1.1 EU development policy revisited
The European Union (EU), often characterised as the world’s largest donor, wields significant power in international development due to the size of its development cooperation budget and its role as a coordinating actor of the member states’ development policies. To reach its ambition of ‘leaving no one behind’ the EU has founded its development policy on respect for and protection of human rights (EU Council, 2014). This commitment to a rights-based approach to development follows from the founding principles of the EU: respect for human rights, democracy, good governance and the rule of law. These principles constitute the backbone of the Union’s foreign policy as well as its development policy (Beke, D’Hollander, Hachez, & Pérez de las Heras, 2014; Broberg, 2013; Sjursen, 2017). This commitment to human rights is not particular to the EU, many states regard human rights as a central component of their foreign policy. Yet, some scholars highlight that the EU’s human rights commitments make it a distinctive development actor: ‘Something akin to a “European” vision and approach has been emerging. Even within the so-called “western” donor landscape, the EU has increasingly differentiated itself’ (Orbie et al., 2017, p. 505).
While the commitment to respect and promote human rights in its development policy seems undeniable, the EU’s attempts to use its development policy to enforce compliance with human rights have prompted criticisms of arbitrariness and imbalance. Critiques of the Union’s approach have come mainly from two camps. Many scholars argue that the EU is acting in an inconsistent manner, and only takes its human rights commitments seriously when this does not involve costs. In other words, the EU’s various economic and security interests, combined with domestic political power-plays, account for its fragmented application of human rights policies (Claeys, 2004; Crawford, 2001; Crawford & Kacarska, 2019; Emmanuel, 2010; Hackenesch, 2015; Molenaers, Dellepiane & Faust, 2015; Smith, 2014; Youngs, 2010; Zimelis, 2011). Another group of scholars rejects the EU’s rights-based approach altogether. Relying on post-colonial perspectives these scholars argue that human rights policies are intrinsically embedded in asymmetrical power structures that create problematic processes of ‘othering’ and marginalisation of groups. Therefore, they cause more harm than good and should be abandoned (Hansen & Jonsson, 2014; Langan, 2018; Rutazibwa, 2010; Staeger, 2016).
This book defends an alternative account of the EU’s rights-based approach to development. While I do not fully reject these literatures’ critical objections, I argue that we need a more nuanced critique and a better explanation of this key area of the Union’s foreign policy.
First, I present a novel critique of the EU’s rights-based approach. I question the post-colonial position that development policy as a tool to enforce compliance with human rights, by default, equals domination (Mutua, 2001). I rely on theories of global justice to spell out a normative defence of rights-based development policies. Specifically, I rely on the argument that, in order for rights-based development policies to be justified, the beneficiaries’ individual autonomy and participation must be secured. However, I also find that, on the criteria of autonomy, the EU’s rights-based approach falls short. I rely on the examples of country ownership and multi-stakeholder arrangements to argue that the EU constructs and upholds a political ‘partnership’ that denies its partners individual autonomy and participation. For instance, the EU’s interpretation of the country ownership principle reflects an understanding of strengthened EU-to-recipient government relations and falls short of a democratic understanding of the ownership principle. Another example is human rights arbitration between the EU and its partners in the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS/ACP)1 which is restricted to executive actors. The EU’s approach contributes to reinforce executive dominance more than advance a partnership that enhances individuals’ right to participation and autonomy.
Second, I question the meaningfulness of operating with consistency as the sole criterion for assessing the EU’s rights-based approach. Inconsistencies are not automatically evidence of arbitrary decisions but may be meaningful and justified with reference to other human rights duties or concerns. Therefore, instead of a stringent focus on inconsistency, I argue for investigating whether the EU engages in a meaningful coherence. Building on Dworkin’s (2011) argument that human rights are interpretative, I assume that reasonable disagreement exists about the duties they create. While human rights principles can operate as neutral and universal standards that are valid for all individuals, they need to be applied, interpreted and specified in particular contexts (Günther, 1993). In addition, other concerns and principles might propose conflicting duties or what I label ‘norm collisions’, something that warrants adjustment of standard procedures and allowing for different solutions. Notwithstanding their validity, human rights principles are only prima facie candidates for application. Then, while different reactions might be evidence of inconsistency, strictly speaking, these reaction patterns might also be meaningful and justified. Accordingly, operating with a standard of meaningful coherence as well as bringing in new empirical case studies, the book brings some novel insights. Existing literature has operated with a biased set of cases, leading them to over-emphasise interest-based explanations of EU development policy. To fully account for the EU’s rights-based approach to development, we need to factor in its discourses of interpretation and application of human rights obligations.
I make these arguments through an engagement with the political relations between EU and its partners in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The book takes a unique approach to the study of EU development policy. The objective is to make a critical analysis of the EU’s commitment to a rights-based approach as well as to provide a novel account of the EU’s development policy. I ask: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the EU’s rights-based development policy? Why does the EU apply differentiated responses to human rights violations in partner states? In answering these questions, I argue for a revisitation of our current understanding of the EU’s development policy as well as the need for a novel explanation of why the EU sometimes avoids using aid suspensions as a means to enforce human rights in partner states.
But why should we care about the EU’s aim to make human rights part and parcel of its development policy? And why do we need yet another study on this area of the EU’s external policies? Political scientists have devoted considerable energy to evaluating the EU’s human rights policies. Contestation of the EU’s approach seems to suggest that the essence of what is wrong with the EU’s policy is political domination – the arbitrary interference by others. That being either by treating partners arbitrarily or as a result of neo-colonial intervention. These various critiques of the EU’s rights-based approach rightly point to the fact that power imparity make aid relationships particularly vulnerable to dominating practices. Basically, its contestants hold that the EU’s policies are unjust. If, indeed, this is the core of the problem, we need to engage further with the puzzle of how such domination could be reversed or avoided altogether.
Post-colonial scholars have suggested that less international involvement might be the way to reduce domination, in particular in North–South relations (Rutazibwa, 2010). However, there is also a vast philosophical literature on global political justice which spells out different conceptions of how international involvement between states and international organisations is possible to achieve in a non-dominating manner. This resource remains untapped in international relations in general, and EU–Africa relations in particular. In this book I rely on global justice theory to make a critical and novel analysis of the EU’s rights-based development policy. Hence, the explicit engagement with different conceptions of global justice will enable me to both characterise dominating practices and engage with the puzzle of how to right the weaknesses of the EU’s rights-based approach.
1.2 A global political justice approach
To take our knowledge forward I propose to engage with theories that spell out conditions for what a just and fair development policy could look like. I derive a set of conditions from the philosophical global justice literature which will serve as ideal-typical standards for analysing the EU’s policies.
Justice is a contested concept, especially for inter-state relations at the global level. Theories of global justice provide the benefit of explicitly stating strengths and weaknesses of different concepts of justice. Strong states and respect for the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention come with the benefit of democratic ownership of global policies. However, it may prove insufficient in ensuring that human rights are respected. Examples like state-driven genocide and ethnic cleansing illustrate that states do not always protect and realise human rights for their inhabitants. What is often referred to as a cosmopolitan concept of global justice, on the other hand, may prove more effective in realising individuals’ human rights as it allows for human rights protection to trump the principle of sovereignty. However, the concern for strengthening individuals’ ability to realise their rights might also face criticism. Although human rights are principles that ‘no one can reasonably reject’ (Eriksen, 2016, p. 17), a strong and supranational human rights regime may be contested from several angles. On democratic grounds one could raise the objection that the intervenors are not democratically elected by the citizens whose human rights have been violated. Thereby, these citizens and their states are deprived of their right to exercise sovereignty. For neo-colonial scholars, what is more problematic is that universal human rights principles can be used to justify measures to protect individuals from harm, without these individuals being consulted. As a result, these measures might be against their will and result in charges of paternalistic intervention (Staeger, 2016).
Engaging with different conceptions of global justice adds critical value to our understanding of the EU’s role in global development by specifying ideal-typical standards for how a rights-based development policy could reduce domination. With these explicit standards spelled out, it is possible to analyse and...
