Bourdieu and Social Space

Mobilities, Trajectories, Emplacements

Deborah Reed-Danahay

• Publisher: Berghahn Books
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781800736412, 9781789203530
• eBook ISBN: 9781789203547
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Cultural & Social Anthropology
• Index: Social Sciences

French sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu's relevance for studies of spatiality and mobility has received less attention than other aspects of his work. Here, Deborah Reed-Danahay argues that the concept of social space, central to Bourdieu's ideas, addresses the structured inequalities that prevail in spatial choices and practices. She provides an ethnographically informed interpretation of social space that demonstrates its potential for new directions in studies of mobility, immobility, and emplacement.  This book traces the links between habitus and social space across the span of Bourdieu's writings, and places his work in dialogue with historical and contemporary approaches to mobility.

CHAPTER
1

Bourdieu’s World-Making

To change the world, one has to change the ways of world-making, that is, the vision of the world and the practical operations by which groups are produced and reproduced.

—“Social Space and Symbolic Power” (1989c, 23)

Bourdieu viewed the power of world-making as symbolic power—that is, the imposition of a point of view and taken-for-granted understanding of the classifications, divisions, and groups in a society. Bourdieu’s concept of social space is inseparable from the related concepts of habitus, field, capital, and symbolic power.¹ These are the concepts that Bourdieu used to imagine the social world he analyzed in his writing. Bourdieu found an affinity between his idea of social space and the concept of world-making introduced by Nelson Goodman in his 1978 book Ways of Worldmaking. He began to cite Goodman after having publishing Distinction (1979b/1984a). In a lecture delivered in 1986 at the University of California, subsequently published in 1989 as “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” Bourdieu remarked:

In fact, there are always, in any society, conflicts between symbolic powers that aim at imposing the vision of legitimate divisions, that is, at constructing groups. Symbolic power, in this sense, is a power of “world-making.” “World-making” consists, according to Nelson Goodman (1978), “in separating and reuniting, often in the same operation,” in carrying out a decomposition, an analysis, and a composition, a synthesis, often by the use of labels. Social classifications, as is the case in archaic societies where they often work through dualist oppositions (masculine/feminine, high/low, strong/weak, etc.), organize the perception of the social world and, under certain conditions, can really organize the world itself. (1989c, 22)

As Zeynep Gürsel pointed out in her book on digital news, for Goodman, “representations are central to worldmaking and contribute the understanding but also the building of the realities in which we live” (Gürsel 2016, 13). For Bourdieu, world-making is the product of struggles over creations of reality.

At the same time that he sought to unveil the workings of world-making through the imposition of doxa as commonsense understandings of social reality, Bourdieu was himself engaged in an alternative construction of the social world—his own sociological vision of how power operates in social life. In his writing, Bourdieu constructed a social world or universe and analyzed the workings of that world—which he viewed as the social space. Novelists, anthropologists, and sociologists are engaged in this type of world-making, as are the “everyday” people we encounter and whose lives we study and write about.²

Bourdieu hoped to change understandings of the social world that masked the ways in which social inequality and social dominance are reproduced. In examining his key concepts, we also, therefore, examine Bourdieu’s vision of the world. Bourdieu sought to challenge existing ways of world-making in order to establish a more equitable society. In this chapter, I consider how his writing acted as a form of world-making (by exposing and analyzing how symbolic power operates). Bourdieu stated, “To change the world, one has to change the ways of world-making.” Whether or not he was successful, it is clear that Bourdieu hoped his form of social analysis might have the power to change the world for the better by stripping us of some of our illusions.

Bourdieu’s theoretical approach was a form of world-making in that, first of all, he viewed all social interaction as informed by an underlying structure. The structure of this world is the social space—which is hierarchical, divided, and a space of struggles for both material and symbolic dominance. Bourdieu’s social world was also one in which we are all habituses (positions in social space), even if we see ourselves otherwise as autonomous individuals who freely make choices. Our lives are guided by the dispositions of our habitus, which shapes our aspirations as well as the things from which we distance ourselves or reject. Some people have more power to shape understandings of the social world, which is connected to their symbolic power—the power of representation and the imposition of meaning about the world. Bourdieu viewed the social world as one of competition and struggle in which social actors are either motivated to maximize their own positions in social space or resolve themselves to immobility. Although some have criticized Bourdieu for seeing all life in terms of power dynamics,³ I think it is also fair to see him as understanding that people engage in activities not only to get ahead but also to get by.

In order to fully take advantage of Bourdieu’s framework and apply it to new social configurations and relationships connected to mobility practices, it is essential to understand how the various elements within it complement each other and are part of an overall view of the social world. In the rest of this chapter, I will discuss Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, capital, and symbolic power as they worked together with social space in his thought.

Habitus, Affinity, and Social Distance

For Bourdieu, physical and geographical space are linked through the embodied habitus, which occupies a place in physical space and a position in social space. Habitus and social space cannot be understood without reference to each other.⁴ Bourdieu’s theory of practice aimed to bridge what he viewed as a false dichotomy between the structure of social space and social practices by proposing a continual process of mutual shaping. Paying close attention to the ways Bourdieu describes the habitus as a position in social space helps avoid interpretations of his work that either exalt the strategies of habitus or view it as overdetermined.⁵ Social space is connected to physical space through the habitus as a body, which is in a “place” both physically and socially. Bourdieu wrote in his book Pascalian Meditations that “the structures of the social space … shape bodies by inculcating in them, through the conditionings associated with a position in that space, the cognitive structures that these conditionings apply to them” (1997/2000c, 183). Although Setha Low (2003, 12) charged Bourdieu with treating the body as “an empty container without consciousness or intention,” I challenge such a view here. The embodied aspects of habitus are central to Bourdieu’s theory, which posits that habitus engages in social practices that are shaped, if not determined, by the structures of social space.

Many aspects of the habitus that each of us embodies are shared by others who grew up in a similar social milieu. The primary habitus is acquired through informal mechanisms of socialization in a social space from early childhood and onward. People with similar social origins (not only in terms of social class position but also national and regional affiliations) have affinities of habitus. A person can also acquire a secondary habitus through geographic or social mobility, which may result in what Bourdieu called a “split habitus” (habitus clivé). When a person acquires a new habitus with new dispositions and orientations to the world, this frequently causes emotional distress because the person no longer feels “at home” in the world. For Bourdieu, as Jean-Louis Fabiani (2016, 94) has observed, the consequences of having a split habitus are generally negative—leading to feelings of displacement rather than to a positive expansion of one’s sense of selfhood. Acquiring a secondary habitus is what causes the “split,” because the original habitus is durable. Although I agree with Fabiani’s point, I also think that an understanding of the consequences of acquiring new orientations and dispositions that result from mobility should be further explored ethnographically. When mobility is understood as an opening up to new experiences (associated with a certain cosmopolitan outlook) and a broadening of the self in positive terms, as in so-called “lifestyle migration” (Benson and O’Reilly 2009), then it is a matter of investigating to what degree the habitus has shifted and what the consequences are for feelings of belonging.

Our embodied habitus informs our everyday, commonsense understandings of our social world and how to behave within it, as well as our aspirations—that is, our understandings of what is possible (and not possible) for us. Bourdieu referred to commonsense understandings of the world as doxa. These taken-for-granted assumptions about social reality vary, however, according to the orientations and dispositions of any particular acquired habitus. According to Bourdieu, habitus is not a conscious aspect of identity or action under most circumstances. It is more like, as he put it, a “feel for the game.” Habitus is an “invisible reality that can neither be shown nor handled, and which organizes agents’ practices and representations” (1991a, 635).

Bourdieu sought to analyze the relationships between time, physical space, and social space in ways that emphasized how social practices generated from habitus (in terms of behaviors, world views, position-takings, and physical locations) are influenced both by the other habituses in a particular social space, and the possibilities (in terms of both “objective” opportunities and “subjective” aspirations) available to each habitus. A person’s movement across time and space, and up or down in the social hierarchy, is a product of habitus (entailing both inherited and acquired cultural and symbolic capital). Habitus is not only situated in geographic and social space, therefore, but has a trajectory related to forms of mobility and immobility. A person’s relationships to others may change, as they come to feel closer or more socially distant from certain people and as they acquire new forms of capital or enhance the ones they already possess. Bourdieu therefore understood social space not as a static structure but rather as a space in which the positions and positionings of social agents (his term for “individuals”) are in motion as their positions may alter in relationship to each other.

Bourdieu evoked the term “point of view” to describe understandings of social reality, which will vary according to habitus because different positions or locations in social space provide different perspectives on the social world. Physical and social space are linked through perceptions of social distance and closeness (or proximity) related to the affinities of habitus—those dispositions (tastes and distastes) and ways of understanding the world and one’s position within it that are related to family origins. People who share similar dispositions and worldview are closer in social space. They may also be drawn to each other in physical space when they perceive each other as socially close. Bourdieu argued that the physical places or localizations that people inhabit are related to their position in social space. A person will have understandings of their position in social space and the range of other positions and position-takings in this space. These understandings are related to the disposition of their habitus. The position of any particular person (or agent) in social space is expressed through such physical locations as their place of residence or their business address.

Bourdieu noted that there is quite often geographic segregation so that those distant in social space are also distant in physical space. However, he also observed:

People who are close together in social space tend to find themselves, by choice or by necessity, close to one another in geographic space; nevertheless, people who are very distant from each other in social space can encounter one another and interact, if only briefly and intermittently, in physical space. (1989c, 16)

Although proximity in social space depends on affinities of shared habitus (or similar habitus), it may be that people brought into close physical proximity with each other might be far apart in social space. Being physically close to those from whom one is distant in social space can be experienced as “intolerable” (1993c/1999b, 128), and this helps to reinforce social divisions by producing feelings that encourage people to keep their physical distance from those who are also perceived as socially distant. Those sharing a particular type of habitus and position in social space will tend to inhabit differently valued geographical settings.

Bourdieu introduced the concept of lieu in the collaborative book The Weight of the World in order to describe physical location as well as location in social space. It refers to emplacement and means “a place” or “a site.” Noting that humans have bodies and, like other material things, occupy space, Bourdieu defined lieu as: “The point in physical space where an agent or a thing is situated, ‘takes place,’ exists; that is to say, either as a localization or, from a relational viewpoint, as a position, a rank in an order” (1993c/1999b, 123). The term “location” or lieu thus refers to both social and physical location, and Bourdieu saw each as organized through hierarchy, with any particular location being either of higher or lower position relative to other locations. Physical location comes to express social location because those who possess highly valued symbolic capital are able to dominate and to define what are understood to be the most prestigious physical locations. Bourdieu wrote that “the power over space … comes from possessing various kinds of capital …” (ibid., 124), so that where you live and where you shop become reified expressions of your cultural capital.

Because social space is inscribed in mental as well as spatial structures, physical space becomes a site for the assertion of power and of symbolic violence. Capital allows those who have it to keep their distance from undesirable people and things, and to get close to desirable people, places, and things. In describing what could be viewed as immobility, Bourdieu wrote that “the lack of capital intensifies the experience of finitude; it chains one to a place” (ibid., 127). People make spatial choices, Bourdieu noted, in order to avoid feeling “out of place”—as in a person in a museum who is not used to visiting museums. Bourdieu (1993c/1999b, 123) characterized American ghettos as examples of lieux that can only be explained by social processes that exist elsewhere, in that they are defined in terms of absences of various basic social services like health care.

Because localizations in physical places are connected to positions in social space, those who are homeless therefore have no recognized or legitimate “social existence” (Bourdieu 1993c/1999b, 124). Relative position in social space is also expressed during more “temporary localizations,” such as seating arrangements during official ceremonies. These forms of appropriations or consumptions of space can be displays of power. Bourdieu wrote, “The locus and the place occupied by an agent in appropriated social space are excellent indicators of his or her position in social space” (1996a, 11). Those sharing a particular type of habitus tend to dwell in differently valued geographical settings, so that the rich will live in more pleasant and favored neighborhoods within cities.

In some cases, those who are in more elevated positions in social space will interact with others in such a way that their social distance from those with lower positions is downplayed. Bourdieu referred to this as “strategies of condescension” (ibid., 16). The ways in which such behavior is perceived by those lower in the social hierarchy indicate they understand that the social distance is not truly eliminated even when they may approve of the attempt to close the distance. For example, a remark such as “he is not so highbrow, for a university professor” reveals that the speaker understands the distance and qualifies it through the reference to the status of professor. Those who have been, in Bourdieu’s terms, “consecrated” with higher status are most able to transgress social boundaries. As he wrote, “He who is sure of his cultural identity can play with the rules of the cultural game” (1982b/1992c, 87).

On the other hand, there is also the possibility of avoiding interactions with those who are perceived to be socially distant. Bourdieu remarked that “social distances are inscribed in bodies or, more precisely, into the relation to the body, to language, and to time” (1989c, 17), and this includes having a sense of one’s place (in Goffman’s terms). This can lead to a strategy of not wanting to get too familiar and can be perceived by others as either timidity or arrogance, depending on the social context. It is this “sense of one’s place” that leads to the feelings of either social closeness or distance (associated with emotions of sympathy or antipathy) that influence forms of affiliation, cooperation, and sociality. This also connects to feelings of belonging, as mentioned above. Bourdieu cited E. P. Thompson’s study, The Making the English Working Class (ibid., 18), to underscore his point that groups do not exist in any “social reality” but must be constructed. For Bourdieu, each habitus, as a position in social space, views the world as “natural” and accepts various divisions in social space that are part of the social structure. These structurings can be economic, ethnic, national, religious, and so on.

As I have argued elsewhere (Reed-Danahay 2005b), Bourdieu’s first uses of the notion of habitus in the early 1960s drew both from the more psychological theory of habitus used by Norbert Elias and that of the theory of bodily habits and habitus in the work of Marcel Mauss. For Elias, habitus is a form of “embodied social learning” associated with drives and impulses that determine tastes and habits (Dunning and Mennell 1996, ix). Social habitus is a form of “we-feeling” and is related to group identity (Elias 1987, 225). Mauss used the concept of habitus to refer to customary habits of moving the body and wrote: “In them we should see the techniques and work of collective and individual practical reason …” ([1950] 1979, 101).

Max Weber and Erwin Panofsky also influenced Bourdieu in his development of the concept of habitus.⁶ Bourdieu was drawn to Panofsky’s work on gothic architecture and scholastic mental habits, and he later wrote that it inspired his development of ideas of habitus to include the generation of practices (see Bourdieu 1967 and 1985a) that would be harmonized in a particular social milieu, such as that of scholasticism. Bourdieu interpreted Weber’s approach to religion and charisma through a lens of the religious habitus and its points of view (1971). It was also in his analysis of Weber and religion that Bourdieu offered one of his earliest examples of the concept of field (religious field) in relationship to habitus.

In a discussion of the origins of his concepts of field and habitus, Bourdieu explained that both were intended to draw upon the same “generative” idea that Chomsky was developing about grammar. For Bourdieu, the active and “inventive capacities” of habitus are not those of a “universal mind,” as he believed was Chomsky’s perspective on language; rather, the dispositions of habitus are those of the “acting agent” driven by practical reason (1985a, 13). Bourdieu’s theory of field was not that of an autonomous field but a “social space of objective relationships” (ibid., 16) in which cultural production can occur. This meant that positions of social actors in a field must be understood as occurring within social space. Fields are only partially autonomous in that the interactions within them are based on the underlying “objective relationships” between different fields in wider social space resulting from the positioning of habituses in that space. In this Bourdieusian view of the world, there is room for some invention and creativity, which can permit some social actors to develop new fields and sometimes “produce actions or works which go beyond their intentions and their interests” (ibid., 24).

Field

Readers often overlook the distinctions between Bourdieu’s understandings of field and social space, and this is largely due to Bourdieu’s own use of social space (espace social) and social field (champ) in both more general and more specific ways.⁷ Bourdieu’s concept of fie...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction. Bourdieu, Social Space, and Mobility
• Chapter 1. Bourdieu’s World-Making
• Chapter 2. A Sense of One’s Place
• Chapter 3. Landscapes of Mobility
• Chapter 4. The Nation-State and Thresholds of Social Space
• Chapter 5. The European Union as Social Space
• Conclusion. Toward an Ethnography of Social Space
• References
• Index