Mapping Arctic Paradiplomacy

Limits and Opportunities for Sub-National Actors in Arctic Governance

Mathieu Landriault, Jean-François Payette, Stéphane Roussel, Mathieu Landriault, Jean-François Payette, Stéphane Roussel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN:
  9780367674250
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000397659
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book analyses the possibilities and limitations that sub-national actors face when developing diplomatic activities in the Arctic region.

Sub-national actors, such as civil society groups and sub-national governments or administrations, have been active in international relations for decades. They face specific political and economic limitations on the international scene as non-sovereign entities. This book investigates how these actors have developed their international presence in the Arctic region. It analyzes the diplomatic activities of states, provinces, regional administrations, and multilateral forums made of sub-national governments to offer comparative insights on the strategies, interests, and activities of sub-national governments. Alaska, Scotland, Quebec, Yakutsk, and Indigenous People's organizations are among the examples covered in this book that have forged bilateral and multilateral relations to promote and defend their interests and values. Moreover, sovereign states are often using these sub-national actors to further their own interests, as exemplified in this book in how Russia and China harnessed the potential of sub-national governments to align with their Arctic policies.

The volume will be useful to academics and graduate students of Arctic politics, international relations, comparative politics, comparative federalism, foreign policy, and global governance.

1 Nordicity and Québec’s Arctic paradiplomacy

Jean-François Payette and Stéphane Roussel¹

DOI: 10.4324/9781003131311-1

Winter, snow, and cold are the elements that distinguish the population of Québec and that of Canada as a whole from most of the rest of the planet: only a handful of other countries and some regions of the far North, not to mention Antarctica, can claim familiarity with such a bitter climate. These geographical elements form the basis of nordicity, a concept whose social and cultural manifestations are expressed in the Nordic or Arctic character.

Although not always explicitly recognized, Canada’s Nordic or Arctic character is an important component of Canada’s national and international identity that is evident in many aspects of its relations with other states. Is the same true of Québec, the most active Canadian province on the international stage? The linguistic and cultural dimensions of Québec’s external relations are well known, but what is the effect of its Nordic character? Does Québec’s nordicity impact its international relations? Does it explain some of Québec’s external affair orientations? In other words, is there an Arctic identity component to Québec’s paradiplomacy? Québec’s Nordic identity has been well described and explored by a number of scholars (Hamelin, 1975; 2012; Tellier, 1977; Chartier, 2007; 2008; Chartier and Désy, 2014). It seems reasonable therefore to expect that Québec’s nordicity exerts an influence on its international relations: that it will be evident in its choice of international partners, priorities, and issues; in its motivations, roles, and diplomatic stances; in its ambitions and strategies; and in the way in which Québec presents itself to the world.

It is our contention that Québec’s Nordic identity does in fact shape its international initiatives in part and that it is, therefore, possible to speak of Québec’s Arctic “identity paradiplomacy.” The first section of this article looks at this concept of identity paradiplomacy and why it applies well to Québec. We then consider in what way the Arctic and nordicity are part of the Québec, Canadian, and Inuit identities. Finally, we give a nuanced response to the question as to whether Québec’s international activity does indeed take Arctic identity issues into account.

Identity paradiplomacy

Paradiplomacy is defined as a kind of foreign policy carried out at the sub-state level and parallel to that of the federal state. It is therefore “foreign policy” of a sub-state² actor, often a subnational state. The fundamental aim of identity paradiplomacy is to construct and reinforce minority national identity in the context of a multinational country. Its goal is to seek the resources outside the country that are lacking internally and to achieve international recognition as a state (Paquin, 2004: 203).

The process of seeking external recognition is particularly meaningful in the context of the constructivist approach, which considers identity to be actors’ principal motivating force and thus the source of their behaviour (Frank, 2012: 71). “Identity” is defined here as the ongoing process by which an actor conceives of itself, others, and the nature of their interactions. It is therefore concerned with the elements that are common to a collective actor (such as a state), and those that distinguish them from other actors. National identity can thus be conceived as a body of beliefs, attitudes, and opinions regarding oneself and the Other that are shared by an important majority of the national entity in question. These common beliefs, attitudes, and opinions include values, culture, and the conception of the role that the state should play in international politics, and what its status should be among other states (Macleod et al., 2004: 9).

It is therefore important in the study of international relations that particular attention is paid to the role of identity in determining the actors’ interests and actions (Battistella, 2015). According to Alexander Wendt, there are two basic premises. First, “that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than by material forces.” Second, “that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt, 1999: 1). Furthermore, identity is never fixed but is subject to a perpetual process of reconstruction according to the evolving ideas or the events affecting the actor in question. It is thus the meaning that one gives to this identity at a particular moment in time that determines the way in which the actor’s interest and behaviour are envisioned (Frank, 2012: 71). In this connection, it is important to take into account the causes of the important changes that transform a society and that determine a certain number of its choices, orientations, and collective behaviour.

This approach applies well to the case of Québec. On the one hand, Québec society and the state that represents it possess identity attributes that allow them to establish a distinction from and also, in many cases, a relation of otherness to Canadians living outside Québec. These markers are linguistic and cultural (a francophone community in a majority anglophone country), as well as historic (a minority conquered people of the Catholic faith in a country in large part made up of descendants of the Protestant conquerors). The fact that the two communities have never completely integrated has allowed Québec society to develop its identity markers.

French Canadian identity was maintained in Québec for close to 200 years through a form of isolation and withdrawal known as the ideology of survival,³ but Québec society underwent a transformational change during the 1960s. The Quiet Revolution⁴ saw the marginalization of the omnipresent Catholic Church, hitherto the guarantor of the survival of the community’s identity, its replacement by the state, and the emergence of Québécois intellectual and economic elite. Language, more than religion, became the feature that distinguished Québec from the other provinces. One of the consequences of this transformation was the emergence of a strident nationalism calling for independence, and in 1968 a political party dedicated to that goal, the Parti Québécois (PQ), was created.

Within this transformational context, Québec’s society and state became increasingly concerned with international matters: not only did the society open up a window onto the world but also the government implemented a very active paradiplomacy, aimed, among other things, at finding the resources abroad necessary to sustain the rapid growth of the state. However, this international activity was also “motivated by a desire to achieve recognition of its identity and by a project of nation-building” (Paquin and Chaloux, 2010: 26–27).

Québec’s international activity was thus fuelled by its need for recognition of its distinct identity. According to Louis Bélanger: “It would seem that, in order to analyze the domestic motivations for Québec’s international action, we must first examine the close relations between such activity and the Québec government’s strategies of identity. … Québec’s international politics consist of an effort to define the external contours of a distinct Québec national identity” (Bélanger, 2002: 200). This goal of achieving international recognition of its identity explains why all Québec governments since the 1960s have been so active on the international stage and why they have all relied on the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine to elaborate, intensify, or justify their international activity (Beaudoin, 2011; Jeyabalaratnam and Paquin, 2016).

However, despite the election of several sovereigntist governments (1976–1985, 1994–2003, and 2012–2014), Québec’s paradiplomacy does not appear to correspond to protodiplomacy, a form of international activity that seeks support for independence abroad. “Overall, the international activities of the provincial government have been aimed at securing not independence for Québec as a sovereign state, but a paradiplomacy that strengthens Québec identity” (Nossal et al., 2015: 354).

A study of the Québec government archival documents supports this thesis of identity paradiplomacy. During the 1960s, for example, government members discussed the issue of strengthening Québec’s identity on the international stage. The preamble of a 1966 document relating to Québec’s imperatives at the international level, which states that Québec claims the right to the full enjoyment of its limited international competence in order to be able to affirm its identity within the community of states, bears out the hypothesis of identity reinforcement (quoted in Payette, 2016: 346). Following Minister of Education Paul Gérin-Lajoie’s 1965 speech establishing the doctrine that today bears his name, Louis Sabourin wrote that Québec, in search of its identity, realized the importance of using all methods at its disposal to consolidate, develop, and assert its character. Consequently, the government felt the need to embark on an international policy to gain recognition of its particular international personality (Sabourin, 1965: 355). Since the 1960s, Québec’s francophone nature, which has received special recognition from France and the other francophone nations, has been key to the development of this personality.

Generally speaking, Québec’s policy has been aimed at France and the other francophone states likely to meet the needs of identity diplomacy, as well as the United States, by far the largest market for Québec’s exports and its most important economic partner. Indeed, some argue that the scale of the international activities of successive Québec governments towards these two targets is such that they have almost completely dictated the paradiplomacy (Bernier, 1996; Legaré, 2003). If this is true, what room is there for an Arctic diplomacy? The answer to this question requires a broad understanding of the fundamentals and the breadth of Québec’s paradiplomacy.

Fundamentals of Québec’s paradiplomacy

Canada, as a federal state, has two orders of institutions: those, federal, having jurisdiction over the entire country, and those, provincial, having limited territorial jurisdiction. Federal institutions are competent in a large number of areas of general interest, whereas provincial institutions exercise their authority over matters of local or private interest within the province (Bernard, 1995: 9). The powers of the legislative assemblies of the federal and the federated states (in this case, the provinces), respectively, are dictated by the constitution of the federal state. The distribution of these powers, fundamental to any federal constitution, is found in sections 91–95 of the Canadian Constitution and can be summarized as follows.

Section 91, entitled Powers of the Parliament, sets out 29 heads of power exclusively assigned to the federal government, ranging from currency and banking to the establishment of marine hospitals, and include defense, the public debt and property, the raising of money by any mode or system of taxation, as well as criminal law, Indian affairs, railroads, fisheries, and so on. The opening words of section 91 assign all residuary power – that is, power in matters relating to subjects not given exclusively to the provincial legislatures, such as telecommunications (Linteau et al., 1979) – to the federal government.

Section 92, entitled Exclusive Powers of Provincial Legislatures, enumerates 16 matters of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, including property and civil rights in the province, direct taxation in the province to raise money for provincial purposes, hospitals (other than marine hospitals), municipal institutions, and the solemnization of marriage in the province. Section 93 gives the province exclusive legislative power over education.

In addition, some sections provide for matters of shared or concurrent jurisdiction. Brun et al. (2008: 446) write that the only matters not exclusively assigned, and therefore of concurrent jurisdiction, are agriculture (section 95), immigration (section 95), old age pensions and supplementary benefits (section 94), and interprovincial export of natural resources (section 92A.2).

The Canadian Constitution, therefore, does not expressly assign jurisdiction to the federal government in matters relating to international affairs,⁵ and Québec’s doctrine concerning its competence is based on this fact. In 1965, Paul Gérin-Lajoie (then Québec’s Minister of Education) in a Montréal speech to foreign consular representatives, took as his starting point the Constitution’s silence regarding jurisdiction in international affairs,⁶ and enunciated the thesis (now called the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine) of the external extension of Québec’s internal jurisdictions.⁷ This doctrine essentially links the province’s competence to enforce an agreement, convention, or treat...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Lists of Illustrations
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• List of acronyms
• Introduction
• 1 Nordicity and Québec’s Arctic paradiplomacy
• 2 North American Arctic paradiplomacy: between multilateral and bilateral inclinations
• 3 Canada–Russia subnational cooperation in the Arctic
• 4 Arctic paradiplomacy of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): the impact of federalism, nationalism, and identity
• 5 Small enough to act, big enough to matter: subnational Arctic climate change actors
• 6 Arctic cross-border cooperation: the opportunities and limits of subnational cooperation in the Barents Region
• 7 The Arctic paradiplomacy of Indigenous peoples’ organizations
• 8 Indigenous diplomats at the IMO: a case study in successful cross-scale governance for international shipping traffic in the Bering Strait
• 9 Between the “Arc of Prosperity” and the Arctic: challenges and opportunities of Nordic Scotland’s paradiplomacy
• 10 Silk on ice or when China plays the paradiplomatic card in the Arctic
• Conclusion – limitations and opportunities in Arctic paradiplomacy
• Index