China, the USA and Technological Supremacy in Europe

Csaba Moldicz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000428193
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The book explores how technological competition is linked to the geopolitical contest between the US and China, and why Europe and the European Union (EU) have become involved in this competition for technological supremacy.

China's political and economic rise, the concurrent US withdrawal from the region, and the rise of new technologies such as 5G, and AI creates a new and more unstable geopolitical environment in the region. In addition, the EU, far from being a global player, finds it increasingly difficult to play a leading role. The book analyses the nature of the ultimate goal of technological competition between the United States and China and shows how and why did the EU become the centre of this struggle. The author argues that the EU has become the new battlefield of the technological struggle since wealthy societies in the EU make this competition attractive and profitable to both the US and China.

By shedding light on the geopolitical motivations of China and the question of whether the US can contain China's advance in this domain, the book will be of interest to practitioners in the fields of international relations and political science as well as policymakers and analysts employed by diplomatic services, multilateral organizations, and non-governmental organizations.

1 The battle for technology

The global arena¹

DOI: 10.4324/9781003128625-1

“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world,” Mackinder wrote at the beginning of the 20th century (Mackinder, 1919: 150). In today’s world, an exclusive focus on geography cannot be justified, but the original sentiment, reflecting new realities, can be rephrased: “Who is at the forefront of technology rules the world economy who rules the world economy rules world politics, and who commands both economy and politics rules the world.” Every facet of our life hinges on technology that we use and have access to. In the military, in business, in education, in transportation, and in health care—as the recent coronavirus pandemic painfully reminded us—technology surrounds us, and because we are reliant on these aspects of our lives, we are a technology-dependent species. No wonder that access to the latest and best technology is high on the agenda of every government, nation, and company.

Technological competition between the United States and China is, as we understand it, the most important field of competition for hegemonic power. This struggle has often been portrayed as a race between two different political regimes (Mead, 2014; Sun, 2019). Another aspect is that in this contest, although it plays out on many levels and in several places, Europe is wealthy and inherently weak as a political power, making it the ideal battleground for this final contest. For both the United States and China, Europe is a major business and investment partner, and therefore the European continent, especially the EU, is an idealistic spot for this conflict since the reward for the winner here is the highest on the globe. This chapter discusses the main narratives of technical and broader competition by drawing on the existing literature (see Section 1.1), then it investigates the “hard factors” of the competition by looking at key statistical indicators (see Section 1.2).

1.1 Technology as a key factor of a superpower’s influence

The debates that shape and change our perception of China have intensified in recent years. With the Chinese reforms of 1978 and later, a new economic paradigm was born that brought immense changes and lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. Over the last four decades (1980–2019), the average GDP growth of the Chinese economy has been 9.44 percent. It is no wonder that the analysis of this economic miracle puts Chinese economic development at the center of research and raises questions such as: what are the reasons for such rapid growth; what are the economic and political factors; can it be emulated by other countries; and most importantly, where will this path lead? When will China’s rise stop? Should it be stopped at all? How should the West, especially the United States, respond to the challenges China presents? Is the new Chinese economic development model superior to liberal free market systems? Section 1.1 will discuss three main narratives: the “rise of China” narrative, the United States’ dilemma expressed in the “engagement” vs. “disengagement” debate, and the “developmental state” narrative. We will see that all three narratives add new aspects to the debate on understanding China’s development, but with regard to the main research topic of this book, the developmental state debate promises to give us more insight into the nature of China’s political and economic regime and thus predict the outcome of the contest between the two powers.

1.1.1 “The rise of China” debate

Different narratives of China’s rise are part of an old debate, which has never abated and probably never will. The nature of this discourse is more academic, and its contribution to understanding China’s technological rise is that it suggests a broad conceptual framework for us to comprehend the stakes and domains of this competition, but it offers no rationale for predicting which nation is most likely to emerge as the winner in the contest for technological supremacy. In this debate, scholars tend to focus on indicators such as GDP, GDP per capita, the role of the national currency in foreign reserves and international trade, various military indicators (size of the army, expenditures, technology deployed), and the ability to lead in areas of technological competition. This book focuses essentially on the last area, and also in this area on how recent developments of competition are played out in Europe and what is its significance in international relations.

From the early 1990s on, the debate over China’s rise has polarized researchers, political leaders, and diplomats. The now-powerful country’s economic, technological, and military advances have attracted interest beginning in the early 1990s. Nicholas Kristof put it enthusiastically as early as 1993:

The rise of China, if it continues, may be the most important trend in the world for the next century. When historians one hundred years hence write about our time, they may well conclude that the most significant development was the emergence of a vigorous market economy—and army—in the most populous country of the world. This is particularly likely if many of the globe’s leading historians and pundits a century from now do not have names like Smith but rather ones like Wu.

(Kristof, 1993)

While Nicolas Kristof heralded the inevitable rise of China without hesitation, another team of researchers expressed serious doubts as to whether China can lead, especially in innovation. They pointed out that the political environment in China imposes severe constraints on schools, universities, and businesses (Abrami et al., 2014). They were not alone in reasoning this way. To mention just one of the most influential China experts of the time, Elizabeth Economy emphasized the problems created by heavy state intervention in the economic system, pointing to the Chinese state’s hunger for capital, which they believed was starving the more efficient private sector (Economy, 2019). A similar view is expressed by Julian Baird Gewirtz, who reminds us of the challenges posed by:

top-down CCP-led innovation … waste and massive oversupply, or the challenges of supporting small entrepreneurs and researchers without heavy-handed interference.

(Gewirtz, 2019)

This is the point at which the debate becomes linked to the question of the Chinese (economic and political) model. The main argument of those prophesying the collapse of China is that only open, democratic systems can sustain economic institutions and guarantee long-term growth (this concept is discussed in more detail in the chapter on the developmental state debate).

The following thread in the debate over China’s rise is whether the country can rise peacefully, or whether the containment of China is unavoidable due to Beijing’s behavior. The discussion also revolves around whether China poses a threat to world peace and order. Realists tend to argue that the country’s rise will lead to hegemonic war and that a rising China will ultimately pose a menace to world peace, while libertarians envision a more peaceful nature of the globalized world in which states seek compromise and are willing to cooperate (Ye, 2002).

This debate has resurfaced in various forms over time, including even to extremes.² The question remains as to how much we can gain from such a broad debate, encompassing so many voices and viewpoints. As we understand it, such a debate is futile, as no right answers can be given, but it draws our attention to what the areas of contest are between the United States and China (economy, military, and technology) and the fact that China’s rise cannot continue without the help of technology developmen...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of tables
• Author biography
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 The battle for technology: the global arena
• 2 The war of arguments: the European battlefield
• 3 Economic and political interests of the major powers: the United States, Germany, and Russia
• 4 Chinese investment and 5G cooperation in the EU: France, Germany, and Italy
• 5 Chinese investment and 5G networks in the Visegrád countries
• 6 Conclusions
• Index