Building a Road to Nuclear Disarmament

Bridging the Gap Between Competing Approaches

Rizwana Abbasi

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9780367673963
• eBook ISBN: 9781000439625
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book while comprehending the contemporary global security environment, offers a new roadmap for nuclear disarmament by creating a balance between deterrence supporters and disarmament advocators.

The author identifies the divide between competing approaches such as traditional security-centric aspects and humanity-centered disarmament perspectives, tackling the complex question of how to balance some states' requirements for effective nuclear deterrence with other states' long-term desire for a nuclear-free world. The book explores how new technologies such as cyber and Artificial Intelligence advances are available to more countries than nuclear technology, and could level the playing field for weaker nuclear weapons states. It also looks into the issues which continue to be obstacles in the way of convincing the nuclear weapon states on nuclear disarmament presented in this volume. The author argues that the gap between states' security needs and disarmament aspirations can be bridged by building a new roadmap and creating new security environment.

This volume will be of great interest to students and scholars, researchers, policymakers, NGOs and members of the diplomatic community, in the fields of security studies, strategic studies and nuclear policy.

1

Nuclear disarmament

Tracing lessons from history

DOI: 10.4324/9781003131205-1

Introduction

The development of nuclear weapons by the United States (US), their use during the World War-II and further, proliferation led to generate extensive deliberations in the political and academic circles on the nature and role of nuclear weapons and concept of deterrence. American think tanks such as RAND and renowned scholars such as Brodie,¹ Shelling² and Wohlstetter³ made sizeable contribution to understand the importance of these weapons in war and peace times. Thus, the concept of deterrence was broadly discussed in the US strategic thinking, which correspondingly assisted the US and the former Soviet Union (now Russia) to develop their doctrinal plans, craft contingency strategies, deliberate on budgetary questions and understand significance of the arms negotiations. It can therefore be argued that the nuclear deterrence debate ushered in acceptance for nuclear weapons, which thus became a vital policy tool of some states’ national security. So, deterrence theory⁴ endeavoured to invert the normative association between deterrence and disarmament by asserting that nuclear weapons maintain peace and prevent war rather than promoting it.

Concurrent to the deterrence debate, efforts were being undertaken to legalize the prohibition on the proliferation, possession and employment of nuclear weapons.⁵ Subsequently, Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime evolved as a broad construct, comprising different treaties, conventions and arrangements, which assembled states to promote non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, arms control and disarmament. Some of these instruments are more formal while others are in the form of concurred guidelines that members accept or opt to disregard. The principles and values of the broader non-proliferation regime are: (a) to promote global peace and stability through cooperation and trust building; (b) to achieve security through restraint and not dominance; (c) to promote concept of shared security through compromises and (d) to promote rules-based criteria to achieve undiminished security for all.

More narrowly, in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, the NPT led to promote multilateral arrangements to limit the horizontal spread of all types of nuclear weapons including some of the conventional technologies. Arguably, states focus remained more on non-proliferation while less on disarmament.

In the arms control field, the paramount consideration was reduction of risks of a nuclear war and maintaining deterrence stability than the pursuit of genuine measures that could ultimately lead to the goal of nuclear disarmament. Most arms control agreements and arrangements related to the two superpowers, i.e. the US and Soviet Union (now Russia) with a few exceptions, there existed no multilateral forums on arms reduction at a global level. Although the arms control negotiations introduced stability between the US and Soviet Union but failed to build any impetus for disarmament debate. Even though, the nuclear disarmament deliberations evolved in parallel, on the UN forums (as discussed below), nevertheless states failed to come to consensus on the total elimination of nuclear weapons because of their political differences and nonexistence of treaty-based multilateral legal mechanism.

Sketching guiding posts from the above description, this chapter thematically builds three sections to explain the dynamics attached to nuclear disarmament process. The discussion in the leading section assesses the treaties that are aimed to promote non-proliferation of WMDs and conventional technologies and their impact on trust building process between NWS and NNWS on disarmament. The second section generates a debate on bilateral arms control arrangements between the US and Soviet Union, their effectiveness and impact on strategic stability and disarmament debate. The third section presents a holistic discussion on the UN-led disarmament forums asking why these forums failed to create a consensus on total elimination of nuclear weapons and that how failure of the disarmament process led to impact stability of the broader non-proliferation regime. Finally, this chapter draws lessons as to how some regimes had proven to be effective while other arrangements led to promote a crisis of trust between NWS and NNWS, thereby impacting states’ consensus to construct a clear road to disarmament.

Non-proliferation and disarmament of biological and chemical weapons and conventional arms control

This section examines the treaties and conventions relating to nuclear non-proliferation and evaluates the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the treaties asking why these instruments failed to achieve global consensus on disarmament. It then goes on to briefly overview the conventions and treaties related to disarmament and non-proliferation of biological, chemical and conventional weapons insofar as it is necessary to explore the linkages between nuclear disarmament and other categories of weapons asking how crisis in the nuclear order impacts the regimes related to other types of weapons and vice versa.

Non-proliferation: NPT-centric order affecting the disarmament process

The first institutional attempt to promote norms against proliferation of nuclear material was made with the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. The rationale was to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring ‘assistance provided by the IAEA or at its request, or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.’⁶ The IAEA established its Safeguards system to verify the non-diversion of nuclear materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the agency from peaceful uses to military purposes. In addition to verifying non-diversion commitments of recipients of nuclear technologies under the IAEA auspices, the statute also provided for application of Safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a state, to any of that state's activities in the field of atomic energy.⁷

Later, the NPT came into force in 1970, with a range of obligations for NWS and NNWS.⁸ It was established with the conviction that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would augment the threat of a nuclear war. Thus, the treaty required NWS not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives or control over such devices or assistance to NNWS (Article I). The treaty envisages the NNWS not to acquire, manufacture or seek assistance in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons or explosive devices (Article II). The treaty limited the number of NWS to the US, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and China. The rest of the states, party to the treaty relinquished the nuclear weapon option and in return received two commitments, i.e., the inalienable right to nuclear energy (Article IV) and an obligation on the part of NWS to end the arms race and dismantle their nuclear arsenals (Article VI). The treaty also gives party states the right to withdrawal by giving a three-month notice. Finally, the treaty also had provisions for review conferences to be held at five-year intervals and for an extension conference to be held 25 years after the treaty entered into force, to decide by a majority vote whether the treaty should be extended indefinitely, or not at all.

After it came into force, the NPT assigned the IAEA the responsibility of verifying its Safeguards system at the global level. Under Article IV.2 and Article III of the NPT, the IAEA verifies the implementation of non-proliferation obligations.⁹ Additionally, some other important informal measures had been introduced to strengthen the NPT norms and assist in coordination among its member states. In 1974, an intergovernmental group reckoned as Zangger Committee (ZAC) was established as the ‘faithful interpreter’ of the NPT Article III.2 (aimed at reaching a common understanding on the definition of equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material and the conditions and procedures that would govern the exports of such equipment or material), to harmonize the interpretation of nuclear export control policies for NPT parties. Subsequently, the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) later renamed from its original name London Group (an offshoot of the NPT) emerged in response to 1974 Indian explosions with the purpose of halting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The aim was to reinforce the NPT's Article III and IV to ascertain that transfer of nuclear material would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycles and nuclear explosive activities. Moreover, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) were introduced to ensure regulation of the ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be employed for chemical, biological and nuclear attacks and conventional arms and dual-use technologies, respectively. These informal measures had been introduced to strengthen the NPT norms and facilitate coordination among its member states.

Commenting on the NPT construct, Futter argued, ‘The NPT was setup with more of a focus on anti-proliferation rather disarmament, reflecting the geopolitical realities of the late 1960s. In terms of disarmament, the problem has always been a reluctance on the part of the five recognized nuclear weapons states to fully disarm, and of course the fact that four more nuclear armed states now reside outside the treaty.’¹⁰ The NPT-based construct, elucidated above, had proven to be partially successful in order to attain nuclear non-proliferation goals, whereas failed to make advancement on nuclear disarmament. For example, while focusing on its successes, President Kennedy's prediction in 1963 that 15–20 states would get nuclear weapons by 1964¹¹ has not yet come to pass. The underlined features determine that the NPT somehow played a central role to stabilize the global nuclear order. Firstly, since inception, the NPT's membership (currently 191) has strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation process. Secondly, majority of the countries – the NNWS – are steadfast to not manufacture nuclear weapons, including states like South Africa, Brazil and Argentina which once possessed or considered to procure nuclear weapons renounced it and subsequently joined the NPT as NNWS. Nearly, 110 NNWS party to the nuclear-weapon-free zones have accepted legal obligations not to build or possess/control any nuclear explosive devices on their territories. Although it was a voluntary choice of these countries to stay nuclear-free due to their belief that nuclear weapons cause destruction, these states’ adherence to the NPT added value to the credibility of the treaty. Additionally, some voluntary movements such as anti-war movements and humanitarian initiatives (discussed in the subsequent chapter) on disarmament have led to create normative support to the NPT on its nuclear non-proliferation goals.

Despite its successes, the NPT is under deep stress due to the following reasons. Firstly, under the NPT, only five signatories are considered as recognized NWS, while the rest are regarded as NNWS and are barred from acquiring nuclear weapons. This special arrangement legitimizes the continuous possession of nuclear weapons by five NWS and endorses disarmament of the unarmed states which creates a deep division between NWS and NNWS. Secondly, while placing the obligation on NWS to stop the nuclear arms race, and eventually abolish the nuclear weapons completely, Article VI of the NPT fails to specify the exact timeline or a verification mechanism on disarmament. Some view the stationing of nuclear warheads by NWS on the territories of NNWS states as violation of article obligation of NWS. This evidently overburdened NNWS for upholding their obligations to non-proliferation instead of putting emphasis on NWS for their commitments to disarm. Such noticeable perception has led to prove that the NPT is principally focused on preserving the interests of the P-5 states and that has raised global criticism on the regime's discriminatory construct.

Third, challenge relates to the treaty's non-universality, that is, India, Israel and Pakistan (nuclear possessor states) have never joined the NPT. India (tested nuclear devices first in 1974 and later in 1998) and Pakistan (followed the Indian tests in 1998) developed nuclear arsenals and declared themselves to be NWS, while Israel has maintained the policy of ‘nuclear opacity’ since 1968. After 1968, when NPT allocated benefits entirely to the five NWS, India also asked for a fair share of power within the international nuclear order. The challenge of universality was further deepened by North Korea, which previously joined the NPT but later withdrew in 2003 and tested nuclear devices many times since 2006 despite global sanctions.¹² The NPT is under serious pressure in the backdrop of North Korean behaviour,¹³ particularly after the detonation of its hydrogen bomb and induction of ICBMs.¹⁴ There have been lingering concerns that North Korea's behaviour may threaten states like South Korea and Japan, with advanced nuclear weapons development capabilities to opt for nuclear deterrence. In the case of such concerns translating into reality, the NPT regime could lose its worth. Iran presents yet another challenge to the NPT. In the backdrop of the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreement and subsequent steps taken by Iran¹⁵ inconsistent with the JCPOA thresholds, Iran might follow the North Korean steps while creating further dent for the NPT. Andrew said, ‘there are nine nuclear weapons states which do not want to give up nuclear weapons for their security or other reasons while four of them do not ad...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Nuclear disarmament: Tracing lessons from history
• 2 Competing approaches: Identifying the gaps
• 3 Contemporary security environment: New technologies and nuclear disarmament
• 4 Bridging the gap: Creating a new security environment for nuclear disarmament
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index