The 1945 Burma Campaign and the Transformation of the British Indian Army

Raymond Callahan, Daniel Marston

• Publisher: University Press of Kansas
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9780700630424
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World War II
• Index: History

In 1945, the Indian British XIV Army inflicted on the Imperial Japanese Army in Burma the worst defeat in its history. That campaign, the most brilliant and original operational maneuver conducted by any British general in the twentieth century, largely forgotten until now, is a full and fresh account utilizing a full range of materials, from personal accounts to archival holdings—including the bits the official historians left out, such as the attempt by a jealous British Guards officer to have Slim sacked at the conclusion of the campaign.After the retreat from Burma in 1942, Lieutenant General Sir William Slim, commander of the British XIV Army, played a crucial role in the remarkable military renaissance that transformed the Indian Army and then, with that reborn army, won two defensive battles in 1944, and in the 1945 campaign shredded his Japanese opponents. Behind this dramatic story was another: the war marked the effective end of the Raj. This great transformation was, of course, brought about by many factors but not the least of them was the "Indianization" of the Indian Army's officer corps under the pressure of war. As Slim's great victory signposted the change from the army Kipling knew to a modern army with a growing number of Indian officers, the praetorian guard of the Raj evaporated. "Every Indian officer worth his salt is a nationalist, " the Indian Army's commander-in-chief, Claude Auchinleck, said as the XIV Army took Rangoon.The Burma campaign may not have contributed in a major fashion to the final defeat of Japan, but it was of first-rate importance in the transformation of South Asia, as well as underlining the continuing importance of inspired leadership in complex human endeavors.

1

A Professional Force

The XIV Army at the End of 1944

In most of the literature on the Burma campaign, General Slim is seen as the main architect and embodiment of the victories of 1945. While Slim and his commanders have much to be proud of, and had an important role in the final victories, the XIV Army as an institution was the true instrument of the Imperial Japanese Burma Area Army’s defeat.

The XIV Army’s victories of 1945 were underpinned by a series of reforms across its own home base, GHQ India, and the Indian Army as a whole. Those foundational reforms occurred during the Second World War, and the introduction summarizes some of the key tactical reforms that occurred from 1942 to 1944. This chapter will cover some other key reforms, such as recruitment and officer expansion, as well as the tactical and organizational changes that occurred in the autumn of 1944.¹ Without these reforms, including recruiting enough volunteers from South Asia to create the largest all-volunteer army in history, and the need and desire for Indian officers to fill command and leadership positions, the outcome in 1945 could have been very different. With the reforms, Slim and the XIV Army command created a strongly forged sword with which to strike the Japanese Burma Area Army.

It would be difficult to overstate how far-reaching and fundamental were the changes to the Indian Army in the Second World War. By the end of 1944, it had become a highly professional and modern force that included in its ranks representatives of ethnic groups that had traditionally been ignored as “nonmartial.” Indian commissioned officers (ICOs) and emergency Indian commissioned officers (EICOs) were in positions of command on the battlefield, units were integrated and cohesive, and the army as a whole had played the leading role in the destruction of the Imperial Japanese Army in Burma. In almost every way, the Indian Army of late 1944—battle-seasoned, imbued with regimental esprit de corps, and above all victorious—was a different force from the one that suffered crippling defeats in the difficult early days of the Second World War in Burma and Malaya.

Through all the upheaval of the war years, the XIV Army’s officers and men kept focused on the need to learn from the mistakes that were inevitable for any force finding itself in new situations and environments with inexperienced personnel. The XIV Army had a number of teething troubles as it grew in strength and experience, but it was always able to point with pride to its ability to learn from mistakes and adapt to conditions. Postbattlefield assessment was one of its hallmarks.

By the end of 1944, the Indian Army had reached a level of performance characterized by consistent and reliable professionalism in an impressive variety of types and theaters of warfare.² This success, particularly in contrast to earlier defeats in Malaya and Burma, reinforced the army’s perceptions of itself as a truly professional force, and bolstered esprit de corps throughout the war.³ The Burma campaign, which had begun as the longest retreat in British military history, ended in July 1945 as the Imperial Japanese Army’s most conclusive defeat, with the XIV Army playing the central role. It was a spectacular reversal of the events of 1942. The reforms of recruitment and officer expansion went hand in hand with the tactical- and operational-level reforms that occurred on the battlefields of Assam and Burma. The main engine for such radical changes was ultimately senior Indian Army leadership, led by officers such as Auchinleck, Slim, and Savory. As Raymond Callahan noted:

The rebuilding of the Indian Army and Slim’s Arakan and Imphal victories were demonstrations of the aggressive determination and imaginative leadership Churchill had always called for and so frequently lamented. But those qualities were being displayed by an army he had always undervalued and in a campaign he had never wanted to fight. . . . It [the Indian Army] had remade itself by 1944 and 1945, perhaps in some ways aided by the quasi autonomy that allowed Auchinleck, Savory, Slim, and many others to get on with the business of forging a battleworthy weapon, with few interventions from above. . . . The war in Burma was the war the Indian Army had, and it got on with preparing to win it, accepting whatever new structures or doctrines were necessary. It seems safe to predict that Slim’s campaigns will be deemed examples of the military art far longer than of Monty’s victories.⁴

Recruitment and Indianization of the Army du...