The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation

Ang Cheng Guan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000440102
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Asian History
• Index: History

A History of the Manila Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) from its establishment in 1954 until its dissolution in 1977.
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) has received meagre scholarly attention in comparison to other key events and global developments during the duration of the Cold War, due to its perceived failure early in its existence. However, there has been a renewed interest in the academic study of the organization. Some scholars have argued that SEATO was not an outright failure. New literatures have also shed in detail the workings of SEATO, such as operational-level contingency plans and counter-insurgency plans. This book aims to reconstruct a comprehensive life cycle of SEATO using declassified archival documents which were unavailable to scholars studying the organization from the 1950s through the 1980s and provide a nuanced assessment of it. In addition, in recent years, there is also an emerging interest in the possibility of a multilateral military alliance in Asia, for instance the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue morphing into an "Asian NATO". As such, it is therefore crucial to study how previous multilateral alliances in the context of Asia were formed, how they functioned, and subsequently dissolved.
A groundbreaking reference on a key element of the United States' Cold War strategy in Asia, which will be a valuable resource to scholars of twentieth century diplomatic history.

1 Two approaches to managing regional security

DOI: 10.4324/9781003176404-1

I

The aim of this chapter is to describe the debates from about 1949 on the most acceptable form of regional security arrangement for East and Southeast Asia taking into consideration the interests of all involved, and to provide the broader context for an understanding of the formation of SEATO in 1954.

Damien Fenton, the author of the most recent book-length study of SEATO noted “the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was created as a direct result of the First Indochina War…”¹ While this is indeed true, the idea of a regional security organisation had in fact been raised and discussed as early as 1949. The idea however did not gain much traction until John Foster Dulles revived the idea of “a collective security arrangement” in the spring of 1954 when France was facing the prospect of defeat in Vietnam. Thus, to understand the creation of SEATO (and perhaps its fate), to quote Roger Dingman, we “must begin by recognizing the deep divisions within and between its prospective members”.² For that, we need to travel back some years to 1949 to revisit the Pacific Pact proposals – what David W. Mabon described as the “elusive agreements”³ prior to the creation of SEATO. The Pacific Pact remains a very much under-studied topic to this day.⁴

The idea of a Pacific Pact came arose around the time the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded (in April 1949).⁵ The major proponents for the Pacific Pact were Jiang Kai-shek (Taiwan), Syngman Rhee (Korea), and Elpidio Quirino (Philippines). In April 1949, Jiang was still the leader of the Republic of China fighting a civil war against the communists led by Mao Zedong. It was only in December 1949 that he left for Taiwan. Syngman Rhee was the first President of South Korea from 1948 to 1960. (In August 1948, the Republic of Korea was established in South Korea followed a month later by the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north.) Elpidio Quirino was the president of the Philippines from 1948 to 1953. The Philippines achieved independence from the United States in 1946.

Elpidio Quirino who first raised the idea of a Pacific Pact in 1949 wanted to ensure that US peacetime military assistance to the Philippines would remain “at the desired level”.⁶ The Philippines was also fearful of the revival of Japanese militarism. Syngman Rhee quickly supported Quirino's idea because he saw in it “the best opportunity to retain his American benefactors”.⁷

Apart from the above three who were directly involved in promoting the Pacific Pact to the United States, Australia “was an early supporter of a regional security pact”.⁸ Like Jiang, Rhee, and Quirino, Australian prime minister Robert Menzies “wanted the same formal influence on US decision-making that presumably the NATO partners would be enjoying in Europe”.⁹ New Zealand had the same view. However, Australia and New Zealand “saw little value in close connection with the militarily puny Philippines”.¹⁰ Canberra would later be one of the strongest supporters for the creation of SEATO in 1954. Australia, in the wake of a declining Britain, wanted a “security guarantee against a potentially resurgent Japan as well as against the Soviet Union”.¹¹

The Americans were the common partner all of them wanted to engage because the United States was the only country that emerged from the Second World War by far the most powerful country in the world – economically and militarily. US-Soviet rivalry led to the creation of NATO. The threat of a communist China as well as a resurgence of Japanese militarism was presumed to be strong reasons for the United States to contemplate an Asian version of NATO.

Between 1949 and 1954, the three Asian leaders in particular coordinated in various ways to persuade Washington to consider a Pacific Pact but failed to interest the Truman administration.¹² The State Department had then not yet made up its mind about Mao and his communists except acknowledging that there was nothing that the United States could do to prevent it, short of direct military intervention, (which it would not take), to save the corrupt and inefficient Jiang regime. In the event, the Communists defeated the Nationalists. On 1 October 1949, Mao proclaimed the People's Republic of China and Jiang and his forces fled to Taiwan.

In its evaluation of the US policy towards Southeast Asia, which eventually formed the basis of the National Security Council document, NSC 48/2 (dated 30 December 1949), the State Department was of the view that the idea of a Pacific Pact was “at least temporarily…premature”. The reasons given were that Washington wanted “to avoid charges of new Western imperialism” given that the colonial period was still very fresh in the minds of many Asians, and the process of decolonisation was still ongoing in parts of the region. It was assessed that no policy of the US government could resolve the “immediate crucial issue in Southeast Asia”, namely the “militant nationalism in Indonesia and Indochina”.¹³ Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained that NATO “was the product of a long evolution, and the western countries laid the groundwork for mutual defense before the idea of permanent US participation became credible”. Although Acheson did not say so directly, he implied that this was not the case in Asia and “any Pacific Pact would not be mutual, but instead a one-way US guarantee”. The Secretary of State thus shared the view of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who thought the time was “unripe” and opposed the idea of a Pacific Pact before local Asian conflicts were resolved.¹⁴ The Indians also pointed out that “it was unwise for any Asian leader to stand against Mao's victorious forces since many Asians perceived the communist conquest of China as a victory over Western imperialism”.¹⁵ Like India, both Indonesia and Burma (which achieved independence from the British in 1948) too did not want to be associated with any pact that would affect their neutral stance. Only Thailand expressed support for the idea.

One other influential voice we need to mention is that of the British. Although the once great British empire was diminishing after the Second World War (and would completely disappear by the mid-1960), it had a “special relationship” with the United States that grew out of the successful alliance between the two countries during the Second World War. London recognised that the war made the United States the preeminent partner in the relationship. However, whereas the British were very familiar with the region, Washington “lacked experience in the area”.¹⁶ In the 1950s, the British were still in possession of large swathe of real estate in Southeast Asia – Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak), Brunei, as well as Hong Kong. London also had close relationships with Australia and New Zealand. Finally yet importantly, Britain was (and still is) connected with its former Asian colonies in the form of the Commonwealth. Thus, the British view carried some weight.

The British assessment was that the Soviet threat was real but not imminent. Subversion was a more critical problem and one way to manage subversion was through economic assistance to the regional countries. Economic aid and political support were more useful than a military pact. Thus, while Britain did not reject the Pacific Pact proposal outright, it felt that the idea could be shelved for a later date. The British were aware that the United States was unwilling to make any fresh commitments to the region, but it hoped that they could persuade Washington to provide technical assistance and perhaps just some small amount of ammunition. Like the other countries, the British too were of the view that no plan would succeed without US involvement. Of course, Britain also had its own selfish concern. It feared “a possible resolution against its presence in Malaya” if indeed some form of a regional association did materialise.¹⁷

The Philippines’ effort to cobble together an Asian union of sorts reached a climax at the Baguio Conference in May 1950. Hosted by Carlos Romulo, the newly appointed Philippines Minister of Foreign Affairs, and attended by representatives from the Philippines, Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand, it failed to achieve the objective because of divergent views, and “marked the end of this Philippine effort to play a leadership role in Asia”.¹⁸ The US policy was that it “must not take such an active part in the early stages of the formation” of any regional association.¹⁹ The British, as we have noted above, were wary of how such an association would affect the remnants of its colonial empire. Both Washington and London concurred that they should “keep out of the limelight” and “pull the strings” whenever necessary.²⁰ By this time, we would recall, China had fallen to the communists and Jiang had retreated to Taiwan. Not long after the Baguio Conference, the Korean War broke out in June 1950.

Washington did “pull the strings” although the Americans failed to get their ideas fully accepted. Here, we need to pause briefly to trace a parallel set of developments during this period, which relates to Japan before continuing our narrative. This is also the appropriate point to introduce the controversial and much-misunderstood John Foster Dulles, who many consider as the architect of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), into this narrative.²¹ Although Dulles did not assume the position of Secretary of State until 1953 under the Eisenhower administration, he was invited to join the Truman administration “to build bipartisan support” for the administration's foreign policy.²² Dulles’ role in successfully negotiating the US-Japan security treaty, signed in September 1951, as well as mutual security arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, is particularly relevant to this narrative. It explains the origins of the American “hub-and-spoke” system in Asia, a network of bilateral alliances, which remains to this day. The longevity of this framework stands in stark contrast to the short-lived experiment of multi-national security alliance system in the region, namely SEATO.

To understand John Foster Dulles's perspective of the United States and international politics, we have to turn to the book he wrote entitled War or Peace published in 1950 not long after he joined the Truman administration in May 1949 as a special adviser to Secretary of State Dean Acheson on the Japanese peace treaty issue. In the book, Dulles identified the spread of Communism as the real and present danger. To counter successfully the communist threat, the United States needed to develop bipartisanship within the country, strengthen the United Nations, strive for Western unity, maintain a strong military, and finally yet importantly, save Asia from Communism. According to Dulles, it was no longer possible to depend on US-China relations to save Asia from Communism. Thus, the need for a new approach. Citing NATO as an example of an effective foreign policy, he suggested the establishment of a permanent “Association of Free Nations of Asia and Pacific”. However, unlike NATO, it would not initially be a military alliance but could start as a “consultative council for those who have a common concern for national independence and human freedom and want to do something about it”.

In his informal negotiations for a peace treaty with Japan, Dulles proposed the idea of an “Association of Free Nations of Asia and Pacific”. He believed that the association if formed could fulfil the four criteria established by the State Department for a Japanese Peace Treaty. These were as follows: Ensure US security in Northeast Asia (after full restoration of Japanese sovereignty); assure Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, which still feared the resurgence of Japanese militarism; enlist Japan on the side of the non-communist camp; and to ensure that those countries that did not wish to join the association would not feel threatened.

Meanwhile, an informal working group within the State Department was also exploring approaches for a Japanese Peace Treaty, of which one was rather similar to that of Dulles. In the words of John Howard, special assistant to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who headed the working group “this approach opened for the first time the possibility of a Pacific Pact, which had previously been regarded as contrary to the US policy. The type of pact which had the greatest appeal was an “offshore” Pacific Pact which did not involve US military commitments with respect to the Asian mainland”.²³ The difference between Howard and Dulles was that Howard “produced an outline which mirrored the general mutuality of NATO…”, whereas Dulles objected to the NATO-model, preferring one which resembled the Monroe Doctrine “because the only real source of security for the other members lay in US power”. It is worth noting that the proposed members in the Howard version were the United States, Canada, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Excluded members were Britain, France, and all the other Southeast Asian states. John Howard acknowledged that this was the “most telling objection” to such an arrangement, but “the entire US government was at this time agreed that military agreements guaranteeing the Asian mainland were to be avoided”.²⁴ Dulles argued that it was difficult to include some countries and exclude others. London objected to a Pact that included only one Southeast Asian country – the Philippines. The inclusion “of such an obvious American satellite” would highlight Britain's exclusion and invite the inference that Australia and New Zealand “were being incorporated in an ‘American Commonwealth’ system”.²⁵

Another proposal (which Dulles apparently somewhat liked) was one that included Britain and France, some “offshore” and mainland Asian countries. Moscow and Beijing would guarantee that there would be no aggression against Japan. The other members would guarantee each other against Japanese attack. All the arrangements would be bundled into one “bluntly worded treaty”.²⁶ This proposal further allowed a possible US agreement with Japan to maintain bases on Japanese soil. Canberra was however adamantly against any treaty that did not restrict Japanese rearmament. In fact, Canberra and Wellington rejected any Pact that included Japan.

In a review of John Foster Dulles’ War or Peace (published on 1 March 1953), Hsiao Tso-liang sums up well the mood of the time. Hsiao noted that Dulles’ idea of an “Association of the Free Nations of Asia and the Pacific” was laudable but “the difficulties are enormous”. While the objective of the proposed association was clearly to “promote the cause of anti-Communism”, there were countries such as Australia and New Zealand which were “sensitive to the revival of Japanese militarism”. Indonesia and Burma “have memories of Western colonialism and Japanese aggression, from both of which they have just been liberated”. If Indochina and Malaya were to be included, they “must be approached at present through France and Great Britain which are countries they hate more than Communism”. The Korean War was still ongoing. Japan was still militarily weak. Tokyo also had not yet restored diplomatic relations with regional countries such as the Philip...