Technological developments in the last two centuries have provoked a number of revisions and corrections to a transactional model of contract law that is predicated on a subjective meeting of minds and gives effect to the intentions of the parties. First, subjectivism gave way to a more objective approach; secondly, reasonableness impinged on intention; and, thirdly, the public policy limits on freedom of contract were materially extended.6 Thus, when contract law abandoned a pure transactional theory of contractual rights and obligations in favour of an objective theory of agreement, this served to shield carriers against otherwise crippling claims for compensation (when valuable packages were lost or when there were accidents on the railways); and when, in the middle years of the last century, a mass consumer market for new technological products (cars, televisions, kitchen appliances and so on) was developing, a fundamental correction to freedom and sanctity of contract was needed to protect consumers against the small print of suppliersâ standard terms and conditions.
While these modifications to the law reflected some disturbance to the surface of legal doctrine, a deeper disruption was also taking place. This deeper disruption was to traditional coherentist thinking, for coherentism now found itself in tension with a quite different form of legal reasoning â one that was represented by regulatory instrumentalist thinking.7 These two forms of legal thinking and the tension between them are elaborated in this part of the chapter.
A.Coherentism
For present purposes, we can treat coherentist thinking as being defined by the following five characteristics.8
First, for coherentists, what matters above all is the integrity and internal consistency of legal doctrine. This is viewed as desirable in and of itself. Secondly, coherentists are not concerned with the fitness of the law for its regulatory purpose. Thirdly, coherentists approach new technologies by asking how they fit within existing legal categories (and then try hard to fit them in). Fourthly, coherentists believe that legal reasoning should be anchored to guiding general principles of law. In the case of questions about the enforcement or non-enforcement of transactions, the foundational principles are that parties should be free to make their own deals and that it is the fact that parties have freely agreed to a deal that justifies holding them to the bargain. Fifthly, the function of private law, together with its guiding principles, is largely concerned with ex post correction and compensation.
Coherentism is thus the natural language of litigators and judges, who seek to apply the law in a principled way.9 It is also the default mode of thinking for many lawyers who take it that being trained âto think like a lawyerâ is synonymous with being trained to apply general principles of law to situations and phenomena both familiar and novel.10
So, for example, developments in modern biotechnology have raised questions about the patentability of products and processes the working of which cannot be demonstrated by taking model machines into patent offices;11 and these same developments, like developments in both information technology and blockchain, have raised questions about the way in which fundamental concepts and distinctions in property law map onto a range of âthingsâ, such as cell lines,12 gametes,13 personal data14 and cryptoassets.15
However, according to Edward Rubin, the days of coherentism are numbered. Nowadays, Rubin claims, we live in the age of modern administrative states where the law is used âas a means of implementing the policies that [each particular state] adopts. The rules that are declared, and the statutes that enact them, have no necessary relationship with one another; they are all individual and separate acts of will.â16 In the modern administrative state, the âstandard for judging the value of law is not whether it is coherent but rather whether it is effective, that is, effective in establishing and implementing the policy goals of the modern stateâ.17
In contrast to such modern regulatory thinking, coherentism presupposes a world of, at most, leisurely change. It is not geared for making agile responses to rapidly emerging and highly disruptive technologies. When they are called on to respond to new technological developments, lawyers who reason like coherentists tend to try to classify the new phenomena within existing legal categories. For example, while the initial response to embryonic e-commerce was clearly driven by a regulatory concern that e-transactions should be legally recognised and supported, there was, and still is, a distinctly coherentist response that tries to apply the legal template for offline contracts and the principles of contract law to the emerging world of online transactions.18
Similarly, in the case of blockchain, one of the principal topics of coherentist conversation is whether a smart contract is to be regarded as, in principle, a legally enforceable contract (as per the law of contract).19 To be sure, some of the examples that might be given to illustrate the nature of smart contracts do not sit easily with the template for fiat contracts. Nevertheless, even with unhelpful examples out of the way, there will still be some puzzlement. In particular, coherentists will wonder where we find the offer, the acceptance and the consideration when all that we have is a piece of software that is coded to transfer a specified value from Aâs wallet to Bâs wallet on the occurrence of some specified event. Moreover, because the technology is designed to guarantee that, on the occurrence of the specified event, the value is duly transferred from A to B, coherentists will wonder whether it is possible to apply doctrines that allow for the avoidance of a transaction â for example, doctrines such as duress and undue influence, or misrepresentation â to a smart contract; or how, in the event that the technology fails to perform, we should determine whether there has been a breach (and, if so, how we are to decide upon the nature of the breach and the appropriate remedy).20 Furthermore, coherentists will doubt that a smart contract can be viewed as a contract when the terms and conditions are not written in natural language and when there are no humans in the blockchain loop. To the coherentist, the idea that a smart contract can be likened to an agreement for the supply of goods or services (the staple of the law of contract) will be perplexing indeed.21