Bildung and Paideia

Philosophical Models of Education

Marie-Élise Zovko, John M. Dillon, Marie-Élise Zovko, John M. Dillon

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9780367467166
• eBook ISBN: 9781000335781
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

Bildung and Paideia examines traditional humanistic ideals in light of philosophical reflection on the need for education of the whole human being.

The study of what it is to be human is traditionally the task of the humanities. In recent years, however, the humanities have been increasingly subordinated to technological, economic, and utilitarian aims. Do the humanities still have a fundamentally distinct task to fulfil in education? Today's reduction of educational outcomes to measurable competencies and economically exploitable skills is opposed to traditional ideals like that of Greek paideia and the German Romantic concept of Bildung, which emphasized formation of the whole human being. The present volume takes as its point of departure the conviction that the study of 'the human experience'—whether through philosophy, literature, religion, art, music, history, or languages—has something specific to offer in the realm of education today. The individual contributions examine the specific role of philosophy and the humanities in education from ancient times to the present and explore possibilities for conceiving philosophical models of education.

The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of the journal Educational Philosophy and Theory.

Mania and Knowledge. From the sting of the gods to Socrates as educational gadfly^#

#English translation by Marie-Élise Zovko of Erler, 2017.

Michael Erler

ABSTRACT

In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates asserts that madness is a good thing if it comes from the gods, and demonstrates this using the example of love. Eroticism becomes thereby philosophy, the lover a philosopher, with Plato’s Socrates serving as prototype. The question remains, however, how madness can be reconciled with a philosophical search for truth which relies entirely on rationality. This question must be considered within the context of the growing antagonism between irrationality and rationality, enlightenment and counter-enlightenment, cultic ritual and reason, in the fifth century. Evidence of this antagonism forms a helpful background for interpretation of the question of the role of insanity in the philosophy of the Platonic Socrates. It can be shown that Plato gives Socrates characteristics from the context of contemporary counter-enlightenment and thereby transforms these and integrates them into philosophy. This process can be clearly demonstrated by means of the comparison of Socrates with a gadfly in the Apology.

… but in reality the greatest of blessings come to us through madness, when it is sent as a gift of the gods. (Phdr. 244c)

Madness as a good thing, if it comes from the gods: this assertion, with which Socrates begins a speech in Plato’s dialog Phaedrus —the so-called palinode—irritated not only modern interpreters of Plato. It had to have been felt by his contemporaries to be a provocation. For a look at the myth teaches one quickly that madness is indeed often sent by the gods, but rarely proves to be a good thing for people.

Yet, using the example of love, Socrates wants to show that his theory is plausible. It is true, he admits, that love is a state of madness, even of insanity. Eros manifests itself in a restlessness of the soul, an inner conflict, a wandering (planē) in the concentration of the lover on himself, in follies, and often has multiple psychosomatic effects. All of this is indeed not necessarily a good thing, as Socrates admits. And nevertheless, he makes haste to argue, love can, as an emotional state sent by the gods, without a doubt exert a positive force, if and insofar as at the sight of corporal beauty it does not get hung up on the desire for sensual pleasure, but instead awakens the longing to leave sensuality behind and approach the intellectual realm of beauty and truth ( Phdr. 241ab and 231d, 250a [Plato, 1966 ]; on Platonic erotics, with overview and references, cf. Erler, 2007 ). Socrates elaborates further on this process by developing the famous image of the chariot of the soul, which flies to the realm of the ideas ( Phdr. 243e-257b). Socrates develops thereby an idea of love or ‘erotics’ which becomes a metaphor for that which he understands as the striving for knowledge: the erotic art becomes philosophy and the lover a philosopher. Plato’s figure of Socrates becomes thereby the prototype of the latter. This philosophical erotic became popular as Platonic love in a variety of forms in European art, literature, and philosophy. Thomas Mann’s Death in Venice may be the best-known example to date, in which, albeit, Plato’s surmounting of corporality is, as it were, reversed (on the Ancient Greek concept of mania cf. Dodds, 1951, pp. 64–101; Rohde, 1898/1974; On madness in tragedy cf. Effe, 2000; Gill, 1996; Padel, 1995, pp. 14–17; Schlesier, 1985, pp. 1–45, esp. 8ff.).

This speech on the analogy of erotics and philosophy is impressive and influential. Nevertheless, questions remain which relate to an essential feature of this analogy. Although the analogy, namely appears to be plausible up to a certain point, it includes an element of irrationality or insanity—as Socrates himself concedes—which is understandable as far as love is concerned, but constitutes more of an irritation with regard to philosophy (Phdr. 243e ff.). Socrates would like, it is true, to see this element of irrationality in a positive light. The question arises, however, as to how insanity (mania) can fit into a philosophical search for truth, which after all trusts completely in rationality. How and in what way can insanity or mania be a good thing for the philosopher on the path to knowledge, as Socrates apparently assumes. Socrates himself is presented by Plato as a philosopher completely committed to the intellect, for whom even moral misconduct rests on an intellectual error of judgment, and who in the modern Enlightenment of Voltaire is still praised as a prototype of the Enlightenment thinker (Döring, 1998, p. 172f.). Socrates’ positive appraisal of the value of madness doesn’t seem to fit into the picture, and this even more so at a time—the Phaedrus is set in the last third of the fifth century—which has not without reason been described as the golden age of Greek Enlightenment. In fact, the fifth century was characterized by great confidence in one’s own abilities and one’s own reason, a trust which is, inter alia, manifested in the flourishing of science, art, and architecture, and which produced brilliant examples of human achievement (Meier, 1980, pp. 435–499; 469ff.).

Now, one must take into consideration that in the fifth century not only Enlightenment and the consciousness of the artisan for his techne (Könnensbewußtsein, cf. Höcker, 2011/2015 ) can be observed, but also that growing opposition movements, almost in the sense of a counter-enlightenment, make themselves felt. We observe in particular in the last third of the period of the Peloponnesian War a growing number of cults with orgiastic irrational or delusional traits (cf. Henrichs, 1984; on Dionysus and madness cf. Henrichs, 1994; Schlesier, 1993; on the ambivalencies cf. Lefèvre, 1995; on Dionysus and theater cf. Bierl, 1991, pp. 80–87, esp. 85–87; Schlesier, 2011 ). One may recall the cult of the Phrygian Great Mother, the Thracian Bendis, the dying gods Attis and Adonis, but especially of Dionysus, the god of the political order, but also of intoxication and ecstasy, whose followers called themselves maenads, ‘the raving ones’. A growing antagonism between irrationality and rationality, enlightenment and counter-enlightenment, cult, and the reason becomes manifest here, which is reflected in literature and art, and in particular in the drama of the time—if one recalls, for example, only the Oedipus of Sophocles or Euripides’ Bacchae (cf. Schmidt, 1989 ).

In the following, I would like to defend the thesis that this antagonism offers a helpful interpretative background also for the question of the role of madness in the philosophy of the Platonic Socrates, which is suggested by the analogy between eros and philosophy. For it may be observed that Plato sometimes provides his Socrates figure with features which are intended to remind us of motifs from the context of just such counter-enlightenment currents, and which here remind one, and apparently are supposed to remind one, especially of Dionysus. Plato seems to place his proto-philosopher Socrates in the vicinity of the god of intoxication and one wonders why he does this (cf. Erler, 2010; Wildberg, 2011 ).

Most of the passages of this type are familiar. One, however, has not yet been adequately exploited in this regard, and it is just this passage which can help us to understand better what Socrates might mean by the positive gift of madness within the context of philosophy. It is a question of the well-known passage from the Apology of Plato in which Socrates compares himself and his philosophical activity—apparently in jest—with a horsefly that stings and torments people (Ap. 30e; Platon, 2004, p. 125, n. 228). It is to be noted that this passage, though much quoted, alludes to a myth—and that there the motif of the gadfly is closely tied to a madness sent by a god; and, furthermore, that this motif also plays an important and interesting role in Euripides’ Bacchae. In the following, it will be noted that Plato takes up with the motif of the gadfly or horsefly in the Apology a traditional motif, which he nonetheless does not merely mirror, but on whose content he reflects, transforming it and integrating it into the world of his own thought.

I n order to show this, the proposition will first of all be examined, on the example of the myth, whether it is really valid that madness is good when it comes from the gods. In this context, the motif of the gadfly will be considered and the comparison with Socrates elaborated. Thereby a solution to the question as to what role may really be attributed to the condition of madness or perplexed vexation of the soul in Plato’s philosophy will be suggested.

Madness in myth

Madness as punishment

Madness as something good, when it comes from the gods: how provocative this sentence must have been for the contemporaries becomes clear when one recalls what it is like in the Greek myths (Effe, 2000;Gill,1996,p.249ff.;Mattes, 1970). As a matter of fact, the large number of myths in which madness, mania, plays an important role, is striking—one has counted more than 32 myths in which this is the case (Mattes, 1970, p. 7). This madness manifests itself in impairment or elimination of rationality or of sober reason and has multiple occasions: it can be the rage of battle which robs humans of reason, especially in the epic context; it may be the joy of reunion, for example, as between Orestes and Electra, which turns off the activity of reason; or it can be mourning over one’s own misfortunes, which Hecuba experiences on account of the destruction of Troy (E. Tr. 1284). Often, it is the pain of love which drives humans out of their minds—Alcaeus already has Helen follow her lover Paris to Troy—driven mad by love, as it is said (Alcaeus, Pap.Ox. XXI 2300 fr. 1 = 283 Lobel-Page). Madness can be, it is true, the result of physical pain, or often accompanies that religious ecstasy which is connected to the god Dionysus (E. Tr.1272–1284;Alc.fr.283 Voigt,Pap. Ox. 2300 fr. 1;cf.Mattes,1970, pp. 58–99).

To become mad is often viewed as a punishment meted out by the gods, for example, when someone because of pride—hubris—exalts himself with respect to the gods or when one encroaches on interests of the gods. Heracles, for example, becomes the object of Hera’s jealousy, which results in him killing his children and his wife in a fit of insanity. Bacchylides’ eleventh Epinikion mentions three daughters of Proetus: Lysippe, Iphinoe, and Iphianassa. These were so arrogant that they believed themselves more beautiful than the goddess Hera, for which reason Hera made them mad. Their madness was expressed by them lowing like cows and storming about the countryside. In Baccylides, these women are designated as a-theoi—not because they are themselves godless, but because the divinity turned away from them because of their arrogance (E. HF 930–935; B. 11, 109 Snell/Maehler).

Madness as punishment from the gods is indeed a frequent motif in myth, whereby Dionysus is accorded a special role. For Dionysus is a god who must fight for recognition. He strikes anyone with madness who denies him the necessary respect. Sometimes, it is true, madness is understood as an inexplicable stroke of fate, whose causes are unknown. For it is not always preceded by the culpable conduct of an individual—at least not in the modern sense of culpability. Sometimes, it is only a deed which counts, without there being any intent involved. Sometimes, however, divinely sent madness also strikes people simply because the gods want to demonstrate their power (Mattes, 1970, pp. 50–52, 58ff.), without there being any occasion for punishment. We learn, for example, that Hippolytus neglects the goddess Artemis. Punishment, however, for example, in the form of mania, is withheld. Phaidra, on the other hand, is guilty of no transgression and she is nonetheless struck with madness.

To send madness is thus evidently a means of the gods to strike people down and to demonstrate their power, to obtain respect, sometimes, too, to punish objective misconduct. Nevertheless, the overview of the myths shows also how problematic it is to claim that madness is a good thing for human beings, insofar as it comes from the gods. What Socrates asserts, is something that is in no way corroborated by tradition.

Madness and the 'gadfly'

I n myths, when gods want to demonstrate their power by causing human beings to fall into a state of madness, they use a variety of means. It can be among other things instruments, like the flute, whose music causes the listener to fall into a trance and ecstatic frenzy, or also an insect. In particular, the horsefly or dark giant horsefly (oistros,Ger.‘Kuhbremse')¹ —is often used. This insect is sometimes almost synonymous with madness, for example, in the form of bacchantic mania caused by Dionysus (Mattes, 1970, p. 110). In tragedy, we find the motif of madness and the horsefly, for example, in the context of the Io-legend in the tragedy Prometheus, which is ascribed to Aeschylus. Io is hounded by Hera’s jealousy, because she had a relationship with Zeus. In revenge, the jealous Hera then sends a horsefly (oistros), which chases Io, who has been transformed into a cow, throughout the countryside and drives her mad. We find the motif of the gadfly and madness in a similar role in The Suppliants (Hiketides) of Aeschylus und in Sophocles Elektra. In Euripides, we encounter the horsefly in Heracles, as well as in Hippolytus. Admittedly, in the Bacchae of Euripides, the horsefly has become virtually a leitmotif, as a divinely sent sign of delusion or madness—and this in the context of that particular problem which interests us in Socrates: the antagonism between rationality and irrationality, Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment, philosophy and ritual. Let us turn therefore briefly to this play (A. Pr. 566. 589. 879;Supp. 16. 541. 573; S.El. 5; Tr. 1254; E.HF 1144;Or.791;Ba. 32. 665. 979. 1229).

Pentheus, miracles, and oistros

The content of the Bacchae, composed and performed in 406, is quickly told. Dionysus, son of Zeus and Semele, comes a...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• Editorial: Deep learning, education and the final stage of automation
• Introduction: Humanism vs. competency: Traditional and contemporary models of education
• 1 Mania and knowledge. From the sting of the gods to Socrates as educational gadfly
• 2 Purification through emotions: The role of shame in Plato's Sophist 230b4-e5
• 3 Worldly and otherworldly virtue: Likeness to God as educational ideal in Plato, Plotinus, and today
• 4 Paideia Platonikê: Does the later platonist programme of education retain any validity today?
• 5 "Πᾶσα μὲν ἡ ποίησις τῷ Ὁμήρῳ ἀρετῆς ἐστιν ἔπαινος": Greek poetry and paideia in the homiletic tradition of Basil
• 6 Bild, Bildung and the 'romance of the soul': Reflections upon the image of Meister Eckhart
• 7 Kabbalah, education, and prayer: Jewish learning in the seventeenth century
• 8 Philosophy of education in early Fichte
• 9 Hölderlin's idea of 'Bildungstrieb': A model from yesteryear?
• 10 Hegel's concept of education from the point of view of his idea of 'second nature'
• 11 Bildung and the historical and genealogical critique of contemporary culture: Wilhelm von Humboldt's neo-humanistic theory of Bildung and Nietzsche's critique of neo-humanistic ideas in classical philology and education
• 12 Friedrich Nietzsche in Basel: An apology for classical studies
• 13 Werner Jaeger's Paideia and his 'Third Humanism'
• 14 Radicalising philosophy of education—The case of Jean-Francois Lyotard
• 15 The existential concern of the humanities: R.S. Peters' justification of liberal education
• 16 Paideia, progress, puzzlement
• 17 Rebirth of paideia: ultimacy and the game of games
• 18 Education is mutual: In search of the ideal interpretation
• Index