A History of Western Philosophy of Education in Antiquity

Avi I. Mintz

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN:
  9781350365865
• eBook ISBN:
  9781350074422
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education Theory & Practice

This volume traces the history of Western philosophy of education in Antiquity. Between the fifth century BCE and the fifth century CE, Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, and others raised questions about the nature of teaching and learning, the relationship of education and politics, and the elements of a distinctively philosophical education. Their arguments on these topics launched a conversation that occupied philosophers over the millennia and continues today.

About A History of Western Philosophy of Education:

An essential resource for researchers, scholars, and students of education, this five-volume set that traces the development of philosophy of education through Western culture and history. Focusing on philosophers who have theorized education and its implementation, the series constitutes a fresh, dynamic, and developing view of educational philosophy. It expands our educational possibilities by reinvigorating philosophy's vibrant critical tradition, connecting old and new perspectives, and identifying the continuity of critique and reconstruction. It also includes a timeline showing major historical events, including educational initiatives and the publication of noteworthy philosophical works.

CHAPTER ONE

The Sophistic Movement and the Frenzy of a New Education

M.R. ENGLER

INTRODUCTION: THE FRENZY OF A NEW EDUCATION

The Sophists were itinerant teachers who brought forth a series of ideas that enlightened and enraged fifth-century Greeks, partially by popularizing the doctrines of the previous philosophers: the pre-Socratics. For this reason, the debt of the Sophists to these thinkers is often stressed. Werner Jaeger defines the Sophistic movement as “the invasion of philosophy and science (the old Ionian science and historia) by other interests and problems, especially the educational and social problems which were created by the changes in economic and political life” (1946: 298). His opinion is close to the truth. By applying similar research methods—such as the quest for the origin of things—to areas that had been superficially surveyed or simply overlooked by the pre-Socratics, the Sophists converted the secularization of nature of the previous century into a conscious program operative in every branch of life. They continued to research nature and being, but their focus expanded to politics, ethics, art, language, psychology, and so on. In this movement, they founded the idea of the humanities and pioneered a set of insightful investigations whose results remain relevant. The whole culture, then, became an object of inquiry.

In addition to this shift of focus, the Sophists differ in at least three ways from the pre-Socratics. First, their studies were arranged within the scope of a recent technique, rhetoric, to the extraordinary evolution of which most of them contributed. This represents a breakthrough in the path of Greek philosophy, for language became the new protagonist in the drama of thinking. Second, they all promoted Protagoras’ idea that “man is the measure of all things,” for they were radical humanists eager to research man’s nature and to prove that many things tradition held to be divine were, in the end, human, all too human. In this regard, they also shared Socrates’ impetus, in Cicero’s view (Tusculan Disputations 5,10), to bring philosophy down from the heavens and to scrutinize man and society. Third, their performances and theories aimed at practical purposes: they instructed people how to reason and to speak in order to achieve certain goals. In consequence, the changes they brought to social life were more visible and permanent than those of the pre-Socratics.

Considering these facts, outstanding scholars realized that, in terms of intellectual history, the Sophists are the fathers of the modern Enlightenment, for they dared to “investigate what was merely believed,” in Hegel’s definition (1971: 410). Thus, the Sophists launched an age in which intellectual critique was praised as an intrinsic value. Such scholars correctly comprehended the Sophistic attack on tradition as a humanist crusade on behalf of science and human autonomy, and also realized that the ideal of universal education, with its democratic corollaries, was a sign of political progress. This point is particularly important for the purposes of this chapter. By delivering an empowering teaching to everyone who could afford it, the Sophists confronted the aristocratic belief that leadership, eloquence, and talent were matters of nature. They contributed thereby to spread the range of political agency beyond traditional circles. In a radicalized version, this idea is crucial for opening the political institutions of modern societies to other social classes. This is only one point, however, where the Sophists anticipated the modern battle for freedom of thought and autonomy. The comparison with the Enlightenment could be extended, for example, to the emphasis on epistemology. But suffice it to say that the view of such authors is correct in identifying such opening as a central feature of Sophistic thought.

Moreover, scholars of a Hegelian temper (Kerferd 1981: 10; Zeller 1893: 76) understood the rise of the Sophists as a historical necessity, since the Sophists came to fill a gap that the clash of a once-aristocratic society with a new democracy had opened. They did so by educating people to partake in political decisions and to conduct their business successfully (Protagoras 318e–319a). The need to be educated was felt, then, on an unprecedented scale. Athenian youth were especially sensitive to this need: to be clever (deinos) was a teenage aspiration as influential as, say, to be cool is nowadays. Young men wished to become famous through the ministrations of a Sophist. In the Theages, Plato offers an immortal picture of this situation, describing a concerned father, Demodocus, who comes to downtown Athens looking for a Sophist to educate his son, Theages. On his way, Demodocus finds Socrates and asks the philosopher for advice. According to Demodocus, young friends excited his son with the account of some discussions they had heard, and Theages began pestering his father with the demand that Demodocus should hire a Sophist. Demodocus sees that his son has fallen prey to a dangerous passion. While the boy believes that the Sophists can make him wise (sophos), the father fears they will corrupt his son. “This is why I’ve come to town, to place this boy with one of these so-called sophists” (Theages 122a4–5, trans. modified).

The story testifies to the necessary role that the Sophists played in Athenian society. In spite of being already educated in the letters, wrestling, and music, Theages feels the need for a superior education that would enable him “to govern people in the city” (Theages 124a), as he candidly admits. To help different people to pursue this desire—the desire of “political virtue,” in Plato’s words (Protagoras 319a4)—was the main goal of the Sophistic program. Thus, when the Sophists showed up in Athens, the whole society was already hungering for what they had to offer. Besides the novelty of their doctrines, this historical opening explains the frenzy they sparked.

The movement began with Protagoras’ (c. 490–420/411) sojourn in Athens (c. 450) and rapidly culminated with Gorgias’ embassy (427) and the so-called second generation of Sophists (Thrasymachus, Hippias, Prodicus, Antiphon) during the Peloponnesian War. Pericles’ enthusiasm for arts and philosophy, the anxiety caused by the war, and the hysteria brought on by the plague increased its effect. But the élan of the first years visibly decayed at the dawn of the fourth century together with the city that had nurtured it, and by the time of Plato’s Academy (380) the greatest Sophists had already disappeared. Like Socrates, their names would be now immortalized in Plato’s Dialogues as signs of an era of intense debate and investigation of reality. Notwithstanding this short period of time, they were immediately seen as a powerful flame that could undermine the cultural bases of Greek society and revolutionize its worldview.

This frenzy motif is actually one of the chief features of the movement. While Karl Joël (1921: 674) calls the Sophists the “drunkenness of the youth,” Albin Lesky (1966: 341, 357) names them after German Pre-Romanticism, Sturm und Drang, and says that “what they broke up in Greek society was never put together.” Walter Kranz affirms, for his part, that the “ground staggered because of them” (1981: 98). These expressions point to the fulminant effect the Sophists had on Athenian society. In fact, this impression of the extent of Sophistic influence has ancient roots. In the Protagoras, Plato portrays the young Hippocrates, who is excited by Protagoras’ arrival. When he hears it from his brother late in the evening, his excitement is so intense that he almost runs to Socrates’ house. But he decides to sleep and to visit Socrates very early in the morning. As he gets there, he knocks violently on Socrates’ door and, raving about Protagoras’ arrival, runs to the philosopher, who still lies on his bed. Like Theages, Hippocrates hopes to become wise; he says that he would bankrupt himself and his friends to have lessons with the Sophist. He asks Socrates to go with him and to talk to Protagoras. “Let’s not go there just yet,” replies Socrates, “it is too early. Why don’t we go out here into the courtyard and stroll around until it is light?” (Protagoras 311a2–4). Socrates’ measured answer, like medical advice, highlights how frantic Hippocrates’ behavior was.

The Sophists were aware of their effect and keen to awaken it. They soon adopted the purple cloaks of the poets and started to perform their “miracles” in public places, like the theater and the Olympic Games. The art of speaking well became a sport that the Greeks quickly learned to enjoy. Hippias, for example, was able to memorize at once fifty names in the order that he had heard them (D14a–b).¹ Since Greek tradition considered memory a gift that the Muses bestowed on poets, this must have been a dazzling show. One wonders how shocking Hippias might have sounded as he promised that he could teach for a fee such an art to everyone. Gorgias (c. 483–380), in his turn, acted as a “wizard” with a spellbinding power to improvise on any subject. He was the first to show up in the theater (D8)—others came after him—and boastfully answered any question the audience raised. This talent dumbfounded the Athenian crowd (P13). He became so famous and rich that a life-sized golden statue of him was built at Delphi (P33).

On the one hand, the novelty and the frenzy of the Sophistic program were a consequence of the very fact that there was now an education available that attended to the needs of Greek society. Several new disciplines—rhetoric, grammar, psychology, and so on—appeared as marvelous discoveries of the time and intensified the feeling of a cultural revolution, perhaps in the same way that the internet has worked profound cultural changes in our age. In the harshest satire of the Sophists, the Clouds, Aristophanes realized that there was a fight going on between this new education and the traditional cultural order (Clouds 962). Other authors also insisted on the connection between the Sophists and education, and the Protagoras clarifies that the Sophists offered a comprehensive formation, beyond the common instruction of children, with immediate effects upon political life. All this appeared, then, as a fantastic promise.

On the other hand, this frenzy was a result of the fact that the Sophists made available the educational ideal of Greek aristocracy (aretē) to a wider public. In the Iliad, Achilles’ instruction consists of being able to deliver speeches and to perform noble deeds (Iliad 9.443). With an emphasis on the rhetorical part of education, this was also the pedagogical ideal of classical Athens, for political virtue involved speaking in political gatherings, commanding in battle, and conducting one’s own business successfully. Although the Sophists lured people to criticize tradition, their success depended also on the previous achievements of Greek culture, especially pre-Socratic thinking and epic poetry. And they were aware and proud of such an inheritance: Protagoras claims, for example, that there were other “sophists” in the past, but that they did not identify themselves as such because of the dangers the profession involved. Homer and Hesiod, for example, also educated people; the difference is that Protagoras admits he is a Sophist and charges for his lessons (Protagoras 316d–e). Here, Plato lets Protagoras present himself as an authentic heir of the Greek educational legacy and shows how this legacy is embedded in the Sophistic program.

THE SOPHISTIC TEACHING AND THE RHETORICAL CURRICULUM

Inasmuch as education was at the core of the Sophistic movement, the Sophists are the fathers of both pedagogy and philosophy of education. Naturally they did not practice philosophy in the technical sense of their critics, Plato and Aristotle, but in the broader sense of “pursuit of wisdom,” which was then the meaning of philosophia. Their profession forced them, from a practical and a theoretical perspective, to think about education.

Unfortunately, however, few remaining fragments address educational questions. In the case of Protagoras (c. 490–420), there are only three extant. He says that “instruction needs nature and practice” and that “people must start learning when they are young” (D11). He also claims that “art without practice and practice without art are nothing” (D12) and that “education does not rise up in the soul unless one arrives at a great depth” (D13). These thoughts underscore the harmony between nature and exercise and the deep dedication instruction demands. But they also constitute empirically grounded remarks of an attentive teacher—no sensible educator would deny them—rather than a systematic theory of education. Besides Plato’s testimony, this is all we have of Protagoras’ educational thinking.

From Antiphon (c. 479–411), there is one paragraph with the famous comparison between the growth of a plant and education and another one that indirectly discusses the role character plays in education. In the first, he says that “the foremost thing in human affairs is education,” for “in any action whatsoever, if one begins in the right way, then it is likely that the end will turn out right too”; therefore, “if someone sows a noble education in a young body, it lives and flourishes for his whole life, and neither rain nor drought destroys it” (D62). In the second, he says that “nothing is worse for human beings than the lack of rules,” and thus the men of earlier times “accustomed their children from the beginning to obey and to do what they were told, so that when they became adults they will not be thrown into turmoil if they encountered some great change” (D63). Antiphon recognizes that education in early childhood creates a lifelong habit. As to character, he clarifies that “one necessarily becomes similar in character to whomever one spends most of the day with” (D60). Again, although they are remarkable—the plant-growing metaphor, for example, is one of the oldest definitions of education also accepted by Plato—these fragments are far from revealing the profundity with which the Sophists regarded their activity.

The situation of the other Sophists with respect to their thoughts on education is even more disappointing. Gorgias, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, and Hippias apparently did not write on education; no book title is attested, and the remaining fragments are not explicit on the topic. One might ask, then, how it is possible that the first self-titled teachers did not think or write on education. Since many ancient authors insisted on the link between the Sophists and education, this might be an illusory problem. However, it is important insofar as it shows that, given the precarious condition of the remaining texts, the Sophistic contribution to educational thought must be sought elsewhere.

In this regard, it is reported that many of the Sophists wrote rhetorical manuals (téchnai) to be employed by their students. These contained practical and theoretical information about different fields: instructions on text division, grammar rules, patterns of argumentation (common-places), scientific and historical data, and so on. This teaching method was characteristic of the Sophists. When considered philosophically, however, it seems to be something more: it actually suggests an implicit and still-relevant theory of education. In other words, by designing a comprehensive rhetorical curriculum, the Sophists implicitly show that to educate someone means to make him able to reason and to speak on different subjects. For example, a student has learned politics if he can ponder political affairs and properly speak concerning them. As indirectly assumed by ancient critics, this is the perennial contribution of the Sophists to philosophy of education. In spite of other theoretical differences, this is also what connects them as a group (Gomperz 1912), for they all made use of and taught the art of persuasive speech so intensively that the movement is often confounded with its rhetorical achievements. Furthermore, as discussed in this section they also introduced innovative teaching methods. This being so, any presentation of the Sophistic contribution to educational thinking must focus on rhetoric and explain as well the set of theoretical and practical disciplines it encompassed.

According to a standard view, rhetoric was invented in Sicily in the fifth century by Tisias and Corax. Acting as lawyers, they developed an argumentation technique based on probability (eikos) and convinced people what to believe about particular cases by showing that the action “x” should be taken as true because it is more likely than the action “y.” Thus, rhetoric first arose as a courtroom technique. But, in the following years, the Sophists successfully applied it to other areas since the whole of Greek spiritual life, heavily based on language, provided a fertile ground for it. They transformed rhetoric into a method for researching grammar, psychology, art, politics, philosophy, and religion, so that it is possible to see a flourishing linguistic turn within Greek philosophy. Eventually, rhetoric became so essential to social life and to theoretical thinking that both Plato and Aristotle try to elucidate its nature. Moreover, the attention the Sophists drew to language revealed it to be vital for dialectical and logical reasoning as well as for the understanding of emotions; thus, rhetoric also revolutionized psychology and ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle Page
• Title Page
• Contents 
• Figures
• Series Introduction
• General Editors’ Acknowledgements
• Volume Editor’s Acknowledgements
• Timeline
• Introduction: A Story of Educational Philosophy in Antiquity
• 1 The Sophistic Movement and the Frenzy of a New Education
• 2 Plato: Philosophy As Education
• 3 Xenophon the Educator
• 4 Isocrates: The Founding and Tradition of Liberal Education
• 5 Educating for Living Life at Its Best: Aristotelian Thought and the Ideal Polis
• 6 Ancient Schools and the Challenge of Cynicism
• 7 Roman Educational Philosophy: The Legacy of Cicero
• 8 Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius: Education and the Philosophical Art of Living ANNIE LARIVÉE
• 9 St. Augustine’s Pedagogy as the New Creation
• Contributors
• Index
• Imprint