Mountain Commandos at War in the Falklands

The Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre in Action During the 1982 Conflict

Rodney Boswell

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781526791634
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

A former Royal Marine provides a vividly detailed, firsthand account of Mountain Commando operations in the Falklands War. On June 8th, 1982, eight Royal Marines infiltrated Goat Ridge in East Falkland, a rocky hilltop surrounded by Argentine infantry. From their hiding place just meters away from the enemy, they gathered essential intelligence for a British assault that overwhelmed the Argentine defenses days later. This is just one example of the missions undertaken by the Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre during the Falklands War, all of which are described in graphic detail in Rod Boswell's eyewitness account. Using his own recollections and those of his comrades, he describes their operations in the Falklands: the observation posts set up in the no man's land between San Carlos and Port Stanley; the raid at Top Malo House; and the reconnaissance patrols they carried out close to the Argentine lines during the conflict. His first-hand account gives a fascinating insight into the operational skills of a small, specially trained unit and shows the important contribution it made to the success of the British advance. This chronicle also records the entire experience of the Falklands War from their point of view, from the long voyage south through the Atlantic to the landings, the advance, and the liberation of Stanley.

Chapter 1

M&AW Cadre

(April 1980–April 1982)

After completing the winter deployment of 1980, I finished my time with the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) where I had been the tame Royal Marine officer on exchange. I left the Prince of Wales’s Own Regiment of Yorkshire (PWO) where I had been the operations officer for two years and drove to Arbroath to take over as OC M&AW Cadre (known as the Cadre) from Captain David Nicholls. David had been the OC for the previous three years and was a very professional ML and skilled infantry soldier with a lot of combat experience, so I knew I was taking over a well-oiled machine. My new sergeant major was Warrant Officer 2 (WO2) Brian Snowdon, a man I knew by reputation as a fine professional, capable and knowledgeable ML. He had been the Recce Tp sergeant in 41 Cdo when I was in 40 Cdo. In his own words,

Sitting in my office in May 1980, a figure appeared at the office door dressed in civvies. I said ‘Who the hell are you?’ The reply came, ‘I’m the new OC’ and from that moment onwards we forged a tremendous working relationship and friendship with the same aim to create an operational unit. The OC, myself and TQ [Tactical Quartermaster, Colour Sergeant Everett Young] formed a great working relationship, that is, apart from the OC’s driving.

I received a tremendous handover from David Nicholls. The sting in the tail (and the last snippet he passed on) was that the Corps was very short of ML2s and it had been decided that in 1980 the Cadre would run two ML2 courses, the first starting in May and the second at the normal time in September. This was a double blow for me, meaning that my initial plan to start changing the Cadre’s courses and preparing for an operational role would have to be delayed because of the requirement for the entire Cadre to be involved in ML2 training. It also meant that my intention to start the build-up of ancillary skills required for the new role would have to be delayed. The NCOs needed to attend the courses would all be involved in the ML2 course training until at least April 1981.

I learned very early on that I had joined a group of MLs whose attitude towards a future operational role was very close to mine. They mostly fully agreed with my future plans for the Cadre. This was a great boost to me as I had not been at all sure how my ideas would be taken. But I should have expected the quality of the ML personnel to shine through and, of course, it did. Brian Snowdon again:

Having rejoined the Cadre in May 1979 as sergeant major it was without doubt the pinnacle of my career. However, I believed the Cadre was perceived as a ‘private climbing club’ and had lost the vast military potential it was capable of. After all, the Commando Recce Troops were largely made up of ML officers and NCOs and most of the Marines went on from Recce Troops to either become MLs or to join the SBS (Special Boat Service) or other specialist recce organisations. My ambition was to change this perception and introduce the operational role as I believed in the Cadre having a military capability as the brigade Recce Troop.

Very early on in our working relationship I called a meeting of all the SNCOs within the Cadre and laid out my intentions for my time as the OC. I was absolutely delighted that my plans were given unanimous support by those in attendance. Unfortunately, my immediate plan to begin altering the content of the ML2 and ML1 courses had to be put on the back-burner because of the need for an additional ML2 course. However, we were able to spend valuable time pooling knowledge and contacts for when we would start fully on the preparations which we intended to begin in April 1981.

At that time Major General Jeremy Moore MC and Bar was commanding Commando Forces. He had taken me through training when he was OC of the Officers’ Training Wing and he was also the brigade commander when I had been the Recce Tp commander in 40 Cdo RM. After my meeting in October 1979 with his chief of staff Colonel Julian Thompson, General Moore and Colonel Thompson had discussed the future operational role for the Cadre. As a result, the Cadre was included within the final NATO exercise at the end of the winter deployment to the Arctic, where they carried out a number of patrol and observation tasks that put all their skills to the test. As usual during the winter deployment the Cadre was sent to all the units of the brigade to provide the expert skills for them to perform well in Arctic conditions. Again, quoting Brian Snowdon,

Most importantly, at the end of the Clockwork training [winter deployment] the Cadre began involvement in the final brigade/ NATO exercises providing long-range patrols and having a presence within the command and control at Brigade HQ. This was a major turning-point in the Cadre’s future as we had the capability to carry out long-range deep penetration patrols. During Clockwork 80 I was deployed to train the Royal Engineers. During training we had a visit from General Moore, who was having lunch ‘in the field’ with a group of NATO VIPs. I was informed by his aide-de-camp* (ADC) that I was requested to attend and to sit next to the general. Moments before I sat down the ADC said, ‘This is your chance to put your case for an official operational role directly to the general’, and he would be taking notes of the meeting. Shortly after [I sat] down, the general quite casually turned to me and said ‘I believe you have some suggestions about the future of the Cadre?’ I believe from that moment on his staff officers were taking what we were trying to achieve seriously.

Although in May 1980 I was unable to progress my plans because of the additional workload, I started showing our intention to alter the perceived opinions within the Corps that we were just a ‘bunch of professional climbers’. This perception I always found rather odd but put it down to the fact that the majority of non-climbers considered that people who liked to climb must be short of common sense and thus were not true soldiers! This was so far from the truth that it required considerable patience when dealing with some of my contemporaries. I remember on one occasion, when we were preparing to go to the Alps for our annual high altitude training period, telephoning the relevant staff officer in London to ask his permission to purchase glacier cream and glacier glasses for use in the snow in order to protect our faces and eyes from the glare and reflection. His response was extraordinary. He told me that he was ‘not going to pay for sunglasses and sun-cream for our holiday in the Alps and if we needed such kit, we should pay for it ourselves’. I could not explain the need for the kit in any way that he could comprehend so I had to be a little creative and got the stores through the medical squadron, who did at least understand the medical need for eye and skin protection at high altitudes with full snow cover. This may seem rather petty, but it was the sort of problem that I had to deal with almost daily.

Having taken over command and set the wheels in motion for a very busy year, I started to plan the requirements of the year ahead (1981 and onwards). My first thought was that if we were to become a part of the brigade order of battle, then we needed to be close to Brigade HQ. Being stationed in Arbroath and reporting to a general in Portsmouth for the training side of the job and to a brigadier in Plymouth for the operational side of the job was not going to work as we needed to be ‘in plain sight’. I sent a formal letter to HQ Commando Forces requesting relocation of the Cadre from Arbroath to Plymouth, and explained the need to reduce travel costs and accommodation requirements as well as gaining easier access to air transport for both Norway and the European Alps. My suggestion was rejected out of hand on the grounds that Arbroath was closer to the mountains of Scotland and Norway and thus we were in the best possible location and should remain there. I was flabbergasted but realised that it was just the sort of ill-educated response that I should have expected from the current beliefs of the more senior officers of the Corps at that time. Fortunately, one of the members of the 3 Cdo Bde staff was a very old friend, Captain Phil Wilson, who telephoned me before I had a chance to do something I would later regret; he told me to wind my neck in, and gave me some outstanding advice. He told me that he knew what I was trying to achieve but the best way to do it was to let him have a go from his end first and await developments. Phil was (and is) a great student of the human condition. He said that the best thing to do was for him to send an order for the Cadre to reconsider its geographical location and consider a move further south and nearer the main part of the operational Corps in Plymouth. I should sit on this for a month or two, then send back a casual response stating that we were very happy in Arbroath and had no desire whatsoever to move south. Phil had realised that my early request had been dealt with by the administrative/logistic part of HQ Commando Forces and not the operational side. There was no way therefore that the exchange of letters had ‘crossed the floor’, as it were. In due course I received the formal letter. I waited about six weeks and sent a very casual reply saying that we were very happy in Arbroath and had no desire to leave there at all. The order to prepare to move to Plymouth returned at great speed, signed by the brigade chief of staff! I bought Phil a few beers on the strength of that bit of advice. At last the wheels were rolling and more importantly I knew I had friends in the right places to help with our plans.

At the first Cadre future operations role planning meeting I held we discussed a range of topics, especially the future operational role. I realised that we had to produce a fait accompli. We had to be able at some stage to say to Brigade HQ that we were able to put several fully prepared and trained operational teams in the field. These teams had to be able to get anywhere we were asked to put them (mobility skills), to stay covert through practice and knowledge of the terrain (actual fighting skills) and, more importantly, to report everything we were able to observe (signals skills). Each team needed to be independent and self-sufficient, so additional and superior medical skills would also be necessary. In addition, we had to ensure that all MLs were fully combat ready as prone-to-capture troops and were all given proper resistance to interrogation training.

I knew that I could not arrange for some of these requirements without help from friends within the various services. During my last tour in Northern Ireland I had worked very closely with some of the special Recce Tps and I contacted one or two of them and asked if there was any way I could get places on the Special Forces (SF) signals courses. I had to call in a few favours but was able to negotiate a swap: a couple of places on the ML2 courses in return for up to six of my corporals being sent on the SF signals course. My attempts to achieve medical training were less successful. I ended up dealing with the Medical Squadron, whose staff could not have been more helpful but they were unable to get us on the full SF medical course on the grounds that we were not SF. Fair enough!

By the spring of 1981 we were back to the normal routine for the Cadre. We had also begun to prepare for the operational role in much more detail. I tasked Sergeant Des Wassall, who had just joined the staff, to set up a study team to arrange a six-week long-range patrol course for Cadre staff. It was to begin in early May and be completed by mid-June, before we started our preparations for the Alps. This he did, and we then started the preparations for coordinating the operational role within the ML2 and ML1 courses for late 1981. The plan was that the two courses would finish at the end of March 1982 with a formal operational readiness exercise. The ML1 students would act as team commanders to ML2 students and the exercise would involve a classic long-range patrol exercise across the Highlands of Scotland, culminating in a raid and tactical withdrawal by aircraft back to base. We had already altered the Inner Hebrides survival phase to include resistance to interrogation training, and proper patrol exercises in Norway now included longer distance skiing and actual observation post (OP) tasks along the routes. Reporting and planning were within the exercise briefs so that the ML2s who qualified in April 1981 were far better prepared for this role than any graduates from previous courses.

By Easter 1981 it was my belief that the Cadre was ready to go to Brigade HQ and offer the ability to provide four operational teams plus a unit HQ. This would give the brigade commander the ability to stretch beyond the immediate tactical reach of his Commando Recce Tps, while remaining well inside the strategic reach of SF. At no time was there any suggestion that we wished to interfere with the SF role, nor was there any feeling in the Cadre that the way ahead was to become SF. Our best efforts were aimed at providing a Parachute Brigade-type brigade patrol troop (BPT), giving the brigade commander additional competent and capable troops for operations only.

During the period April 1980 to April 1981 I was mostly employed running the ML1 and two ML2 courses whilst laying the groundwork for offering the brigade commander the option as above. By April 1981 Brigade HQ was seriously considering the proposal to move the Cadre to the south coast and the decision was made that we would move to Plymouth after Easter leave in 1982. I went to Plymouth to carry out a recce of a new location in late May 1981. Brigadier Julian Thompson had taken over command of the brigade and he was entirely on side. I was able to see a more relevant way ahead for the Cadre, with a more significant future for the branch as a whole. In periods where money was dominating all aspects of planning, it was totally unacceptable to have a training unit in the brigade, however specialised and well trained, with no operational role. Forming a specialist operational unit at very little cost to the brigade was clearly the way ahead.

Easter 1981 was also a significant time for me personally. Immediately after Easter leave my new administrative officer (AO) arrived. His presence immediately reduced my workload by about a third and my CSM’s workload by about a half. My predecessor, Captain David Nicholls, had forwarded a formal request for an AO and it had been approved. We had discussed it in our handover but neither of us was very optimistic about how soon it would happen. The arrival of Lieutenant Jon Young was a godsend, and it could not have happened at a more appropriate time. Jon was a Special Duties officer who had been a signaller when he was an NCO. His skills in that area were priceless. He was also an intelligent, competent and able administrator and very quickly became an important cog in the Cadre’s wheel. He found many of our ways very strange and an early misunderstanding caused us to cross swords. He asked if there was any reason why he should climb as part of his job. I explained that his job was to drive the office and to be our ‘base commander’ in my absences, which were many. If he wished to climb, he was very welcome to do so, as that was what we did. From this he inferred that it was somehow a test of his resolve, and so at the very first opportunity he insisted on joining a climb. There are many people to whom climbing is the staff of life. Jon is not one of them. When we started the night climbing phase, he came to me and asked if he really had to night climb. I was horrified because I then realised that we were not working off the same sheet, and he was working up to asking for a transfer. He did not perceive that he was already providing the service he was employed to provide. We had a proper ‘clear the air’ session and agreed that if he wished to climb for pleasure, he could at any time, but he did not need to climb for work at all. From that moment on we got on like a house on fire. He became a very good friend and served the Cadre with distinction for his entire tour.

Shortly after Jon’s arrival I had more time for my real job of commanding the Cadre rather than administering it. This gave me more opportunities to work on my plan for a proper operational role and things began moving ahead rather well.

It was at about this time that a new staff officer arrived at Brigade HQ. Major Hector Gullan was a Parachute Regiment officer seconded to the Royal Marines for a two-year tour. He had served with the SAS and was a very competent soldier. He had heard of the Cadre and visited us early on to get a feel for our capabilities. He and I became good friends, and remain so. His keenness to help was an important part in the next phase of the Cadre’s growth into an operational role. Hector was a proper soldier and a serious volunteer to work in Commando Forces. He believed that all the soldiers serving in the Royal Marines or the Parachute Brigade were from the same stock and he very much wished to experience working with them all. Once he had visited us in Norway, he became a steadfast supporter of both the Cadre and its need for a proper operational role. It was largely due to Hector’s influence that we were able to get students on the SF signals courses in exchange for seats on the ML2 courses. The first SF student sent to the ML2 course in 1980 was superb and came very close to being selected top student. However, it was to Hector that I went when I realised I would have to remove one of the two SF students from the next ML2 course because he was not up for the challenge. The first student on that course had taken a serious fall and broken his leg whilst climbing in North Wales and had to be released. However, the second student was coasting and taking every opportunity to avoid getting fully involved in the course, so I needed him to be removed. Had he been a Royal Marine it would have been an easy decision but I was worried about the politics and called Hector for advice. His response was exactly what was needed. He asked one question: ‘If he was a Royal Marine would you get rid of him?’ My answer was ‘Yes, absolutely.’ He replied, ‘In which case send him home but I wish to speak to him first.’ Hector attended the orderly room where I gave the soldier his marching orders. This was greeted with some contempt, to the extent that Hector asked me to allow him to speak to the student in private. After this discussion the student was returned to the UK (we were in Norway at the time) the next day. I found out subsequently that his service in the SAS was also terminated on his return to the regiment.

By September 1981 the preparations for the modified ML1 and ML2 courses were complete and we started them with the twin aims of providing ML qualified personnel who were also properly prepared soldiers to fit into a brigade patrol troop organisation. I was hoping that I could get interest from on high towards the end of the two courses so that I could then go ahead and formally propose an operat...