘bad’ or an expression of malign government power – although, clearly, in some cases it can be (e.g. the Chinese government’s concentration camps under the guise of de-radicalisation) – instead, we remain more open to the prospect that some manifestations of de-radicalisation can be normatively worthwhile in themselves. The book contributes to understanding what this manifestation may look like, specifically whether the term and concept of de-radicalisation are productive to the normative goal of rehabilitation over punishment, for example. To that end, the book considers ‘policy recommendations’ for practitioners, specifically on how should programmes frame their interventions. The following chapter sets out these literatures and how the book seeks to build upon and contribute to them.

Defining de-radicalisation: academic and policy perspectives

In the last 10 years, de-radicalisation programmes have proliferated across the world as a potential measure to counter and prevent terrorism.¹ Horgan and Taylor, for example, list ‘rehabilitation’, ‘reform’, ‘counselling’, ‘reconciliation’, ‘amnesty’, ‘demobilisation’, ‘disbandment’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘deprogramming’,² and Koehler added ‘reintegration’, ‘re-education’, ‘desistance’ (primary, secondary and tertiary), ‘disaffiliation’, and ‘debiasing’.³ All these terms roughly describe a similar process of turning from a position of perceived deviance or conflict with the surrounding environment and its mainstream centre value system towards moderation and equilibrium. This process can take numerous different forms, for example, voluntary or involuntary; permanent or temporary; individual or collective; and psychological or physical.⁴

It is obvious that all these concepts and terms describe a psychological and physical process essentially measured by an individual’s or a group’s degree of alignment with or opposition to the legal, ideological or moral views of the surrounding majority (or mainstream) environment. Hence, de-radicalisation and its competing concepts have to be understood as terms expressing a societal negotiation between a community and perceived deviants which aim to reduce conflict. Most of these concepts and terms (including de-radicalisation) imply that the source for the conflict lies with the ‘deviant’ other, who must be somehow aligned with the position of the mainstream majority, assuming that an increased alignment automatically reduces conflict. This in turn feeds into an ethical dilemma inherent to de-radicalisation (see later).

Looking at some definitions by leading academic experts, the main difference between de-radicalisation and disengagement is the focus on ideology or, more precisely, the psychological side of exiting a violent extremist milieu. Horgan and Braddock, for example, define disengagement as:

the process whereby an individual experiences a change in role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation. It may not necessarily involve leaving the movement, but is most frequently associated with significant temporary or permanent role change. Additionally, while disengagement may stem from role change, that role change may be influenced by psychological factors such as disillusionment, burnout or the failure to reach the expectations that influenced initial involvement. This can lead to a member seeking out a different role within the movement.⁵

And de-radicalisation as:

the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. De-radicalization may also refer to any initiative that tries to achieve a reduction of risk of re-offending through addressing the specific and relevant disengagement issues.⁶

More specifically, Braddock points out that de-radicalisation is a ‘psychological process through which an individual abandons his [or her] extremist ideology and is theoretically rendered a decreased threat for re-engaging in terrorism’.⁷

Hence, at first glance, the main difference between disengagement and de-radicalisation, according to this view, is whether reduction of the ideological commitment (de-radicalisation) or physical role change and desistance from illegal behaviour (disengagement) is the main focus of the process. However, it is more complex than that. Horgan, for example, notes that even if psychologically reducing commitment to a violent extremist group is the goal, de-radicalisation (i.e. reduction in ideological commitment) does not have to be part of the process and might not even be a likely outcome.⁸ Using the term ‘psychological disengagement’ as synonymous with ‘de-radicalisation’,⁹ he found that in his large sample of interviews with former terrorists, collected between 2006 and 2008, ‘almost all could be described as disengaged, the vast majority of them could not be said to be “deradicalized” ’.¹⁰ In this differentiation between disengagement and de-radicalisation, another term, ‘ideology’, again plays a significant role. To complicate this even further, ideology and its role in entering as well as leaving extremist milieus have essentially divided the discourse specifically on de-radicalisation into a ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ school,¹¹ with the first aiming to achieve rejection of ideological change pertaining to violence and the latter including various other ideological aspects as well. While, furthermore, it has been argued that disengagement, that is, the mere physical role change and desistance from crime, would be more feasible and realistic,¹² other scholars have pointed out that in order to reduce recidivism of extremist offenders, it is necessary to address ‘beliefs and attitudes that drive violent behavior’.¹³ However, beliefs, attitudes and factors of attraction might overlap with the milieu’s ideology, but they do not have to be entirely equal. Other parts of the collective identity or oppositional culture within the extremist environment can also provide a pull factor. In that sense, ‘ideology’ is better understood as a dynamic set of political values and ideals, which is constantly renegotiated between the individual and the collective, albeit to a differing degree of involvement from both sides.

It is important to note here that the term de-radicalisation has been used to describe both, the process of exiting an extremist environment on the one side and the wider practical activity by programmes or mentors on the other. Practitioners in the field tend not to distinguish between the role of ideology in the exit process when describing their activities, but rather see every form of assisted departure from an extremist milieu and reintegration into a non-extremist life as ‘de-radicalisation’ to a certain degree. Bringing together the terminology of the wider academic de-radicalisation discourse at this point, the different forms of exiting can be defined according to the degree of ideological removal (from the weakest to the strongest): physical disengagement, psychological disengagement or de-radicalisation (narrow) and de-radicalisation (broad).

Shifting the focus to de-radicalisation as a practical activity, another set of terms and concepts has entered the discourse. One common classification used in connection to de-radicalisation is the trifold prevention matrix from Caplan being rooted in clinical psychiatry and dubbed the ‘Public Health Model’.¹⁴ ‘Primary’ prevention in this matrix aims to prevent a deviant behaviour from occurring in a non-infected system. ‘Secondary’ prevention aims to avert its solidification, when it is already present, and ‘tertiary’ prevention, in consequence, aims to prevent this element from reoccurring in the future. As intended by Caplan, every intervention in tertiary prevention essentially aims to prevent recidivism. This mechanism was echoed when de-radicalisation as a practical activity was defined around the reduction of risk for terrorist recidivism.¹⁵ In this context, academics and practitioners have seen de-radicalisation activities as tertiary prevention.¹⁶ Objection to that framework was, for example, raised by Koehler, who argued that preventing recidivism is just one necessary (and later) part of de-radicalisation, which must reduce individual physical and psychological commitment to the extremist group and ideology in the first place.¹⁷

Next to these aforementioned classifications from mental health and disease control, attempts to counter violent radicalisation processes have been commonly referred to as ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE) programmes.¹⁸ These are usually understood to be preventative in nature and to be ‘an approach intended to preclude individuals from engaging in, or materially supporting, ideologically motivated violence’.¹⁹ It would be more accurate, however, to see CVE as the umbrella category under which prevention-oriented initiatives (i.e. before a person radicalises to the point of using violence) and intervention-oriented initiatives (i.e. de-radicalisation and disengagement of persons who are already radicalised to the point of using violence) are subsumed. The first is commonly referred to as ‘counter-radicalisation’ or ‘preventing violent extremism’ (PVE) programmes and the latter as de-radicalisation, rehabilitation or reintegration programmes.

Naturally, there is no clear distinction between prevention- or intervention-oriented methods and programmes in practice; radicalisation processes are not linear but are dynamic. Hence, whether or not a person is yet ‘radical enough’ for de-radicalisation is mostly impossible and even futile to answer, which is why most practitioners do not differentiate as clearly the different terms and concepts as the academic discourse might suggest. Case managers or mentors who are in touch with the client, participant or beneficiary have to decide on a case-by-case basis which tools and methods to choose. In reality, prevention- and intervention-oriented tools form a methods-blend that aims to achieve effects on all levels: preventing further radicalisation, dec...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Conceptualising de-radicalisation programmes
• 2 Theorising the media’s framing of de-radicalisation
• 3 The effectiveness and desirability of de-radicalisation
• 4 Nigeria and de-radicalising its “repentant citizens”
• 5 UK and de-radicalisation’s ideational tensions
• 6 German media debates and framing processes in a hybridised P/CVE landscape
• 7 Public relations campaigns, de-radicalisation and the P/CVE field: negotiating a discourse
• Conclusion
• Index