Hearts and Minds

Israel and the Battle for Public Opinion

Nachman Shai

• Publisher: SUNY Press
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781438469065, 9781438469058
• eBook ISBN: 9781438469072
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

Small-scale wars, terrorism, and guerilla warfare, each characterized by low-intensity violence are the new global reality in the twenty-first century. States in general, and liberal democratic states in particular, are compelled to develop a new operational approach to deal with these phenomena. At the same time the world of diplomacy is experiencing its own upheaval, its old closed-door practices being displaced by the demand for ongoing public diplomacy. Concurrent with these developments, individuals and nongovernmental organizations harness the new media revolution to create powerful global networks to promote common causes, transcending the state and breaking its exclusive control over information. In this book, Nachman Shai examines the case of Israel, a liberal democratic state faced with an incessant stream of diverse, low-intensity threats. Shai discusses the military, political, economic, legal, and public diplomacy fronts of the second intifada (2000–2005) and how Israel deliberated its response in an environment where the state is only one of the players in a global arena in which individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and international news corporations all operate.

Chapter 1

“Why Are the Jews Shooting at Us?”

Before Israel’s 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip, Netzarim—a small Jewish settlement amid densely populated Arab areas in central Gaza—was a flashpoint between Palestinians and the Israel Defense Forces for many years. As a result, an IDF post was set up near Netzarim Junction, overlooking the main roads and manned by about 30 soldiers.

On the morning of Saturday, September 30, 2000, near the beginning of what would become the second intifada, hundreds of local residents, many of them teenage boys, streamed into Netzarim Junction, hurling rocks and Molotov cocktails at the army post. Journalist Ron Ben-Yishai, who was at the post, stated that it came under fire from several directions.1 The soldiers at the post returned fire, aiming at Palestinians who were carrying weapons.2

That morning, Jamal al-Dura and his 12-year-old son Muhammad left their home in the Al-Bureij refugee camp to buy a car. “We got in a taxi and drove toward Gaza,” the father later recounted. “When we reached Netzarim Junction, the driver stopped and said there was a riot going on and asked us to get out; he said he couldn’t continue … I got out with Muhammad and tried to cross the street, and then we got caught in a hail of gunfire coming from both sides.”3

A video of the incident shows the two pressed against a wall of concrete blocks, cowering behind a barrel. The gunfire continued for 45 minutes.4 “They started shooting at us and there was nowhere for us to go and no place to take cover. The only thing we saw was the concrete wall, so we hid there. Muhammad started asking me: ‘Why are the Jews shooting at us?’ I couldn’t answer because I was busy looking for a way to protect him. After 15 minutes of shooting, Muhammad was wounded in the right leg. He said: ‘The dogs got me, the dogs got me.’ I told him: ‘Don’t be afraid. An ambulance will come soon and get us out of here.’ But the ambulance didn’t come. It came too late, only when everything was over and my son was dead.”5 Pictures of the incident show what appears to be a burst of gunfire sending puffs of dust from the wall, followed by Muhammad lying dead in his father’s lap as the father’s head lolls helplessly.

The fighting at Netzarim Junction only subsided as evening approached.

There were many journalists and photographers present at the Netzarim Junction that day, but strangely, there was only a single report on the death of Muhammad al-Dura: The incident was filmed exclusively by France 2 cameraman Talal Abu Rahma.

France 2’s Israel bureau chief, Charles Enderlin, was in his Jerusalem office when Abu Rahma phoned and told him about the exchange of gunfire at the junction. He also stated that he was filming a father and son who were under fire. “I receive the footage and can see that it’s very powerful,” Enderlin recalled. “I have no choice—all of Gaza knows that I have this footage and I must air it. The question is how to do so. Does it meet the network’s rules? They won’t show dead bodies or images that are too graphic. In consultation with the editor on duty in Paris, we decided that it complied with the rules and could be aired.”6

Enderlin contacted Maj. Yarden Vatikai, head of the International Media Branch of the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit. “I have some very tough footage,” he said, “and I want the IDF’s response.” Enderlin even suggested one: “The IDF is investigating and apologizes for the shooting.” Vatikai replied that he hadn’t seen the report, so he couldn’t respond to it. He also stated that he did not intend to apologize: “I gave him a response that said the matter has been reported in the media and we will check into it. Within an hour, the footage was on [Israeli] Channel 1 and Channel 2.”7

Later, in the wake of information gathered from the field, the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit issued the following statement: “The Palestinians make cynical use of women and children by bringing them to points of conflict in the territories. The incident filmed in the Gaza Strip began with deliberate live fire, the hurling of explosives and firebombs by Palestinians, including police officers, at IDF forces, and with hundreds of rioters charging toward IDF posts. Heavy exchanges of gunfire ensued and the picture focused exclusively on the injury to the boy and his father who were caught in the crossfire, with no way to identify the source of the gunfire, and thus no way to ascertain who struck the boy and his father. The IDF always regrets the loss of life, particularly of children, but it is clear that given the situation that arose at this location, anyone—Palestinian or Israeli—who came there could have been wounded by gunfire. The responsibility for this falls on the Palestinians and all those responsible for incitement. This incident will be investigated as part of the overall investigation of these events.”8

The statement added to the general confusion and left open the question of whether the IDF had killed Muhammad al-Dura. This was in keeping with Israel’s entire response to this question, which proved disorganized and contradictory, with very different statements coming from various sources. Public relations consultant Lenny Ben-David said of the confusion, “We heard one thing from [GOC Southern Command] Yom-Tov Samia, another thing from the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, and something else from the commander in the field. There was no single version of events.”9

For his part, Enderlin moved quickly, distributing the footage to various news agencies. It was immediately broadcast and the impact was enormous. The Arab affairs reporter for Israel’s Channel 1, Shlomi Eldar, prepared the material for broadcast. “The picture was a formative experience for the entire intifada,” he said.10 The BBC reported on the major impact the story was having, noting that the picture appeared in the main headline of the New York Times. The IDF still offered no response to these accusations.

Deputy IDF Spokesperson Col. Elam Kott was sent to investigate the incident. After reviewing maps of the area, Kott concluded that the IDF did not shoot al-Dura. In consultation with Foreign Ministry officials Alon Pinkas, Gideon Meir, and Meir Shlomo, Kott said the IDF should immediately state that it did not shoot the boy. Meir objected: “If you come out now and say, ‘It wasn’t me,’ you have to be ready to provide solid proof so people will say, ‘Okay, it wasn’t you.’ ”11

On the same day, France 2 aired another report on the incident, this time on Muhammad al-Dura’s funeral. The report mentioned that the IDF had stated it was not possible to conclusively determine who had killed the boy. Meanwhile, media pressure was steadily increasing and, at a meeting of the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland, chief of the Operations Directorate, proposed informing the press that the IDF planned to review its own conduct. At a press conference, he said: “Based on the information I had at the time, I explained that it appeared that he had been shot by us, and that we certainly did not intend to hurt him.”12 After he made this statement, almost all media outlets reported that Israel had accepted responsibility for the incident.13 “I made mistakes here, I admit it,” said Eiland a few years later. “I took responsibility because up to that moment it was a more logical explanation. I thought that to start to be perceived as not knowing—no one will believe you, and you come off badly twice. In retrospect, it was a mistake.”14

That same weekend, major riots erupted in Israeli-Arab communities. Many observers have drawn a connection between the broadcast of the al-Dura video and the outbreak of the riots. Prime Minister Ehud Barak met with leaders of the Arab sector in his office and relayed Eiland’s statement to them: “The boy was killed by IDF fire. … It appears that the soldiers, who were caught in a tight spot, shot and killed the boy unintentionally.”15

At a meeting of the IDF general staff a week after al-Dura’s death, Samia reported the results of a preliminary investigation based on conversations with the post’s commanders and soldiers and aerial photos of the intersection. “Tel Aviv erred with the immediate statement to the media and the apology,” he said. In the meantime, he had ordered the demolition of many structures around the Netzarim Junction, including the wall behind which the al-Duras had taken cover.16 As a result, the original “scene of the crime” was lost. Many believe Samia acted too hastily, and he has acknowledged the error. In this instance, operational considerations outweighed the needs of public diplomacy, whose importance was not properly understood.

After publishing an investigative report of the incident in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, journalist Tom Segev suggested an official investigation.17 Samia agreed and appointed a team of investigators comprised of experts from the military, the police, and Rafael, an Israeli defense technology company.18 The composition of the team was only disclosed seven years later.19 Two of its members were Yosef Doriel, a mechanical engineer, and Nahum Shahaf, a physicist. Both believed that the IDF did not shoot the boy and offered their services to Samia.20

Samia presented his findings to IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz. Samia was absolutely convinced that the IDF did not kill al-Dura, but the investigation’s findings only supported this view to a very high degree of likelihood. Discussing whether to present the findings to the public and, if so, how, Mofaz said that the IDF should close the book on the case: “The chief of staff rightly said … that some uncertainty remains [and therefore] the matter should be dropped.”21

The IDF spokesperson supported the chief of staff’s position.22 The head of the Operations Directorate, Brig. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, felt differently: “In my opinion, the proper thing to do was to insist on telling the real story, on the basis of the findings, realizing by this point that we were dealing with something that would remain a symbol for many years to come, and so it was important to give the public the real story.”23 Similarly, Samia persisted in his view that the investigation’s findings should be made public. On November 27, nearly two months after the incident, a press conference was held to present the main findings: “The odds that [al-Dura and his father] were hit by IDF fire are extremely low, practically zero. The likelihood that al-Dura was struck by either stray or deliberate Palestinian fire is high.”24

Did this press conference help Israel’s public diplomacy efforts? The controversy continued. The Foreign Ministry believes that it simply kept the emotionally charged story in the news, causing Israel considerable damage. But some in the IDF and elsewhere came to feel strongly that Israel should continue to investigate the circumstances of the boy’s death and use every means possible to make its doubts public. The debate continues to this day.

When government officials decided to withdraw from the al-Dura case, Nahum Shahaf decided to investigate the incident on his own to disprove the France 2 report. “We have positive proof that the gunfire came from the direction of the Palestinian position, not from the direction of the Israeli position,” he asserted. “We have Palestinians who murdered the boy in cold blood, and this is a terrible deed: Palestinians who kill the boy in front of the cameras and then blame innocent Israeli soldiers.”25

To prove his claim, Shahaf collected visual material related to the events and sent it to the media and to Danny Seaman, director of the Government Press Office. According to NRG-Maariv, Shahaf doubted that al-Dura and his father were struck by gunfire at all. Even if so, he contended, the gunfire did not come from IDF...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• Abbreviations
• Acknowledgments
• List of Interviewees
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 “Why Are the Jews Shooting at Us?”
• Chapter 2 The Durban Conference: A Strategic Ambush
• Chapter 3 “Smart Power”
• Chapter 4 Low-Intensity Warfare
• Chapter 5 Globalization and the Media Revolution
• Chapter 6 “Drink More Water”
• Chapter 7 “Even When We Do Something, Nothing Comes of It”
• Chapter 8 Voice of Israel
• Chapter 9 The Unseen Shield?
• Chapter 10 Thinking Outside the Box: Or, We’re Always Ready
• Chapter 11 “National Explainer”
• Chapter 12 Blood on Their Hands
• Chapter 13 Was There a Massacre?
• Chapter 14 Deploying a Public Diplomacy Network
• Chapter 15 Countering the BDS Movement
• Epilogue When Peres Died
• Notes
• References
• About the Author
• Index
• Back Cover