A Bloody Business

America's War Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq

Gerry Schumacher

• Publisher: Zenith Press
• Year: 2006
• ISBN:
  9781610600682
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire moderne

As the U.S. Army shrinks, a private army steps into the breach. A Bloody Business offers an unprecedented look behind the scenes and into the ranks of this mercenary force (numbering as many as 15, 000 today) who guard supply convoys, train foreign soldiers, provide security for foreign leaders and dignitaries—and whose workplaces are the most dangerous hot spots on the planet. With its insights into who these men are, what drives them, where they come from, how they prepare, and what they do, this book provides a uniquely close-up and complete picture of the private army behind America's military muscle. The author interviewed security contractors and their families, high-ranking coalition officials, and was in Iraq, where he witnessed how private soldiers fought ambushes, trained Iraqi forces, escorted high-level officials in dangerous conditions, and saw the contractor side of the Iraq war. Includes action on the supply lines and front lines of this unique conflict, and the stories of the contractors who live it every day.

Chapter 1

The Growth of War Zone Contractors

When the U.S. government experiences battlefield deficiencies, it proposes institutional, organizational, and training changes that take years to implement. But the U.S. public seems to want quicker, easier solutions than the military can deliver. The political pressure to keep wars short is intense, and capitalist business practices tend to emphasize efficiency—in other words, quick and easy solutions. Perhaps, then, the merger of war and business would inevitably lead to the employment of more and more war zone contractors.

Capitalists are one step ahead of our government’s request for assistance. Unlike government institutions, a business has an obligation to make profits for its shareholders and investors. In the constant pressure to act in the best financial interest of the firm, they must fulfill contractual obligations efficiently or go out of business.

The U.S. government has proven to be less than agile in adapting to wars that don’t go its way. In Vietnam, we were surprised by the resiliency of the enemy, the lack of support for a corrupt South Vietnamese government, the level of empathy for the North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, and our failure to understand the needs of the people. This shortsightedness generated opportunities for contractors to fix the problems our government had not anticipated. As the war progressed, we hired more and more contractors for infrastructure construction, political development, agricultural enhancements, education, intelligence collection, and combat-support activities. When the United States was a day late and more than a few dollars short, contractors picked up the slack.

In Iraq, the United States was once again caught off guard by the scope and dimension of the counterinsurgency battle and the requirements of that dirty word the administration doesn’t like to use—nation-building. Assumptions about the availability of oil revenues, active support of the Iraqi people, and the limitations of outside groups to influence events were entirely incorrect.

For some reason, pundits and politicians in Washington seemed surprised by the lack of active post-war support. Much of this lack of support can be attributed to the U.S. abandonment of an Iraqi uprising a few years earlier, adding to an already blemished track record from Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. Once again, civilian contractors were required to fill a void in government planning. It is often stated that the U.S. government is always prepared to fight the last war. In fact, our preparedness is worse than that. We are not prepared to fight even the last war. The U.S. government is prepared to fight only a World War II–style conflict. With the exception of our combat action on behalf of the tiny island of Grenada in the fall of 1983, it’s a stretch to call any conflict since the end of World War II a victory for U.S. forces.

Even the first Gulf conflict, where we soundly defeated Saddam Hussein on the battlefield, the United States did not win the war; we won only a series of battles. Iraqi soldiers may have left Kuwait, but Iraq and Saddam continued to be a threat to world peace. To keep them out of Kuwait and under some semblance of control, we had to conduct combat air patrols up to and through the next set of battles: the second Gulf war. The number of years it will take the U.S. government to adjust to its own deficiencies is anyone’s guess.

In the meantime, war zones continue to present opportunities for enterprising businesses. The resurgence of contractors is both a reflection of the changing nature of war and the inability of nations to adjust. While the magnitude of contractor employment is on the rise, the history of contractors is legendary. Following the death of Alexander the Great, the Greeks employed mercenaries to advance Hellenistic civilization. In 755, the Chinese T’ang Dynasty was nearly overthrown by mercenaries from Indian pastoral tribes. England used Flemish mercenaries for several decades in the twelfth century. In the sixteenth century, the Pope employed the Swiss Cantons, now called the Swiss Guards, who made available more than fifteen thousand of the finest warriors of their time. So good were they in battle that the Pope titled them, “The Defenders of the Church of Freedom.”

In the American Revolutionary War, a group headed by none other than Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Harrison hired mercenaries to conduct intelligence operations overseas. The British hired more than thirty thousand mercenaries, many of them Germans, to fight against the colonists. In a twist of history, many German mercenaries switched sides and ultimately fought against the British. During the United States’ two great wars, the use of mercenaries declined, but in the early 1960s African nations incapable of defending themselves reinvigorated mercenary employment. At the same time, private contractors in Vietnam, such as Air America, were experiencing rapid growth.

Air America has roots in an organization formed in pre–World War II days. When Japan invaded China, a group of freelance pilots, called the American Volunteer Group, flew missions against the Japanese. Later this group, renamed the Civil Air Transport, supported Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalists in combat against Mao Zedong’s communists. Air America and its cousins by various names (Air Asia, Southern Air Transport, Civil Air Transport, etc.) flew operations in support of the French at the conclusive battle of Dien Bien Phu. All were U.S.-sponsored contractors assisting in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy, doing what contractors do: executing missions where U.S. military presence is not politically supportable.

During Vietnam, Presidents Johnson and Nixon repeatedly affirmed that there were no U.S. troops in Laos or Cambodia. However, neither of them are known to have denied that there were Air America contractors in Laos or Cambodia. The truth was that Air America helicopters and DC-3s were flying missions daily throughout those two countries. Air America was so commonplace in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia that one could identify their silver aircraft coming and going at nearly every airfield in the region. Only the most naïve visitors to Vietnam actually thought that Air America was a noncombatant civilian air transport company. Air America crews were running search-and-rescue missions to recover secret operatives and teams behind enemy lines. They were dropping food and ammunition to paid tribal mercenaries. And they were dying on a daily basis.

During the first Gulf conflict, one in fifty personnel “in country” were American contractors. Many of them were involved in technical support and reconstruction of Kuwait. In the second Gulf conflict, that number rose to one in fifteen. Granted, part of that growth is due to the scope of nation-building activities launched after the end of major hostilities, as they were called. Nevertheless, the number of contractors in the second Gulf conflict is double that of the first conflict, with less than half the number of U.S. forces involved. In addition to the numbers of contractors, of particular note, are the dangers in unprecedented proportions that all contractors now face. Unlike Kuwait, which provided a secure environment for construction contractors, there are no safe environments in Iraq.

Countries with abundant natural resources and poorly trained, ill-equipped, and untrustworthy armies hire agencies such as Executive Outcomes to protect their wealth, or in some cases, to recover it. In exchange, security firms get a cut of the action. This resembles the classic mercenary profile, which has come into greater prominence in the last thirty years, especially in Africa. Africa’s contractors, some of whom are U.S. citizens, fit the stereotype of taking any side that will pay them well. Many of these contractors are former members of the South African army’s Buffalo Battalion, a notorious group with an unsavory reputation for perpetuating apartheid. Executive Outcomes insists that it performs work for only legitimate governments, but there are a fair number of skeptics to this claim.

The increased power of contracting firms in Africa and expansion into other businesses has been the subject of much controversy in the United Nations and elsewhere. Contractors have been accused of competing not just for contracts, but for vital interests protected by other firms in the less visible war behind the war. They are alleged to be wielding their influence and power to colonize nations. Some of these contracting agencies have even launched public relations campaigns to clean up their image.

To stem the flood of mercenary activity in Africa, several nations have passed laws prohibiting their citizenry from involvement in military actions outside their borders. In Zimbabwe, more than sixty mercenaries were imprisoned for a plot to overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea. Conversely, the requirements and opportunities in Africa for mercenaries continue to grow. Some are even being retained to shoot wildlife poachers. In spite of efforts to curtail contractor activity in Africa, the law of supply and demand will continue to drive a robust contracting business for many years to come.

By contrast, contractors conducting business on behalf of the U.S. government would like nothing more than to avoid the hit-man designation. That is not to say that the United States does not have a few mercenary-type contractors, nor is it beyond consideration that a foreign government might request mercenary services from a U.S. firm. This type of activity operates beneath the radar of public scrutiny, with good reason. If caught, they can kiss the possibility of future contracts—and their business—good-bye.

That said, some U.S. firms have a Teflon-like ability to conduct direct combat operations without leaving a telltale signature. Contractors’ slipperiness keeps them in business. For instance, the contracting agency involved in planning and executing Croatia’s successful campaign against the Serbs in the 1990s publicly denies any direct combat involvement to this day. Their explanation—training assistance—is hard to refute without any evidence. But the fact that some of these training exercises with Croatian forces turned into hostile encounters with the enemy hardly seems coincidental.

Construction and infrastructure contractors are the most diverse and come from every conceivable trade, skill, profession, avocation, and career. They are clerks, cooks, truck drivers, carpenters, bridge builders, engineers, machinists, communications specialists, computer technicians, utility installers, and oil drillers. For reasons known only to them, they are willing to risk life and limb in a war zone. They develop companionships similar to those typically found only in combat military units. Contractors share experiences on the Web, in chat rooms, and around their often abysmal living conditions. Even after returning home, they keep in touch with one another and on occasion host contractor reunions.

Military hardware has become exceedingly high tech. Units are equipped with computers, lasers, biological sniffers, mass spectrometers, robots, night-vision systems, people sensors, satellite radios, video recording equipment, and ground and aerial surveillance radar. Helicopters use advanced microchips and firing systems. High-tech gear is placed in the hands of the military years before the Department of Defense can develop the training programs to provide the required maintenance experts. Contractors are hired in droves to keep these critical battlefield devices operating. They live and work with the military units they support. There is constant pressure to reduce turnaround time on broken equipment. Increasingly, they are brought farther forward on the battlefield. The idea is to fix and repair as close to the user as possible. Increasingly, they are placed in harm’s way.

Civilian logistics, infrastructure, trucking, and technical contractors are caught in the conundrum of modern war. They are prohibited from carrying weapons. When the rules were made, war zones and the geographical employment of these contractors was perceived to be something different from the realities of counterinsurgency conflict now taking place in countries like Iraq. The law was meant to prevent contractors from losing legal protections afforded noncombatants and to reduce the chances that civilian contractors will shoot the wrong people. These prohibitions do not sufficiently resolve the environmental realities these men and women face. Today’s enemies do not respect a civilian’s noncombatant status. The enemy shoots civilian contractors as casually as they shoot soldiers.

When the military is unable to provide civilian truck convoys with even a token armed escort, as is often the case, the convoys must employ private security companies to protect their personnel, supplies, and vehicles. But with convoys frequently stretching long distances over winding roads, one or more segments might face enemy fire with escorts unaware or unable to respond.

The number and complexity of logistics and construction operations in Iraq stretches the army too thin to adequately provide daily protection to these activities, so utility and construction firms are forced to employ private security contractors. The war zone proliferates with civilians protecting civilians. These contractors quickly become streetwise to nuances of war, developing a keen sense of danger and planning for all contingencies.

The thought of having to shoot one’s way out of an impending ambush leaves many contractors on edge. Employees want to get home to their families, and it gets expensive for companies to replace the ones that get hurt. Fueled by survival instinct and simple economics to use the very best weaponry, protection, and employees, firms turn to ex-military and law enforcement personnel to give them the upper hand.

Former special forces, Navy Seals, Marine Force Recon, Air Force pararescue, and law enforcement personnel are flooded with opportunities to join the war zone contracting industry. Many become trainers, personal-security agents, and asset-protection guards. Security and training contractors often seek and receive permission to carry weapons. If they are not authorized to carry a personal firearm, they get around this limitation by theoretically having to conduct firearms training, twenty-four hours a day. They have been attacked while training police or military units or protecting their assignment. Under these conditions, they are authorized to use lethal force to subdue their attackers. And they do.

Although they are not official combatants and are not subject to the same law of war/armed conflict and rules of engagement as military personnel, they are restricted on the type of firearms they are authorized to carry. Theoretically, they will use weapons only in a self-defense mode. Other than the military and police-unit trainers, some contractors are not allowed to carry fully automatic weapons and some are restricted to handguns. These restrictions seem to change daily. This is yet another example of the U.S. government’s failure to adapt to new exigencies. On the other hand, weapons manufacturers are not so slow at the draw. They are one step ahead of government and have recently been offering personal sidearms that tread a fine line regarding these limitations yet provide the user with a higher level of accurate, lethal firepower.

John Karuza, a military training contractor, tells a story of weapons being acquired in an unconventional way. Karuza spent a year training Iraqi soldiers, who bonded with him as their teacher—a kind of bond Iraqis are known for, one that crosses cultural, ethnic, national, and religious borders.

While training the Iraqis, Karuza had not been authorized to carry a personal sidearm. By the time of his subsequent return to Iraq, the soldiers he and his fellow contractors had trained were in leadership positions. They confronted the U.S. military, demanding that their friend Karuza and his fellow contractors be properly armed. Their demands were nonnegotiable. The confrontation concluded with the U.S. Army coughing up about a hundred weapons.

The United States continually struggles to keep control in the war zone. But the government’s muddled bureaucracy is slow to recognize new developments and adapt accordingly. Politicians seem surprised by the organization, structure, and dynamics, or lack thereof, in the twenty-first-century war zone. The battlefield spirals out of control with insurgents armed to the teeth who mix with the Iraqi populace, with no telling friend from foe. Faced with the constant threat of being killed or captured, contractors have no illusions about a cavalry coming over the hill to rescue them. Self-sufficient and street-smart, many contractors, including truck drivers, technicians, and construction workers, have resorted to buying unauthorized weapons on the black market. It’s every man and woman for themselves.

It doesn’t do much good to fix training problems at the front lines, while leaving a country’s leadership unchanged. In Vietnam, we saw example after example of corrupt or incompetent mid- to senior-level leaders. In that country, much of the military and political leadership was not fit to lead or employ the civilians and soldiers in their charge. There was a breakdown of confidence at every level, with the South Vietnamese army’s morale in the toilet. The rural people were indifferent or opposed to the elected provincial and national leaders. To witness the void between Vietnam’s leadership and the people, one only had to wander into a thatched hut in some rural village or hamlet. In accordance with the law, each hut was adorned with framed photographs of their president. A common image showed him in a suit and tie standing next to a Lincoln Continental. Little wonder that peasants and farmers related more to Ho Chi Minh than the government we were there to support.

The U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense have done little training of advisors for local and regional officials and senior-level military officers of developing nations in the time since Vietnam. They have deemphasized counterinsurgency training and focused more on conventional combat tactics. Many post-Vietnam special forces units were deactivated, and funding for these types of units was severely curtailed. The basic premise of military thinking was that nation-building was not part of the U.S. military’s charter. Recently, the army has taken steps to expand the reserve component of civil affairs. But civil affairs soldiers remain limited in what they can do to help local civil, military, and law enforcement authorities in third world nations, and they know next to nothing about rebuilding decapitated militaries.

With the shortage of advisors, trainers, and strategic planners for these countries, it seems that the U.S. government has left these difficult tasks up to contract agencies. Firms like MPRI and SAIC have answered the call. Accordingly, the entrepreneurial vision of these companies has brought them a wealth of business in reconstruction and force development.

The president and founder of MPRI is former U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono. His right-hand man is retired General Ron Griffith, who, among his many distinguished assignments, was the army’s vice chief of staff and commander of the 1st Armored Division during the first Gulf conflict. They are surrounded on a daily basis by a support staff of high-level government employees and accomplished civilian and military professionals, many with offices in the State Department, Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense. It is fair to call them part of the Beltway establishment.

MPRI projected a need and delivered the expertise to train and advise both senior civilian and military leaders in several conflicts. They assist and review military, political, tactical, and strategic objectives. MPRI is under contract to advise leaders in dozens of countries. Former U.S. colonels and generals teach principles of military decision making and leadership; provide feedback from their field-level operators, both civil and military; and act as a conduit for communication between leadership levels for their counterparts.

Organizing elections, developing governmental agencies, managing economic growth, developing new trade relationships, and creating impartial judicial processes are complex, sensitive, and often alien endeavors to war-torn countries. When elected officials and candidates for office in Afghanistan and Iraq sought help in effectively communicating their messages to the people, U.S. advertising agencies came out of the woodwork, providing expertise and marketing savvy in a neutral—and sometimes clandestine—manner.

In January 2005, the Iraqi people were presented with a series of slick television ads that promoted unity among Iraq’s three major parties. One video clip portrayed Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds engaged in an angry exchange. Children from the three groups rush forward to hug one another. The adults in the video clip look on with embarrassment over their own prejudicial behavior. The ad ends with the message: “Divided, we won’t conquer.” No firm has stepped forward to take credit for the paid advertisements, and the stations themselves remain mum on the subject, but the skills behind them had all the hallmarks of a Madison Avenue ad agency.

U.S. law enforcement personnel, including senior officials such as former New York City Police Commissioner Berna...