Intelligence Analysis in the Digital Age

Stig Stenslie, Lars Haugom, Brigt H. Vaage, Stig Stenslie, Lars Haugom, Brigt H. Vaage

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000426618
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Geheimdienst & Spionage

This book examines intelligence analysis in the digital age and demonstrates how intelligence has entered a new era.

While intelligence is an ancient activity, the digital age is a relatively new phenomenon. This volume uses the concept of the "digital age" tohighlight the increased change, complexity, and pace of information that is now circulated, as new technology has reduced the time it takes to spread news to almost nothing. These factors mean that decision-makers face an increasingly challenging threat environment, which in turn increases the demand for timely, relevant, and reliable intelligence to support policymaking. In this context, the book demonstrates that intelligence places greater demands on analysis work, as the traditional intelligence cycle is no longer adequate as a process description. In the digital age, it is not enough to accumulate as much information as possible to gain a better understanding of the world. To meet customers' needs, the intelligence process must be centred around the analysis work – which in turn has increased the demand for analysts. Assessments, not least predictions, are now just as important as revealing someone else's secrets.

This volume will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, security studies, and international relations.

1
Introduction

An old activity in a new age

Stig Stenslie, Lars Haugom, and Brigt Harr Vaage

Princes and warlords from all cultures have at all times relied on intelligence to achieve their goals. Intelligence is even referred to as “the world’s second oldest profession”.¹ In the Old Testament, we can read that Moses sent 12 spies to explore Canaan, the land that God had promised the Israelites. Hieroglyphs from ancient Egypt, the land the Israelites escaped from, testify that the pharaohs had their own organised intelligence service, known as “the king’s ears”. The Greeks and Romans also had their well-developed network of spies. In ancient texts written by Indian and Chinese military strategists, like Chanakya and Sun-Tzu, the importance of intelligence in order to get an advantage over one’s opponent is emphasised. Japanese rulers are said to have used the legendary ninjas to gather intelligence. And in South America, the Aztec rulers used so-called pochtecas, traders with diplomatic immunity, as spies.²

Unveiling what others want to keep hidden and then exploiting this knowledge to one’s own advantage have over the centuries been central to intelligence. And because intelligence is conducted at all times in all forms of organised societies, this activity must be understood in light of the societal context in which it operates. As the external circumstances change, the way intelligence is conducted also changes.

The starting point for this book, Intelligence Analysis in the Digital Age, is that intelligence in general and intelligence analysis in particular have entered a new era. While intelligence is an ancient activity, the digital age is a relatively new phenomenon. The speed, huge volume, and complexity of information are its foremost characteristics. New technology has reduced the time it takes to spread news to about zero, and we are now getting to know about every small event even in the most distant little place almost before it has happened. The book’s title emphasises the importance of technology for the pursuit and understanding of intelligence. But the book is not about technology, new collection methods, or the need for more advanced IT systems – although each of these subjects is discussed. Rather, the book employs the concept digital age as the expression of an increased pace of change, complexity, and speed of information. These factors, in turn, affect decision-makers’ demands for intelligence in support of policymaking. The message of this book is that good and efficient intelligence places greater demands on the analysis work than ever before. Assessments, not least predictions, are as important as revealing someone else’s secrets.

How to work with intelligence analysis in the digital age? What kind of questions will customers have answers to? What methods and tools can an analyst rely on, and what are their possibilities and limitations? How to warn of today’s subtle threats? How to capture the attention of busy decision-makers? What specific challenges are associated with politicisation and ethics in the digital age? These are among the questions that will be discussed, and hopefully answered, in this book.

We hope this book will be a useful contribution to preparing today’s and tomorrow’s analysts for the challenges that lie ahead.

Intelligence analysis

The type of “intelligence” we write about in this book is a state-driven activity. The knowledge this activity generates is intended to give decision-makers the best possible basis for making decisions. Taking the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) as an example, its vision is “to contribute to the decision-making basis of the Norwegian authorities with timely, reliable, and relevant knowledge of the world around us”.³ Knowledge is power, not at least in intergovernmental relations. Michael Herman points out that intelligence is a type of power that states possess, that is, “intelligence power”.⁴ Intelligence is typically directed at matters affecting the security of the state,⁵ and a key task for intelligence analysts is to alert key political, civilian, and military decision-makers to potential threats – for example, other countries’ military power, terrorism, or cyberattacks. While international law, to a lesser degree, regulates intelligence, the framework for this activity in Western democratic countries such as Norway is regulated by national law. The NIS’s task is specified in the Act on the Intelligence Service of 1998, § 3:

The Norwegian Intelligence Service shall procure, process and analyse information regarding Norwegian interests viewed in relation to foreign states, organizations or private individuals, and in this context prepare threat analyses and intelligence assessments to the extent that this may help to safeguard important national interests.⁶

To achieve and maintain relative intelligence power, the activity is carried out under cover. In particular, the sources and methods of information collection are kept secret. Intelligence is therefore associated with secrecy. Michael Warner even goes so far as to claim that “no secrets, no intelligence”.⁷ The fact that the intelligence activity is hidden distinguishes it from research and journalism, two activities that it otherwise has much in common with.

Although intelligence is closely linked to various forms of hidden information collection, it does not mean that the activity can be reduced to a question of collection methods alone. According to Sherman Kent, the late history professor at Yale University, who is often referred to as the “father of intelligence studies”, the concept of intelligence is used interchangeably with the associated organisation, the activity, and the knowledge generated.⁸ The term can thus refer to information and knowledge: “What kind of intelligence do we have on Iran’s missile programme?” Or it may refer to the organisation: “The intelligence considers it likely that Iran will develop a nuclear programme.” Or it may refer to the activity: “How extensive is the intelligence that foreign powers carry out in Norway?”

Info box 1.1 Intelligence-collection disciplines

It is common to distinguish between human-based collection (HUMINT) and technical collection. HUMINT refers to information obtained through interaction with human sources. Technical collection is a collective term that refers to information acquired through the use of various technical sources – such as a radar or images taken from a satellite. This type of collection includes signal intelligence (SIGINT), image intelligence (IMINT), acoustic intelligence (ACINT), radar intelligence (RADINT), geographic intelligence (GEOINT), and open-source intelligence (OSINT).⁹ Today, an increasing share of an intelligence service’s information comes from open sources (the Internet, media reports, private intelligence organisations, research publications, etc.). Another increasingly important source of information is social media collection (SOCMINT).¹⁰

Based on Kent’s insights formulated as early as 1949, it is still common to illustrate intelligence as a continuous step-by-step production process. This also applies to the Norwegian Defence Intelligence Doctrine of 2013, according to which the production process is divided into four distinct sub-stages.¹¹

The first step is “direction”. The intelligence service receives intelligence requirements from decision-makers, referred to as customers in this book, as part of an ongoing intelligence dialogue with them. The various intelligence needs are prioritised, and production and collection plans are developed. The second step is “collection”, which involves gathering and processing data. Collection includes inputs from various intelligence-gathering disciplines. The third step is “processing”, where data are systematised, analysed, and summarised into products. The products use words of estimative probability that help the customers assess the validity of the conclusions drawn. The fourth step is “dissemination”, where the product is communicated to the customer in a suitable form and where it is ensured as far as possible that the content is understood correctly. The product often generates new intelligence needs, and the cycle restarts (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 The Intelligence Cycle

Three assumptions can be identified in the traditional intelligence cycle: firstly that it is useful to distinguish between the various functional components of the process, such as collection and analysis; secondly that the components are sequential; and thirdly that they can be shaped into a cycle through the feedbacks of customers, which in turn dictates future needs. This cyclical model is still used in intelligence doctrines and basic military education.

The digital age

In 1989, Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web. The foundations of the digital age, also known as the information age, had been laid years earlier with the invention of internet technology and the rise of home computers. But it was the introduction of the World Wide Web that allowed information to flow freer and more quickly than ever in human history.¹² This important innovation led to the fall of age-old obstacles to human interaction, such as geography, language, and restricted information.¹³ In 2005, the global internet population reached 1 billion.¹⁴ By 2012, over 2 billion people used the Internet. By 2016, half of the world’s population was connected, and as of 2021 that number had risen to almost two-thirds.¹⁵

Information is flowing faster and faster – a trend that seriously accelerated in the 2000s with the introduction of social media channels such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram – and humanity is accumulating an incredible amount of information. Eric Schmidt, Google founder, points to the long historical lines in an attempt to illustrate this development:

There was 5 exabytes of information created between the dawn of civilization through 2003, but that much information is now created every 2 days, and the pace is increasing.¹⁶

As a result of this, “information overload” has become a hallmark of the digital age. The term is used to describe how difficult it is to understand a problem and effectively make decisions when one has too much information. Such situations occur when the amount of information exceeds the ability to process it and both individuals and organisations have limited processing capacity.¹⁷ The topic was discussed already in the nineteenth century by the German sociologist Georg Simmel,¹⁸ while the term itself was popularised by Alvin Toffler in his bestselling book Future Shock in 1970.¹⁹ None of them could have foreseen the actuality this topic would get in the digital age, when the rapidly growing volume of easily accessible information arguably makes it increasingly difficult to make decisions.²⁰

Nowadays, everybody can access all kinds of information with just a few clicks through Google and Wikipedia – a development that has led some to proclaim the “death of the expert”.²¹ Of course, there will still be experts – those with more knowledge than other people in individual fields – doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other specialists. But the point is that there are good reasons to believe that easy access to information will gradually weaken people’s recognition of expertise. Today, anyone can search for information and become an “expert”. “But doctor, I googled it!” is a phrase often heard in consultations – a challenge to any medical expert.²²

The spread of so-called fake news makes it even more complicated to navigate the ocean of information. False information, spread with the goal of confusing and influencing, is far from a new ph...