The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners

Andrew Taylor

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9780367756512
• eBook ISBN: 9781000373837
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia britannica

First published in 1984, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners examines all aspects of political activity of the Yorkshire Area of the NUM.

The book was written using original research from the archives of the Yorkshire Area combined with the author's personal experience. It explores developments from 1945 onwards, and looks at internal politics within the Area, discussing the nature of policies on both industrial bargaining and wider political aims. It considers the role of sponsored MPs and their relationship to the Area, as well as the NUM's 'special relationship' with the Labour Party. The structure of the Area and its role within the NUM nationally are also discussed, and detailed analysis is given to the strikes of 1972 and 1974.

Chapter One

THE YORKSHIRE MINERS AND THE LABOUR PARTY, 1945-1963

DOI: 10.4324/9781003163381-2

The Miners, Nationalisation and Coal Production

The mineworkers and their Union saw a Labour Victory in the 1945 General Election as vital to their futurq economic security. A Conservative Government could not provide this security as it was not committed to nationalisation and would repeat the policies of the 1920s and 1930s.¹ For the NUM the General Election was about nationalisation; “A vote for Labour is a vote for the public ownership of the industry for the benefit of the Nation”.² in his Presidential Address Will Lawther warned Conference delegates that the Conservatives “would use Churchill for all he was worth to obscure the real issues” but insisted that the electorate would see that the Conservatives offered no hope, and, “for us as mineworkers… the acid test is the Government’s policy for dealing with the mining industry”. The only solution for the ills of the industry was nationalisation; the promised reorganisation of private capitalism was not enough.³ Lawther warned that nationalisation would warrant a reciprocal response from mineworkers: actively co-operating with both Government and management in the production of coal.

Before the General Election the YMWA Council issued a circular to all branches urging,

… our membership, whether having a vote or not, to support not only our mining candidates, but all who are pledged to the Labour Party’s policy in the forthcoming General Election. This election will prove to be the most vital and far reaching one in history, and dependent upon its result the future welfare of the working class community for generations to come will rest.⁴

The Labour Government immediately called upon the miners to help resolve the post-war economic crisis. The Government sought to promote an export-led economic recovery which depended on the level of industrial output which needed abundant cheap energy supplies. At all levels of the NUM the miners took the burden of an expanding demand for coal, and the level of coal production was made both an index of, and the test of loyalty to the Labour Government. This was coupled with warnings that a failure to produce sufficient coal might cause a postponement of nationalisation.⁵

A production drive was launched soon after the General Election. The YMWA passed a resolution attacking unofficial strikers for “sabotaging their own interests and those for which the present Government has been elected”,⁶ a good example of coal production being elevated to an index of political loyalty. In accepting joint responsibility for the level of coal output the Union saw itself as taking this responsibility to help keep the Labour Government in power - a task it readily accepted.⁷

The NUM willingly transformed itself into adjunct of the Ministry of Power to secure nationalisation and sustain a Labour Government. The result was a conviction that there was no distinction between the interests of the Government and the interests of the mineworkers and their Union. This may have carried weight with the NEC and at Area level, but many miners regarded this with increasing scepticism. The transformation of coal production into a political issue ensured that political conflict was introduced into every dispute in the industry; every stoppage affected the Labour Government and any failure to meet Government demands for coal helped the Conservatives. The mineworkers were constantly told of their duty and responsibility to help ‘their’ Government.

We are no longer urged to do this in the interests of the coalowners… the call is for the people of Britain to meet the needs of the Nation… We must show the Nation whatever the difficulties there may have been in the past, there is now a disposition of full cooperation between the mineworkers, the Labour Government, and the… Ministry of Fuel and Power, and that we will spare no effort to bring to a successful conclusion the aims and purposes for which the Labour Government has been elected.⁸

Yorkshire reached its maximum output in the middle of December 1945 and after that date declined. The Yorkshire miners were exhorted to “Help the Nation” and maintain coal output.⁹ The sentiments and attitudes of the era of private ownership continued amongst the mineworkers because of the persistence of the problems of the private coal industry: low investment, a chaotic wages system and an ageing workforce. The miners had high expectations of the post-war period, many of which were not met, the result being a crisis of expectations reflected in unofficial strike action.

The severe winter of 1947 saw a major fuel crisis. During the winter an Emergency Committee was established composed of cabinet members, TUC General Council members and the NEC of the NUM to consider ways of expanding the fuel supply. The NEC rejected any idea that the miners were responsible for the fuel crisis: “the roots of the present crisis are to be found in the policies that for years were carried out in the coal industry by those people who are attacking the Labour Government.”¹⁰

Directing present discontent to past events was of great importance in explaining how the official, leadership of the NUM could control what was, at times, a mutinous membership. Co-operation between the NUM and the Government was cemented not only by loyalty, but by a mutual antipathy to all things Conservative and an overwhelming desire to make a success of Labour’s first majority government.

The year 1947 saw the mines nationalised heralding a new era for the industry. Will Lawther claimed: “We know that the NCB looks upon its employees in an entirely different light from those who employed miners in the past”, and there could now be few grounds for industrial action.¹¹ However, the authority structures of private industry, pay systems, and methods of work remained unchanged, and the result was unofficial industrial conflict. There was a tendency to lay any dissent or unrestat the door of anyone who was politically unacceptable to the NUM leadership. Disputes were felt to be politically damaging to the Labour Government given Labour’s dire need for coal, and the miners now had a duty to co-operate with the management: “There are now no opposing sides in the industry”.¹² At the 1947 NUM Conference Emmanuel Shinwell, the Minister of Fuel and Power, praised the co-operation of the NUM but emphasised that

… having sent to power a Labour Government, a Government of your own making, and having laboured long and hard throughout the period of the capitalist wilderness, clearly, it is the bounden duty as well as the high responsibility of those who returned a Labour Government to stand by that Government with the utmost loyalty.¹³

The Government and the NEC fell over each other saluting each other’s statesmanship and responsibility, but this unity was not a feature of the NUM as a whole. Shinwell criticised those branch leaders who refused to abandon the old attitudes of private ownership and who were reluctant to co-operate fully with the NCB,

There seems to be in some parts of the country a lack of appreciation of the tremendous economic and social issues at stake… the nation cannot afford monkey tricks…¹⁴

Shinwell’s oratory was greeted with applause: there were strong feelings that miners owed a debt of loyalty to Labour.

This gratitude can be seen in the speech by Joe Hall, the Yorkshire Area President, to the Annual Demonstration of 1947.

This day we demonstrate our thankfulness to those who fought for our cause, and we ourselves renew our faith and loyalty… not only to the Trade Union Movement…(but) to the Government… for without this Government the realisation of our faith and hopes would have been vanquished.¹⁵

Yet, Shinwell noted the failure of the Yorkshire Miners to keep their promises. Speaking at the same Demonstration he said,

The Yorkshire Miners said to me, ‘Give us the Five Day Week and if you do we’ll give you the coal…’ We have given (You) the Five Day Week: where is the coal? I do not want resolutions, I cannot burn resolutions, although some of them should be burnt…¹⁶

Pressure for wage increases to compensate for increases in the cost of living and constant Government pressure for more coal at the cheapest price, ensured that the NUM became subject to increasing internal tension as union leaders sought to reconcile their dilemma. Gaitskell’s appointment as Minister of Fuel and Power saw no change in the Union-Government relationship: Gaitskell declared to the Yorkshire Area Council,

… the pledge is continued support to the Labour Government… in efforts to increase and then maintain a high standard of coal production(it is)only by a continuation of our efforts in this nationalised industry that the ultimate success of the Labour Government will be ensured and Labour’s task make easier in the General Election.¹⁷

The narrow victory of the Labour Government in the 1950 General Election was blamed by the NUM on the failure of the working class and trade union members to support ‘their’ government.¹⁸ Critics of Government policies within the trade unions were attacked for eroding the workers’ confidence in ‘their’ government.¹⁹

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Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Contents Page
• List of Abbreviations Page
• List of Tables Page
• Preface Page
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 The Yorkshire Miners and the Labour Party, 1945-1963
• Chapter 2 The Yorkshire Miners and the Labour Government, 1964-1970. The Problem of Pit Closures
• Chapter 3 The Yorkshire Miners and the Labour Government: Pay, Politics and Protest
• Chapter 4 The Special Relationship: The Miners and the Labour Party
• Chapter 5 The Yorkshire Miners and Parliamentary Politics
• Chapter 6 The Internal Politics of the Yorkshire Area, 1947-1968
• Chapter 7 The Unofficial Strikes and the Rise of the Left, 1969-1973
• Chapter 8 The National Coal Strike of 1972
• Chapter 9 The National Coal Strike of 1974
• Chapter 10 The Left in Power
• Conclusions
• Appendices
• Bibliography
• Index