Most sub-Saharan states have suffered from the legacies of colonialism and its discontents. The political administrations that succeeded the colonial regimes have become mostly authoritarian. Underdevelopment and the ensuing poverty remain some of the characterizing features of post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. Most importantly, ethnic and religious conflicts and brutal civil wars continue to present grim challenges. On a positive note, however, the abundance of diversity and cultural richness, the more or less analogous paths in terms of the history of state formation, the untapped resources and opportunities, and societal norms in the greater region also make the countries broadly comparable. This does not also mean that anomalous historical attributes that could define and explain a certain sub-Saharan African state more than another are non-existent. For instance, looking at the evolution of the modern state of Ethiopia, one finds a state that maintained its independence from colonial rule after defeating and surviving imperial Italy’s historically ambitious attempt to create a large colonial empire in the eastern part of Africa. Such a historical reality indeed requires those studying sub-Saharan African states to be mindful of various possible idiosyncrasies requiring different research approaches and methodologies.
Regardless of the particularities mentioned above, however, the prospects of witnessing successful cases of political development in sub-Saharan Africa remain limited, and present several challenges to the study of the phenomenon. Moreover, the explanation for the continued presence of long-serving dictatorships, regardless of how much is written and said, remains a conundrum that fully deserves the attention of scholars in comparative politics. Attempting to further explore why such states fail to democratize and/or understanding how the political regimes in this part of Africa persistently survive the many challenges posed to their rule therefore remain essential questions. For the most part, however, it is also critical to note that most of the comparative research literature presents diverse reasons elucidating the failure of democratization attempts. Such attempts nonetheless fail to adequately explain the major factors behind most successful cases of authoritarian survival. Consequently, this work attempts to fill that gap by presenting some of the factors that have helped authoritarian survival, at least by focusing on the Ethiopian state. In this respect, it aims to contribute to our understanding of how authoritarian regimes preserve their hold on political power despite their ineffective governance and a steady increase in popular resentment at their rule. Moreover, this book closely examines the country’s modern history and the political culture that defines modes of elite interaction. By looking into institutional designs such as federalism, this work also shows survivalist political settings proposed and created by the political elite. By doing so, it shows how elite choices and institutions both matter, in almost equal measure, with regard to pursuing a relevant course in research directions in comparative political studies.
As indicated, however, the fact that tackling such questions demands more resources, in conjunction with the presence of inadequate data availability, means that this work is limited to studying a single case study: Ethiopia. In doing so, it presents explanations of authoritarian survival from varied lenses and approaches that are primarily used in the study of the topic, while borrowing some from the democratization literature. This study, therefore, mostly in Part 2, questions how a minority ethnic clique with strong control of a political coalition could have a strong hold on the political, economic, military, and security might of the Ethiopian state; and how this political group was able to survive and retain its hold on political power despite grievances of political as well as economic exclusion on the part of the country’s two major ethnic groups (the Oromo and Amhara, which constitute about 65 per cent of the Ethiopian population), as well as the country’s other ethnic groups, remaining ever present. Indeed, such was Ethiopia’s reality until the beginning of 2018. Hence, where Ethiopia is headed since the advent of the political change and the coming of the new prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, the possible prospects there might be for the peaceful coexistence of its citizens and groups, and what is at stake for the country’s democratic aspirations – and how the political culture plays into these questions – will be explored at the end of the book.
Before delving deep into an effort to address the research question and studying the politics of the contemporary Ethiopian state, however, it is crucial to look at the three important and historically puzzling realities that do most to shape the debate on the question of assessing how authoritarian regimes (in the past or present) in the Ethiopian state survived the challenges to their political dominance in their particular periods of administration.
Factors to consider in the study of Ethiopian politics
First, the political landscape in Ethiopia today is a result of the historical making and unmaking of the state in a variety of different ways by different regimes that had control of political power in different political eras. As explained earlier, this fact holds regardless of the historic truth that the country is one of the relatively few states in the developing world that has never been administered by a colonial power in its entire history, which is a reality that also means that the debate on the legacy of colonialism can be avoided altogether – at least when it comes to studying the case of Ethiopia in general, and in particular the 28 years that the authoritarian rule of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) survived. Hence, looking at other pervasive historical preludes of the state becomes crucial. The regime headed by Emperor Haile Selassie I ruled the country for over four decades until it was overthrown by the Dergue (a socialist military junta) in 1974. The Dergue’s regime, which was mostly controlled and administered by the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE), was itself overthrown in 1991, after ruling the country with an iron fist for 17 years. Here, it is crucial to examine how these regimes structured their governance, managed centre–periphery relations (relations between the regional states, also referred to as sub-states in the past, and the central government), and succeeded in remaining in power for an extended period. Researching and understanding the underlying reasons, and incorporating those cultural, institutional, economic, and strategic approaches that are relevant for identifying the causal explanations for the survival of such regimes in the longer term, will make a huge contribution to the study of Ethiopian politics overall.
Second, present-day Ethiopia, formally the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), is a state featuring the institutional design of ethnic federalism as a form of government structure, which is anomalous in the context of other federal cases in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. Accordingly, this book investigates the guiding principles behind the political and economic relationships between the regional states and the central government. The EPRDF-led regime, in power from 1991 to 2019, constituted the Ethiopian state by drawing linguistic and ethnic lines as a result of its desire to extend rights to many groups by promoting economic and political equality. In order to do so, elites in post-1991 Ethiopia started to implement their vision after accusing their predecessors of creating inequalities in the past.
Despite the existence of other African states with federal structures (Nigeria provides a good comparison), the Ethiopian experience remains an anomaly, mainly because its federal arrangement is devised chiefly along ethnic and linguistic lines or classifications, resulting in a clear departure from the old pan-Ethiopian unity pursued by the regimes that preceded the recent incumbents. Hence, understanding the broader ramifications – in terms of the consequences of having this type of federal arrangement – on the political survival of the EPRDF regime is significant for our knowledge of the contemporary politics of Ethiopia. Moreover, by adding to our wider understanding of the politics of federalism and the devolution of powers in a sub-Saharan African state such as Ethiopia we are also making a contribution to the field of comparative politics.
Third, Ethiopia’s protracted civil wars, until the fall of the Dergue and the formation of a transitional council in 1991 with the coming to political power of the EPRDF coalition, will be examined as well. Given how such episodes of civil conflict shaped the course of events that followed, these historical eras are indeed worth investigating. The civil wars, which started during the 1960s and mostly ended in the early 1990s, involved a number of rebel organizations, representing many different ethnic grievances, all with their political causes for their struggles. For such rebel groups, exploiting ethnocentric agendas was extremely important for achieving recognition for the political grievances they embraced upon raising arms. Moreover, ethno-nationalist sentiments and causes were also found to be effective as organizing principles.
During the civil war eras, whereas some of the rebel organizations, such as the famed EPRP (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party), fought to realize a pan-Ethiopian unity agenda along mostly socialist ideological lines, some others, such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), paid a huge price for their ultimately unsuccessful secessionist bids. The only exception among those advocating secession was the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF; it later become the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice: PFDJ), which accomplished its secessionist struggle with the establishment of the state of Eritrea (Iyob 1997). The commonality in most of these former rebel movements that waged armed struggle during the political eras prior to the 1990s was their ambition for the expansion of group rights and that of the realization of self-determination rights by ending what they wrongly termed “the domination of the Amhara” in every sphere of political and economic life in the historic Ethiopian state (Aalen 2006).
These rebel groups were also the ones that would later put their ethnic agenda ahead of broad-based national political interests when opportunities to take political power emerged in 1991. The groups and individual elites that inspired the formation of the rebellion forces of old had wanted all ethnic groups in the country to enjoy equal political representation and economic opportunities. For these groups, addressing such issues was a first priority that could legitimize their rule, limit potential opposition, and help solve the said historical questions of inequality. Adding to the commonality of these elites from the radical left-wing era, as most rebels and their subsequent organizations followed ideologies along the lines of socialism, the leaders of these groups had also once been part of the very active students’ movement in the 1960s, which, among others, contributed to the downfall of the long-serving regime led by Emperor Haile Selassie I.
Indeed, these groups of individuals from the pre-EPRDF (pre-1991) political periods constantly debated the issue of identity and what they referred to as competing ethnic nationalisms and grievances, which they regarded as having been created as a result of the domination of all minorities in the country by what they saw as the mostly Amhara/Tigray-dominated political culture and the dominance of Amhara political elites (Gudina 2004).1 Certainly, in light of the broader comparative politics literature on the recurrence of civil conflict, it is clear that the probability of a return to civil war is highly likely given the experience of a history of conflict.2 The literature also asserts that, even though ethnic or religious fractionalization might not be blamed for the outbreak or recurrence of civil wars, in a situation when a minority ethnic group dominates the political space, ethnic fractionalization could well serve as an explanation for the onset of civil war.3 This fact is also confirmed by recent literature putting the issue of “creed”, among others, as part of the overall explanation for the emergence of conflicts, as well as for the sustenance or duration of such wars (Zartman 2004). It is important to note that the aim here is not to discuss the causations or recurrences of the various conflicts the Ethiopian state has experienced in its contemporary history. Nevertheless, the reality that those who enjoyed their “turn” to rule Ethiopia between 1991 and 2018 came to the pinnacle of political power through a violent civil war necessitates the discussion of the issue at some point or other for its relevance in shaping our understanding of authoritarian survival in the country. Even the fact that the TPLF, as the last two chapters explain, opted to prepare for and wage war against the federal government after losing its power and dominance after almost three decades shows that old Ethiopian political habits die hard.
Therefore, even though these political organizations (primarily the OLF and TPLF) aspired to address political and economic inequalities by overthrowing the pan-unity authoritarian forces that were then in power, when their opportunity to rule arrived they ended up establishing a political coalition (the EPRDF) that served an ethnic minority liberation front that assembled the said coalition instead. Thus, the promises by political groups and their individual leaders to bring about a democratic Ethiopia became a terrible failure, which further perpetuated the cycle of violence, ethnic conflict, internal displacement of people, and tolerated corruption, reinforced by a clientelist pattern of elite interaction that eventually served the authoritarian survival agenda of the incumbent elites.4
Such realities of the recent past, and many others that this work touches upon, further make the question of possible democratic transition a debatable one and the issue of authoritarian survival in the Ethiopian state a complex one. In fact, following the collapse of the military socialist regime in 1991, many hoped that the transition that followed might usher in brighter prospects for democratic governance in the country. Unfortunately, in this pivotal period, the historic political and economic solutions put forth by the EPRDF coalition’s elites, introduced as designs to pave the road for the emergence of a democratic Ethiopia, failed to materialize. Instead, these institutional designs and programmes created political and economic winners and losers. Those who were perceived as historically powerful political groups, mostly Amhara, would be penalized for their past “perceived” successes. Meanwhile, the political groups that replaced them, especially the most dominant ones in the post-1991 transition, would become winners, viewing the wealth of the state as their reward for the struggles from the civil war era and for the sacrifices they had made during that period. Thus, the vicious cycle continued.
The solutions for power sharing that attempted to address the political inequalities in the realm of representation, as spearheaded by the EPRDF, were presented in the form of the institutional design of ethnic federalism. The initial perception was that this could lead to considerable political stability by providing a much-needed interlude for leaving behind the tumultuous period of the civil war. Unfortunately, however, as the institutional design was implemented and became solidified over time, ethnic relations descended to an all-time low and the internal displacement of groups, violations of individuals’ rights, and ethnic conflicts increased significantly. To reiterate: these solutions that were introduced in terms of institutional designs with expectations of answering the historical grievances of the various groups (formerly represented by the various ethnic rebels) failed terribly. Given the comprehensive failure of such institutional solutions, an effort to disentangle the prospects as well as the challenges of an arrangement such as ethnic federalism is critical. In this respect, given that the democratization process has failed in Ethiopia, and since researchers are therefore left endeavouring to understand the survival mechanisms of such a political regime in the country, the contribution of such institutional models for these questions of political survival has become a legitimate topic that this work sheds new light onto.
As is clear from the many instances of failed institutional models of ...
