The editing of the present volume coincided with the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.1 This novel â even for todayâs scientifically and technologically highly advanced societies â situation arose at the same time as recently (re-)emerging (âcoldâ and âhotâ) wars and their destructive humanitarian and environmental repercussions, large-scale financial crises with international impact, constantly increasing social inequalities, widespread (in many instances, systemic and gravely violent) incidents of racism and xenophobia and the societal responses thereto in the form of massive distrust and protest movements. The unique conglomeration of symmetric and asymmetric challenges for nation states, the international community of nations and the individual and society (majorities and minorities) as a whole has prompted governments and organisations worldwide to reconsider their official priorities and strategies in the fields of socio- and geopolitics, economics, international relations and, not least, security and criminal justice â not always for the advancement of individual and human rights. The resulting universal consequences in almost every field of social life could not but affect our research as well, particularly with respect to basic viewpoints on the issues addressed here. Due to their diachronic importance for liberal states and democratic legal orders, the volumeâs main orientation points and thematic questions remained unchanged. This notwithstanding, specific theses and assumptions, especially those debating the relationship between fundamental personal freedoms and security, had to be (implicitly or explicitly) re-evaluated in light of recent developments and setbacks in criminal justice and the global security architecture. Still, in the midst of momentous events of unprecedented global proportions, one insight was reaffirmed: the significance of the proportionality concept for preventing arbitrary coercion, preserving vested human rights and guaranteeing the rule of law.
A.Balancing Constellations: Old and New
The raison dâĂȘtre of public authority, that is, the safeguarding of freedom and human dignity of all individuals, is best reflected in the notions of the social contract and the rule of law. A fundamental negative obligation of liberal rule-of-law states and international communities is to limit official (coercive) conduct that restricts human freedoms and poses a direct threat to human dignity. This is mainly achieved by incorporating the (constitutional) definition of individual and human rights into the law. At the same time, modern democratic states and institutions have the positive obligation to actively guarantee the unobstructed exercise of these rights. As a result, they are often required to implement security and coercive measures so as to prevent risks that might compromise freedom and human dignity and to protect the public from harm threatened from within and/or from outside a specific area. The control of crime is one major challenge in this respect. The administration and delivery of criminal justice is another: in addition to the provision of preventive instruments of crime control it is also necessary to maintain operational law enforcement and judicial systems geared to providing an effective and fair response to serious infringements of freedoms, individual rights and collective legal interests by other individuals and entities.
Individual freedoms and human rights guarantees, effective security and prevention mechanisms and operational justice systems may very well be essential in maintaining social peace. But there are two faces to Janus: the positive obligation to actively protect freedom and human dignity often clashes with the negative obligation to safeguard peopleâs fundamental rights from institutional interferences. Thus, positive and negative obligations must be constantly weighed and measured against each other. How to arrive at the proper balance is the most difficult question driving pertinent legal research and policy.2 In contemporary legal systems the competing interests may be balanced at three different levels: the legislative, the executive (administrative/law-enforcing) and the judicial. In search of adequate weighing tools and factors, the application of so-called proportionality tests has been extensively explored in the field of constitutional law,3 whereas in the fields of crime control and criminal justice the scope and limits of the proportionality concept have attracted less doctrinal analysis (save for sentencing issues)4 or empirical attention.5
Its importance not only for individual subjects but also for the systemic integrity of law enforcement and criminal justice cannot be historically denied,6 but the notion of a proportionate balancing of interests is only one of the many factors which the three branches of public power are called to consider and weigh against each other when designing, applying and enforcing measures of security and crime repression. Although equally difficult to define and verify (at least in empirical terms), a higher-profile concept is that of effectiveness. Ever-present in policy programmes and socio-legal debates, effectiveness constitutes an essential part of contemporary crime control strategies, conflict resolution mechanisms and sanction models. Two different ways to examine the effectivenessâproportionality relationship in this context are as a dipole, on the one hand, and as interdependent concepts, on the other. Depending on oneâs perspective, proportionality can indeed be viewed as being at odds with, setting limits on, or presenting obstacles to the effectiveness of crime control and criminal justice instruments. A more analytical approach, however, suggests that effectiveness actually depends on the proportionality (suitability, necessity and appropriateness) of measures pursuing legitimate aims of criminal policy, and that effectiveness is itself an integral element of proportionality.7 According to another opinion, the question whether effectiveness and proportionality are in conflict with each other should not be given so much weight. To some extent, particularly in terms of the necessity and appropriateness of the measures at hand, effectiveness and proportionality can be in conflict, and, occasionally, it might appear inevitable to sacrifice one value over the other. Setting aside any symptomatic political eagerness to advertise and promote effectiveness, however, following this approach, balancing and evaluating should be focused on efficiency rather than the (supposed) effectiveness of crime control and criminal justice measures; in this case efficiency includes (and, thus, cannot conflict with) proportionality.8
Different notions of the balancing processes and the relationship between proportionality and other policy goals may lead to different strategies as to how to configure or reconfigure crime-fighting techniques. Yet, a common prerequisite of, and simultaneously a further challenge for, operational crime control and criminal justice systems is the continuous identification and evaluation of the pragmatic dilemmas faced by legal orders and societies in terms of safeguarding and, in times of conflict, prioritising fundamental norms and values. Traditional risks include potential collisions of rights of different persons as well as of individual and societal interests, notably those concerning personal freedoms, on the one hand, and individual or collective (subjective or objective)9 security, on the other. It is an undisputed achievement of liberal legal orders that, at least in theory, they have been reserving the use of criminal law, punishment and other powerful coercive instruments â supposedly the most effective and efficient10 tools of enforcement and conflict resolution â as a response only to the most severe (types) of infringements in this context and, for that matter, have been equipping citizens with sufficient rule-of-law guarantees against the arbitrary exercise of institutional powers. In this sense, the criminal law principle of ultima ratio is based, inter alia, on notions of proportionality, leniency and justness; in turn, proportionality encompasses the idea of ultima ratio.11 Of key importance in this regard is the acknowledgment that, today more than ever, liberties must be safeguarded and people must be kept safe not only from crime but also from âevils that emanate from the state itselfâ.12
These observations are also significant with respect to newly emerging and less traditional risk constellations. Characteristic examples involve polemic labels such as âwar on terrorâ and âinvisible enemiesâ. Such phenomena may refer to anything, from international terrorism, terrorists in the making, financiers and ideological supporters of terrorism, to the imperceptible structures of (transnational) organised crime and money laundering, to the sophisticated and virtually untraceable cyberattacks against economic establishments and state institutions. In response to these latest kinds of threats, governments, international organisations and cooperating priva...